C6e  Hifcrarp 

of  t|>e 

Onitietsttp  of  Bortf)  Carolina 


Henan  Memorial  Collection 

.        3n  SjBnnorp  of 

Ofllilliam  Iftann  J&man 

gibcn  bp  fugs  Daughter 

9£arp  Eilp  Ikman  jFIaoJer 


DEVOTED  TO  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  SOUTH 
IN  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


UNIVERSITY  OF  N.C.  AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


10002476697 


This  book  is  due  at  the  LOUIS  R.  WILSON  LIBRARY  on  the 
last  date  stamped  under  "Date  Due."  If  not  on  hold  it  may  be 
renewed  by  bringing  it  to  the  library. 

utV                    RET- 

DATE 
DUE 

' 

MKZ^m 

m\  i 7 

imrrasBi 

"\f\ 

APR  1 1  19 

m 

: 

■> 

i 

MARia 

zmb 

- 

.7  ^: 

HAY  2? 

2011 

— — —  , 

4AY022 

in 

^rp  ]  7  ?n 

M 

■     c     I  if, 

K 

Form  No.  513 

Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2012  with  funding  from 

University  of  North  Carolina  at  Chapel  Hill 


http://archive.org/details/lieutenantgeneraearl 


Lieutenant  General 
Jubal  Anderson  Early 


C.  S.  A. 


GENERAL  JUBAL  ANDERSON  EARLY 


r£(l5 

Lieutenant  General  ^/a 

Jubal  Anderson  Early 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  AND  NARRA- 
TIVE OF  THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  STATES 


With  Notes  by 

R.  H.  Early 


Philadelphia  £sf  London 
J.   B.    Lippincott    Company 

IQI2 


COPYRIGHT,  1913,  BY  J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT   COMPANY 


PUBLISHED    NOVEMBER,    1912 


PRINTED   BY  J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT   COMPANY 

AT  THE   WASHINGTON   SQUARE   PRESS 

PHILADELPHIA,  U.S.A. 


LIBRARY  UNIV.  OF 
NORTH  CAROLINA  „ 

EDITOR'S  NOTE 

It  becomes  my  duty  and  privilege  to  undertake  the 
publication  of  General  Early's  narrative  of  the  war  left 
in  manuscript  form  at  the  time  of  his  death,  March  2, 
1894.  Its  preparation  covered  the  term  of  years  begin- 
ning immediately  after  the  close  of  the  war  and  continu- 
ing to  the  end  of  his  life.  Impressed  with  the  belief 
that  "  truth  crushed  to  earth  will  rise  again,"  he  labored 
conscientiously  at  his  task,  the  motive  of  his  writing  be- 
ing the  wish  that  a  detailed  history,  accurate  as  far  as 
lay  within  his  compassing,  might  be  handed  down  to 
posterity.  He  was  well  equipped  for  the  work  under- 
taken and  his  efforts  met  with  the  encouragement  of  his 
former  comrades.  In  submitting  to  the  public  the  result 
of  his  long  labor,  I  feel  confident  of  its  being  accorded  the 
just  consideration  for  which  he  strove. 

E.  H.  Eaely 

Lynchburg,  Va. 
June,  1912 

i 

:sV 
I 

<\ 


PREFACE 

When  the  question  of  practical  secession  from  the 
United  States  arose,  as  a  citizen  of  the  State  of  Virginia, 
and  a  member  of  the  Convention  called  by  the  authority 
of  the  Legislature  of  that  State,  I  opposed  secession  with 
all  the  ability  I  possessed,  with  the  hope  that  the  horrors 
of  civil  war  might  be  averted  and  that  a  returning  sense 
of  justice  on  the  part  of  the  masses  of  the  Northern 
States  would  induce  them  to  respect  the  rights  of  the 
people  of  the  South. 

While  some  Northern  politicians  and  editors  were 
openly  and  sedulously  justifying  and  encouraging  seces- 
sion, I  was  laboring  honestly  and  earnestly  to  preserve 
the  Union. 

As  a  member  of  the  Virginia  Convention,  I  voted 
against  the  ordinance  of  secession  on  its  passage  by  that 
body,  with  the  hope  that  even  then,  the  collision  of  arms 
might  be  avoided  and  some  satisfactory  adjustment  ar- 
rived at.  The  adoption  of  that  ordinance  wrung  from 
me  bitter  tears  of  grief ;  but  I  at  once  recognized  my  duty 
to  abide  the  decision  of  my  native  State,  and  to  defend 
her  soil  against  invasion.  Any  scruples  which  I  may 
have  entertained  as  to  the  right  of  secession  were  soon 
dispelled  by  the  unconstitutional  measures  of  the  authori- 
ties at  Washington  and  the  frenzied  clamor  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  North  for  war  upon  their  former  brethren  of 
the  South.  I  recognized  the  right  of  resistance  and  revo- 
lution as  exercised  by  our  fathers  in  1776  and  without 
cavil  as  to  the  name  by  which  it  was  called,  I  entered 
the  military  service  of  my  State,  willingly,  cheerfully, 
and  zealously. 

When  the  State  of  Virginia  became  one  of  the  Con- 
federate States  and  her  troops  were  turned  over  to  the 
Confederate  Government,  I  embraced  the  cause  of  the 


PREFACE 

whole  Confederacy  with  equal  ardor,  and  continued  in 
the  service,  with  the  determination  to  devote  all  the 
energy  and  talent  I  possessed  to  the  common  defence. 
I  fought  through  the  entire  war,  without  once  regretting 
the  course  I  pursued,  with  an  abiding  faith  in  the  jus- 
tice of  our  cause. 

It  was  my  fortune  to  participate  in  most  of  the  great 
military  operations  in  which  the  army  in  Virginia  was 
engaged  both  before  and  after  General  Lee  assumed  the 
command.  In  the  last  year  of  this  momentous  struggle, 
I  commanded,  at  different  times,  a  division  and  two  corps 
of  General  Lee's  Army  in  the  campaign  from  the  Rap- 
idan  to  James  River,  and  subsequently,  a  separate  force 
which  marched  into  Maryland,  threatened  Washington 
City  and  then  went  through  an  eventful  campaign  in 
the  valley  of  Virginia.  No  detailed  reports  of  the  oper- 
ations of  these  different  commands  were  made  before  the 
close  of  the  war  and  the  campaign  in  Maryland  and  the 
Valley  of  Virginia  has  been  the  subject  of  much  com- 
ment and  misapprehension.  I  have  now  written  a  narra- 
tive of  all  my  commands  before  and  during  the  closing 
year  of  the  war  and  lay  it  before  the  world  as  a  contribu- 
tion to  the  history  of  our  great  struggle  for  indepen- 
dence. In  giving  that  narrative,  I  have  made  such  state- 
ments of  the  positions  and  strengths  of  the  opposing 
forces  in  Virginia  and  such  reference  to  their  general 
operations  as  were  necessary  to  enable  the  reader  to 
understand  it,  but  I  do  not  pretend  to  detail  the  opera- 
tions of  other  commanders. 

My  operations  and  my  campaign  stand  on  their  own 
merits.  And  in  what  I  have  found  it  necessary  to  say  in 
regard  to  the  conduct  of  my  troops,  I  do  not  wish  to  be 
understood  as,  in  any  way,  decrying  the  soldiers  who  con- 
stituted the  rank  and  file  of  my  commands.  I  believe 
that  the  world  has  never  produced  a  body  of  men  su- 
perior, in  courage,  patriotism,  and  endurance,  to  the 
private  soldiers  of  the  Confederate  armies.  I  have  re- 
peatedly seen  those  soldiers  submit,  with  cheerfulness, 


PREFACE 

to  privations  and  hardships  which  would  appear  to  be 
almost  incredible;  and  the  wild  cheers  of  our  brave  men, 
when  their  thin  lines  were  sent  back  opposing  hosts  of 
Federal  troops,  staggering,  reeling  and  flying,  have  often 
thrilled  every  fibre  in  my  heart.  I  have  seen,  with  my  own 
eyes,  ragged,  barefooted,  and  hungry  Confederate  sol- 
diers perform  deeds  which,  if  performed  in  days  of  yore 
by  mailed  warriors  in  glittering  armor,  would  have  in- 
spired the  harp  of  the  minstrel  and  the  pen  of  the  poet. 

Having  been  a  witness  of  and  participant  in  great 
events,  I  have  given  a  statement  of  what  I  saw  and  did, 
for  the  use  of  the  future  historian.  I  have  not  under- 
taken to  speculate  as  to  the  causes  of  our  failures,  as 
I  have  seen  abundant  reason  for  it  in  the  tremendous 
odds  brought  against  us.  Having  had  some  means  of 
judging,  I  will  say  that,  in  my  opinion,  both  Mr.  Davis 
and  General  Lee,  in  their  respective  spheres,  did  all 
for  the  success  of  our  cause  which  it  was  possible  for 
mortal  men  to  do  and  it  is  a  great  privilege  and  com- 
fort for  me  so  to  believe.  In  regard  to  my  own  services, 
I  have  the  consciousness  of  having  done  my  duty  to  my 
country,  to  the  very  best  of  my  ability. 

During  the  war,  slavery  was  used  as  a  catch-word 
to  arouse  the  passions  of  a  fanatical  mob,  and  to  some 
extent  the  prejudices  of  the  civilized  world  were  ex- 
cited against  us ;  but  the  war  was  not  made  on  our  part 
for  slavery.  High  dignitaries  in  both  church  and  state 
in  Old  England,  and  puritans  in  New  England,  had  par- 
ticipated in  the  profits  of  a  trade  by  which  the  ignorant 
and  barbarous  natives  of  Africa  were  brought  from  that 
country  and  sold  into  slavery  in  the  American  Colonies. 
The  generation  in  the  Southern  States  which  defended 
their  country  in  the  late  war,  found  amongst  them,  in  a 
civilized  and  Christianized  condition,  4,000,000  of  the 
descendants  of  those  degraded  Africans.  The  Creator 
of  the  Universe  had  stamped  them,  indelibly,  with  a 
different  color  and  an  inferior  physical  and  mental  or- 
ganization.   He  had  not  done  this  from  mere  caprice 


PREFACE 

or  whim,  but  for  wise  purposes.  An  amalgamation  of 
the  races  was  in  contravention  of  His  designs  or  He 
would  not  have  made  them  so  different.  This  immense 
number  of  people  could  not  have  been  transported  back 
to  the  wilds  from  which  their  ancestors  were  taken,  or, 
if  they  could  have  been,  it  would  have  resulted  in  their 
relapse  into  barbarism.  Eeason,  common  sense,  true 
humanity  to  the  black,  as  well  as  the  safety  of  the  white 
race,  required  that  the  inferior  race  should  be  kept  in 
a  state  of  subordination.  The  conditions  of  domestic 
slavery,  as  it  existed  in  the  South,  had  not  only  resulted 
in  a  great  improvement  in  the  moral  and  physical  con- 
dition of  the  negro  race,  but  had  furnished  a  class  of 
laborers  as  happy  and  contented  as  any  in  the  world, 
if  not  more  so.  Their  labor  had  not  only  developed  the 
immense  resources  of  the  immediate  country  in  which 
they  were  located,  but  was  the  main  source  of  the  great 
prosperity  of  the  United  States,  and  furnished  the  means 
for  the  employment  of  millions  of  the  working  classes  in 
other  countries.  Nevertheless,  the  struggle  made  by  the 
people  of  the  South  was  not  for  the  institution  of  slavery, 
but  for  the  inestimable  right  of  self-government,  against 
the  domination  of  a  fanatical  faction  at  the  North;  and 
slavery  was  the  mere  occasion  of  the  development  of  the 
antagonism  between  the  two  sections.  That  right  of 
self-government  has  been  lost,  and  slavery  violently 
abolished. 

When  the  passions  and  infatuations  of  the  day  shall 
have  been  dissipated  by  time,  and  all  the  results  of  the 
late  war  shall  have  passed  into  irrevocable  history,  the 
future  chronicler  of  that  history  will  have  a  most  im- 
portant duty  to  perform,  and  posterity,  while  poring 
over  its  pages,  will  be  lost  in  wonder  at  the  follies  and 
crimes  committed  in  this  generation. 

Each  generation  of  men  owes  the  debt  to  posterity 
to  hand  down  to  it  a  correct  history  of  the  more  impor- 
tant events  that  have  transpired  in  its  day.     The  his- 


PREFACE 

tory  of  every  people  is  the  common  inheritance  of  man- 
kind, because  of  the  lessons  it  teaches. 

For  the  purposes  of  history,  the  people  of  the  late 
Confederate  States  were  a  separate  people  from  the  peo- 
ple of  the  North  during  the  four  years  of  conflict  which 
they  maintained  against  them. 

No  people  loving  the  truth  of  history  can  have  any 
object  or  motive  in  suppressing  or  mutilating  any  fact 
which  may  be  material  to  its  proper  elucidation. 

The  sole  merit  I  claim  for  the  narrative  now  given 
to  the  public  is  its  truthfulness.  In  writing  it,  I  have 
received  material  aid  from  an  accurate  diary  kept  by 
Lieutenant  William  W.  Old,  aide  to  Major  General  Ed- 
ward Johnson,  who  was  with  me  during  the  campaign  in 
Maryland  and  the  Shenandoah  Valley  until  August  12th, 
1864;  and  the  copious  notes  of  Captain  Jed.  Hotchkiss, 
who  acted  as  Topographical  Engineer  for  the  Second 
corps  and  the  Army  of  the  Valley  District,  and  recorded 
the  events  of  each  day  from  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign on  the  Eapidan  in  May,  1864,  until  the  affair  at 
Waynesboro,  in  March,  1865. 

J.  A.  Early 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Editor's  Introductory  Note v 

Preface vii 

Autobiographical  Sketch xvii 

The  Invasion  of  Virginia  .' 1 

Fight  at  Blackburn's  Ford ."V. 6 

Early's  Brigade  at  Manassas 15 

Details  of  the  Battle  of  Manassas 31 

Operations  along  Bull  Run!:' 47 

Manoeuvring  on  the  Peninsula 58 

Battle  of  Williamsburg.  .  X 68 

Battles  around  Richmond  .  *?. 74 

Battle  of  Cedar  Run 92 

Operations  on  the  Rappahannock 104 

Capture  of  Manassas  Junction.  1 114 

The  Affair  at  Groveton.  .V 119 

Second  Battle  of  Manassas  .4 122 

Affair  at  Ox  Hill  or  Chantilly 129 

Movement  into  Maryland 134 

Battle  of  Sharpsburg  or  Antietam 139 

Preparations  about  Fredericksburg 162 

Battle  of  Fredericksburg 167 

Operations  in  Winter  and  Spring,  1862-63 184 

Battle  of  Chancellorsville 193 

Invasion  of  Pennsylvania 236 

Capture  of  Winchester 240 

At  York  and  Wrightsville 253 

Battle  of  Gettysburg 266 

Retreat  to  Virginia 276 

Treatment  of  Prisoners,  Wounded  and  Dead 287 

On  the  Rapid  an 302 

Devastation  of  the  Country 307 

Skirmishing  at  Mine  Run 319 

Averill's  Raid  and  the  Winter  Campaign 326 

From  the  Rapidan  to  the  James 343 

Battles  of  the  Wilderness 346 

Battles  Around  Spottsylvania 352 

xiii 


CONTENTS 

Operations  near  Hanover  Junction 359 

Battles  of  Cold  Harbor 361 

Campaign  in  Maryland  and  Virginia 366 

Pursuit  of  Hunter 371 

Operations  in  Lower  Valley  and  Maryland 380 

Battle  of  Monocacy 387 

In  Front  of  Washington 389 

Return  to  Virginia 396 

Battle  of  Kernstown 399 

The  Burning  of  Chambersburg 401 

Retreat  to  Fisher's  Hill 406 

Battle  of  Winchester 420 

Affair  at  Fisher's  Hill 429 

The  March  up  the  Valley 432 

Battle  of  Cedar  Creek,  or  Belle  Grove 437 

Close  of  the  Valley  Campaign 453 

Operations  in  1865 459 

Conclusion 466 

Appendix 470 

Index 481 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

General  Jubal  Anderson  Early Frontispiece 

General  Jubal  Anderson  Early  (Profile) 16 

General  Robert  E.  Lee  on  His  Horse,  "Traveller,"  1867.     (By- 
permission  of  A.  H.  Plecker) 74 

Major  Andrew  L,  Pitzer  (On  General  Early's  Staff) 106 

Major  Samuel  Hale  (On  General  Early's  Staff) 144 

Captain  Samuel  H.  Early  (On  General  Early's  Staff) 186 

Major  John  Warwick  Daniel  (On  General  Early's  Staff) 188 

Wall  (on  the  Left  of  Road)  at  Marye's  Heights.     Chancellors- 
ville  and  Fredericksburg  Battlefields 206 

Lee's  Headquarters — The  Wilderness 348 

Cedar  Creek  Battlefield 438 

General    Early,    Disguised    as    a    Farmer,    while    Escaping    to 

Mexico,  1865 464 

Major  Thomas  P.  Turner,  Commandant  of  Libby  Prison,  and  Gen- 
eral Early  in  Havana,  1865 464 

Jefferson  Davis,  President  C.  S.  A.,  and  Mrs.  Davis 472, 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

According  to  the  record  in  the  family  Bible,  I  was 
born  on  the  third  day  of  November,  1816,  in  the  County 
of  Franklin,  in  the  State  of  Virginia.  My  father,  Joab 
Early,1  who  is  still  living,  is  a  native  of  the  same  county, 
and  while  resident  there,  he  enjoyed  the  esteem  of  his 
fellow-citizens  and  held  several  prominent  public  posi- 
tions, but  in  the  year  1847,  he  removed  to  the  Kanawha 
Valley  in  Western  Virginia.  My  mother's  maiden  name 
was  Euth  Hairston,  and  she  was  likewise  a  native  of 
the  County  of  Franklin,  her  family  being  among  the  most 
respected  citizens.  She  died  in  the  year  1832,  leaving 
ten  children  surviving  her,  I  being  the  third  child  and 
second  son.  She  was  a  most  estimable  lady,  and  her 
death  was  not  only  the  source  of  the  deepest  grief  to 
her  immediate  family,  but  caused  universal  regret  in  the 
whole  circle  of  her  acquaintances. 

Until  I  was  sixteen  I  enjoyed  the  benefit  of  the  best 
schools  in  my  region  of  country  and  received  the  usual 
instruction  in  the  dead  languages  and  elementary  math- 
ematics. In  the  spring  of  1833,  while  General  Jackson 
was  President,  I  received,  through  the  agency  of  our 
member  of  Congress,  the  Hon.  N.  H.  Claiborne,  an  ap- 
pointment as  cadet  in  the  United  States  Military 
Academy  at  West  Point. 

I  repaired  to  the  Academy  at  the  end  of  May  and 
was  admitted  about  the  first  of  June  in  the  same  year. 
I  went  through  the  usual  course  and  graduated  in  the 
usual  time,  in  June,  1837.  There  was  nothing  worthy  of 
particular  note  in  my  career  at  West  Point.  I  was 
never  a  very  good  student,  and  was  sometimes  quite  re- 
miss, but  I  managed  to  attain  a  respectable  stand  in  all 

1  Died  at  the  home  of  his  son,  Robert  H.  Early,  in  Lexington,  Mo.,  1870. 

xvii 


It  3  5 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

my  studies.  My  highest  stand  in  any  branch  was  in  mili- 
tary and  civil  engineering  and  that  was  sixth.  In  the 
general  standing  on  graduation  my  position  was  eigh- 
teenth in  a  class  of  fifty. 

I  was  not  a  very  exemplary  soldier  and  went  through 
the  Academy  without  receiving  any  appointment  as  a 
commissioned  or  non-commissioned  officer  in  the  corps 
of  cadets.  I  had  very  little  taste  for  scrubbing  brass, 
and  cared  very  little  for  the  advancement  to  be  obtained 
by  the  exercise  of  that  most  useful  art. 

Among  those  graduating  in  my  class  were  General 
Braxton  Bragg,  Lieutenant  General  John  C.  Pemberton, 
Major  Generals  Arnold  Elzey  and  Wm.  H.  T.  Walker, 
and  a  few  others  of  the  Confederate  Army;  and  Major 
Generals  John  Sedgwick,  Joseph  Hooker,  and  Wm.  H. 
French  and  several  Brigadier  Generals  of  minor  note 
in  the  Federal  Army.  Among  my  contemporaries  at 
West  Point  were  General  Beauregard,  Lieutenant  Gen- 
eral Ewell,  Major  General  Edward  Johnson  and  some 
others  of  distinction  in  the  Confederate  Army;  Major 
Generals  McDowell  and  Meade  and  several  others  in  the 
Federal  Army. 

The  whole  of  my  class  received  appointments  in  the 
United  States  Army  shortly  after  graduation.  By  rea- 
son of  the  Indian  War  in  Florida,  there  had  been  a 
number  of  resignations  and  deaths  in  the  army  and  very 
few  of  the  class  had  to  go  through  the  probation  of 
brevet  lieutenants.  I  was  appointed  Second  Lieutenant 
in  the  Third  Eegiment  of  Artillery,  and  was  assigned  to 
Company  "  E,"  which  afterward  became  celebrated  as 
Sherman's  battery.  We  did  not  enjoy  the  usual  leave 
of  absence,  but  in  August,  1837,  a  number  of  my  class, 
myself  included,  were  ordered  to  Fortress  Monroe  to 
drill  a  considerable  body  of  recruits  which  were  in  ren- 
dezvous at  that  place,  preparatory  to  being  sent  to 
Florida,  where  the  Seminole  War  was  still  in  progress. 
From  Fortress  Monroe,  with  several  other  officers,  I 
accompanied  a  body  of  recruits  which  sailed  for  Florida, 

xviii 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

and  we  landed  at  Tampa  Bay  in  October,  1837.  From 
Tampa  Bay  I  went  to  Gary's  Ferry,  on  Black  Creek,  and 
there  joined  my  company,  which  was  comprised  almost 
entirely  of  recruits  recently  joined.  My  Captain  (Lyon) 
was  an  invalid  from  age  and  infirmity,  and  both  the 
First  Lieutenants  were  absent  on  special  duty,  so  that 
being  the  senior  Second  Lieutenant,  I  was  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  company.  In  that  capacity  I  went 
through  the  campaign  of  1837-8  under  General  Jessup, 
from  the  St.  John's  Eiver  south  into  the  Everglades, 
and  was  present  at  a  skirmish  with  the  Indians  on  the 
Lockee  Hatchee,  near  Jupiter  Inlet,  in  January,  1838. 
This  was  my  first  "  battle,"  and  though  I  heard  some 
bullets  whistling  among  the  trees,  none  came  near  me, 
and  I  did  not  see  an  Indian. 

The  party  of  Seminoles  with  which  we  had  the  skir- 
mish was  subsequently  pursued  into  the  Everglades  and 
induced  to  come  in  and  camp  near  us  at  Fort  Jupiter, 
under  some  stipulations  between  General  Jessup  and 
the  chiefs,  about  which  there  was  afterwards  some  mis- 
understanding which  resulted  in  the  whole  party  being 
surrounded  and  captured;  and  my  company  was  em- 
ployed with  the  rest  of  the  troops  in  this  work.  This 
was  my  last  " warlike  exploit"  for  many  years.  After 
this  we  remained  near  the  sea-coast,  inactive  for  the 
most  of  the  time,  until  late  in  the  spring,  when,  as  all 
active  hostilities  had  ceased,  we  were  marched  across  to 
Tampa  Bay,  from  whence  my  company,  with  some  other 
troops,  was  shipped  to  New  Orleans,  and  then  sent  up 
the  Mississippi,  Ohio  and  Tennessee  Rivers  to  Ross' 
Landing  (now  Chattanooga)  to  report  to  General  Scott, 
who  had  charge  of  the  removal  of  the  Cherokees,  with 
whom  some  difficulty  was  apprehended.  My  company 
was  stationed  near  Ross'  Landing,  and  it  was  soon  dis- 
covered that  there  would  be  no  trouble  with  the  Indians. 

It  had  not  been  my  purpose  to  remain  permanently 
in  the  army,  and,  as  there  was  to  be  no  difficulty  with 
the  Cherokees,  and  the  Seminole  War  was  thought  to  be 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

at  an  end,  I  determined  to  resign  for  the  purpose  of 
going  into  civil  life.  I  tendered  my  resignation  and 
received  a  leave  of  absence  until  it  could  be  acted  on. 
Under  this  leave  I  started  from  Ross'  Landing,  on 
July  4,  1838,  for  my  home,  by  the  way  of  Nashville  and 
Louisville.  Upon  arriving  at  Louisville,  I  found  from 
the  papers  that  the  army  had  been  increased,  and  that 
I  was  made  a  first  lieutenant  in  my  regiment.  Had  this 
news  reached  me  before  the  tendering  of  my  resignation, 
that  resignation  might  have  been  withheld,  but  it  was 
now  too  late  to  alter  my  plans. 

In  the  fall  of  1838,  I  commenced  the  study  of  law 
in  the  office  of  N.  M.  Taliaferro,  Esq.,  an  eminent  law- 
yer residing  at  the  county  seat  of  my  native  county, 
who  some  years  afterward  became  a  judge  of  the  Gen- 
eral Court  of  Virginia.  I  obtained  license  to  practise 
law  in  the  early  part  of  the  year  1840,  and  at  once  en- 
tered the  profession.  In  the  spring  of  the  year  1841,  I 
was  elected  by  a  small  majority,  as  one  of  the  delegates 
from  the  County  of  Franklin,  to  the  Virginia  Legisla- 
ture, and  served  in  the  session  of  1841  and  1842,  being 
the  youngest  member  of  the  body. 

In  the  following  spring,  I  was  badly  beaten  by  my 
former  preceptor  in  the  law,  who  was  a  member  of  the 
Democratic  Party,  while  I  was  a  supporter  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Whig  Party,  of  which  Mr.  Clay  was  the 
principal  leader. 

My  political  opponent,  though  a  personal  friend,  Mr. 
Taliaferro,  held  the  position  of  prosecuting  attorney 
in  the  circuit  courts  of  several  counties,  and  as  these 
offices  were  rendered  vacant  by  his  election  to  the  Legis- 
lature, I  received  the  appointments  for  the  Counties  of 
Franklin  and  Floyd,  having  previously  been  appointed 
prosecuting  attorney  in  the  county  court  of  Franklin. 
These  appointments  I  held  until  the  reorganization  of 
the  State  government  under  the  new  constitution  of 
1851. 

In  the  meantime,  I  continued  the  practice  of  law  in 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

my  own  and  the  adjoining  counties,  with  very  fair  suc- 
cess until  the  breaking  out  of  the  war  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico,  consequent  upon  the  annexation  of 
Texas.  Though  I  had  voted,  in  the  presidential  elec- 
tion of  1844,  for  Mr.  Clay,  who  opposed  the  annexation 
of  Texas,  yet,  when  war  ensued,  I  felt  it  to  be  my  duty 
to  sustain  the  government  in  that  war  and  to  enter  the 
military  service  if  a  fitting  opportunity  offered.  When 
the  regiment  of  volunteers  from  Virginia  was  called  for 
by  the  President,  I  received  from  the  Governor  and 
Council  of  State  the  appointment  as  Major  in  that  regi- 
ment, and  was  mustered  into  service  on  the  7th  of  Jan- 
uary, 1847.  Colonel  John  F.  Hamtramck,  of  the  County 
of  Jefferson,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Thomas  B.  Ran- 
dolph,  of  the  County  of  Warren,  were  the  other  field  offi- 
cers. The  regiment  was  ordered  to  rendezvous  at  For- 
tress Monroe  and  the  superintendence  of  the  drilling 
there  and  the  embarkation  for  Mexico  were  entrusted 
to  me.  Two  extra  companies  were  allowed  to  the  regi- 
ment, and,  on  account  of  some  delay  in  the  organization 
of  them,  I  did  not  sail  from  Fortress  Monroe  with  the 
last  detachment  of  these  companies  until  March  1st,  ar- 
riving at  Brazos  Santiago  on  the  17th,  to  learn,  for  the 
first  time,  the  news  of  General  Taylor's  victory  at  Buena 
Vista.  We  proceeded  up  the  Rio  Grande  at  once  and 
the  whole  regiment  was  assembled  at  Camargo,  under 
the  command  of  the  Colonel,  the  day  after  my  arrival 
there. 

About  the  first  of  April  the  regiment  moved  from 
Camargo  for  Monterey,  by  the  way  of  a  little  town 
called  China,  as  an  escort  for  a  provision  train.  One- 
half  of  the  regiment  was  left  temporarily  at  China  under 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Randolph,  and  the  other  half  moved 
to  Monterey  under  my  command — Colonel  Hamtramck 
having  become  too  sick  to  remain  on  duty.  We  were 
encamped  at  the  Walnut  Spring  near  General  Taylor's 
headquarters,  and  there  I  met,  for  the  first  time,  Colonel 
Jefferson  Davis,  of  the  First  Mississippi  Regiment,  who 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

has  become  illustrious  as  the  President  of  the  Confeder- 
rate  States.  I  was  struck  with  his  soldierly  bearing,  and 
he  did  me  the  honor  of  complimenting  the  order  and  regu- 
larity of  my  camp.  After  being  here  a  short  time,  the 
battalion  under  my  command  relieved  an  Ohio  regi- 
ment, which  had  been  garrisoning  Monterey,  but  was  go- 
ing home,  and  for  two  months  I  acted  as  miltary  gov- 
ernor of  the  city.  It  was  generally  conceded  by  officers 
of  the  army  and  Mexicans  that  better  order  reigned  in 
the  city  during  the  time  I  commanded  there,  than  had 
ever  before  existed,  and  the  good  conduct  of  my  men 
won  for  them  universal  praise.  Some  time  in  the  month 
of  June,  the  whole  regiment,  under  the  command  of  the 
Colonel,  moved  to  Buena  Vista,  a  few  miles  from  Sal- 
tillo,  and  joined  the  forces  of  General  Wool,  at  that 
point.  It  remained  near  that  locality  for  the  balance 
of  the  war,  for  the  most  part  inactive,  as  all  fighting  on 
that  line,  except  an  occasional  affair  with  guerillas, 
ceased  after  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista.  I  had,  there- 
fore, no  opportunity  of  seeing  active  service.  For  a 
short  time  I  was  attached,  as  acting  Inspector  General, 
to  the  staff  of  Brigadier  General  Caleb  Cushing,  who 
commanded  the  brigade  to  which  my  regiment  was  at- 
tached, until  he  was  ordered  to  the  other  line.  During 
this  period  I  contracted,  in  the  early  part  of  the  fall 
of  1847,  a  cold  and  fever,  which  eventuated  in  chronic 
rheumatism,  with  which  I  have  ever  since  been  afflicted. 
My  condition  became  such  that  I  received  a  leave  of  ab- 
sence in  the  month  of  November,  and  returned  to  the 
States,  on  a  visit  to  my  friends  in  the  Kanawha  Valley. 
After  improving  a  little  I  started  back  to  Mexico, 
and  on  my  way  I  had  the  luck  to  meet  with  that  fate, 
which  is  very  common  to  Americans  who  travel  much, 
that  is,  I  was  on  a  steamboat  which  was  blown  up,  the 
8th  of  January,  1848,  on  the  Ohio  River,  a  few  miles  be- 
low the  mouth  of  the  Kanawha.  I  had  a  very  narrow 
escape,  as  half  of  my  state-room  was  carried  off  and 
some  pieces  of  the  boiler  protruded  through  the  floor, 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

cutting  and  burning  my  feet  when  I  jumped  out  of  the 
berth.  The  explosion  took  place  about  1.00  o'clock  at 
night,  when  it  was  very  dark  and  extremely  cold,  and 
before  the  passengers,  who  were  not  killed,  could  get 
ashore  and  obtain  shelter,  they  were  very  much  exposed; 
but,  after  getting  over  the  first  effects  of  the  slight  in- 
jury received,  I  experienced  a  decided  improvement  in 
my  rheumatism,  though  I  would  not  advise  blowing  up 
in  a  western  steamboat  as  an  infallible  remedy. 

I  rejoined  the  regiment  about  the  first  of  February, 
and  commanded  the  greater  part  of  it  during  the  rest 
of  the  war — three  or  four  companies  having  been  de- 
tached to  the  town  of  Parras — as  Colonel  Hamtramck 
had  returned  to  Virginia  on  recruiting  service.  At  the 
close  of  the  war,  I  carried  the  regiment  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Eio  Grande,  and  had  it  embarked  at  Brazos  for 
Fortress  Monroe,  going  on  one  of  the  vessels  myself.  I 
was  mustered  out  of  the  service  with  the  rest  of  the 
regiment  in  the  first  part  of  April,  1848,  being  the  only 
field  officer  on  duty  with  it.  It  had  no  opportunity  of 
reaping  laurels  during  the  war,  but  I  can  say  that  it 
had  not  sullied  the  flag  of  the  State,  which  constituted 
the  regimental  colors,  by  disorderly  conduct  or  acts  of 
depredation  on  private  property,  and  non-combatants. 
It  had  been  my  fortune  to  have  the  disagreeable  duty  of 
breaking  in  the  regiment  at  the  beginning  and  I  had 
commanded  it  for  a  much  longer  time  than  any  other 
field  officer.  Being  rather  a  strict  disciplinarian  and, 
in  consequence  thereof,  naturally  regarded  by  inexpe- 
rienced troops  as  harsh  in  my  treatment  of  them,  I  was 
by  no  means  popular  with  the  mass  of  the  regiment  prior 
to  the  commencement  of  the  return  march  from  Sal- 
tillo,  but  I  can  safely  say  that,  on  the  day  they  were 
mustered  out  of  service  at  Fortress  Monroe,  I  was  the 
most  popular  officer  in  the  regiment,  and  I  had  the  satis- 
faction of  receiving  from  a  great  many  of  the  men  the 
assurance  that  they  had  misjudged  me  in  the  beginning 
and  were  now  convinced  that  I  had  been  their  best 
friend  all  the  time. 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

I  returned  to  the  practice  of  law  and  continued  it 
nntil  the  commencement  of  the  late  struggle  between  the 
Southern  and  Northern  States. 

After  my  return  from  Mexico,  I  was  the  only  one  of 
my  name  left  in  my  county,  as  all  the  rest  of  my  father's 
family  had  removed  to  the  Kanawha  Valley. 

In  the  year  1850  I  was  a  candidate  for  the  conven- 
tion called  to  revise  the  constitution  of  Virginia,  but  I 
was  defeated  by  an  overwhelming  majority,  receiving 
only  about  two  hundred  votes  in  a  district  polling  sev- 
eral thousand.  I  opposed  firmly  and  unflinchingly  all 
the  radical  changes,  miscalled  reforms,  which  were  pro- 
posed, and  as  the  people  seemed  to  run  wild  in  favor 
of  them,  not  only  was  I  beaten,  but  so  were  all  other 
candidates  professing  similar  sentiments. 

In  the  year  1853,  I  was  again  a  candidate  for  the 
Legislature,  but  was  badly  beaten,  as  the  county  had  be- 
come strongly  wedded  to  the  opposite  party. 

My  practice  had  become  very  considerable,  and  at 
the  close  of  my  professional  career,  I  believe  I  was  re- 
garded as  among  the  best  lawyers  in  my  section  of  the 
State.  My  most  important  contest  at  the  bar  and  my 
greatest  triumph  was  in  a  contested  will  case  in  Lowndes 
County,  Mississippi,  in  the  autumn  of  1852,  in  which  a 
very  large  amount  of  property  was  involved.  I  went  to 
Mississippi  to  attend  to  this  case  specially,  and  I  con- 
tended single-handed  and  successfully  with  three  of  the 
ablest  lawyers  of  that  State. 

I  had  in  a  very  limited  degree  the  capacity  for  popu- 
lar speaking  as  generally  practised  in  the  States,  and 
it  was  regarded  that  my  forte  at  the  law  was  not  be- 
fore a  jury  as  an  advocate,  but  on  questions  of  law  be- 
fore the  court,  especially  in  cases  of  appeal. 

I  was  never  blessed  with  popular  or  captivating  man- 
ners, and  the  consequence  was  that  I  was  often  mis- 
judged and  thought  to  be  haughty  and  disdainful  in  my 
temperament.  When  earnestly  engaged  about  my  busi- 
ness, in  passing  through  a  crowd  I  would  frequently 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

pass  an  acquaintance  without  noticing  him,  because  of 
the  preoccupation  of  my  mind,  and  this  often  gave  of- 
fence. From  all  of  which  it  resulted  that  I  was  never 
what  is  called  a  popular  man.  I  can  say,  however,  that 
those  who  knew  me  best,  liked  me  best,  and  the  preju- 
dices against  me  were  gradually  wearing  off  as  the  peo- 
ple became  better  acquainted  with  me. 

My  labors  in  my  profession  were  rather  spasmodic, 
and  by  procrastination,  I  would  often  have  to  compass 
a  vast  deal  of  work  in  a  very  short  time,  on  the  eve  of 
or  during  the  session  of  a  court.  I  was  careless  in  se- 
curing and  collecting  my  fees,  very  often  relying  on 
memory  as  the  only  evidence  of  them,  and  the  conse- 
quence was  that  my  practice  was  never  very  lucrative. 

I  have  now  given  a  sketch  of  my  life  up  to  the  time 
of  the  beginning  of  the  great  struggle  in  the  South  for 
independence,  and  like  most  men,  I  had  done  many  things 
which  I  ought  not  to  have  done,  and  left  undone  many 
things  which  I  ought  to  have  done,  but  I  had  done  some 
good,  and  had  not  committed  any  very  serious  wrong, 
considering  it  in  a  mere  worldly  point  of  view.  I  would, 
however,  by  no  means,  commend  my  life  as  a  pattern 
for  the  young,  unless  it  be  in  the  sincerity  and  integrity 
of  purpose  by  which  I  claim  to  have  ever  been  actuated. 

As  there  have  been  some  descriptions  of  my  person 
attempted,  in  which  I  have  failed  to  recognize  the  slight- 
est resemblance,  I  will  state  that,  up  to  the  time  of  my 
service  in  Mexico,  I  was  quite  erect  and  trim  in  stature. 
My  average  weight  for  many  years  was  from  154  to 
164  pounds — during  the  war  it  was  about  170  pounds. 
The  stoop  with  which  I  am  now  afflicted  is  the  result  of 
rheumatism  contracted  in  Mexico,  and  when  casual  ob- 
servers have  seen  me  bent  up,  it  has  been  very  often 
the  result  of  actual  pain  to  which  I  have  been  very  much 
subjected  for  the  last  nineteen  years.  One  writer,  who 
was  actuated  by  the  most  friendly  motives  and  ought 
to  have  known  better,  has  described  me  as  having  a 
rough,  curly  head  and  shaggy  eye-brows,  whereas  the 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

fact  is  that  my  hair  always  has  been,  and  what  is  left 
still  is,  as  straight  as  an  Indian's,  and  my  eyebrows  are 
very  moderate  and  smooth.  Some  writer,  who  certainly 
never  put  himself  in  a  position  to  see  me  during  the 
war,  has  described  my  dress  as  being  habitually  like 
that  of  a  stage-driver.  All  tailors  who  have  ever  worked 
for  me  up  to  the  present  time  will  testify  to  the  fact 
t!iat  I  have  always  been  one  of  the  most  particular  men 
about  the  cut  and  fit  of  my  clothes  among  their 
customers. 

During  the  war  I  was  almost  constantly  in  the  camp 
or  field,  except  when  wounded,  and  I  had  no  time  to  get 
new  clothes  if  I  had  been  able.  My  tastes  would  always 
have  induced  me  to  dress  neatly  and  genteelly  if  I  could 
have  indulged  them. 

So  much  for  my  life  previous  to  the  war.  Henceforth 
it  will  be  developed  in  my  narrative. 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN 
THE  STATES 

CHAPTER  I. 

The  Invasion  of  Virginia. 

After  the  fall  of  Fort  Sumter,  the  Government  at 
Washington  commenced  concentrating  a  large  force  at 
that  city  nnder  the  superintendence  of  Lieutenant 
General  Scott  of  the  United  States  Army,  and  it  was 
very  apparent  that  Virginia  would  be  invaded. 

When  the  ordinance  of  secession  had  been  passed  by 
the  Virginia  convention,  and  the  authority  had  been 
given  to  the  Governor  to  call  out  troops  for  the  defence 
of  the  State,  Governor  Letcher  called  for  volunteers. 
The  Navy  Yard  at  Gosport,  near  Norfolk,  and  the 
arsenal  and  armory  at  Harper's  Ferry  were  taken  pos- 
session of  by  militia  forces  hastily  assembled,  but  not 
until  the  United  States  officers  had  partially  destroyed 
both. 

As  soon  as  General  Lee  reached  Richmond,  which  was 
very  shortly,  after  his  appointment  to  the  command  of 
the  Virginia  forces,  he  entered  actively  on  the  work 
of  reorganization. 

The  day  the  convention  took  recess  to  await  the  result 
of  the  popular  vote,  I  tendered  my  services  to  the  Gov- 
ernor, and  received  from  him  the  commission  of  Colonel 
injthe  volunteer  service  of  the  State.  On  reporting  to 
General  Lee,  I  was  ordered  to  repair  to  Lynchburg,  and 
take  command  of  all  the  Virginia  volunteers  who  should 
be  mustered  into  service  at  that  place,  and  organize  them 
into  regiments,  as  they  were  received  by  companies.     I 

1 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

took  command  at  Lynchburg  on  the  16th  of  May,  and 
proceeded  to  organize  the  volunteers,  which  were  being 
mustered  into  the  Virginia  service  at  that  point,  by 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Daniel  A.  Langhorne. 

"While  there,  I  organized  and  armed  three  regiments, 
to-wit:  The  28th  Virginia  Regiment  (Colonel  R.  T. 
Preston)  and  the  24th  Virginia  Regiment  (my  own), 
both  as  infantry,  and  the  30th  Virginia  Regiment 
(Colonel  R.  C.  W.  Radford),  as  cavalry.  This  latter 
regiment  was  subsequently  designated  the  2d  Virginia 
Cavalry. 

On  the  24th  of  May,  the  day  after  the  election  in 
Virginia  ratifying  the  ordinance  of  secession,  the 
Federal  troops,  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General 
McDowell,  crossed  over  from  Washington  into  Virginia, 
the  bands  playing  and  the  soldiers  singing  "John 
Brown's  soul  goes  marching  on";  and  John  Brown's 
mission  was,  subsequently,  but  too  well  carried  out  in 
Virginia  and  all  the  Southern  States  under  the  inspira- 
tion of  that  anthem. 

The  Confederate  Government  had  sent  some  troops 
to  Virginia,  and  a  portion  of  them  along  with  some  of 
the  Virginia  troops  were  concentrated  at  and  near 
Manassas  Junction  on  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Rail- 
road, about  thirty  miles  from  Washington.  Brigadier 
General  Beauregard  was  sent  to  take  command  of  the 
troops  at  Manassas,  and  other  troops  had  been  sent  to 
Harper's  Ferry,  to  the  command  of  which  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  assigned.  As  soon  as  it  was 
ascertained  that  the  Federal  troops  had  crossed  over 
and  occupied  Alexandria,  I  commenced  sending  the  regi- 
ments organized  by  me,  as  they  were  ready,  to  Manassas. 
The  infantry  was  armed  with  smooth-bore  percussion 
muskets,  but  there  were  no  belts  or  bayonet  scabbards 
or  cartridge  boxes  for  them,  and  they  had  to  be  supplied 
with  cloth  pouches  for  their  ammunition.  The  cavalry 
regiment,  consisting  of  nine  companies,  was  armed  prin- 
cipally with  double-barrelled  shot  guns,  and  sabres  of 
an  old  pattern  which  had  been  collected  in  the  country 

2 


THE  INVASION  OF  VIRGINIA 

from  old  volunteer  companies.  The  State  had  very  few 
arms  of  any  kind,  and  those  furnished  the  infantry  had 
been  borrowed  from  North  Carolina.  There  were  no 
cavalry  arms  of  any  value. 

I  also  armed  and  sent  off  a  number  of  companies  to 
be  attached  to  regiments  already  in  the  field. 

Having  attended  the  convention  when  it  re-assembled 
in  June,  as  soon  as  the  ordinance  of  secession  was 
signed,  I  received  orders  to  turn  over  the  command  at 
Lynchburg  to  Colonel  Langhorne  and  join  my  regiment 
in  the  field.  The  Confederate  Government  had  now 
reached  Richmond,  and  that  city  became  the  capital  of 
the  Confederacy. 

I  reached  Manassas  and  reported  to  General 
Beauregard  on  the  19th  of  June.  I  found  my  regiment 
(the  24th  Virginia)  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Peter 
Hairston,  located  about  four  miles  east  of  the  Junction, 
for  the  purpose  of  watching  the  fords  of  Bull  Run 
immediately  above  its  junction  with  the  Occoquon,  and 
those  on  the  latter  stream  above  the  same  point.  At 
this  time  no  brigades  had  been  formed,  but  in  a  few  days 
the  regiments  under  General  Beauregard's  command 
were  organized  into  six  brigades,  as  follows :  a  brigade  of 
South  Carolina  troops  under  Brigadier  General  Bonham, 
a  brigade  of  Alabama  and  Louisiana  troops  under 
Brigadier  General  Ewell,  a  brigade  of  South  Carolina 
and  Mississippi  troops  under  Brigadier  General  D.  R. 
Jones,  a  brigade  of  Virginia  troops  under  Colonel  George 
H.  Jerrett,  who  was  subsequently  replaced  by  Brigadier 
General  Longstreet,  a  brigade  of  Virginia  troops  under 
Colonel  Philip  St.  George  Cocke,  and  a  brigade  composed 
of  the  7th  and  24th  Virginia,  and  the  4th  South  Carolina 
Regiments  under  my  command,  but  the  4th  South  Caro- 
lina had  been  sent  to  Leesburg  in  Loudoun  and  did  not 
join,  it  being  subsequently  replaced  by  the  7th  Louisiana 
Regiment. 

After  this  organization  the  troops  were  located  as 
follows:  the  4th  South  Carolina  Regiment  and  Wheat's 
Louisiana  Battalion   were   at  Leesburg  under   Colonel 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Evans;  Bonham's  brigade  was  at  Fairfax  Court-House, 
Cocke's  at  Centreville,  and  Ewell's  brigade  at  and  near 
Fairfax  Station,  all  in  front  of  Bull  Run;  while  D.  R. 
Jones'  brigade  was  encamped  on  the  south  of  the  Run 
near  the  railroad,  at  a  place  called  Camp  Walker,  Long- 
street's  at  the  Junction,  and  the  7th  and  24th  Virginia 
Regiments  of  my  brigade,  camped  separately,  northeast 
and  east  of  the  Junction,  from  three  to  four  miles  dis- 
tant. The  cavalry,  consisting  of  Colonel  R.  C.  W.  Rad- 
ford's regiment  of  nine  companies  and  several  unat- 
tached companies,  was  employed  mainly  on  scouting  and 
picketing  duty  with  Evans,  Bonham,  and  Ewell,  one 
company  being  on  my  right  to  watch  the  lower  fords  of 
the  Occoquon,  and  the  landings  on  the  Potomac  below 
the  mouth  of  the  Occoquon,  where  it  was  subsequently 
joined  by  another. 

It  was  my  duty  to  watch  the  right  of  our  line,  and 
the  two  companies  of  cavalry  on  that  flank,  Eugene 
Davis'  and  W.  W.  Thornton's  companies  of  Virginia 
cavalry,  were  placed  under  my  command,  and  Captain 
John  Scott  was  assigned  to  the  immediate  command  of 
them. 

A  few  days  after  my  arrival,  under  orders  from 
General  Beauregard,  I  made  a  reconnaissance  to  the 
village  of  Occoquon,  near  the  mouth  of  the  stream  of 
that  name,  with  the  24th  Regiment,  and  examined  the 
landings  of  the  Potomac  as  far  down  as  Freestone  Point. 

Early  in  July  General  Beauregard  summoned  all  his 
brigade  commanders  to  a  conference  at  Fairfax  Station, 
and  there  disclosed  to  them,  in  confidence,  his  plan  of 
operations  in  the  event  of  an  advance  by  the  enemy,  for 
which  he  had  learned  active  preparations  were  being 
made. 

He  anticipated  that  the  enemy's  main  force  would 
move  on  the  road  through  Fairfax  Court-House  and 
Centreville  toward  Manassas,  and  his  plan  was,  for  all 
the  troops  on  the  north  of  Bull  Run  to  fall  back  to  the 
south  bank  of  that  stream.    Bonham,  in  the  centre  on  the 

4 


THE  INVASION  OF  VIRGINIA 

direct  road  to  Manassas,  to  Mitchell's  Ford;  Cocke,  on 
the  left,  to  Stone  Bridge  on  the  Warrenton  Pike;  and 
Ewell,  on  the  right,  to  Union  Mills;  and  Evans  was  to 
retire  from  Loudoun  and  unite  with  Cocke ;  while  Long- 
street  was  to  move  up  to  Blackburn's  Ford,  about  a  mile 
below  Mitchell's  Ford;  D.  R.  Jones  to  McLean's  Ford, 
about  a  mile  or  two  further  down ;  and  I  was  to  move  up 
to  Union  Mills  in  support  of  Ewell.  His  anticipation 
further  was,  that  the  enemy  would  follow  up  Bonham 
and  attack  him  at  Mitchell's  Ford;  in  which  event  the 
rest  of  the  troops  were  to  cross  Bull  Run  and  attack  the 
enemy  on  both  flanks — Longstreet  crossing  at  Black- 
burn's Ford,  and  Jones  at  McLean's  Ford,  and  attacking 
the  enemy's  left  flank;  Ewell  at  the  same  time  moving 
up  towards  Centreville,  on  the  road  from  Union  Mills, 
and  attacking  the  enemy  on  his  left  and  rear;  while  I 
was  to  follow  Ewell  in  support  and  look  out  for  his  right 
flank  and  rear,  and  Cocke,  supported  by  Evans,  was  to 
come  down  on  the  enemy's  right  flank. 

The  routes  by  which  all  these  movements  were  to 
be  made  were  pointed  out  and  designated  on  maps  pre- 
viously prepared,  and  each  brigade  commander  was 
instructed  to  make  himself  familiar  with  the  ground  over 
which  he  would  have  to  operate.  General  Beauregard 
at  the  same  time  informed  us  that  the  returns  showed 
an  effective  force  under  his  command  of  very  little 
more  than  15,000  men. 

A  few  days  after  this,  the  7th  Louisiana  Regiment, 
under  Colonel  Harry  T.  Hays,  arrived,  and  was  assigned 
to  my  brigade  in  lieu  of  the  4th  South  Carolina.  The 
7th  Virginia  was  commanded  by  Colonel  James  L. 
Kemper,  and  the  24th  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Peter 
Hairston. 

On  the  12th  of  July  I  made  another  reconnaissance 
to  Occoquon,  with  the  7th  Virginia  Regiment  under 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Williams,  and  a  section  of  the  Wash- 
ington Artillery  of  New  Orleans,  under  Lieutenant 
Squires,  and  returned  to  camp  on  the  14th. 

5 


CHAPTER  II. 

Fight  at  Blackburn's  Ford. 

On  the  night  of  the  16th  information  was  sent  from 
General  Beauregard's  headquarters  that  the  enemy  was 
advancing,  and  orders  were  given  for  moving  early 
next  morning  in  accordance  with  previous  instructions. 

At  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  I  commenced 
the  movement  of  my  brigade  to  its  assigned  position 
in  rear  of  the  ford  at  Union  Mills,  and  on  my  arrival 
there  I  found  General  Ewell's  force  falling  back  to  the 
same  point.  Under  previous  instructions  four  com- 
panies of  the  24th  Virginia  Regiment  had  been  left  under 
Major  Hambrick  to  guard  the  camp  of  the  regiment  and 
picket  on  the  right  of  our  line,  and  the  two  companies 
of  cavalry  under  Captain  Scott  had  also  been  left  to 
watch  our  right.  Three  pieces  of  artillery,  under 
Lieutenant  Squires  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  were 
attached  to  my  brigade  and  joined  it  at  the  position  near 
Union  Mills.  I  remained  there  inactive  during  the  rest 
of  the  day  after  my  arrival,  but  on  the  morning  of  the 
18th  I  was  ordered  further  to  the  left,  to  Camp  Walker 
on  the  railroad.  On  falling  back,  Ewell  had  burned  the 
bridges  on  the  railroad  between  Fairfax  Station  and 
Union  Mills,  and  on  this  morning  the  bridge  over  Bull 
Run,  at  the  latter  place,  was  likewise  burned. 

After  remaining  for  some  time  at  Camp  Walker,  I 
was  ordered  by  General  Beauregard  to  move  my  brigade 
to  the  gate  in  rear  of  McLean's  farm  on  the  road  from 
Blackburn's  Ford  to  the  Junction,  keeping  it  in  the 
woods  out  of  view.  The  General  had  now  established 
his  headquarters  at  McLean's  house  between  my  posi- 
tion and  those  of  Generals  Longstreet  and  Jones. 
From  this  last  position  taken  by  me,  the  open  fields  on 
the  heights  beyond  Blackburn's  Ford  were  visible,  being 
between  two  and  three  miles  distant.     A  little  before 

6 


FIGHT  AT  BLACKBURN'S  FORD 

12  m.  we  discovered  clouds  of  dust  from  the  direction 
of  Centreville  and  bodies  of  troops  moving  into  the 
fields  beyond  the  ford,  and  while  we  were  speculating 
as  to  whether  this  was  the  enemy,  we  saw  the  smoke 
arise  from  his  first  gun,  the  fire  from  which  was  directed 
towards  Bonham's  position  at  Mitchell's  Ford. 

After  the  firing  had  continued  for  a  short  time,  I 
received  an  order  from  General  Beauregard  to  move  my 
command  to  the  rear  of  a  pine  thicket  between  McLean's 
house  and  Blackburn's  Ford,  so  as  to  be  in  supporting 
distance  of  Bonham,  Longstreet  or  Jones.  In  order  to  do 
this  I  had  to  run  through  open  fields  in  view  of  the  enemy 
and  this  attracted  his  fire  in  our  direction,  but  I  reached 
the  cover  of  the  pines  without  any  casualty,  and  I  was 
here  joined  by  Lieutenant  Richardson,  of  the  Washing- 
ton Artillery?  with  two  more  pieces.  The  enemy's  fire 
was  continued  for  some  time,  and  one  or  two  shells 
passed  through  an  out-house  near  General  Beauregard's 
headquarters. 

In  the  afternoon  the  General  rode  towards  Mitchell's 
Ford,  and  after  he  had  been  gone  a  short  time  a  very 
brisk  musketry  fire  opened  at  Blackburn's  Ford.  The 
enemy  had  attacked  Longstreet  at  that  point,  and  after 
the  firing  had  continued  for  some  time,  I  received  a  mes- 
sage from  General  Longstreet,  through  one  of  his  aides, 
requesting  reinforcements.  I  immediately  put  my  whole 
command  in  motion  towards  the  ford,  but  before  arriving 
there,  I  received  an  order  from  General  Beauregard  to 
carry  two  regiments  aud  two  pieces  of  artillery  to  Long- 
street's  assistance.  My  command  was  then  moving  with 
the  7th  Louisiana  in  front,  followed  immediately  by  the 
7th  Virginia,  and  I  ordered  the  six  companies  of  the  24th 
Virginia,  which  were  bringing  up  the  rear  under  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Hairston,  to  halt,  and  directed  Lieutenant 
Squires  to  move  two  pieces  of  artillery  to  the  front  and 
halt  the  rest.  I  found  that  General  Longstreet 's  command 
had  been  hotly  engaged  and  had  just  repulsed  an  attempt 
to  force  a  crossing  of  the  stream. 

7 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

The  position  occupied  by  our  troops  was  a  narrow 
strip  of  woods  on  low  ground  along  the  bank  of  the 
stream,  with  an  open  field  in  rear,  while  the  enemy  occu- 
pied higher  and  better  ground  on  the  opposite  bank. 
Immediately  on  its  arrival,  the  7th  Louisiana,  Colonel 
Hays,  was  put  in  position  in  the  strip  of  woods  on  the 
left  of  the  ford,  relieving  the  17th  Virginia  Regiment 
and  some  companies  of  the  11th  Virginia  which  had 
been  actively  engaged;  and  the  7th  Virginia  Regiment, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Williams  commanding,  was  formed 
on  the  right  of  the  ford,  in  rear  of  the  strip  of  woods, 
and  advanced  to  the  bank  of  the  stream,  relieving  the 
1st  Virginia  Regiment. 

These  movements  were  made  under  fire  from  the 
enemy  on  the  opposite  bluffs,  and  while  the  7th  Virginia 
was  being  formed  in  line,  two  volleys  were  fired  at  it  by 
the  enemy,  throwing  it  into  some  confusion  and  causing 
it  to  begin  firing  without  orders,  while  there  were  some 
of  our  troops  in  front  of  it.  It,  however,  soon  recovered 
from  the  momentary  confusion  and  advanced  with  firm- 
ness to  the  front.  Lieutenant  Squires  moved  his  pieces 
into  the  open  field  in  rear  of  our  line  and  to  the  right  of 
the  road  leading  to  the  ford,  and  opened  fire  without  any 
guide  except  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  musketry,  as  he  was 
concealed  from  our  view  by  the  woods  on  the  bluffs  occu- 
pied by  him.  The  six  companies  of  the  24th  Virginia  Regi- 
ment and  the  remaining  pieces  of  the  Washington  Artil- 
lery, including  two  pieces  under  Lieutenant  Grarnett  which 
were  attached  to  Longstreet's  brigade,  were  sent  for, 
and  the  companies  of  the  24th  were  put  in  position  along 
the  banks  of  the  stream  on  Hays'  left,  while  the  rest  of 
the  artillery  was  brought  into  action  on  the  same  ground 
with  Squires. 

Squires  had  soon  silenced  the  enemy's  infantry,  which 
retired  precipitately  before  his  fire,  but  the  artillery  from 
the  heights  be}7'ond  the  stream  had  opened  on  ours,  which 
now  responded  to  that  of  the  enemy.  An  artillery  duel 
was   thus   commenced  which  lasted  for   a  considerable 

8 


FIGHT  AT  BLACKBURN'S  FORD 

time.  The  opposing  batteries  were  concealed  from  each 
other's  view  by  the  intervening  woods,  and  they  were 
therefore  compelled  to  regulate  their  fire  by  the  sound 
of  the  guns.  The  enemy  had  the  decided  advantage  of 
position,  as  he  was  on  high  ground,  while  our  guns  were 
located  in  a  flat  nearly  on  a  level  with  the  stream,  thus 
giving  them  the  benefit  of  a  plunging  fire.  This  duel 
finally  ceased  and  the  enemy  retired,  baffled  in  his  effort 
to  force  our  position. 

In  his  reports  of  this  affair,  the  enemy  represented 
our  troops  as  being  protected  by  rifle  pits  with  masked 
batteries ;  whereas  the  fact  was  that  we  had  nothing  in 
the  shape  of  rifle  pits  or  breastworks,  and  our  guns  were 
in  the  open  field,  though  concealed  from  the  enemy's 
view  by  the  intervening  woods.  These  guns  had  been 
brought  on  the  field  along  with  my  brigade,  but  were 
so  brought  as  to  elude  observation.  Before  their  arrival 
not  an  artillery  shot  had  been  fired  by  us  from  this 
quarter,  and  there  had  been  only  a  few  shots  earlier  in 
the  day  from  the  guns,  with  Bonham,  at  Mitchell's  Ford 
above. 

As  soon  as  it  was  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had 
retired,  General  Longstreet  moved  to  the  rear  with  his 
two  regiments  that  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  fight,  and 
I  was  left  to  occupy  his  former  position  with  my  brigade 
and  the  11th  Virginia  Regiment  of  his  brigade.  A  few 
were  wounded  in  my  command,  but  I  believe  none  killed. 
General  Longstreet 's  loss  was  not  heavy,  but  an  examina- 
tion of  the  ground  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Run,  next 
morning,  showed  that  the  enemy  had  suffered  severely, 
quite  a  number  of  dead  bodies  being  found  abandoned. 
At  one  point,  where  it  was  apparent  a  regiment  had 
been  in  line,  over  one  hundred  muskets  and  hats  were 
found  in  a  row,  showing  evidently  that  they  had  been 
abandoned  in  a  panic,  produced  probably  by  the  fire 
from  Squires'  guns.  Many  knapsacks,  canteens,  blankets 
and  India  rubber  cloths  were  found  scattered  on  the 
ground,  proving  that  the  enemy  had  retired  in  confusion. 

9 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

This  fight  was  preliminary  to  the  approaching  battle, 
and  its  result  had  a  very  inspiring  effect  upon  our  troops 
generally.  It  was  subsequently  ascertained  that  the  force 
engaged,  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  was  Tyler's  division 
of  McDowell's  army,  which  had  been  sent  to  the  front 
for  the  purpose  of  making  a  demonstration,  while 
McDowell  himself  was  engaged  in  reconnoitring  on  our 
right,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  that  flank 
could  be  turned  by  the  way  of  Wolf  Run  Shoals,  just 
below  the  junction  of  Bull  Run  and  the  Occoquon.  Tyler 
exceeded  his  instructions,  it  appears,  and  endeavored  to 
gain  some  glory  for  himself  by  forcing  our  position  at 
Blackburn's  Ford,  but  he  paid  dearly  for  the  experiment. 

During  the  19th  I  continued  to  occupy  the  position 
at  Blackburn's  Ford,  and  occasionally  small  bodies  of  the 
enemy  could  be  seen  by  scouts  sent  to  the  opposite  side 
of  Bull  Run,  on  the  heights  where  he  had  taken  his  posi- 
tion on  the  18th,  previous  to  the  advance  against  Long- 
street.  During  the  day  my  troops,  with  a  few  rough  tools 
and  their  bayonets,  succeeded  in  making  very  tolerable 
rifle  pits  on  the  banks  of  the  stream,  and  they  were  not 
molested  by  the  enemy. 

About  dark  the  brigade  commanders  were  summoned 
to  a  council  at  McLean's  house  by  Gfeneral  Beauregard, 
and  he  proceeded  to  inform  us  of  his  plans  for  the  next 
day.  He  told  us  that,  at  his  instance,  the  Government 
at  Richmond  had  ordered  General  Johnston  to  move  from 
the  Shenandoah  Valley  with  his  whole  force  to  co-operate 
with  ours ;  and  that  the  General  was  then  on  his  march 
directly  across  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  would  probably  attack 
the  enemy's  right  flank  very  early  the  next  morning, 
while  we  were  to  fall  upon  his  left  flank.  Before  he 
finished  the  statement  of  his  plans,  Brigadier  General 
Thomas  J.  Jackson,  subsequently  famous  as  "Stonewall 
Jackson,"  entered  the  room  and  reported  to  General 
Beauregard  that  he  had  just  arrived  from  General  John- 
ston's army,  by  the  way  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad, 
with  his  brigade,  about  2500  strong. 

10 


FIGHT  AT  BLACKBURN'S  FORD 

This  information  took  General  Beauregard  by  sur- 
prise, and  he  inquired  of  General  Jackson  if  General 
Johnston  would  not  march  the  rest  of  his  command  on 
the  direct  road  so  as  to  get  on  the  enemy's  right  flank. 
General  Jackson  replied  that  he  thought  not,  that  he 
thought  the  purpose  was  to  transport  the  whole  force 
on  the  railroad  from  Piedmont  station  on  the  east  of  the 
Blue  Ridge.  After  General  Jackson  had  given  all  the 
information  he  possessed,  and  received  instructions  as 
to  the  disposition  of  his  brigade,  he  retired,  and  General 
Beauregard  proceeded  to  develop  his  plans  fully.  The 
information  received  from  General  Jackson  was  most 
unexpected,  but  General  Beauregard  stated  that  he 
thought  Jackson  was  mistaken,  and  that  he  was  satisfied 
General  Johnston  was  marching  with  the  rest  of  his 
troops  and  would  attack  the  enemy's  right  flank  as  before 
stated. 

Upon  this  hypothesis,  he  then  decided  that,  when 
General  Johnston's  attack  began  and  he  had  become 
fully  engaged,  of  which  we  were  to  judge  from  the 
character  of  the  musketry  fire,  we  would  cross  Bull  Run 
from  our  several  positions  and  move  to  the  attack  of  the 
enemy's  left  flank  and  rear.  He  stated  that  he  had  no 
doubt  Johnston's  attack  would  be  a  surprise  to  the  enemy, 
that  the  latter  would  not  know  what  to  think  of  it,  and 
when  he  turned  to  meet  that  attack  and  found  himself 
assailed  on  the  other  side,  he  would  be  still  more  sur- 
prised and  would  not  know  what  to  do,  that  the  effect 
would  be  a  complete  rout,  a  perfect  Waterloo,  and  that 
we  would  pursue,  cross  the  Potomac  and  arouse  Mary- 
land. 

General  Johnston's  attack,  according  to  General 
Beauregard's  calculations,  was  to  begin  next  morning 
about  or  very  shortly  after  daybreak.  Having  received 
our  instructions  fully,  we  retired,  and  I  returned  to  my 
position  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  where  I  assembled  my 
colonels,  and  was  proceeding  to  explain  to  them  the 
plans  for  the  next  day  and  instruct  them  to  have  every- 

11 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

thing  in  readiness,  when  we  were  startled  by  a  fierce 
volley  of  musketry  on  our  immediate  right.  This  of 
course  put  an  end  to  the  conference  and  every  one 
rushed  to  his  position  in  anticipation  of  a  night  attack. 

The  11th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  Samuel  Garland, 
was  moved  promptly  to  the  rear  of  the  point  where  the 
firing  occurred,  which  was  repeated,  and  after  a  good 
deal  of  trouble  we  succeeded  in  ascertaining  that  it 
proceeded  from  two  of  my  companies,  which  had  been 
posted  in  the  woods  on  the  bank  of  the  stream  to  the  right 
of  my  position,  in  order  to  cover  some  points  where  a 
crossing  might  be  effected.  The  officers  of  one  of  the 
companies  declared  that  a  body  of  the  enemy  could  be 
seen,  stealthily  moving  down  the  opposite  bank,  and  that 
the  firing  had  been  at  that  body  and  had  been  returned. 
The  firing  by  this  time  had  ceased  and  no  movement  of 
the  enemy  could  be  heard.  This  affair,  however,  kept 
us  on  the  alert  all  night,  but  I  became  satisfied  that  it 
resulted  from  some  mistake,  caused  perhaps  by  the  move- 
ment of  some  straggling  persons  of  our  own  command, 
in  the  darkness,  in  the  woods.  Such  alarms  were  not 
uncommon,  subsequently,  when  two  opposing  forces  were 
lying  on  their  arms  at  night  in  front  of  each  other.  A 
very  slight  circumstance  would  sometimes  produce  a 
volley  at  night  from  the  one  or  the  other  side,  as  it 
might  be. 

At  light  on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  instead  of  our 
being  required  to  advance  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy 
according  to  the  programme  of  the  night  before,  General 
Longstreet  came  in  a  great  hurry  to  relieve  me,  and 
with  orders  for  my  brigade  to  move  as  rapidly  as  pos- 
sible to  a  point  on  our  right  on  the  road  leading  from 
Yates'  Ford,  below  Union  Mills,  to  Manassas  Junction. 
As  soon  as  relieved,  I  moved  in  the  direction  indicated, 
and  the  head  of  my  column  was  just  emerging  into 
Camp  Walker,  from  the  woods  in  rear  of  McLean's  farm, 
— where  I  had  been  on  the  18th,  at  the  time  the  enemy 
opened  his  artillery  fire  beyond  Blackburn's  Ford, — when 

12 


FIGHT  AT  BLACKBURN'S  FORD 

I  was  met  by  a  courier  with  orders  to  halt  where  I 
was,  as  the  alarm,  upon  which  the  order  to  me  had  been 
founded,  had  proved  false. 

As  this  false  alarm  was  rather  singular  in  its  nature, 
but  of  such  a  character  that  any  general  might  have 
been  deceived  by  it,  I  will  state  how  it  occurred.  A 
captain  of  General  Ewell's  brigade,  who  had  been  posted 
with  his  company  on  picket  at  Yates'  Ford  not  far 
below  Union  Mills,  retired  from  his  post  and  reported 
in  the  most  positive  manner  that  the  enemy  had  ap- 
peared in  heavy  force  on  the  opposite  bank  of  Bull  Run 
and  commenced  building  two  bridges.  He  further  stated 
that  he  had  seen  General  McDowell  on  a  white  horse 
superintending  the  construction  of  the  bridges. 

As  there  was  no  reason  to  doubt  his  veracity  or 
courage,  General  Ewell,  of  course,  sent  at  once  the 
information  to  General  Beauregard  and  hence  the  order 
for  my  movement.  After  the  message  was  dispatched, 
something  suggested  a  doubt  as  to  the  correctness  of 
the  report,  and  the  officer  making  it  was  sent  in  charge 
of  another  to  ascertain  the  facts.  On  arriving  in  sight 
of  the  ford  he  pointed  triumphantly  to  the  opposite  bank 
and  exclaimed,  " There  they  are.  Don't  you  see  the  two 
bridges,  don't  you  see  McDowell  on  his  white  horse?" 
when  the  fact  was  there  was  nothing  visible  but  the  ford 
and  the  unoccupied  banks  of  the  stream,  which  were 
so  obstructed  as  to  render  a  crossing  impracticable  until 
the  obstructions  were  removed. 

It  was  then  apparent  that  it  was  a  clear  case  of 
hallucination,  produced  by  a  derangement  of  the  nervous 
system,  consequent  on  a  loss  of  sleep  and  great  anxiety 
of  mind  resulting  from  the  nature  of  the  duties  in  which 
he  had  been  engaged.  Neither  his  sincerity  nor  his 
courage  was  questioned,  and  this  affair  shows  how  the 
most  careful  commander  may  be  misled  when  he  has  to 
rely  on  information  furnished  by  others.  It  requires 
very  great  experience  and  a  very  discriminating  judg- 
ment to  enable  a  commanding  general  to  sift  the  truth 

13 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

out  of  the  great  mass  of  exaggerated  reports  made  to 
him,  and  hence  he  has  often  to  rely  on  his  own  personal 
inspection. 

I  have  known  important  movements  to  be  suspended 
on  the  battlefield,  on  account  of  reports  from  very  gal- 
lant officers  that  the  enemy  was  on  one  flank  or  the  other 
in  heavy  force,  when  a  calm  inspection  proved  the  re- 
ported bodies  of  the  enemy  to  be  nothing  more  than  stone 
or  rail  fences.  Some  officers,  while  exposing  their  lives 
with  great  daring,  sometimes  fail  to  preserve  that  clear- 
ness of  judgment  and  calmness  of  the  nerves  which  is 
so  necessary  to  enable  one  to  see  things  as  they  really 
are  during  an  engagement;  and  hence  it  is  that  there 
are  so  many  conflicting  reports  of  the  same  matters. 
The  capacity  of  preserving  one's  presence  of  mind  in 
action  is  among  the  highest  attributes  of  an  efficient 
commander  or  subordinate  officer,  and  it  must  be  con- 
fessed that  the  excitement  of  battle,  especially  when 
the  shells  are  bursting  and  the  bullets  whistling  thick 
around,  is  wonderfully  trying  to  the  nerves  of  the 
bravest. 

The  false  alarm  out  of  which  the  above  reflections 
have  sprung,  operated  as  a  very  great  relief  to  my  com- 
mand, as  it  enabled  my  men,  who  had  had  very  little  to 
eat,  and  scarcely  any  rest  or  sleep  for  two  nights  and 
days,  to  cook  provisions  and  get  a  good  rest  and  sleep 
in  the  woods  where  they  were  halted,  and  thereby  to  be 
prepared  to  go  through  the  extraordinary  fatigues  of 
the  next  day. 

On  this  day,  the  20th,  General  Johnston  arrived  at 
Manassas  by  the  railroad,  and  an  order  was  issued  for 
his  assuming  command,  as  the  ranking  officer,  of  all  the 
troops  of  the  united  armies.  It  was  now  ascertained 
beyond  doubt  that  all  of  his  troops  were  coming  by  the 
railroad. 


GENERAL  JUBAL  ANDERSON  EARLY 


CHAPTER  III. 

Early's  Brigade  at  Manassas. 

At  this  time  the  largest  organizations  in  our  army- 
were  brigades,  and  each  brigade  commander  received  his 
orders  directly  from  headquarters.  Since  the  conference 
at  Fairfax  Station,  when  General  Beauregard  stated  that 
his  effective  strength  did  not  exceed  15,000  men,  one 
regiment,  the  1st  South  Carolina,  had  been  sent  off  by 
reason  of  expiration  of  term  of  service,  and  one  regiment, 
the  7th  Louisiana,  had  joined  my  brigade.  Besides  this, 
General  Beauregard's  troops  had  been  augmented,  since 
the  advance  of  the  enemy,  by  the  arrival  of  six  com- 
panies of  the  8th  Louisiana,  the  5th  North  Carolina 
State  Troops,  the  11th  North  Carolina  Volunteers,  the 
13th  Mississippi,  three  companies  of  the  49th  Virginia 
and  Hampton's  South  Carolina  Legion;  the  latter  con- 
taining six  companies  of  infantry.  His  whole  effective 
force,  however,  did  not  probably  much  exceed  the 
estimate  made  at  the  time  of  the  conference,  as  the 
measles  and  typhoid  fever,  which  were  prevailing,  had 
reduced  very  much  the  strength  of  the  regiments,  espe- 
cially among  the  Virginia  troops  which  were  entirely  new. 
To  reinforce  him,  Holmes '  brigade  of  two  regiments  had 
arrived  from  Aquia  Creek,  and  Johnston's  troops  were 
arriving  by  the  railroad,  after  much  delay  by  reason  of 
accidents  or  mismanagement  on  the  part  of  the  railroad 
officials. 

On  the  20th  we  were  not  molested  by  the  enemy, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  21st  the  position  of  Beau- 
regard's troops  was  pretty  much  the  same  as  it  had 
been  on  the  18th,  to  wit:  Ewell  at  Union  Mills;  D.  E. 
Jones  at  McLean's  Ford;  Longstreet,  reinforced  by  the 
5th  North  Carolina,  at  Blackburn's  Ford;  Bonham,  re- 
inforced by  six  companies  of  the  8th  Louisiana  and  the 
11th  North   Carolina   Volunteers,   at   Mitchell's   Ford; 

15 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Cocke,  reinforced  by  some  companies  of  the  8th  Virginia 
Regiment  and  three  companies  of  the  49th  Virginia 
Regiment,  at  some  fords  below  Stone  Bridge ;  and  Evans 
at  Stone  Bridge;  while  my  brigade  was  in  reserve  in 
the  woods  in  rear  of  McLean's  farm.  No  artillery  was 
attached  to  my  brigade  on  this  day. 

The  arrival  of  General  Johnston  in  person  and  the 
transportation  of  his  troops  on  the  railroad  had,  of 
course,  entirely  changed  the  plans  of  operations  as  com- 
municated to  us  on  the  night  of  the  19th,  but  the  new 
plans,  which  were  rendered  necessary  by  the  altered 
condition  of  things,  were  not  communicated  to  us,  and 
I  had,  therefore,  to  await  orders. 

Very  early  on  the  morning  of  the  21st  the  enemy 
opened  fire  with  artillery  from  the  heights  on  the  north 
of  Bull  Run  near  Blackburn's  Ford,  and  I  was  ordered 
to  occupy  a  position  in  rear  of  the  pine  woods  north 
of  McLean's  house,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  support  Long- 
street  or  Jones  as  might  be  necessary.  After  being  in 
position  some  time,  I  received  a  request  from  General 
Longstreet  for  one  of  my  regiments  to  be  sent  to  him, 
and  I  sent  him  the  six  companies  of  the  24th  Virginia 
under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hairston,  and  two  companies 
of  the  7th  Louisiana  under  Major  Penn.  Not  long  after- 
wards I  received  a  request  for  another  regiment,  and 
I  carried  the  remaining  eight  companies  of  the  7th 
Louisiana  to  Blackburn's  Ford,  leaving  Colonel  Kemper 
with  his  regiment  behind. 

On  arriving  at  the  ford,  I  found  that  the  whole  of 
Longstreet 's  brigade  had  been  crossed  over  Bull  Run, 
and  were  lying  under  cover  at  the  foot  of  the  hills  on 
its  northern  bank,  awaiting  a  signal  to  advance  against 
the  enemy,  who  was  in  considerable  force  near  the  point 
occupied  by  his  artillery  at  the  fight  on  the  18th.  The 
companies  of  the  24th  were  being  crossed  over  to  join 
Longstreet 's  brigade,  and  the  General  ordered  the  7th 
Louisiana  to  be  formed  in  line  in  the  strip  of  woods 
on  the  southern  bank  of  the  stream,  covering  the  ford. 

16 


EARLY'S  BRIGADE  AT  MANASSAS 

The  enemy  was  keeping  up  a  continuous  artillery  fire 
from  two  batteries,  one  in  front  of  the  ford  and  the 
other  some  distance  to  the  right,  which  rendered  the 
vicinity  of  the  ford  quite  uncomfortable,  but  the  troops 
across  the  Run  were  in  a  great  measure  under  cover. 

After  Hays'  regiment  had  been  put  in  position,  Gen- 
eral Longstreet  went  across  the  stream  to  reconnoitre, 
and  in  a  short  time  returned  and  directed  me  to  take 
Hays'  and  Kemper's  regiments,  cross  at  McLean's  Ford, 
and  move  around  and  capture  the  battery  to  his  right, 
which  he  said  could  be  easily  taken.  I  was  informed 
by  him  that  Jones  had  crossed  the  Run  and  was  on  the 
hills  beyond  McLean's  Ford,  likewise  awaiting  the  signal 
to  advance,  and  I  was  directed  to  move  between  Mm 
and  the  Run  against  the  enemy's  battery.  Hays'  regi- 
ment was  moved  back  to  where  Kemper's  was,  and 
was  exposed  to  the  fire  from  the  enemy's  batteries  which 
was  attracted  by  the  dust  arising  from  its  march  over 
the  direct  road  through  the  pines.  A  shell  exploded 
in  the  ranks,  killing  and  wounding  four  or  five  men.  The 
two  regiments  were  moved  to  McLean's  Ford,  and  while 
they  were  crossing  over  and  forming,  I  rode  forward 
to  an  eminence,  where  I  observed  a  lookout  in  a  tree, 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  exact  position  of 
the  battery  and  the  route  over  which  I  would  have  to 
advance  against  it.  While  I  was  engaged  in  obtaining 
this  information,  Colonel  Chisolm,  a  volunteer  aide  of 
General  Beauregard,  rode  up  and  informed  me  that 
General  Beauregard's  orders  were  that  the  whole  force 
should  cross  Bull  Run  to  the  south  side. 

I  think  this  was  about  11.00  a.m.  I  informed  him 
of  the  order  I  had  received  from  General  Longstreet, 
and  he  stated  that  Longstreet  was  crossing,  and  that 
the  order  embraced  me  as  well  as  the  rest.  I  felt  this  as 
a  reprieve  from  almost  certain  destruction,  for  I  had 
discovered  that  the  route  by  which  I  would  be  compelled 
to  advance  against  the  battery  was  along  an  open  valley 
for  some  distance  and  then  up  a  naked  hill  to  the  plain 
2  17 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

on  which  the  battery  was  located,  the  greater  part  of 
the  route  being  raked  by  the  enemy's  guns.  The  look- 
out had  also  informed  me  that  a  considerable  body  of 
infantry  was  in  the  woods  near  the  battery.  It  turned 
out  afterwards  that  this  battery,  which  I  was  ordered  to 
take,  was  supported  by  a  brigade  of  infantry,  posted 
behind  a  formidable  abattis  of  felled  timber.  An  at- 
tempt to  carry  out  my  orders  would  very  probably 
have  entailed  the  annihilation  or  utter  rout  of  my  two 
regiments;  and  in  fact  much  later  in  the  day,  Jones' 
brigade  on  moving  against  this  battery  sustained  a 
damaging  repulse. 

After  recrossing  to  the  south  side,  I  sent  Kemper's 
regiment  to  its  former  position,  and  moved  with  Hays' 
regiment  up  the  Run  to  Longstreet's  position,  as  I 
thought  he  probably  desired  its  return  to  him.  On  reach- 
ing Blackburn's  Ford,  I  found  General  Longstreet  cau- 
tiously withdrawing  a  part  of  his  troops  across  the 
Run,  and  he  informed  me  that  he  did  not  now  require 
Hays'  regiment,  but  would  retain  the  companies  of  the 
24th.  Hays  was  then  ordered  to  move  down  the  Run  to 
McLean's  Ford  and  return  in  that  way  to  the  position 
at  which  Kemper  was,  so  as  to  avoid  the  artillery  fire 
while  passing  over  the  direct  route. 

I  rode  directly  to  Kemper's  position,  and  after  being 
there  a  short  time  I  discovered  clouds  of  dust  arising 
about  McLean's  Ford,  which  I  supposed  to  be  produced 
by  Jones'  brigade  returning  to  its  original  position. 
Fearing  that  Hays'  regiment  might  be  mistaken  for  the 
enemy  and  fired  upon,  I  rode  rapidly  to  Jones'  position 
and  found  some  of  his  men  forming  in  the  rifle  pits  in 
rear  of  the  ford,  while  the  General  was  looking  with  his 
field  glasses  at  Hays'  regiment,  which  was  advancing 
from  the  direction  of  the  enemy's  position  higher  up 
the  Run.  I  informed  him  what  command  it  was  and 
requested  that  his  men  might  be  cautioned  against  firing, 
for  which  they  were  preparing. 

As  soon  as  this  was  done,  General  Jones  asked  me 

18 


EARLY'S  BRIGADE  AT  MANASSAS 

if  I  had  received  an  order  from  General  Beauregard, 
directing  that  I  should  go  to  him  with  my  brigade.  Upon 
my  stating  that  I  had  received  no  such  order,  he  said 
that  he  had  received  a  note  from  General  Beauregard 
in  which  he  was  directed  to  send  me  to  the  General. 
The  note,  which  was  in  the  hands  of  one  of  Jones'  staff 
officers,  was  sent  for  and  shown  to  me.  It  was  in  pencil, 
and  after  giving  brief  directions  for  the  withdrawal 
across  the  Run  and  stating  the  general  purpose  to  go 
to  the  left  where  the  heavy  firing  was,  there  was  a 
direction  at  the  foot  in  very  nearly  these  words, — ' '  Send 
Early  to  me."  This  information  was  given  to  me  some 
time  between  12  m.  and  1  p.m.* 

The  note  did  not  state  to  what  point  I  was  to  go, 
but  I  knew  that  General  Beauregard's  position  had 
been  near  Mitchell's  Ford  and  that  he  was  to  be  found 
somewhere  to  our  left.  I  sent  word  for  Hays  to  move 
up  as  rapidly  as  possible,  directed  Kemper  to  get  ready 
to  move,  sent  a  message  to  General  Longstreet  request- 
ing the  return  of  the  companies  of  the  24th,  and  directed 
my  Acting  Adjutant  General,  Captain  Gardner,  to  ride 
to  Mitchell's  Ford  and  ascertain  where  General  Beau- 
regard was,  as  well  as  the  route  I  was  to  pursue. 

The  messenger  sent  to  General  Longstreet  returned  and 
informed  me  that  the  General  said  there  was  a  regiment 
in  the  pines  to  my  left  which  had  been  ordered  to  report 
to  him,  and  that  I  could  take  that  regiment  instead  of 
the  companies  of  my  own,  to  save  time  and  prevent 
the  exposure  of  both  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery 
in  passing  to  and  from  Blackburn's  Ford.  In  this 
arrangement  I  readily  concurred,  and  soon  found,  to  my 
left  in  the  pines,  the  13th  Mississippi  Regiment  under 
Colonel  Barksdale,  which  had  very  recently  arrived.  The 
Colonel  consented  to  accompany  me,  and  as  soon  as  the 


*  In  his  report  (General  Beauregard  states  that  I  did  not  receive 
this  order  until  2.00  p.m.  This  is  a  mistake.  I  could  not  possibly 
have  reached  the  battlefield  at  the  time  I  did,  if  the  reception  of  the 
order  had  been  delayed  until  2.00  p.m. 

19 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

command  could  be  got  ready,  it  was  started  on  the  road 
towards   Mitchell's   Ford. 

This  movement  commenced  about  or  very  shortly  after 
1  o'clock  p.m.  On  the  way  I  met  Captain  Gardner  re- 
turning with  the  information  that  General  Beauregard's 
headquarters  would  be  at  the  Lewis  house,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  firing  on  our  extreme  left,  and  that  I  was 
to  go  there.  On  reaching  General  Bonham's  position 
in  rear  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  he  informed  me  that  I  would 
have  to  move  through  the  fields  towards  the  left  to 
find  the  Lewis  house,  and  he  pointed  out  the  direction; 
but  he  did  not  know  the  exact  location  of  the  house.  I 
moved  in  the  direction  pointed  out,  and  continued  to 
pass  on  to  our  left,  through  the  fields,  towards  the  firing 
in  the  distance,  endeavoring,  as  I  advanced,  to  find  out 
where  the  Lewis  house  was. 

While  moving  on,  Captain  Smith,  an  assistant  in  the 
adjutant  general's  office  at  General  Beauregard's 
headquarters,  passed  us  in  a  great  hurry,  also  looking- 
for  General  Beauregard  and  the  Lewis  house.  He  told 
me  that  information  had  been  received  at  the  Junction 
that  6,000  of  the  enemy  had  passed  the  Manassas  Gap 
railroad,  and  it  was  this  information  (which  subsequently 
proved  to  be  false)  that  he  was  going  to  communicate  to 
the  General. 

The  day  was  excessively  hot  and  dry.  Hays'  regi- 
ment was  a  good  deal  exhausted  by  the  marching  and 
the  counter-marching  about  Blackburn's  and  McLean's 
Fords.  Barksdale's  regiment,  an  entirely  new  one,  had 
just  arrived  from  the  south  over  the  railroad,  and  was 
unused  to  marching.  Our  progress  was  therefore  not 
as  rapid  as  I  could  have  wished,  but  we  passed  on  with 
all  possible  speed  in  the  direction  of  the  firing,  which 
was  our  only  guide.  Towards  3  o'clock  p.m.  we  reached 
the  field  of  battle  and  began  to  perceive  the  scenes 
usual  in  rear  of  an  army  engaged  in  action.  On  enter- 
ing the  road  leading  from  the  Lewis  house  towards 
Manassas,  we  met  quite  a  stream  of  stragglers  going 

20 


EARLY'S  BRIGADE  AT  MANASSAS 

to  the  rear,  and  were  informed  by  them  that  everything 
was  over  with  us.  I  was  riding  by  the  side  of  Colonel 
Kemper  at  the  head  of  the  column,  and  we  had  the 
satisfaction  of  being  assured  that  if  we  went  on  the 
field  on  horseback,  we  certainly  would  be  killed,  as  the 
enemy  shot  all  the  mounted  officers.  Some  of  the  men 
said  that  their  regiments  had  been  entirely  cut  to  pieces, 
and  there  was  no  use  for  them  to  remain  any  longer. 

It  was  to  the  encouraging  remarks  of  this  stream 
of  recreants  that  my  command  was  exposed  as  it  moved 
on,  but  not  a  man  fell  out  of  ranks.  Only  one  man  who 
had  been  engaged  offered  to  return  and  he  belonged 
to  the  4th  Alabama  Regiment,  which  he  said  had  been 
nearly  destroyed,  but  he  declared  that  he  would  "go 
back  and  give  them  another  trial."  He  fell  into  the 
ranks  of  Kemper's  regiment  and  I  believe  remained 
with  it  to  the  close  of  the  battle.  Captain  Gardner 
had  been  sent  ahead  for  instructions  and  had  met  with 
Colonel  John  S.  Preston,  a  volunteer  aide  to  General 
Beauregard;  and  on  our  getting  near  to  the  battlefield, 
Colonel  Preston  rode  to  meet  us  and  informed  me  that 
the  General  had  gone  to  the  front  on  the  right,  to  con- 
duct an  attack  on  the  enemy,  but  that  General  Johnston 
was  on  that  part  of  the  field  near  which  we  were  and 
would  give  me  instructions.  He  pointed  out  the  direc- 
tion in  which  General  Johnston  was,  and  I  moved  on, 
soon  meeting  the  General  himself,  who  rode  towards  us 
when  he  discovered  our  approach,  and  expressed  his 
gratification  at  our  arrival. 

I  asked  him  at  once  to  show  me  my  position,  to 
which  he  replied  that  he  was  too  much  engaged  to  do 
that  in  person,  but  would  give  me  directions  as  to  what 
I  was  to  do.  He  then  directed  me  to  move  to  our  own 
extreme  left  and  attack  the  enemy  on  his  right,  stating 
that  by  directing  my  march  along  the  rear  of  our  line, 
by  the  sound  of  the  firing  in  front,  there  could  be  no 
mistake;  and  he  cautioned  me  to  take  especial  care  to 
clear  our  whole  line  before  advancing  to  the  front,  and 

21 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

be  particular  and  not  fire  on  any  of  our  own  troops, 
which  he  was  sorry  to  say  had  been  done  in  some 
instances. 

Affairs  now  wore  a  very  gloomy  aspect,  and  from 
all  the  indications  in  the  rear  the  day  appeared  to  be 
going  against  us.  While  General  Johnston  was  speaking 
to  me,  quite  a  squad  of  men  approached  us  going  to 
the  rear,  and  the  General  asking  them  to  what  regiment 
they  belonged  and  where  going  without  receiving  any 
satisfactory  answer,  directed  me  to  make  my  men  charge 
bayonets  and  drive  them  back  to  the  front.  I  immediately 
ordered  Colonel  Kemper  to  charge  them  with  his  regi- 
ment, when  they  commenced  making  excuses,  saying  they 
were  sick,  or  wounded,  or  had  no  ammunition.  I  saw  at 
once  there  was  no  fight  in  them,  and  I  directed  Colonel 
Kemper  to  move  on  and  not  delay  battling  with  such 
cowards. 

Immediately  in  front  of  us  was  a  body  of  woods  ex- 
tending to  our  left,  in  which  there  was  a  constant  rattle 
of  musketry,  and  I  moved  along  the  rear  of  this  woods, 
crossing  the  road  from  Manassas  to  Sudley,  and  inclining 
to  the  left  so  as  to  clear  our  line  entirely.  While  so 
moving  Colonel  Kemper  pointed  out  to  me  the  United 
States  flag  floating  in  the  distance  on  some  high  point 
in  front  of  our  right,  probably  the  top  of  a  house. 

To  clear  our  line  entirely  on  our  left,  I  found  that 
it  was  necessary  to  pass  beyond  the  woods  in  which 
our  troops  were,  and  as  I  approached  the  open  space 
beyond,  a  messenger  came  to  me  from  Colonel,  after- 
wards General,  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  who  was  on  our  ex- 
treme left  with  two  companies  of  cavalry  and  a  battery 
of  artillery  under  Lieutenant  Beckham,  stating  that  the 
Colonel  said  the  enemy  was  about  giving  way  and  if 
we  would  hurry  up  he  would  soon  be  in  retreat.  This 
was  the  first  word  of  encouragement  I  had  received 
after  reaching  the  vicinity  of  the  battlefield.  I  was  then 
making  all  the  haste  the  condition  of  my  men,  who  were 
much  blown,  would  permit,  and  I  directed  my  march  to 

22 


EARLY'S  BRIGADE  AT  MANASSAS 

a  field  immediately  on  the  left  of  the  woods,  and  between 
Stuart's  position  and  the  left  of  our  infantry  then  en- 
gaged. 

The  messenger  from  Colonel  Stuart  soon  returned 
in  a  gallop  and  stated  that  the  Colonel  said  the  enemy 
had  only  retired  his  right  behind  a  ridge  now  in  my 
front,  and  was  moving  another  flanking  column  behind 
said  ridge  still  further  to  our  left,  and  he  cautioned  me 
to  be  on  the  lookout  for  this  new  column. 

Having  now  cleared  the  woods,  I  moved  to  the  front, 
in  order  to  form  line  against  the  flanking  column  the 
enemy  was  reported  forming  behind  the  ridge  in  front 
of  me.  I  ordered  Colonel  Kemper,  who  was  in  front, 
to  form  his  regiment,  by  file,  into  line  in  the  open  field, 
just  on  the  left  of  the  woods,  and  sent  back  directions 
for  the  other  regiments  to  move  up  as  rapidly  as  pos- 
sible and  form  to  Kemper's  left  in  echelon.  Just  at 
this  time  I  observed  a  body  of  our  troops  move  from  a 
piece  of  woods  on  my  immediate  right  across  an  open 
space  to  another  in  front  of  it,  and  this  proved  to  be 
the  left  regiment  of  Elzey's  brigade.  I  heard  a  rapid 
fire  open  from  the  woods  into  which  this  regiment  had 
moved,  and  a  body  of  the  enemy  approached  on  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  immediately  in  my  front,  preceded  by  a 
line  of  skirmishers. 

This  ridge  was  the  one  on  which  is  situated  Chinn's 
house,  so  often  mentioned  in  the  description  of  this 
battle,  and  the  subsequent  one  near  the  same  position. 
It  is  a  high  ridge  sloping  off  towards  our  right,  and 
the  enemy  had  the  decided  advantage  of  the  ground, 
as  my  troops  had  to  form  on  the  low  ground  on  our 
side  of  the  ridge,  near  a  small  stream  which  runs  along 
its  base.  The  formation  of  my  troops  was  in  full  view 
of  the  enemy,  and  his  skirmishers,  which  were  about 
four  hundred  yards  in  front  of  us,  opened  on  my  men, 
while  forming,  with  long  range  .rifles  or  minie  muskets. 
Barksdale  and  Hays  came  up  rapidly  and  formed  as 
directed,  Barksdale  in  the  centre  and  Hays  on  the  left. 

23 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

While  their  regiments  were  forming  by  file  into  line, 
under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  sharpshooters,  Kemper's 
regiment  commenced  moving  obliquely  to  the  right 
towards  the  woods  into  which  Elzey's  troops  had  been 
seen  to  move,  and  I  rode  in  front  and  halted  it,  informing 
it  that  there  were  no  troops  in  the  woods,  and  pointing 
out  the  enemy  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge  in  front.  I  then 
rode  to  the  other  regiments  to  direct  their  movements, 
when  Colonel  Kemper,  finding  the  fire  of  the  enemy, 
who  was  beyond  the  range  of  our  smooth  bores,  very 
annoying  to  his  men,  moved  rapidly  to  the  front,  to  the 
cover  of  a  fence  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge.  As  soon  as 
Hays'  regiment  was  formed,  I  ordered  an  advance  and 
Hays  moved  forward  until  in  a  line  with  Kemper,  then 
their  two  regiments  started  up  the  side  of  the  hill.  As  we 
advanced  the  enemy  disappeared  behind  the  crest,  and 
while  we  were  ascending  the  slope  Lieutenant  McDonald, 
acting  aide  to  Colonel  Elzey,  came  riding  rapidly  towards 
me  and  requested  me  not  to  let  my  men  fire  on  the 
troops  in  my  front,  stating  that  they  consisted  of  the 
13th  Virginia  Regiment  of  Elzey's  brigade.  I  said  to 
him, — "They  have  been  firing  on  my  men,"  to  which 
he  replied,  "I  know  they  have,  but  it  is  a  mistake,  I 
recognize  Colonel  Hill  of  the  13th,  and  his  horse."  This 
was  a  mistake  on  the  part  of  Lieutenant  McDonald, 
arising  from  a  fancied  resemblance  of  a  mounted  officer 
with  the  enemy  to  the  Colonel  of  the  13th.  This  regiment 
did  not  reach  the  battlefield  at  all. 

This  information  and  the  positive  assurance  of  Lieu- 
tenant McDonald,  however,  caused  me  to  halt  my  troops 
and  ride  to  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  where  I  observed  a 
regiment  about  two  hundred  yards  to  my  right  drawn 
up  in  line  in  front  of  the  woods  where  Elzey's  left  was. 
The  dress  of  the  volunteers  on  both  sides  at  that  time 
was  very  similar,  and  the  flag  of  the  regiment  I  saw 
was  drooping  around  the  staff,  so  that  I  could  not  see 
whether  it  was  the  United  States  or  the  Confederate 
flag.     The  very   confident   manner   of   Lieutenant   Mc- 

24 


EARLY'S  BRIGADE  AT  MANASSAS 

Donald,  in  his  statement  in  regard  to  the  troops  in  my 
front,  induced  me  to  believe  that  this  must  also  be  one 
of  our  regiments. 

Colonel  Stuart  had  also  advanced  on  my  left  with 
his  two  companies  of  cavalry  and  Beckham's  battery 
of  four  guns,  and  passed  around  Chinn's  house,  the 
battery  had  been  brought  into  action  and  opened  a  flank 
fire  on  the  regiment  I  was  observing.  Thinking  it  cer- 
tainly was  one  of  ours,  I  started  a  messenger  to  Colonel 
Stuart,  to  give  him  the  information  and  request  him  to 
stop  the  firing,  but  a  second  shell  or  ball  from  Beckham's 
guns  caused  the  regiment  to  face  about  and  retire  rapidly, 
when  I  saw  the  United  States  flag  unfurled  and  dis- 
covered the  mistake  into  which  I  had  been  led  by  Lieuten- 
ant McDonald. 

I  immediately  ordered  my  command  forward  and 
it  advanced  to  the  crest  of  the  hill.  All  this  occurred 
in  less  time  than  it  has  taken  me  to  describe  it.  On 
reaching  the  crest  we  came  in  view  of  the  "Warrenton 
Pike  and  the  plains  beyond,  and  now  saw  the  enemy's 
troops  in  full  retreat  across  and  beyond  the  pike.  When 
Kemper's  and  Hays'  regiments  had  advanced,  Barks- 
dale's,  under  a  misapprehension  of  my  orders,  had  not 
at  first  moved,  but  it  soon  followed,  and  the  whole 
command  was  formed  in  line,  along  the  crest  of  the 
ridge,  on  the  right  of  Chinn's  house. 

We  were  now  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  whole  of 
our  infantry,  and  in  advance  of  the  main  line.  The 
only  troops  on  our  left  of  any  description  were  the  two 
companies  of  cavalry  and  Beckham's  battery  with 
Stuart.  On  my  immediate  right  and  a  little  to  the  rear 
was  Elzey's  brigade,  and  farther  to  the  right  I  saw 
our  line  extending  towards  Bull  Bun,  but  I  discovered 
no  indications  of  a  forward  movement. 

My  troops  were  now  very  much  exhausted,  especially 
Hays'  regiment,  which  had  been  marching  nearly  all  the 
morning  before  our  movement  to  the  left,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  give  the  men  a  little  time  to  breathe.  Beck- 

25 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

ham's  guns  had  continued  firing  on  the  retreating  enemy 
until  beyond  their  range,  and  Stuart  soon  went  in 
pursuit  followed  by  Beckham.  Colonel  Cocke  now  came 
up  and  joined  me  with  the  19th  Virginia  Regiment. 

As  soon  as  my  men  had  rested  a  little,  I  directed 
the  brigade  to  advance  in  column  of  divisions  along  the 
route  over  which  we  had  seen  the  enemy  retiring,  and  I 
sent  information  to  the  troops,  on  my  right,  of  my  pur- 
pose to  move  in  their  front  with  the  request  not  to  fire 
on  us.  I  moved  forward  followed  by  Cocke's  regiment, 
crossing  Young's  branch  and  the  Warrenton  Pike  to 
the  north  side.  When  we  got  into  the  valley  of  Young's 
branch  we  lost  sight  of  the  enemy,  and  on  ascending  to 
the  plains  north  of  the  pike  we  could  see  nothing  of 
them.  Passing  to  the  west  and  north  of  the  houses 
known  as  the  Dogan  house,  the  Stone  Tavern,  the 
Matthews  house  and  the  Carter  or  Pittsylvania  house, 
and  being  guided  by  the  abandoned  haversacks  and  mus- 
kets, we  moved  over  the  ground  on  which  the  battle  had 
begun  with  Evans  in  the  early  morning,  and  continued 
our  march  until  we  had  cleared  our  right. 

We  had  now  got  to  a  point  where  Bull  Run  makes 
a  considerable  bend  above  Stone  Bridge,  and  I  halted 
as  we  had  not  observed  any  movement  from  the  main 
line.  Nothing  could  be  seen  of  the  enemy,  and  his 
troops  had  scattered  so  much  in  the  retreat  that  it  was 
impossible  for  me  to  tell  what  route  he  had  taken.  More- 
over the  country  was  entirely  unknown  to  me.  Stuart 
and  Beckham  had  crossed  the  run  above  me,  and  Cocke's 
regiment  had  also  moved  towards  a  ford  above  where 
I  was.  While  I  was  engaged  in  making  some  observa- 
tions and  trying  to  find  out  what  was  going  on,  Colonel 
Chisolm  of  General  Beauregard's  volunteer  staff  passed 
me  with  a  detachment  of  cavalry  in  pursuit  of  a  body  of 
the  enemy  supposed  to  be  across  Bull  Run  above  me. 

About  this  time  it  was  reported  to  me  that  the  enemy 
had  sent  us  a  flag  of  trace,  but  on  inquiry  I  found  it 
was  a  messenger  with  a  note  from  Colonel  Jones  of  the 

26 


EARLY'S  BRIGADE  AT  MANASSAS 

4th  Alabama  Regiment,  who  had  been  very  badly 
wounded  and  was  at  one  of  the  enemy's  hospitals  in 
rear  of  the  battlefield,  and  I  sent  for  him  and  had  him 
brought  in  to  Matthews'  house  near  where  the  battle 
had  begun.  I  also  found  Lieutenant  Colonel  Gardner  of 
the  8th  Georgia  Regiment  in  the  yard  of  the  Carter 
house,  where  he  had  been  brought  by  some  of  the  enemy 
engaged  in  collecting  the  wounded,  and  suffering  from 
a  very  painful  wound. 

Shortly  after  this  President  Davis,  accompanied  by 
several  gentlemen,  rode  to  where  my  command  was. 
He  addressed  a  few  remarks  to  each  regiment  and  was 
received  with  great  enthusiasm.  I  then  informed  him 
of  the  condition  of  things  as  far  as  I  knew  them,  told 
him  of  the  condition  and  location  of  Colonel  Gardner, 
and  requested  him  to  have  medical  assistance  sent  to 
him,  as  no  medical  officer  could  be  found  with  my  com- 
mand at  that  time.  I  informed  him  of  the  fact  that  I 
was  unacquainted  with  the  situation  of  the  country  and 
without  orders  to  guide  me  under  the  circumstances, 
and  asked  him  what  I  should  do. 

He  said  I  had  better  form  my  men  in  line  near  where 
I  was  and  let  them  rest  until  orders  were  received.  I 
requested  him  to  inform  Generals  Beauregard  and 
Johnston  of  my  position  and  ask  them  to  send  me  orders. 
While  we  were  conversing  we  observed  a  body  of  troops 
across  Bull  Run,  some  distance  below,  moving  in  good 
order  in  the  direction  of  Centreville.  I  at  first  supposed 
it  to  be  Bonham's  brigade  moving  from  Mitchell's  Ford, 
but  it  turned  out  to  be  Kershaw's  and  Cash's  regiments 
of  that  brigade,  which  had  preceded  me  to  the  battlefield 
and  were  now  moving  in  pursuit,  after  having  crossed 
at  or  below  Stone  Bridge.  Bonham's  position  at 
Mitchell's  Ford  was  entirely  too  far  off  for  his  move- 
ment to  be  observed. 

As  soon  as  Mr.  Davis  left  me,  I  moved  my  com- 
mand farther  into  the  bend  of  Bull  Run,  and  put  it  in 
line  across  the  bend  with  the  flanks  resting  on  the  stream, 

27 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  right  flank  being  some  distance  above  Stone  Bridge. 
In  this  position  my  troops  spent  the  night.  They  were 
considerably  exhausted  by  the  fatigues  of  the  day,  and 
had  had  nothing  to  eat  since  the  early  morning.  They 
were  now  miles  away  from  their  baggage  and  trains. 
Early  in  the  morning  a  Virginia  company  under  Captain 
Gibson,  unattached,  had  been  permitted,  at  the  request 
of  the  Captain,  to  join  Kemper's  regiment  and  remained 
with  it  throughout  the  day.  A  South  Carolina  company 
belonging  to  Kershaw's  or  Cash's  regiment,  which  was 
on  picket  at  the  time  their  regiments  moved  from 
Mitchell's  Ford,  not  being  able  to  find  its  proper  com- 
mand, had  joined  me  just  as  we  were  advancing  against 
the  enemy  near  China's  house,  and  had  been  attached 
to  Hays'  regiment,  with  which  it  went  into  action.  Lieu- 
tenant Murat  Willis  had  volunteered  his  services  early 
in  the  day  as  aide  and  been  with  me  through  all  my 
movements,  rendering  valuable  service. 

The  conduct  of  my  troops  during  the  whole  day  had 
been  admirable,  and  the  coolness  with  which  they  formed 
in  open  ground  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  sharp- 
shooters was  deserving  of  all  praise.  They  were  in  a 
condition  to  have  taken  up  the  pursuit  the  next  day,  but 
it  would  have  been  with  empty  haversacks,  or  rather 
without  any  except  those  picked  up  on  the  battlefield  and 
along  the  line  of  the  enemy's  retreat. 

My  loss  was  in  killed  and  wounded,  seventy-six,  the 
greater  part  being  in  Kemper's  regiment. 

The  troops  which  were  immediately  in  my  front  near 
Chinn's  house  constituted  the  enemy's  extreme  right, 
and  were,  I  think,  composed  in  part  of  the  regulars 
attached  to  McDowell's  army.  Their  long  range  mus- 
kets or  rifles  enabled  them  to  inflict  the  loss  on  my 
command,  but  I  am  satisfied  that  the  latter  inflicted  little 
or  no  loss  on  the  enemy,  as  he  retired  before  we  got 
within  range  with  our  arms,  which  were  smooth-bore 
muskets. 

As  soon  as  my  troops  were  disposed  for  the  night 

28 


EARLY'S  BRIGADE  AT  MANASSAS 

and  steps  taken  to  guard  the  front,  I  rode  with  my  staff 
officers  in  search  of  either  General  Beauregard  or  Gen- 
eral Johnston,  in  order  to  give  information  of  my 
position  and  get  instructions  for  the  next  morning.  Not 
knowing  the  roads,  I  had  to  take  the  circuitous  route 
over  which  I  had  advanced,  but  I  finally  reached  the 
Lewis  house  to  find  it  a  hospital  for  the  wounded,  and 
the  headquarters  removed.  Not  being  able  to  get  here 
any  information  of  either  of  the  generals,  I  rode  in  the 
direction  of  Manassas  until  I  met  an  officer  who  said  he 
was  on  the  staff  of  General  Johnston  and  was  looking 
for  him.  He  stated  that  he  was  just  from  Manassas 
and  did  not  think  either  of  the  generals  was  there. 

Taking  this  to  be  true  and  not  knowing  where  to 
look  further,  I  rode  back  along  the  Sudley  Mills  road 
to  the  Stone  Tavern,  passing  over  the  main  battlefield, 
and  rejoined  my  command  after  twelve  o'clock  at  night, 
when  I  lay  down  to  rest,  my  bed  being  a  bundle  of 
wheat.  While  trying  to  find  the  generals,  I  discovered 
that  there  was  very  great  confusion  among  our  troops 
that  had  been  engaged  in  the  battle.  They  were  scattered 
in  every  direction,  regiments  being  separated  from  their 
brigades,  companies  from  their  regiments,  while  many 
squads  and  individuals  were  seeking  their  commands. 
That  part  of  the  army  was  certainly  in  no  condition  to 
make  pursuit  next  morning. 

Very  early  on  the  morning  of  the  22nd,  I  sent  Captain 
Fleming  Gardner  to  Manassas  for  instruction,  and  he 
returned  with  directions  to  me  from  General  Beauregard 
to  remain  where  I  was  until  further  orders,  and  to  have 
my  men  made  as  comfortable  as  possible.  A  heavy  rain 
had  now  set  in,  which  continued  through  the  day  and 
night.  When  it  was  ascertained  that  there  was  to  be 
no  movement,  I  rode  over  the  battlefield  and  to  the  hos- 
pitals in  the  vicinity  to  see  about  having  my  wounded 
brought  in  who  had  not  been  taken  care  of.  The  country 
in  rear  of  the  enemy's  line  of  battle  of  the  day  before, 
and  along  his  routes  of  retreat  was  strewn  with  knap- 

29 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JTJBAL  A.  EARLY 

sacks,  haversacks,  canteens,  blankets,  overcoats,  india- 
rubber  cloths,  mnskets,  equipments,  and  all  the  debris 
of  a  routed  army. 

A  report  subsequently  made  by  a  Committee  of  the 
Federal  Congress,  of  which  Senator  Wade  was  chair- 
man, gave  a  most  preposterous  account  of  "Rebel 
atrocities"  committed  upon  the  dead  and  wounded  of 
the  Federal  army  after  the  battle.  I  am  able  to  say, 
from  my  personal  knowledge,  that  its  statements  are 
false,  and  the  Federal  surgeons,  left  with  the  wounded, 
could  bear  testimony  to  their  falsehood. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
Details  of  the  Battle  of  Manassas. 

I  have  now  told  what  I  saw  and  did  during  the  first 
battle  of  Manassas,  and  as  many  very  erroneous  accounts 
of  that  battle,  both  in  its  general  features  and  its  details, 
were  given  by  newspaper  correspondents,  from  both 
sections,  which  have  furnished  the  basis  for  most  of 
the  descriptions  of  it,  contained  errors — even  in  works 
professing  to  be  authentic  histories, — I  will  here  give  a 
succinct  account  of  the  battle  from  the  authentic  official 
reports,  and  my  own  knowledge  as  far  as  it  extends. 

On  the  morning  of  the  21st  we  held  the  line  of  Bull 
Run,  with  our  right  at  Union  Mills  and  our  left  at  Stone 
Bridge.  Elwell's  brigade  was  at  Union  Mills,  Jones'  at 
McLean's  Ford,  Longstreet's  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  Bon- 
ham's  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  Cocke  at  the  fords  below 
Stone  Bridge,  and  Evans  with  Sloan's  regiment  and 
Wheat's  battalion  was  at  the  Stone  Bridge.  Holmes' 
brigade,  which  had  arrived  from  Aquia  Creek,  was  some 
three  miles  in  rear  of  Ewell  's  position.  My  brigade  was 
in  reserve  to  support  Longstreet  or  Jones,  as  might  be 
required,  and  Jackson's  and  parts  of  Bee's  and  Bartow's 
brigades  of  Johnston's  army — which  had  arrived  by 
the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad — were  held  as  a  general 
reserve  to  be  used  as  occasion  might  require.  The  War- 
renton  Pike  from  Centreville  to  Warrenton  crosses  Bull 
Run  at  Stone  Bridge,  and  its  general  direction  from 
Centreville  is  a  little  south  of  west. 

McDowell's  force  had  reached  Centreville  on  the 
18th,  and  that  day  the  19th  and  20th  had  been  employed 
by  him  in  reconnoitring.  Contrary  to  General  Beau- 
regard's anticipations,  McDowell,  instead  of  advancing 
against  our  centre  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  left  one 
division  (Miles')  and  a  brigade  of  another  (Tyler's)  to 
hold  Centreville  and  amuse  our  right  and  centre,  while 

31 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

lie  moved  two  divisions  (Hunter's  and  Heintzelman's) 
and  three  brigades  of  another  (Tyler's)  against  our 
left,  with  the  view  of  turning  that  flank  and  forcing 
us  from  the  line  of  Bull  Run.  The  three  brigades  of 
Tyler's  division  moved  directly  against  Stone  Bridge, 
over  the  Warrenton  Pike,  and  opened  an  artillery  fire 
at  six  o  'clock  a.m.  About  the  same  time  lire  was  opened 
from  two  batteries  established  by  the  enemy  north  of 
Bull  Run,  near  Blackburn's  Ford,  which  was  kept  up 
steadily  until  late  in  the  afternoon.  Hunter's  division, 
diverging  from  the  Warrenton  Pike,  moved  across  Bull 
Run  at  or  near  Sudley  Mills,  about  three  miles  above 
Stone  Bridge,  and  then  towards  Manassas  on  the  direct 
road,  so  as  to  get  in  rear  of  Stone  Bridge,  while  Heintzel- 
man  followed  Hunter  to  support  him. 

When  this  movement  was  developed,  Colonel  Evans, 
leaving  a  very  small  force  at  Stone  Bridge,  where  the 
road  had  been  blocked  up  by  felled  timber,  moved  to  the 
left  to  meet  Hunter  and  encountered  his  advance  north 
of  the  Warrenton  Pike,  sustaining  his  attack  for  some 
time,  until  overwhelming  numbers  were  accumulated 
against  him.  Evans  was  being  forced  back  when  Bee, 
with  the  parts  of  his  own  and  Bartow's  brigades  which 
had  arrived,  came  to  his  assistance,  and  the  advance  of 
the  enemy  was  stopped  for  some  time  until  Heintzelman's 
division  united  with  Hunter's  and  tw'o  of  Tyler's 
brigades  crossed  over  above  Stone  Bridge. 

Bee  and  Evans,  though  fighting  with  great  obstinacy, 
were  forced  back  across  the  Warrenton  Pike  to  a  ridge 
south  of  it,  and  nearly  at  right  angles  with  Bull  Run. 
Here  they  were  reinforced  first  by  Hampton's  six  com- 
panies 5and  then  by  Jackson's  brigade,  when  a  new  line 
was  formed  and  the  fight  renewed  with  great  obstinacy. 
Subsequently  two  of  Cocke's  regiments  were  brought 
up,  as  also  the  seven  companies  of  the  8th  Virginia, 
under  Colonel  Hunter;  the  three  companies  of  the  49th 
Virginia  Regiment,  under  Colonel  Smith;  the  6th  North 
Carolina  Regiment,  under  Colonel  Fisher;    and  two  of 

32 


DETAILS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

Bonham's  regiments,  under  Colonel  Kershaw;  and 
engaged  in  the  battle. 

The  fighting  was  very  stubborn  on  the  part  of  our 
troops,  who  were  opposed  to  immense  odds,  and  the 
fortunes  of  the  day  fluctuated  for  some  time.  From 
the  beginning,  artillery  had  been  employed  on  both  sides, 
and  a  number  of  our  batteries  did  most  excellent  ser- 
vice. Colonel  Stuart  made  a  charge  at  one  time  with 
two  companies  of  cavalry  on  the  right  of  the  enemy's 
line.  At  a  most  critical  period  three  regiments  of 
Elzey's  brigade — which  had  arrived  at  the  junction  by 
the  railroad  and  been  promptly  moved  to  the  battlefield 
under  the  direction  of  Brigadier  General  E.  Kirby  Smith 
— came  upon  the  field  in  rear  of  our  line,  and  after 
General  Smith  had  been  wounded  were  moved  to  our 
left,  under  command  of  Colonel  Elzey,  just  in  time  to 
meet  and  repulse  a  body  of  the  enemy  which  had  over- 
lapped that  flank.  A  short  time  afterwards,  while  the 
enemy  was  preparing  for  a  last  effort,  my  brigade 
arrived  on  the  field,  and  operated  on  the  left  of  Elzey's 
brigade  just  as  the  enemy  began  his  attack. 

He  had  been  repulsed,  not  routed.  When,  however, 
the  retreat  began,  it  soon  degenerated  into  a  rout  from 
the  panic-stricken  fears  of  the  enemy's  troops,  who 
imagined  that  legions  of  cavalry  were  thundering  at  their 
heels,  wheii  really  there  were  only  a  few  companies  acting 
without  concert.  Kershaw's  two  regiments  with  a  bat- 
tery of  artillery  moved  in  pursuit  along  the  Warrenton 
Pike,  and  made  some  captures,  but  the  mass  of  our  troops 
on  this  part  of  the  field  were  not  in  a  condition  to  pursue 
at  once.  Swell's  and  Holmes'  brigades  had  been  sent 
for  from  the  right,  when  the  day  appeared  doubtful,  but 
the  battle  was  won  before  they  arrived,  and  they  were 
ordered  to  return  to  their  former  positions. 

D.  R.  Jones,  in  the  afternoon,  made  an  advance 
against  the  battery  which  I  had  been  ordered  to  take 
in  the  morning,  but  was  compelled  to  retire  with  loss. 
Bonham  and  Longstreet  moved  across  the  Run  in  the 

3  33 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

direction  of  Centreville  just  before  night,  but  retired  to 
their  former  positions  on  the  approach  of  darkness. 
The  enemy  retreated  in  great  disorder  to  Centreville, 
where  he  attempted  to  re-form  his  troops  on  the  un- 
broken division  and  brigade  that  remained  at  that  place, 
but  shortly  after  dark  he  retreated  with  great  precipita- 
tion, and  by  light  next  morning  the  greater  part  of  his 
troops  were  either  in  the  streets  of  Washington,  or  on 
the  southern  banks  of  the  Potomac. 

Twenty-seven  pieces  of  artillery  fell  into  our  hands, 
some  of  which  were  captured  on  the  field,  but  the  greater 
part  were  abandoned  on  the  road  between  the  battlefield 
and  Centreville.  Besides  the  artillery,  a  considerable 
quantity  of  small  arms,  a  number  of  wagons,  ambulances, 
and  some  stores  fell  into  our  hands;  and  we  captured 
about  1,500  prisoners.  Our  loss  in  killed  and  wounded 
was  1,852.  The  enemy's  loss  was  much  heavier,  and  is 
reported  by  McDowell. 

I  have  thus  given  an  outline  of  the  battle  as  it  took 
place,  but  I  have  not  attempted  to  give  the  details  of 
what  the  several  commands  did,  for  which  reference 
must  be  had  to  the  official  reports. 

There  are  several  popular  errors  in  regard  to  this 
battle,  which  have  been  widely  circulated  by  the  writings 
of  those  who  have  undertaken  to  describe  it,  and  about 
which  very  few  people  indeed  seem  to  be  correctly  in- 
formed. 

Foremost  among  them  is  the  opinion  that  General 
Johnston  yielded  the  command  to  General  Beauregard, 
and  that  the  latter  controlled  the  operations  of  our  troops 
during  the  battle.  This  erroneous  statement  was  so 
often  and  confidently  made  without  contradiction,  that  I 
must  confess  for  a  long  time  I  gave  it  some  credence, 
though  when  I  saw  General  Johnston  on  the  field  he 
appeared  to  be  acting  the  part  and  performing  the 
duties  of  a  commanding  general.  Each  of  these  gen- 
erals is  entitled  to  sufficient  glory  for  the  part  taken 
in  this  battle  in  the  performance   of  his   appropriate 

34 


DETAILS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

duties,  to  render  a  contest  among  their  friends  for  the 
chief  glory  idle  as  well  as  mischievous. 

I  cannot  better  explain  the  truth  of  the  matter  than 
by  giving  the  following  extract  of  a  letter  from  General 
Johnston  himself  to  me,  which  is  in  entire  accordance 
with  the  facts  coming  within  my  knowledge  on  the  field 
as  far  as  they  go,  and  will  not  be  doubted  by  any  one 
who  knows  General  Johnston.  He  says:  "General 
Beauregard's  influence  on  that  occasion  was  simply  that 
due  to  my  estimate  of  his  military  merit  and  knowledge 
of  the  situation.  As  soon  as  we  met  I  expressed  to  him 
my  determination  to  attack  next  morning,  because  it 
was  not  improbable  that  Patterson  might  come  up 
Sunday  night.  He  proposed  a  plan  of  attack  which  I 
accepted.  It  was  defeated,  however,  by  the  appearance 
of  Tyler's  troops  near  the  Stone  Bridge  soon  after  sun- 
rise. He  then  proposed  to  stand  on  the  defensive  there 
and  continue  the  offensive  with  the  troops  on  the  right 
of  the  road  from  Manassas  to  Centreville.  This  was 
frustrated  by  the  movement  which  turned  Cocke  and 
Evans,  and  the  battle  fought  was  improvised  on  a  field 
with  which  General  Beauregard  and  myself  were  equally 
unacquainted.  Early  in  the  clay  I  placed  myself  on  the 
high  bare  hill  you  may  remember  a  few  hundred  yards  in 
rear  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  and  General  Beauregard  soon 
joined  me  there.  When  convinced  that  the  battle  had  be- 
gun on  our  left,  I  told  him  so,  and  that  I  was  about  to 
hasten  to  it.  He  followed.  When  we  reached  the  field 
and  he  found  that  I  was  about  to  take  immediate  control 
of  the  two  brigades  engaged,  he  represented  that  it 
would  be  incompatible  with  the  command  of  the  army 
to  do  so,  and  urged  that  he  should  have  the  command 
in  question.  I  accepted  the  argument.  This,  however, 
left  him  under  me,  and  was  the  command  of  a  small 
fraction  of  troops." 

This  places  the  matter  in  its  true  light  and  does  not 
detract  at  all  from  the  very  great  credit  to  which  Gen- 
eral Beauregard  is  entitled  for  thwarting  the  enemy's 

35 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

plans  until  the  arrival  of  General  Johnston,  and  for 
his  able  cooperation  afterwards.  But  it  is  nevertheless 
true  that  General  Johnston  is  entitled  to  the  credit 
attached  to  the  chief  command  in  this,  the  first  great 
battle  of  the  war. 

Another  error  in  regard  to  the  battle  is  the  belief, 
almost  universal,  that  Kirby  Smith,  hearing  the  roar 
of  musketry  and  artillery  while  passing  over  the  Manas- 
sas Gap  Railroad,  stopped  the  cars  before  reaching  the 
Junction  and  moved  directly  for  the  battlefield,  coming 
upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  right  flank.  This  is  en- 
tirely unfounded  in  fact.  Smith's  command  consisted 
of  Elzey's  brigade,  three  regiments  of  which  were  in 
the  battle,  and  they  moved  up  from  the  Junction  to  the 
rear  of  our  centre,  under  orders  which  General  Smith 
found  there  on  his  arrival,  and  were  subsequently  moved 
by  Elzey  to  meet  the  enemy's  right  after  Smith  was 
wounded.  My  brigade  went  to  the  left  of  Elzey,  and 
I  am  able  to  say  that  none  of  our  troops  got  to  the 
enemy's  rear,  unless  it  may  have  been  when  Stuart 
made  his  charge.  The  reports  of  Generals  Johnston 
and  Beauregard  as  well  as  that  of  Colonel,  afterwards 
Major  General,  Elzey,  show  the  truth  of  the  matter, 
and  it  is  a  little  singular  that  those  writers  who  have 
undertaken  to  describe  this  battle  have  taken  the  news- 
paper accounts  as  authentic  without  thinking  of  having 
recourse  to  the  official  reports. 

Another  erroneous  statement  in  reference  to  'the 
battle  which  has  gone  current,  is  that  Holmes'  brigade 
came  up  at  a  critical  time  and  helped  to  save  the  day, 
when  the  fact  is  that  that  brigade  was  further  from 
the  field  than  any  of  our  troops,  and,  though  sent  for 
in  the  afternoon,  did  not  reach  the  battlefield  at  all, 
but  its  march  was  arrested  by  the  close  of  the  fight. 

The  concentration  of  Johnston's  and  Beauregard's 
forces  against  McDowell  was  a  master  stroke  of  strategy 
well  executed,  and  our  generals  displayed  great  ability 
and  energy  in  meeting  and  defeating  the  unexpected 

36 


DETAILS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

movement  against  our  left.  Claims  were  put  forward 
in  behalf  of  several  commands  for  the  credit  of  having 
saved  the  day  and  secured  the  victory. 

It  is  rather  surprising  to  observe  that  erroneous 
views  often  prevail  in  regard  to  the  relative  merits  of 
different  commands,  engaged  in  bearing  respectively 
very  necessary  parts  in  an  action.  If  a  small  force  has 
been  fighting  obstinately  for  hours  against  great  odds, 
until  it  has  become  exhausted  and  is  beginning  to  give 
way,  and  then  fresh  troops  come  up  and  turn  the  tide 
of  battle,  the  latter  are  said  to  have  gained  the  day  and 
often  reap  all  the  glory.  It  is  not  likely  to  be  considered, 
that,  but  for  the  troops  whose  obstinate  fighting  enabled 
the  fresh  ones  to  come  up  in  time,  the  day  would  have 
been  irretrievably  lost  before  the  appearance  of  the 
latter.  It  is  an  old  saying  that  "It  is  the  last  feather 
that  breaks  the  camel's  back,"  yet  the  last  feather  would 
do  no  harm  but  for  the  weight  which  precedes  it.  The 
first  feather  contributes  as  much  as  the  last  to  the 
catastrophe. 

At  this  battle,  but  for  the  cavalry  which  watched 
the  enemy's  movements  and  gave  timely  notice  to  Evans 
so  that  he  could  move  to  the  left  and  check  the  advance 
of  Hunter,  the  day  would  probably  have  been  lost  at 
the  outset.  But  for  the  prompt  movement  of  Evans  to 
the  left  and  the  obstinate  fighting  of  his  men,  the  enemy 
would  have  reached  the  range  of  hills  on  which  our 
final  line  of  battle  was  formed,  thus  turning  our  left 
completely  and  necessitating  a  rapid  falling  back  from 
the  line  of  Bull  Run,  which  would  most  assuredly  have 
resulted  in  defeat.  This  would  likewise  have  been  the 
case  had  not  Bee  arrived  to  the  assistance  of  Evans 
when  he  did  and  stayed  the  progress  of  the  enemy  by 
his  stubborn  resistance. 

When  Bee  and  Evans  were  forced  back  across  the 
Warrenton  Pike,  the  day  would  have  been  lost  had  not 
Jackson  arrived  most  opportunely  and  furnished  them 
a  barrier  behind  which  to  re-form.    From  the  beginning 

37 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

our  batteries  rendered  most  essential  service,  and  the 
infantry  would  probably  have  been  overpowered  but 
for  their  well  directed  fire.  The  arrivals  of  Cocke's  two 
regiments,  Hampton's  Legion,  the  ten  companies  of  the 
7th  and  49th  Virginia  Regiments,  the  6th  North  Carolina 
and  Bonham's  two  regiments  all  served  to  stem  the  tide 
of  battle  and  stay  defeat,  but  still  in  all  probability  the 
day  would  have  been  lost  but  for  the  timely  appearance 
of  Smith  with  Elzey's  command  and  the  subsequent 
movement  of  Elzey  to  our  left. 

I  do  not  claim  to  have  won  or  saved  the  day  with  my 
command,  but  I  think  it  will  be  conceded  by  all  who  read 
the  reports  of  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  that 
the  arrival  of  that  command  and  the  cool  and  deliberate 
manner  in  which  my  men  formed  in  line,  under  fire  and 
in  full  view  of  the  enemy,  and  their  advance  had  a 
material  effect  in  thwarting  the  last  effort  of  the  enemy 
to  flank  our  line  and  in  precipitating  his  retreat.  I 
can  bear  testimony  to  the  very  efficient  service  rendered 
by  Stuart  with  his  two  companies  of  cavalry,  and  Beck- 
ham's battery. 

The  fact  is  that  all  the  troops  engaged  in  the  battle 
were  necessary  to  prevent  defeat  and  secure  victory, 
and  each  command  in  its  proper  sphere  may  be  said 
to  have  saved  the  day.  It  is  very  unjust  to  give  all  the 
credit  or  the  greater  part  of  it  to  any  one  command; 
and  I  would  not  exempt  from  the  general  commendation 
those  troops  on  the  right  who  held  that  part  of  the  line, 
under  fire,  and  prevented  the  enemy  from,  getting  to 
our  rear  and  cutting  off  our  communications. 

It  is  not  easy  to  account  for  McDowell's  delay  in 
making  his  attack,  thereby  permitting  the  concentration 
against  him.  So  far  as  he  is  personally  concerned,  a 
ready  excuse  is  to  be  found  for  him  in  the  fact  that 
he  was  inexperienced  in  command,  having  before  that 
served  in  the  field  only  in  the  capacity  of  a  staff 
officer;    but    General    Scott,    an    old    and    distinguished 

38 


DETAILS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

soldier,  was  in  fact  controlling  the  operations  and 
was  in  constant  communication  by  telegraph  with 
McDowell,  who  had  been  his  aide  and  was  selected 
to  carry  out  his  plans.  General  Scott  was  in  fact  the 
commander  and  McDowell  was  merely  his  executive 
officer  in  the  field.  The  former  was  the  responsible 
man  and  to  his  name  must  be  attached  the  discredit  for 
the  failure  at  Bull  Run.  Had  McDowell's  whole  force 
been  thrown  against  our  centre  on  the  day  Tyler  ad- 
vanced on  Blackburn's  Ford,  our  line  must  have  been 
broken  and  a  defeat  to  us  must  have  ensued,  for  at  that 
time  our  troops  were  too  few  and  too  much  scattered  to 
have  furnished  sufficient  resistance  to  the  enemy's  over- 
whelming force,  or  to  have  permitted  an  effective  attack 
on  his  flanks.  By  delay  this  opportunity  was  lost  and 
the  two  armies  were  concentrated  against  McDowell. 

McDowell  seems  to  have  made  an  honest  effort  to 
conduct  the  campaign  on  the  principles  of  civilized  war- 
fare, and  expressed  a  very  just  indignation  at  the  ex- 
cesses committed  by  his  troops.  In  a  dispatch  from 
Fairfax  Court-House,  dated  the  18th  of  July,  he  said: 
"I  am  distressed  to  have  to  report  excesses  by  our 
troops.  The  excitement  of  the  men  found  vent  in  burn- 
ing and  pillaging,  which,  however,  was  soon  checked.  It 
distressed  us  all  greatly."  On  the  same  day  he  issued 
an  order  from  which  I  make  the  following  extract : 

"Any  persons  found  committing  the  slightest  depre- 
dation, killing  pigs  or  poultry  or  trespassing  on  the 
property  of  the  inhabitants,  will  be  reported  to  the  then 
headquarters,  and  the  least  that  will  be  done  to  them 
will  be  to  send  them  to  the  Alexandria  jail.  It  is  again 
ordered  that  no  one  shall  arrest  or  attempt  to  arrest 
any  citizen  not  in  arms  at  the  time,  or  search  or  attempt 
to  search  any  house,  or  even  enter  the  same  without 
permission.  The  troops  must  behave  themselves  with 
as  much  forbearance  and  propriety  as  if  they  were  at 

39 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

their  own  homes.  They  are  here  to  fight  the  enemies  of 
the  country,  not  to  judge  and  punish  the  unarmed  and 
helpless,  however  guilty  they  may  be.  When  necessary, 
that  will  be  done  by  the  proper  person. 

"By  command  of  General  McDowell. 

"Jas.  B.  Fry,  Assistant  Adjutant  General." 

This  order  deserves  to  be  exhumed  from  the  oblivion 
into  which  it  seems  to  have  fallen,  and  is  in  strong  con- 
trast with  the  subsequent  practice  under  Butler,  Pope, 
Milroy,  Hunter,  Sheridan,  Sherman,  etc.  This  war  order 
of  McDowell's  might  well  have  been  commended  to  the 
consideration  of  military  satraps  set  to  rule  over  the 
people  of  the  South  in  a  time  of  "peace."  It  did  not 
prevent  the  burning  of  the  entire  village  of  German- 
town,  a  few  miles  from  Fairfax  Court-House,  but  the 
citizens  agreed  that  McDowell  had  made  an  honest  effort 
to  prevent  depredations  by  his  troops ;  and  it  gives  me 
pleasure  to  make  the  statement,  as  it  is  the  last  time  I 
will  have  occasion  to  make  a  similar  one  in  regard  to 
any  of  the  Federal  commanders  who  followed  him. 

Pursuit  of  the  enemy  was  not  made  after  the  battle 
in  order  to  capture  Washington  or  cross  the  Potomac, 
and  as  this  omission  has  been  the  subject  of  much  com- 
ment and  criticism,  I  will  make  some  observations  on 
that  head. 

In  the  first  place,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  our 
generals  were  inexperienced  in  command. 

In  the  next  place,  it  must  be  conceded  that  a  com- 
manding general  knows  more  about  the  condition  of  his 
troops  and  the  obstacles  in  his  way  than  any  other  can 
know ;  and  for  very  obvious  reasons  he  is  debarred  from 
making  public  at  the  time  the  reasons  and  conditions 
which  govern  his  course. 

It  must  also  be  considered  that  he  cannot  know  be- 
forehand as  much  as  the  critics  who  form  their  judgment 
from  the  light  of  after  events.  Those,  therefore,  who 
ascertained  some  days  after  the  battle  what  was  the 

40 


DETAILS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

actual  condition  of  McDowell's  army  on  the  retreat, 
must  recollect  that  this  was  not  known  to  General 
Johnston  until  that  army  was  safe  from  pursuit,  even 
if  it  had  been  practicable  to  accomplish  any  more  than 
was  done  with  our  army  in  its  then  condition. 

Without  having  been  in  General  Johnston's  con- 
fidence, or  professing  to  know  more  about  the  motives 
actuating  him  at  the  time  than  he  has  thought  proper 
to  make  public,  I  will  undertake  to  show  that  it  was 
utterly  impossible  for  any  army  to  have  captured  Wash- 
ington by  immediate  pursuit,  even  if  it  had  been  in  con- 
dition to  make  such  pursuit,  and  that  it  would  have 
been  very  difficult  to  cross  the  Potomac  at  all. 

In  the  first  place,  I  will  say  that  the  army  was  not 
in  condition  to  make  pursuit  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
21st  after  the  battle,  or  that  night.  All  the  troops  en- 
gaged, except  Cocke's  regiment,  the  19th  Virginia,  the 
two  regiments  with  Kershaw,  and  my  command,  were 
so  much  exhausted  and  shattered  by  the  desperate  con- 
flict in  which  they  had  participated,  that  they  made  no 
attempt  at  pursuit  and  were  incapable  of  any. 

Our  cavalry  consisted  of  one  organized  regiment  of 
nine  companies,  and  a  number  of  unattached  companies. 
This  cavalry  was  armed  principally  with  shot  guns  and 
very  inferior  sabres,  and  was  without  the  discipline 
and  drill  necessary  to  make  that  arm  effective  in  a 
charge.  Moreover  it  had  been  necessarily  scattered  on 
the  flanks  and  along  the  line,  to  watch  the  enemy  and 
give  information  of  his  movements.  It  could  not  readily 
be  concentrated  for  the  purpose  of  an  efficient  pursuit, 
and  the  attempts  made  in  that  direction  were  desultory. 

By  light  on  the  morning  of  the  22nd,  the  greater  part 
of  the  enemy's  troops  were  either  in  the  streets  of 
Washington  or  under  the  protection  of  the  guns  at 
Arlington  Heights. 

The  question  then  arises  whether,  by  pursuit  on  the 
morning  of  the  22nd,  Washington  could  have  been  cap- 
tured. And  I  will  here  call  attention  to  some  facts  which 

41 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

seem  entirely  to  have  escaped  the  attention  of  the  critics. 
The  Potomac  is  at  least  a  mile  wide  at  Washington  and 
navigable  to  that  place  for  the  largest  vessels.  The  only 
means  of  crossing  the  river,  except  in  vessels,  are  by  the 
Long  Bridge,  the  aqueduct  on  the  Chesapeake  &  Ohio 
Canal  at  Georgetown,  and  the  chain  bridge  above 
Georgetown. 

The  Long  Bridge  is  an  old  wooden  structure  with  at 
least  one  draw  and  perhaps  two  in  it,  and  could  have 
been  easily  destroyed  by  fire,  besides  being  susceptible 
of  being  commanded  through  its  entire  length  by  vessels 
of  war  lying  near  Washington,  where  there  were  some 
out  of  range  of  any  guns  we  would  have  brought  to  bear. 

The  aqueduct  is  long  and  narrow  with  a  channel  for 
the  water,  which  we  could  not  have  turned  off  as  it  runs 
from  the  northern  side  of  the  Potomac,  and  a  narrow 
towpath  on  the  side.  One  piece  of  artillery  at  its  north- 
ern end  could  have  effectually  prevented  the  passing 
of  troops  over  it,  and  besides  it  could  have  been  easily 
ruined  and  some  of  the  spans  blown  up,  so  as  to  render 
it  impassable. 

The  chain  bridge  is  a  wooden  structure  and  could 
have  been  easily  burned.  If  therefore  the  entire  Federal 
Army  had  fled  across  the  river  on  our  approach,  we 
could  not  have  crossed  it  near  Washington.  The  largest 
pieces  of  artillery  we  had,  capable  of  being  transported, 
were  small  field  pieces  of  which  the  heaviest  for  solid 
shot  were  six  pounders,  and  we  had  no  Howitzer  larger 
than  a  twenty-four  pounder  if  we  had  any  of  that  size. 
None  of  our  guns  were  of  sufficient  range  to  reach  across 
the  river  into  the  city.  If,  therefore,  we  had  advanced 
at  once  upon  Washington  and  the  -Federal  Army  had 
fled  across  the  river  on  our  approach,  abandoning  the 
city  itself,  still  we  could  not  have  entered  it,  unless  the 
bridges  had  been  left  intact;  and  it  is  not  to  be  supposed 
that  McDowell,  General  Scott,  and  all  the  officers  of  the 
regular  army,  were  so  badly  frightened  and  demoralized 
that  they  would  have  fled  on  our  approach,  and  omitted 
to  destroy  the  approaches  to  the  city,  even  if  such  had 

42 


DETAILS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

been  the  case  with  the  volunteers,  the  civil  authorities, 
and  the  Congress. 

All  the  bridges  above,  to  and  beyond  Harper's  Ferry, 
had  been  burned,  and  the  nearest  ford  to  Washington, 
over  which  at  low  water  it  is  possible  for  infantry  to 
pass,  is  White's  Ford,  several  miles  above  Leesburg, 
and  forty  miles  from  Washington.  This  was  then  an 
obscure  ford,  where,  in  1862,  General  Jackson  had  ^  to 
have  the  banks  dug  down  before  our  wagons  and  artillery 
could  cross,  and  then  the  canal  on  the  northern  bank  had 
to  be  bridged.  We  had  nothing  in  the  shape  of  pontoons, 
and  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  have  obtained 
them  in  any  reasonable  time. 

I  had  occasion,  in  1864,  to  make  myself  acquainted 
with  the  character  of  the  Potomac  and  its  crossing  at 
and  above  Washington,  and  what  I  state  here  is  not 
mere  speculation.  General  Johnston  had  resided  in 
Washington  for  several  years,  and  must  be  supposed  to 
have  been  acquainted  with  the  difficulties. 

I  have  heard  some  wiseacres  remark  that  if  we  had 
gone  on,  we  could  have  entered  pell-mell  with  the  enemy 
into  Washington.  To  have  done  that,  if  possible,  we 
would  have  had  to  keep  up  with  the  enemy,  and  I  don't 
think  any  one  supposes  that  a  solitary  soldier  in  our 
army  could  have  reached  the  banks  of  the  Potomac  by 
daylight  the  morning  after  the  battle.  It  is  possible  to 
cross  a  bridge  of  a  few  yards  in  length,  or  enter  through 
the  gates  of  a  city  pell-mell  with  an  army,  but  no  one 
ever  heard  of  that  thing  being  done  on  a  bridge  more 
than  a  mile  in  length  and  with  a  draw  raised  in  the 
middle. 

The  truth  is  that,  while  the  enemy's  retreat  was  very 
disorderly  and  disgraceful,  some  of  his  troops  retained 
their  organization  and  the  condition  of  things  at  Wash- 
ington was  not  quite  as  bad  as  represented.  Spectators 
in  the  city,  seeing  the  condition  of  the  fugitives  throng- 
ing the  streets,  and  the  panic  of  the  civilians,  may  have 
well  supposed  that  the  whole  army  was  disorganized, 
and  so  utterly  demoralized  that  it  would  have  fled  on 

43 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  very  first  cry  that  the  "rebels  are  coming,"  but  if 
General  McDowell  and  his  officers  are  to  be  believed, 
there  still  remained  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Potomac 
a  considerable  force  in  fighting  condition.  Miles' 
division  had  not  been  engaged  and  Runyon's  had  not 
reached  Centreville  when  the  battle  took  place.  Besides 
a  considerable  force  had  been  retained  in  Washington 
under  Mansfield. 

McClellan  states  in  his  report,  that,  when  he  assumed 
command  on  the  27th  of  July,  the  infantry  in  and  around 
Washington  numbered  50,000,  and  this  was  much  larger 
than  our  whole  force  was  after  the  reinforcements  had 
reached  us  subsequent  to  the  battle.  The  strength  of 
our  army  at  this  time,  as  well  as  on  all  other  occasions, 
has  been  greatly  exaggerated  even  by  Southern  writers ; 
its  organization  was  very  imperfect,  many  of  the  troops 
not  being  brigaded. 

If  we  had  advanced,  Alexandria  would  probably  have 
fallen  into  our  hands  without  a  struggle,  and  we  might 
have  forced  the  enemy  to  evacuate  his  works  south  of 
the  Potomac,  but  very  likely  not  until  after  a  fight  in 
which  our  loss  would  have  been  greater  than  the  object 
to  be  accomplished  would  have  justified.  We  might 
have  transferred  our  line  to  the  banks  of  the  Potomac, 
but  we  could  not  have  held  it,  and  would  eventually  have 
been  compelled  to  abandon  it  with  greater  damage  to 
us  than  the  evacuation  of  the  line  of  Bull  Run  caused. 

So  much  for  the  question  as  between  the  commanding 
general  and  the  cavillers.  But  there  is  another  phase 
of  it,  in  which  a  staff  officer  of  General  Beauregard, 
writing  for  a  Northern  journal,  has  endeavored  to  raise 
an  issue  between  that  general  and  the  Government  at 
Richmond.  I  have  before  shown  that  General  Johnston, 
as  commander  of  the  army,  was  the  responsible  person, 
and  I  believe  he  has  never  attempted  to  evade  the  re- 
sponsibility. General  Beauregard's  agency  in  the  mat- 
ter could  only  be  as  an  adviser  and  lieutenant  of  the 
commanding  general. 

44 


DETAILS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

The  point  made  against  the  Government  is  that 
Washington  could  and  would  have  been  taken,  if  the 
President,  Secretary  of  War,  and  the  heads  of  the 
Quarter-master  and  Commissary  Departments  had 
furnished  sufficient  transportation  and  supplies,  though 
it  is  admitted  that  Mr.  Davis  left  the  question  of  an 
advance  entirely  to  his  generals. 

Now  in  regard  to  transportation,  we  had  an  abund- 
ance of  wagons  to  carry  all  the  ammunition  needed,  and 
for  gathering  in  provisions,  and  if  the  bridges  on  the 
railroad  had  not  been  burned,  we  might  have  moved 
our  depot  to  Alexandria  as  we  moved,  provided  we 
could  have  advanced  to  that  point,  as  the  enemy  had 
repaired  the  railroad  to  Fairfax  Station,  and  had  not 
interfered  with  it  on  his  retreat.  The  burning  of  the 
bridges  on  the  railroad  did  not  impede  the  progress 
of  the  enemy  before  the  battle,  as  he  did  not  march  on 
it  and  Bull  Run  was  fordable  anywhere.  That  burning 
could  only  have  served  the  purpose  of  obstructing  the 
use  of  the  railroad  by  the  enemy  in  the  event  of  our 
defeat,  which  with  his  means  of  reconstruction  would 
have  been  but  a  very  few  days,  and  it  did  not  obstruct 
our  movements  for  a  much  longer  time.  At  the  time  of 
the  battle,  the  county  of  Loudoun  on  the  Virginia  side 
of  the  Potomac,  and  the  whole  State  of  Maryland,  were 
teeming  with  supplies,  and  we  could  have  readily 
procured  all  the  transportation  needed  from  the  citizens, 
if  we  had  not  taken  it  from  the  enemy,  which  would 
probably  have  been  the  case  if  an  advance  had  been 
practicable  otherwise. 

Certain  it  is,  that  in  1862,  after  the  second  battle  of 
Manassas,  when  the  enemy's  army  had  been  defeated, 
not  routed,  and  was  still  vastly  superior  in  number  and 
equipment  to  our  own,  we  did  not  hesitate  a  moment 
about  supplies,  though  our  army  was  without  rations 
and  Fairfax  and  Loudoun  had  been  nearly  exhausted 
of  their  grain  and  cattle ;  but  taking  only  transportation 
for  the  ammunition  and  the  cooking  utensils,  and  send- 

45 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

ing  the  rest  of  our  trains  to  the  valley,  except  wagons 
to  gather  up  flour,  we  marched  across  the  Potomac  into 
Maryland,  our  men  and  officers  living  principally  on 
green  corn  and  beef  without  salt  or  bread.  Neither  was 
our  army  prevented  from  making  the  movement  into 
Pennsylvania,  in  1863,  for  fear  of  not  getting  provisions. 
We  depended  upon  taking  them  from  the  enemy  and 
the  country  through  which  we  marched,  and  did  thus 
procure  them.  The  alleged  difficulties  in  1861  would 
have  been  no  difficulties  in  1862,  1863,  or  1864.  These 
were  not  the  real  difficulties  which  prevented  the  capture 
of  "Washington  after  the  battle  of  the  21st  of  July,  and 
the  issue  which  is  attempted  to  be  made  with  the  Govern- 
ment at  Richmond  is  therefore  an  idle  one. 

These  remarks  are  not  made  with  the  slightest  pur- 
pose of  disparaging  in  any  way  General  Beauregard, 
for  whom  I  have  great  regard  and  admiration.  When 
he  ordered  the  burning  of  the  bridge  over  Bull  Run,  he 
had  reason  to  apprehend  that  his  comparatively  small 
force  would  have  to  encounter  McDowell's  whole  army 
before  any  reinforcements  arrived  to  his  assistance,  and 
he  had  therefore  good  grounds  to  regard  this  as  a  pre- 
caution which  the  circumstances  warranted  and 
demanded. 

The  foregoing  reflections  and  comments  are  such  as 
my  subsequent  experience  and  observation  have  enabled 
me  to  make,  and  I  do  not  pretend  that  a  tittle  of  them 
occurred  to  me  at  the  time. 

Both  of  our  generals,  notwithstanding  their  inex- 
perience in  command,  displayed  extraordinary  energy 
and  capacity  in  thwarting  the  plans  of  a  veteran  com- 
mander, whom  the  country  at  that  time  regarded  as 
one  of  the  ablest  military  chieftains  of  the  age.  If 
they  did  not  accomplish  all  that  might  have  been  accom- 
plished by  an  experienced  and  skilful  commander,  with 
an  army  of  veterans,  they  are  not  therefore  to  be  con- 
demned ;  but  it  is  equally  unjust  to  attempt  to  shift  the 
responsibility  to  the  shoulders  of  the  Government  at 
Richmond. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Operations  along  Bull  Run. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  the  21st  a  portion 
of  our  troops  were  moved  across  Bull  Run  and  the 
former  line  north  of  that  stream  was  re-occupied.  The 
army  at  that  time  was  known  as  the  "Army  of  the 
Potomac,"  and  General  Beauregard's  command  was  re- 
organized as  the  1st  corps  of  that  army,  with  the  same 
brigade  commanders  as  before.  I  was  promoted  to  the 
rank  of  brigadier  general  to  date  from  the  21st  of  July, 
and  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  a  brigade  com- 
posed of  the  24th  Virginia  Regiment,  the  5th  North 
Carolina  State  Troops,  Colonel  Duncan  K.  McRae,  and 
the  13th  North  Carolina  Volunteers  (subsequently 
designated  the  23rd  North  Carolina  Regiment),  Colonel 
John  Hoke.  The  greater  part  of  the  army  was  moved 
to  the  north  of  Bull  Run,  but  I  resumed  my  position  on 
the  right  of  the  Junction  at  my  former  camps,  and 
remained  there  until  the  latter  part  of  August,  when 
I  moved  to  the  north  of  the  Occoquon,  in  front  of  Wolf 
Run  Shoals,  below  the  mouth  of  Bull  Run.  Our  line  was 
extended  from  this  point  by  Langster's  cross-roads  and 
Fairfax  Station  through  Fairfax  Court-House.  Hamp- 
ton's Legion  was  composed  of  a  battalion  of  infantry, 
a  battalion  of  cavalry,  and  a  battery  of  artillery,  and 
remained  south  of  the  Occoquon  on  the  right,  and 
watched  the  lower  fords  of  that  stream  and  the  land- 
ings on  the  Potomac  immediately  below  Occoquon. 
Evans  had  occupied  Leesburg. 

Captain  W.  W.  Thornton's  company  of  cavalry  had 
been  again  attached  to  my  command  and  subsequently, 
in  the  month  of  September,  a  battery  of  Virginia  artil- 
lery under  Captain  Holman  reported  to  me.  In  the  lat- 
ter part  of  August,  General  Longstreet,  who  had  com- 
mand of  the  advanced  forces  at  Fairfax  Court-House, 

47 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

threw  forward  a  small  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry 
and  established  strong  pickets  at  Mason's  and  Munson's 
Hills,  in  close  proximity  to  the  enemy's  main  line  on  the 
south  of  the  Potomac. 

McClellan  had  succeeded  McDowell,  in  command  of 
the  Federal  Army  opposed  to  us,  and  that  army  was 
being  greatly  augmented  by  new  levies. 

A  few  days  after  1  reached  my  camp  in  front  of 
Wolf  Run  Shoals,  my  brigade  was  ordered  to  Fairfax 
Station,  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  Longstreet,  if 
necessary.  After  being  there  a  day,  I  was  ordered  by 
General  Longstreet  to  move  with  two  of  my  regiments 
to  Mason's  Hill,  to  relieve  one  of  his  on  duty  at  that 
place.  I  took  with  me  the  24th  Virginia  and  5th  North 
Carolina  Regiments,  and  my  movement  was  so  timed 
as  to  reach  Mason's  Hill  in  the  night.  I  arrived  there 
before  light  on  the  morning  of  the  31st  of  August,  and 
relieved  the  17th  Regiment,  Colonel  Corse.  About  light 
on  that  morning,  one  of  Colonel  Corse's  companies, 
which  was  on  picket  one  mile  from  the  main  force  in  the 
direction  of  Alexandria,  was  attacked  by  a  detachment 
from  a  New  Jersey  regiment,  under  its  colonel,  and 
after  a  very  sharp  fight,  repulsed  the  enemy  and  in- 
flicted a  severe  punishment  on  him. 

This  advanced  line  at  Mason's  and  Munson's  Hills 
was  about  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  in  front  of  Fairfax 
Court-House,  and  was  a  mere  picket  line  held  ordinarily 
by  two  infantry  regiments  with  a  few  pieces  of  artillery, 
while  a  small  force  of  cavalry  watched  the  flanks.  From 
it  there  were  in  full  view  the  dome  of  the  Capitol  at 
Washington  and  a  part  of  the  enemy's  line  on  the 
heights  south  and  west  of  Alexandria.  The  two  main 
positions  were  in  sight  of  each  other  and  about  a  mile 
apart.  From  them  smaller  pickets  were  thrown  out  in 
front  and  up  to  within  a  very  short  distance  of  large 
bodies  of  the  enemy,  those  from  Mason's  Hill  being  in 
some  cases  more  than  a  mile  from  the  main  body.  The 
pickets  were  constantly  skirmishing  with  those  of  the 

4S 


OPERATIONS  ALONG  BULL  RUN 

enemy,  and  it  was  very  evident  that  lie  was  much,  alarmed 
at  this  demonstration  in  his  immediate  front,  as  Pro- 
fessor Lowe,  who  now  made  his  appearance  with  his 
balloons,  kept  one  of  them  up  almost  constantly,  and 
large  parties  were  seen  working  very  energetically  at 
the  line  of  fortifications  in  our  front.  Contemporaneous 
accounts  given  by  the  enemy  represent  this  movement 
on  our  part  as  a  very  serious  one,  and  he  was  evidently 
impressed  with  the  idea  that  the  greater  part  of  our 
army  was  immediately  confronting  him,  whereas,  if  it 
had  not  been  for  his  excessive  caution  and  want  of  enter- 
prise, he  might  have  moved  out  and  captured  the  whole 
of  our  advance  force  without  the  possibility  of  its 
escape. 

After  my  pickets  had  relieved  those  of  Corse,  it  was 
reported  to  me  that  a  flag  of  truce  had  appeared  at  the 
outside  picket,  where  the  fight  had  taken  place  in  the 
early  morning,  and  I  rode  to  a  house  in  the  vicinity  of 
that  point  and  had  the  person  bearing  the  flag  brought 
to  me  blindfolded.  He  proved  to  be  a  Dr.  Coxe,  surgeon 
of  the  New  Jersey  regiment,  a  detachment  of  which 
had  been  engaged  in  the  above  named  affair.  He  stated 
that  he  came  on  the  part  of  Colonel  Tyler  of  the  3rd  New 
Jersey  to  get  the  bodies  of  several  men  who  were  miss- 
ing, and  that  he  was  informed  that  General  Kearney, 
who  commanded  on  that  part  of  the  line,  had  directed 
Colonel  Tyler  to  send  the  party  with  the  flag. 

I  informed  him  of  the  irregularity  of  the  proceeding, 
but  after  some  conversation  in  which  I  endeavored  to 
leave  him  under  the  impression  that  we  had  a  large 
force  in  the  vicinity,  I  gave  him  permission  to  carry 
off  the  dead  bodies,  two  of  which  he  had  picked  up  out- 
side of  my  picket,  and  two  others  having  been  brought 
in  to  the  picket  before  his  arrival.  We  remained  at 
Mason's  Hill  three  or  four  days,  and  I  was  then  relieved 
by  Colonel  Smith  in  command  of  the  20th  Georgia  Regi- 
ment. My  pickets  had  been  constantly  skirmishing  with 
small  parties  of  the  enemy,  and  there  had  been  one  or 

4  49 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

two  false  alarms  of  an  approach  against  us,  but  the 
enemy  made  no  serious  demonstration.  This  advanced 
line  of  pickets  was  subsequently  abandoned,  after  hav- 
ing been  maintained  for  several  weeks,  but  I  did  not 
again  return  to  it. 

After  leaving  Mason's  Hill,  I  moved  back  to  my 
camp  in  front  of  Wolf  Bun  Shoals,  again  occupying  the 
right  of  our  line.  I  remained  on  this  flank  until  the  fore 
part  of  October,  and  my  regiments  picketed  at  Spring- 
field on  the  line  of  the  railroad,  alternating  with  those 
of  Ewell's  brigade  at  Langster's  cross-roads.  On  the 
4th  of  October  Major  General  Earl  Van  Dorn  joined 
our  army  and  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  a  division 
composed  of  Ewell's  brigade  and  mine.  This  was  the 
first  division  organized  in  the  "Army  of  the  Potomac" 
(Confederate)  and  I  think  in  the  entire  Confederate 
army.  In  a  day  or  two  afterwards  my  brigade  was 
moved  to  a  position  between  Fairfax  Station  and  Fair- 
fax Court-House,  and  remained  there  until  the  army 
was  moved  back  to  the  line  which  it  occupied  for  the 
winter,  my  regiment  picketing  at  Burke's  Station  on 
the  railroad  in  the  meantime. 

Soon  after  the  organization  of  the  division,  Captain 
Green's  company  of  cavalry,  for  which  Thornton's  had 
been  exchanged,  was  relieved  from  duty  with  me  and 
attached  to  General  Van  Dorn's  headquarters.  On  the 
7th  of  October,  the  20th  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel 
W.  D.  Smith,  was  attached  to  my  brigade,  and  joined 
me  in  a  day  or  two  thereafter.  On  the  15th  of  October 
the  whole  of  our  army  moved  back  from  the  line  passing 
through  Fairfax  Court-House  to  me,  extending  from 
Union  Mills  on  the  right,  through  Centreville,  to  Stone 
Bridge  on  the  left.  At  the  new  position  Van  Dorn's 
division  was  on  the  right,  with  Ewell's  brigade  at  Union 
Mills  and  mine  on  its  left  above  that  point.  We  pro- 
ceeded at  once  to  fortify  the  whole  line  from  right  to 
left. 

McClellan's  report  shows  that  the  troops  under  his 

50 


OPERATIONS  ALONG  BULL  RUN 

command  in  and  about  Washington,  including  those  on 
the  Maryland  shore  of  the  Potomac  above  and  below 
Washington  and  the  troops  with  Dix  at  Baltimore,  on 
the  15th  day  of  October,  the  day  before  our  retrograde 
movement,  amounted  to  133,201  present  for  duty,  and  an 
aggregate  present  of  143,647.  The  mass  of  this-  force 
was  south  of  the  Potomac,  and  nearly  the  whole  of  it 
available  for  an  advance.  The  whole  force  under  Gen- 
eral Johnston's  command  did  not  exceed  one- third  of 
McOlellan's,  though  the  latter  has  estimated  our  force 
"on  the  Potomac"  in  the  month  of  October  at  not  less 
than  150,000. 

After  the  occupation  of  the  line  at  Centreville,  the 
infantry  of  our  army  at  and  near  that  place  was  organ- 
ized into  four  divisions  of  three  brigades  each  and  two 
corps.  Bonham's  brigade  was  attached  to  Van  Dorn's 
division,  and  the  command  of  the  other  divisions  was 
given  to  Major  Generals  G-.  W.  Smith,  Longstreet,  and 
E.  Kirby  Smith,  respectively.  Van  Dorn's  and  Long- 
street's  divisions  constituted  the  first  corps  under  Gen- 
eral Beauregard,  and  the  other  two  divisions  constituted 
the  second  corps  under  the  temporary  command  of 
Major  General  G.  W.  Smith. 

About  the  same  time,  General  Jackson,  with  the 
rank  of  Major  General,  was  sent  to  the  valley  with  his 
old  brigade,  and  the  22nd  of  October  an  order  was  issued 
from  the  Adjutant  General's  office  at  Richmond,  estab- 
lishing the  Department  of  Northern  Virginia,  composed 
of  the  Valley  district,  the  Potomac  district,  and  the 
Aquia  district,  under  the  command  of  General  Johnston ; 
the  districts  being  assigned  to  the  command  of  Major 
General  Jackson,  General  Beauregard,  and  Major  Gen- 
eral Holmes,  in  the  order  in  which  they  are  named. 
Colonel  Robert  E.  Rodes  of  the  5th  Alabama  Regi- 
ment had  been  made  brigadier  general  and  assigned  to 
the  command  of  Ewell's  brigade,  Ewell  being  tempo- 
rarily assigned  to  a  brigade  in  Longstreet 's  division, 
and  subsequently  made  major  general  and  transferred 

51 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JIJBAL  A.  EARLY 

to  the  command  of  E.  K.  Smith's  division,  when  the 
latter  officer  was  sent  to  Tennessee. 

The  affair  of  Evans'  command  with  the  enemy  at 
Ball's  Bluff  occurred  on  the  21st  of  October,  and  Stuart's 
affair  with  the  enemy  at  Drainesville  occurred  on  the 
20th  of  December.  These  are  the  only  conflicts  of  the 
"Army  of  the  Potomac"  with  the  enemy  of  any  con- 
sequence, during  the  fall  and  winter,  after  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  line  of  Centreville.  Our  front  was  covered 
by  a  line  of  pickets  some  distance  in  front,  extending 
from  left  to  right,  and  all  under  command  of  Brigadier 
General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  of  the  cavalry,  who  was  espe- 
cially assigned  to  that  duty,  details  by  regiments  being 
made  from  the  infantry  to  report  to  him. 

Rodes'  brigade  was  moved  to  the  south  of  Bull  Run 
to  go  into  winter  quarters,  leaving  my  brigade  on  the 
right  of  our  line,  which  was  now  contracted  so  as  to 
merely  cover  McLean's  Ford  on  that  flank.  About  the 
middle  of  January,  1862,  Major  General  Van  Dorn  was 
relieved  from  duty  with  the  "Army  of  the  Potomac" 
and  ordered  to  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department,  Gen- 
eral Bonham  succeeding  to  the  command  of  the  division 
as  senior  brigadier  general.  On  the  30th  of  January, 
General  Beauregard  took  leave  of  the  "Army  of  the 
Potomac,"  he  having  been  ordered  to  Kentucky;  and 
after  this  time  there  was  no  distinction  of  corps  in  the 
"Army  of  the  Potomac,"  but  all  division  commanders 
reported  directly  to  General  Johnston. 

After  the  1st  of  February  General  Bonham  re- 
linquished the  command  of  the  division,  having  resigned 
his  commission  to  take  his  seat  in  Congress,  and  I  suc- 
ceeded to  the  command  of  the  division  as  next  in  rank 
— Colonel  Kershaw,  who  was  appointed  brigadier  gen- 
eral, succeeding  Bonham  in  the  command  of  his  brigade. 
My  brigade  had  gone  into  temporary  winter  quarters 
at  the  point  to  which  it  had  moved,  when  we  fell  back 
from  the  line  of  Fairfax  Court-House  for  the  purpose 
of  continuing  the  construction  of  the  works  on  our  right, 

52 


OPERATIONS  ALONG  BULL  RUN 

which  were  rendered  necessary  by  the  change  in  the  line 
before  mentioned;  and  it  was  engaged  in  building  new 
winter  quarters  south  of  Bull  Run,  and  completing  the 
earthworks  covering  McLean's  Ford  when  the  line  of 
Bull  Run  was  abandoned. 

About  two  weeks  before  the  evacuation  took  place, 
division  commanders  were  confidentially  informed  of 
the  probability  of  that  event,  and  ordered  to  prepare 
their  commands  for  it  in  a  quiet  way.  Up  to  that  time 
there  had  been  no  apparent  preparation  for  such  a 
movement,  but  an  immense  amount  of  stores  of  all  kinds 
and  private  baggage  of  officers  and  men  had  been  per- 
mitted to  accumulate.  Preparations,  however,  were  com- 
menced at  once  for  sending  the  stores  and  baggage  to 
the  rear.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  our  army  had  remained 
stationary  so  long,  and  the  inexperience  in  campaigning 
of  our  troops,  there  had  been  a  vast  accumulation  of 
private  baggage  by  both  officers  and  men;  and  when  it 
became  necessary  to  change  a  camp  it  was  the  work  of 
two  or  three  days.  I  had  endeavored  to  inculcate  proper 
ideas  on  this  subject  into  the  minds  of  the  officers  of 
my  own  immediate  command,  but  with  very  indifferent 
success,  and  it  was  very  provoking  to  see  with  what 
tenacity  young  lieutenants  held  on  to  baggage  enough 
to  answer  all  their  purposes  at  a  fashionable  watering 
place  in  time  of  peace. 

After  the  confidential  instructions  for  the  evacuation 
were  given,  I  tried  to  persuade  all  my  officers  to  send 
all  their  baggage  not  capable  of  being  easily  transported 
and  for  which  they  did  not  have  immediate  necessary 
use,  on  the  railroad  to  some  place  in  the  rear  out  of  all 
danger,  but  the  most  that  I  could  accomplish  was  to 
get  them  to  send  it  to  Manassas  Junction.  This  was 
generally  the  case  with  the  whole  army,  and  the  con- 
sequence was  that  a  vast  amount  of  trunks  and  other 
private  baggage  was  accumulated  at  the  Junction  at 
the  last  moment,  for  which  it  was  impossible  to  find 
any  transportation.    This  evil,  however,  was  finally  and 

53 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

completely  remedied  by  the  burning  wnich.  took  place 
when  the  Junction  itself  was  evacuated,  and  we  never 
had  any  great  reason  subsequently  to  complain  of  a 
plethoric  condition  of  the  baggage. 

Besides  this  trouble  in  regard  to  private  baggage, 
there  was  another  which  incommoded  us  to  some  ex- 
tent, and  that  resulted  from  the  presence  of  the  wives 
of  a  number  of  officers  in  and  near  camp.  These  would 
listen  to  no  mild  appeals  or  gentle  remonstrances,  but 
held  on  with  a  pertinacity  worthy  of  a  better  cause,  and 
I  was  myself  compelled,  as  a  final  resort,  to  issue  a 
peremptory  order  for  some  of  them  to  leave  my  camp. 

The  order  was  finally  given  for  the  movement  to 
the  rear  on  the  8th  of  March  and  early  on  that  morning 
I  broke  up  my  camps  and  moved  with  my  brigade  and 
that  of  Kershaw  towards  the  Junction.  We  were  de- 
layed, however,  waiting  for  the  movement  of  the  other 
troops,  and  did  not  arrive  at  the  Junction  until  in  the 
afternoon.  A  portion  of  Ewell's  division  was  to  move 
in  front  of  us  along  the  railroad,  while  the  remainder 
of  it,  with  Rodes'  brigade,  was  to  move  on  a  road  east 
of  the  railroad.  Our  wagon  trains  had  been  previously 
sent  forward  on  the  roads  west  of  the  railroad.  We 
waited  at  the  Junction  until  the  troops  that  were  to 
precede  us  had  passed  on,  and  the  last  of  the  trains  of 
cars  could  be  gotten  off.  Finally  at  a  late  hour  of  the 
night  after  the  last  available  train  of  cars  had  left,  we 
moved  along  the  railroad  past  Bristow  Station,  and 
bivouacked  for  the  night,  my  brigade  bringing  up  the 
rear  of  our  infantry  on  that  route. 

A  very  large  amount  of  stores  and  provisions  had 
been  abandoned  for  want  of  transportation,  and  among 
the  stores  was  a  quantity  of  clothing,  blankets,  etc.,  which 
had  been  provided  by  the  States  south  of  Virginia  for 
their  own  troops.  The  pile  of  trunks  along  the  railroad 
was  appalling  to  behold.  All  these  stores,  clothing, 
trunks,  etc.,  were  consigned  to  the  flames  by  a  portion  of 
our  cavalry  left  to  carry  out  the  work  of  their  destruction. 

54 


OPERATIONS  ALONG  BULL  RUN 

The  loss  of  stores  at  this  point,  and  at  White  Plains, 
on  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  where  a  large  amount 
of  meat  had  been  salted  and  stored,  was  a  very  serious 
one  to  us,  and  embarrassed  us  for  the  remainder  of 
the  war,  as  it  put  us  at  once  on  a  running  stock. 

The  movement  back  from  the  line  of  Bull  Run  was 
in  itself  a  very  wise  one  in  a  strategic  point  of  view, 
if  it  was  not  one  of  absolute  necessity,  but  the  loss  of 
stores  was  very  much  to  be  regretted.  I  do  not  pretend 
to  attach  censure  to  any  one  of  our  officials  for  this 
loss,  especially  not  to  General  Johnston.  I  know  that  he 
was  exceedingly  anxious  to  get  off  all  the  stores,  and 
made  extraordinary  exertions  to  accomplish  that  object. 
My  own  opinion  was  that  the  failure  to  carry  them  off 
was  mainly  owing  to  inefficient  management  by  the  rail- 
road officials,  as  I  always  found  their  movements  slow 
and  little  to  be  depended  on,  beginning  with  the  trans- 
portation of  the  troops  sent  by  me  from  Lynchburg  in 
May  and  June,  1861. 

McClellan  in  his  report  assumes  that  the  evacuation 
of  the  line  of  Bull  Run,  was  in  consequence  of  his  pro- 
jected movement  to  the  Peninsula  having  become  known 
to  the  Confederate  commander,  but  such  was  not  the 
fact.  Our  withdrawal  from  that  line  was  owing  to  the 
fact  that  our  force  was  too  small  to  enable  us  to  hold 
so  long  a  line  against  the  immense  force  which  it  was 
known  had  been  concentrated  at  and  near  Washington. 
McClellan 's  statement  of  his  own  force  shows  that  his 
troops,  including  those  in  Maryland  and  Delaware, 
numbered  on  the  1st  of  January,  1862,  191,840  for  duty; 
on  the  1st  of  February,  190,806  for  duty;  and  on  the 
1st  of  March,  193,142  for  duty.  Of  this  force  he  carried 
into  the  field  in  his  campaign  in  the  Peninsula  con- 
siderably over  100,000  men,  after  having  left  over 
40,000  men  to  protect  Washington.  He  could  have 
thrown  against  General  Johnston's  army,  at  and  near 
Manassas,  a  force  of  more  than  four  times  the  strength 
of  that  army.     I  have  before   stated  that   Johnston's 

55 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

army  was  composed  of  four  divisions  of  infantry  besides 
the  cavalry  and  artillery. 

The  division  commanded  by  me  was  fully  an  average 
one,  and  that  division,  including  three  batteries  of  artil- 
lery and  a  company  of  cavalry  attached  to  it,  as  shown 
by  my  field  returns  now  before  me,  numbered  on  the 
1st  of  February,  1862,  6,965  effective  total  present,  and 
an  aggregate  present  of  8,703 ;  and  on  the  1st  of  March, 
5,775  effective  total  present,  and  an  aggregate  present 
of  7,154.  At  both  periods  a  very  large  number  present 
were  on  the  sick  list.  The  aggregate  present  and  absent 
on  the  1st  of  March  amounted  to  10,008,  there  being  at 
that  time  twenty-four  officers  and  962  enlisted  men  ab- 
sent sick  and  61  officers  and  1,442  enlisted  men  absent 
on  furlough — the  rest  of  the  absentees  being  on  de- 
tached service  and  without  leave.  This  will  give  a  very 
good  idea  of  General  Johnston's  entire  strength,  and 
will  show  the  immense  superiority  of  the  enemy's  force 
to  his. 

The  evacuation  of  Manassas  and  the  line  of  Bull 
Run  was  therefore  a  movement  rendered  absolutely 
necessary  by  the  inability  of  our  army  to  cope  with  the 
enemy's  so  near  to  his  base,  and  had  been  delayed  fully 
as  long  as  it  was  prudent  to  do  so. 

Moving  back  over  the  routes  designated,  Ewell's 
division  and  mine  crossed  the  Rappahannock  on  the 
10th  of  March  and  took  position  on  the  south  bank.  We 
remained  there  several  days,  when  my  division  was 
moved  to  the  Rapidan  and  crossed  over  to  the  south 
bank,  Ewell  being  left  to  guard  the  crossing  of  the 
Rappahannock.  G.  W.  Smith's  and  Longstreet's 
divisions  had  moved  by  the  roads  west  of  the  railroad, 
and  were  concentrated  near  Orange  Court-House. 

I  remained  near  the  Rapidan  until  the  4th  of  April, 
when  I  received  orders  to  move  up  to  Orange  Court- 
House  to  take  the  cars  for  Richmond  and  report  to  Gen- 
eral Lee,  who  was  then  entrusted  with  the  general  direc- 
tion   of    military    operations,    under    the    President.    I 

56 


OPERATIONS  ALONG  BULL  RUN 

marched  to  the  court-house  next  day,  but  found  diffi- 
culty in  getting  cars  enough  to  transport  my  division. 
Rodes  was  first  sent  off,  then  Kershaw,  and  my  own 
brigade  was  finally  put  on  board  on  the  7th.  Going 
with  the  rear  of  this  last  brigade,  I  reached  Richmond 
on  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  April,  after  much  delay 
on  the  road,  and  found  that  Rodes  and  Kershaw  had 
been  sent  to  General  Magruder  on  the  Peninsula,  to 
which  point  I  was  also  ordered  with  my  own  brigade, 
part  going  by  the  way  of  York  River,  and  the  rest  by 
the  way  of  James  River  in  vessels  towed  by  tugs.  My 
trains  and  artillery  moved  by  land  from  Orange  Court- 
House. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Manoeuvring  on  the  Peninsula. 

I  landed  and  reported  to  General  Magruder  on  the 
morning  of  the  9th  of  April. 

After  the  abandonment  of  the  line  of  Bull  Run  by 
our  troops,  McClellan  had  moved  the  greater  part  of 
his  army  to  the  Peninsula,  and  by  the  4th  of  April  had 
landed  about  100,000  men  at  or  near  Fortress  Monroe. 
Magruder  at  that  time  occupied  the  lower  Peninsula 
with  a  force  which  did  not  exceed  in  effective  men  7,000 
or  8,000.  Upon  this  force  McClellan  advanced  with  his 
immense  army,  when  Magruder  fell  back  to  the  line  of 
Warwick  River,  extending  from  Yorktown  on  York 
River  across  James  River,  and  checked  the  enemy's 
advance.  McClellan  then  sat  down  before  the  fortifica- 
tions at  Yorktown  and  along  Warwick  River  and  began 
a  siege  by  regular  approaches. 

When  I  arrived  at  Magruder 's  headquarters,  I  was 
informed  by  him  that  his  force,  before  the  arrival  of 
mine,  amounted  to  12,000,  he  having  been  reinforced 
since  the  enemy's  advance,  by  troops  from  the  south  side 
of  James  River  and  Wilcox's  brigade  of  G.  W.  Smith's 
(now  D.  R.  Jones')  division,  the  said  brigade  having 
been  detached  from  the  army  under  Johnston.  The 
division  carried  by  me  now  numbered  about  8,000  men 
and  officers  for  duty,  it  having  been  increased  to  that 
amount  by  the  return  of  those  on  furlough  and  some 
recruits;  so  that  Magruder 's  force  now  amounted  to 
20,000  men  and  officers  for  duty.  McClellan,  in  a 
telegram  to  President  Lincoln,  dated  the  7th  of  April, 
says:  "Your  telegram  of  yesterday  received.  In  reply 
I  have  to  state  that  my  entire  force  for  duty  amounts 
to  only  about  eighty-five  thousand  men."  At  that  time, 
except  Wilcox's  brigade,  not  a  soldier  from  General 
Johnston's   army  had   arrived,   and  my  division   con- 

58 


MANOEUVRING  ON  THE  PENINSULA 

stituted  the  next  reinforcement  received  from  that  army 
by  Magruder. 

Yorktown  had  been  previously  strongly  fortified, 
and  some  preparations  had  been  made  to  strengthen  the 
other  part  of  the  line,  which,  however,  had  not  been 
completed.  Warwick  Eiver  runs  diagonally  across  the 
Peninsula  from  the  vicinity  of  Yorktown,  and  its  course 
for  the  greater  part  of  the  way  is  through  low,  marshy 
country.  Though  at  its  head  it  is  quite  a  small  stream, 
it  had  been  dammed  up  to  within  about  a  mile  of  the 
works  at  Yorktown  by  dams  thrown  across  at  several 
points,  so  as  to  be  impassable  without  bridging  at  any 
other  points  than  where  the  dams  were,  which  later  we 
defended  with  earthworks. 

Between  Warwick  River  and  Yorktown  were  two 
redoubts,  called  respectively  Redoubt  No.  4  and 
Redoubt  No.  5,  which  were  connected  by  a  curtain, 
with  wings  or  lateral  breastworks  extending  to 
Warwick  River  on  the  one  side,  and  the  head  of  a  deep 
ravine  between  Redoubt  No.  4  and  Yorktown  on  the 
other.  Redoubt  No.  4,  which  was  the  one  nearest  York- 
town,  was  sometimes  called  Fort  Magruder.  Gloucester 
Point,  across  York  River  from  Yorktown,  was  occupied 
by  a  small  infantry  force  with  some  heavy  batteries. 
The  whole  line  was  nearly  fifteen  miles  in  length.  The 
assuming  and  maintaining  the  line  by  Magruder,  with 
his  small  force  in  the  face  of  such  overwhelming  odds, 
was  one  of  the  boldest  exploits  ever  performed  by  a 
military  commander,  and  he  had  so  manoeuvred  his 
troops,  by  displaying  them  rapidly  at  different  points, 
as  to  produce  the  impression  on  his  opponent  that  he 
had  a  large  army.  His  men  and  a  considerable  body  of 
negro  laborers  had  been  and  were  still  engaged  in 
strengthening  the  works  by  working  night  and  day,  so 
that  their  energies  were  taxed  to  the  utmost  limit. 

Before  my  arrival,  Kershaw's  brigade  had  been 
ordered  to  the  right  of  the  line  and  assigned  to  that 
part  of  it  under  the  command   of  Brigadier  General 

59 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

McLaws,  and  Rodes'  brigade  had  been  posted  at  the 
works  between  the  defences  of  Yorktown  and  the  head 
of  the  obstructions  on  Warwick  River.  On  my  arrival 
I  was  ordered  to  move  my  own  brigade  near  the  point 
occupied  by  Rodes,  and  I  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  that  part  of  the  line  extending  from  the  ravine  south 
of  Yorktown  to  the  right  of  Wynn's  Mill  as  far  as  the 
mouth  of  the  branch  leading  into  the  pond  made  by  Dam 
No.  1,  which  was  the  first  dam  below  that  at  Wynn's 
Mill.  There  were  two  dams  on  the  line  thus  assigned 
me,  the  dam  at  Wynn's  Mill,  etc.  The  troops  defending 
the  part  of  the  line  thus  assigned  me  consisted  of  Rodes' 
brigade;  my  own,  now  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
D.  K.  McRae,  of  the  5th  North  Carolina  Regiment;  the 
2nd  Florida  Regiment,  Colonel  Ward;  the  2nd  Mississippi 
Battalion,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Taylor;  Brigadier  Gen- 
eral Wilcox's  brigade;  and  two  regiments  temporarily 
attached  to  his  command  under  Colonel  Winston  of 
Alabama;  and  the  19th  Mississippi  Regiment,  Colonel 
Mott.  The  latter  regiment  was,  however,  transferred 
to  another  part  of  the  line  in  a  few  days. 

The  only  portions  of  my  line  exposed  to  the  view 
of  the  enemy  were  Redoubts  Nos.  4  and  5  and  the  works 
attached  to  them,  the  works  at  Wynn's  Mill  and  part 
of  a  small  work  at  the  upper  dam  of  Wynn's  Mill — 
the  works  at  Wynn's  Mill  and  the  upper  dam  with  the 
intervening  space  being  occupied  by  Wilcox's  command. 
Between  the  works  designated,  including  Dam  No.  1, 
the  swamps  on  both  sides  of  Warwick  River  were  thickly 
wooded,  and  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  cross 
without  cutting  away  the  dams,  which  could  not  have 
been  done  without  first  driving  away  our  troops.  This 
was  also  the  case  below  Dam  No.  1  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent.  Redoubts  Nos.  4  and  5  with  the  curtain  and 
lateral  works  had  been  from  necessity  constructed  on 
ground  sloping  towards  the  enemy,  and  the  interior  and 
rear  of  them  were  therefore  much  exposed  to  his  fire. 
This  was  also  the  case  at  Wynn's  Mill,  and  at  both  points 

oo 


MANOEUVRING  ON  THE  PENINSULA 

it  had  been  necessary  to  cut  zig-zag  trenches,  or  bayous, 
to  enable  the  men  to  pass  into  and  from  the  works  with 
as  little  exposure  as  possible. 

Our  side  of  the  Warwick  Eiver,  between  the  exposed 
points,  was  occupied  by  thin  picket  lines.  Besides  the 
infantry  mentioned,  there  were  several  batteries  of  field 
artillery  in  the  works,  and  in  Redoubt  No.  4  there  were 
two  heavy  guns  and  a  large  Howitzer.  Brigadier  Gen- 
eral Raines  had  charge  of  the  immediate  defences  of 
Yorktown  and  Gloucester  Point. 

When  I  took  command  I  found  the  enemy  busily 
engaged  in  constructing  trenches  and  earthworks  in 
front  of  Redoubts  4  and  5  and  of  Wynn's  Mill.  In 
front  of  Redoubt  No.  5  was  a  dwelling  house,  with  sev- 
eral out-houses  and  a  large  peach  orchard  extending  to 
within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  our  works,  under  cover 
of  which  the  enemy  pushed  forward  some  sharp- 
shooters, with  long-range  rifles,  and  established  a  line 
of  rifle  pits  within  range  of  our  works,  which  annoyed 
us  very  much  for  several  days,  as  nearly  our  whole 
armament  for  the  infantry  consisted  of  smooth-bore 
muskets,  and  our  artillery  ammunition  was  too  scarce 
to  permit  its  use  in  a  contest  with  sharp-shooters.  On 
the  11th  of  April  General  Magruder  ordered  sorties 
to  be  made  by  small  parties  from  all  the  main  parts  of 
the  line  for  the  purpose  of  fooling  the  enemy.  Wilcox 
sent  out  a  party  from  Wynn's  Mill  which  encountered 
the  skirmishers  the  enemy  had  thrown  up  towards  his 
front,  and  drove  them  back  to  the  main  line. 

Later  in  the  day  Colonel  Ward,  with  his  own  regi- 
ment and  the  2nd  Mississippi  Battalion,  was  thrown 
to  the  front  on  the  right  and  left  of  Redoubt  No.  5, 
driving  the  enemy's  sharp-shooters  from  their  rifle  pits, 
advancing  through  the  peach  orchard  to  the  main  road 
beyond,  from  Warwick  Court-House  and  Fortress  Mon- 
roe, so  as  to  compel  a  battery,  which  the  enemy  had 
posted  at  an  earthwork  on  our  left  of  said  road,  to  retire 
precipitately.     Colonel  Ward,  however,  returned  to  our 

61 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

works  on  the  approach  of  a  large  force  of  the  enemy's 
infantry,  after  having  set  fire  to  the  honse  above  men- 
tioned and  performed  the  duty  assigned  him  in  a  very 
gallant  and  dashing  manner  without  loss  to  his'  com- 
mand. These  affairs  developed  the  fact  that  the  enemy 
was  in  strong  force  both  in  front  of  Wynn's  Mill  and 
Redoubts  4  and  5. 

On  the  night  following  Ward's  sortie,  the  24th 
Virginia  Regiment,  under  Colonel  Terry,  moved  to  the 
front,  and  cut  down  the  peach  orchard  and  burned  the 
rest  of  the  houses  which  had  afforded  the  enemy  shelter ; 
and  on  the  next  night  Colonel  McRae,  with  the  5th 
North  Carolina  Regiment,  moved  further  to  the  front 
and  cut  down  some  cedars  along  the  main  road  above 
mentioned,  which  partially  screened  the  enemy's  move- 
ments from  our  observation,  both  of  which  feats  were 
accomplished  without  difficulty  or  loss ;  and  after  this 
we  were  not  annoyed  again  by  the  enemy's  sharp- 
shooters. About  this  time  Major  General  D.  H.  Hill 
arrived  at  Yorktown  with  two  brigades  from  General 
Johnston's  army,  and  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  left  wing,  embracing  Raines'  command  and  mine. 
No  change,  however,  was  made  in  the  extent  of  my 
command,  but  I  was  merely  made  subordinate  to  General 
Hill. 

The  enemy  continued  to  work  very  busily  on  Ms 
approaches,  and  each  day  some  new  work  was  developed. 
He  occasionally  fired  with  arti]lery  on  our  works,  and 
the  working  parties  engaged  in  strengthening  them  and 
making  traverses  and  epaulments  in  the  rear,  but  we 
very  rarely  replied  to  him,  as  our  supply  of  ammunition 
was  very  limited. 

During  the  month  of  April  there  was  much  cold, 
rainy  weather,  and  our  troops  suffered  greatly,  as  they 
were  without  tents  or  other  shelter.  Their  duties  were 
very  severe  and  exhausting,  as  when  they  were  not  on 
the  front  line  in  the  trenches  they  were  employed  in 
constructing  heavy  traverses  and  epaulments  in  the  rear 

62 


MANOEUVRING  ON  THE  PENINSULA 

of  the  main  line,  so  as  to  conceal  and  protect  the  ap- 
proaches to  it.  In  addition  to  all  this,  their  rations  were 
very  limited  and  consisted  of  the  plainest  and  roughest 
food.  Coffee  was  out  of  the  question,  as  were  vegetables 
and  fresh  meat.  All  this  told  terribly  on  the  health  of 
the  men,  and  there  were  little  or  no  hospital  accommoda- 
tions in  the  rear. 

In  a  day  or  two  after  General  Hill's  arrival,  Colston's 
brigade  reported  to  me  and  occupied  a  position  be- 
tween the  upper  dam  of  Wynn's  Mill  and  Redoubt  No.  5. 
On  the  16th  the  enemy  made  a  dash  at  Dam  No.  1  on 
my  right  and  succeeded  in  crossing  the  dam  and  enter- 
ing the  work  covering  it,  but  was  soon  repulsed  and 
driven  across  the  river  with  some  loss.  This  was  not 
within  the  limits  of  my  command,  but  a  portion  of  my 
troops  were  moved  in  the  direction  of  the  point  at- 
tacked without,  however,  being  needed.  By  the  18th, 
the  residue  of  General  Johnston's  troops  east  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  except  Ewell's  division  and  a  portion  of 
the  cavalry  which  had  been  left  on  the  Rappahannock 
and  a  small  force  left  at  Fredericksburg,  had  reached 
the  vicinity  of  Yorktown,  and  on  that  day  General  John- 
ston, having  assumed  the  command,  issued  an  order 
assigning  Magruder  to  the  command  of  the  right  wing, 
beginning  at  Dam  No.  1  and  extending  to  James  River; 
D.  H.  Hill  to  the  command  of  the  left  wing,  including 
Yorktown,  and  Redoubts  4  and  5,  and  their  appertinent 
defences;  Longstreet  to  the  command  of  the  centre, 
which  extended  from  Dam  No.  1  to  the  right  of  the 
lateral  defences  of  Redoubt  No.  5;  and  G.  W.  Smith 
to  the  command  of  the  reserve. 

This  order,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  curtailed 
my  command,  which  was  now  confined  to  Redoubts  Nos. 
4  and  5  and  the  works  adjacent  thereto,  and  they  were 
defended  by  Rodes '  and  my  brigades,  and  the  2nd  Florida 
Regiment,  2nd  Mississippi  Battalion,  and  49th  Virginia 
Regiment,  the  latter  regiment  having  been  lately  as- 
signed to  me  for  the  defence  of  the  head  of  the  ravine 

63 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

south  of  Yorktown.  Shortly  afterwards  General  Hill 
made  a  new  arrangement  of  the  command,  by  which 
Rodes'  brigade  was  separated  from  mine  and  General 
Rodes  was  assigned  to  the  charge  of  Redoubt  No.  5 
and  the  defences  on  its  right,  while  I  was  assigned  to 
the  charge  of  Redoubt  No.  4  and  the  defences  on  the 
right  and  left  of  it,  including  the  curtain  connecting  the 
two  redoubts. 

The  enemy  continued  to  advance  his  works,  and  it 
was  while  we  were  thus  confronting  him  and  in  constant 
expectation  of  an  assault,  that  the  reorganization  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  regiments  of  our  army,  under  the 
Conscript  Act  recently  passed  by  Congress,  took  place. 
Congress  had  been  tampering  for  some  time  with  the 
question  of  reorganizing  the  army  and  supplying  the 
place  of  the  twelve  months'  volunteers,  which  composed 
much  the  greater  part  of  our  army ;  and  several  schemes 
had  been  started  and  adopted  with  little  or  no  success 
and  much  damage  to  the  army  itself,  until  finally  it  was 
found  necessary  to  adopt  a  general  conscription.  If 
this  scheme  had  been  adopted  in  the  beginning,  it  would 
have  readily  been  acquiesced  in,  but  when  it  was  adopted 
much  dissatisfaction  was  created  by  the  fact  that  it 
necessarily  violated  promises  and  engagements  made 
with  those  who  had  re-enlisted  under  some  of  the  former 
schemes.  The  reorganization  which  took  place  resulted 
in  a  very  great  change  in  the  officers,  especially  among 
the  field-officers,  all  of  whom  were  appointed  by  election, 
and  as  may  well  be  supposed  this  state  of  things  added 
nothing  to  the  efficiency  of  the  army  or  its  morals. 

In  the  meantime  the  enemy's  army  had  been  greatly 
augmented  by  reinforcements,  and  by  the  last  of  April 
his  approaches  in  our  front  had  assumed  very  formid- 
able appearances.  McClellan,  in  his  report,  states  the 
strength  of  his  army  as  follows :  present  for  duty,  April 
30,  1862,  4,725  officers,  and  104,610  men,  making  109,335 
aggregate  present  for  duty,  and  115,350  aggregate  pres- 
ent.    This  was  exclusive  of  Wool's  troops  at  Fortress 

G4 


MANOEUVRING  ON  THE  PENINSULA 

Monroe.  General  Johnston's  whole  force,  including 
Magruder's  force  in  it,  could  not  have  exceeded  50,000 
men  and  officers  for  duty,  if  it  reached  that  number,  and 
my  own  impression,  from  data  within  my  knowledge,  is 
that  it  was  considerably  below  that  figure. 

After  dark  on  the  night  of  Thursday  the  1st  of  May, 
General  Hill  informed  his  subordinate  commanders  that 
the  line  of  Warwick  River  and  Yorktown  was  to  be 
abandoned,  according  to  a  determination  that  day  made, 
upon  a  consultation  of  the  principal  officers  at  General 
Johnston's  headquarters;  and  we  were  ordered  to  get 
ready  to  evacuate  immediately  after  dark  on  the  fol- 
lowing night,  after  having  previously  sent  off  all  the 
trains.  This  measure  was  one  of  absolute  necessity,  and 
the  only  wonder  to  me  was  that  it  had  not  been  pre- 
viously resorted  to. 

The  line  occupied  by  us  was  so  long  and  our  troops 
had  to  be  so  much  scattered  to  occupy  the  whole  of  it, 
that  no  point  could  be  sufficiently  defended  against  a 
regular  siege  or  a  vigorous  assault.  The  obstacles  that 
had  been  interposed  to  obstruct  the  enemy,  likewise 
rendered  it  impossible  for  us  to  move  out  and  attack 
him  after  he  had  established  his  works  in  front  of  ours ; 
and  we  would  have  to  await  the  result  of  a  regular  siege, 
with  the  danger,  imminent  at  any  time,  of  the  enemy's 
gunboats  and  monitors  running  by  our  works  on  York 
and  James  Rivers,  and  thus  destroying  our  communica- 
tion by  water.  About  twelve  miles  in  rear  of  Yorktown, 
near  Williamsburg,  the  Peninsula  is  only  about  three  or 
four  miles  wide,  and  there  are  creeks  and  marshes  inter- 
secting it  on  both  sides  at  this  point,  in  such  way  that 
the  routes  for  the  escape  of  our  army  would  have  been 
confined  to  a  very  narrow  slip,  if  our  line  had  been 
broken.  The  most  assailable  point  on  our  whole  line 
was  that  occupied  by  Rodes  and  myself,  and  when  the 
enemy  could  have  got  his  heavy  batteries  ready,  our 
works  on  this  part  of  the  line  would  have  soon  been 
rendered  wholly  untenable. 

5  65 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JTJBAL  A.  EARLY 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  ground  on  which  these 
works  were  located  sloped  towards  the  enemy's  position, 
so  as  to  expose  to  a  direct  fire  their  interior  and  rear, 
it  would  have  been  easy  for  him  to  have  shelled  us  out 
of  them ;  and  when  this  part  of  the  line  had  been  carried, 
the  enemy  could  have  pushed  to  our  rear  on  the  direct 
road  to  Williamsburg  and  secured  all  the  routes  over 
which  it  would  have  been  possible  for  us  to  retreat,  thus 
rendering  the  capture  or  dispersion  of  our  entire  army 
certain.  Nothing  but  the  extreme  boldness  of  Magruder 
and  the  excessive  caution  of  McClellan  had  arrested  the 
march  of  the  latter  across  this  part  of  the  line  in  the 
first  place,  as  it  was  then  greatly  weaker  than  we  sub- 
sequently made  it. 

During  the  night  of  the  1st  of  May,  after  orders  had 
been  given  for  the  evacuation,  we  commenced  a  can- 
nonade upon  the  enemy,  with  all  of  our  heavy  guns,  in 
the  works  at  Yorktown  and  in  Redoubt  No.  4.  The  ob- 
ject of  this  was  to  dispose  of  as  much  of  the  fixed 
ammunition  as  possible  and  produce  the  impression  that 
we  were  preparing  for  an  attack  on  the  enemy's  trenches. 
This  cannonading  was  continued  during  the  next  day, 
and,  on  one  part  of  the  line,  we  were  ready  to  have  com- 
menced the  evacuation  at  the  time  designated,  but  a 
little  before  night  on  that  day  (Friday  the  2nd)  the 
order  was  countermanded  until  the  next  night,  because 
some  of  Longstreet's  troops  were  not  ready  to  move. 
We  therefore  continued  to  cannonade  on  Friday  night 
and  during  Saturday.  Fortunately,  after  dark  on  the 
latter  day  the  evacuation  began  and  was  conducted  suc- 
cessfully— Stuart's  cavalry  having  been  dismounted  to 
occupy  our  picket  line  in  front,  and  then  men  attached 
to  the  heavy  artillery  remaining  behind  to  continue  the 
cannonade  until  near  daylight  next  morning,  so  as  to 
keep  the  enemy  in  ignorance  of  our  movements.  There 
was  a  loss  of  some  stores  and  considerable  public  prop- 
erty which  had  been  recently  brought  down,  for  which 
there   was    no    transportation,    as    the    steamboats    ex- 

66 


MANCEUVRING  ON  THE  PENINSULA 

pected  for  that  purpose  did  not  arrive,  and  the  whole  of 
our  heavy  artillery  including  some  guns  that  had  not 
been  mounted  had  to  be  abandoned. 

Hill's  command,  to  which  I  was  attached,  moved  on 
the  direct  road  from  Yorktown  to  Williamsburg,  but  our 
progress  was  very  slow,  as  the  roads  were  in  a  terrible 
condition  by  reason  of  heavy  rains  which  had  recently 
fallen.  My  command  passed  through  Williamsburg 
after  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  the  4th,  and 
bivouacked  about  two  miles  west  of  that  place.  The 
day  before  the  evacuation  took  place  the  20th  Georgia 
Regiment  had  been  transferred  from  my  brigade,  and 
its  place  had  been  supplied  by  the  38th  Virginia  Regi- 
ment under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Whittle.  The  2nd 
Florida  Regiment  and  the  2nd  Mississippi  Battalion 
continued  to  be  attached  to  my  command.  No  supplies 
of  provisions  had  been  accumulated  at  Williamsburg, 
and  the  rations  brought  from  Yorktown  were  now 
nearly  exhausted,  owing  to  the  delay  of  a  day  in  the 
evacuation  and  the  fact  that  our  transportation  was 
very  limited. 

We  rested  on  Sunday,  but  received  orders  to  be 
ready  to  resume  the  march  at  3  o'clock  a.m.  on  next 
day,  the  5th.  My  command  was  under  arms  promptly 
at  the  time  designated,  but  it  had  been  raining  during 
the  night,  and  it  was  very  difficult  for  our  trains  and 
artillery  to  make  any  headway.  My  command,  there- 
fore, had  to  remain  under  arms  until  about  noon,  before 
the  time  arrived  for  it  to  take  its  place  in  the  column 
to  follow  the  troops  and  trains  which  were  to  precede 
it,  and  was  just  about  to  move  off  when  I  received  an 
order  from  General  Hill  to  halt  for  a  time.  I  soon  re- 
ceived another  order  to  move  back  to  Williamsburg  and 
report  to  General  Longstreet,  who  had  been  entrusted 
with  the  duty  of  protecting  our  rear. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Battle  of  Williamsburg. 

On  reporting  to  General  Longstreet  at  Williamsburg, 
I  ascertained  that  there  was  fighting,  by  a  portion  of 
our  troops,  with  the  enemy's  advance,  at  a  line  of  re- 
doubts previously  constructed  a  short  distance  east  of 
Williamsburg,  the  principal  one  of  which  redoubts, 
covering  the  main  road,  was  known  as  Fort  Magruder. 
I  was  directed  to  move  my  command  into  the  college 
grounds  and  await  orders.  There  was  now  a  cold, 
drizzling  rain  and  the  wind  and  the  mud  in  the  roads, 
and  everywhere  else,  was  very  deep.  After  remaining 
for  some  time  near  the  college,  I  received  an  order  from 
General  Longstreet  to  move  to  Fort  Magruder  and  sup- 
port Brigadier  General  Anderson,  who  had  command 
of  the  troops  engaged  with  the  enemy. 

My  command  was  immediately  put  into  motion,  and 
I  sent  my  aide,  Lieutenant  S.  H.  Early,  forward,  to 
inform  General  Anderson  of  my  approach,  and  ascer- 
tain where  my  troops  were  needed.  Lieutenant  Early 
soon  returned  with  the  information  that  General  Ander- 
son was  not  at  Fort  Magruder,  having  gone  to  the 
right,  where  his  troops  were  engaged,  but  that  General 
Stuart,  who  was  in  charge  at  the  fort,  requested  that 
four  of  my  regiments  be  moved  into  position  on  the 
right  of  it  and  two  on  the  left.  As  I  was  moving  on  to 
comply  with  his  request  and  had  neared  Fort  Magruder, 
General  Longstreet  himself  rode  up  and  ordered  me  to 
move  the  whole  of  my  command  to  a  position  which  he 
pointed  out,  on  a  ridge  in  a  field  to  the  left  and  rear  of 
the  Fort,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  turning  the 
position  in  that  direction,  and  to  await  further  orders. 
General  Longstreet  then  rode  towards  the  right,  and  I 
was  proceeding  to  the  position  assigned  me,  when  one 
of  the  General's  staff  officers  came  to  me  with  an  order 

68 


BATTLE  OF  WILLIAMSBURG 

to  send  him  two  regiments,  which  I  complied  with  by 
sending  the  2nd  Florida  Regiment  and  the  2nd 
Mississippi  Battalion,  under  Colonel  Ward. 

With  my  brigade  proper  I  moved  to  the  point  desig- 
nated before  this  last  order,  and  took  position  on  the 
crest  of  a  ridge  in  a  wheat  field  and  facing  towards  a 
piece  of  woods  from  behind  which  some  of  the  enemy's 
guns  were  firing  on  Fort  Magruder.  Shortly  after  I 
had  placed  my  command  in  position,  General  Hill  came 
up  and  I  suggested  to  him  the  propriety  of  moving 
through  the  woods  to  attack  one  of  the  enemy's  batteries 
which  seemed  to  have  a  flank  fire  on  our  main  position. 
He  was  willing  for  the  attack  to  be  made,  but  replied 
that  he  must  see  General  Longstreet  before  authorizing 
it.  He  then  rode  to  see  General  Longstreet  and  I  com- 
menced making  preparations  for  the  projected  attack. 
While  I  was  so  engaged,  Brigadier  General  Rains,  also 
of  Hill's  command,  came  up  with  his  brigade  and  formed 
immediately  in  my  rear  so  as  to  take  my  place  when  I 
moved.  General  Hill  soon  returned  with  the  informa- 
tion that  the  attack  was  to  be  made,  and  he  proceeded 
to  post  some  field-pieces  which  had  come  up,  in  position 
to  cover  my  retreat  if  I  should  be  repulsed. 

As  soon  as  this  was  done,  my  brigade  moved 
forward  through  the  wheat  field  into  the  woods,  and 
then  through  that  in  the  direction  of  the  firing,  by  the 
sound  of  which  we  were  guided,  as  the  battery  itself 
and  the  troops  supporting  it  were  entirely  concealed 
from  our  view.  General  Hill  accompanied  the  brigade, 
going  with  the  right  of  it.  It  moved  with  the 
5th  North  Carolina  on  the  right,  then  with  the  23rd 
North  Carolina,  then  the  38th  Virginia,  and  then  the 
24th  Virginia  on  the  left.  I  moved  forward  with  the 
24th  Virginia,  as  I  expected,  from  the  sound  of  the 
enemy's  guns  and  the  direction  in  which  we  were  mov- 
ing, it  would  come  upon  the  battery.  After  moving 
through  the  woods  a  quarter  of  a  mile  or  more,  the 
24th  came  to  a  rail  fence  with  an  open  field  beyond, 

69 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

in  which  were  posted  several  guns,  under  the  support 
of  infantry,  near  some  farm  houses.  In  this  field  were 
two  redoubts,  one  of  which,  being  the  extreme  left  re- 
doubt of  the  line  of  which  Fort  Magruder  was  the 
main  work,  was  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  this  redoubt 
was,  from  the  quarter  from  which  we  approached, 
beyond  the  farm  house  where  the  guns  mentioned  were 
posted.  The  24th,  without  hesitation,  sprang  over  the 
fence  and  made  a  dash  at  the  guns  which  were  but  a 
short  -distance  from  us,  but  they  retired  very  precipi- 
tately, as  did  the  infantry  support,  to  the  cover  of  the 
redoubt  in  their  rear  and  the  fence  and  piece  of  woods 
nearby. 

My  line  as  it  moved  forward  was  at  right  angle  to 
that  of  the  enemy,  so  that  my  left  regiment  alone  came 
upon  him  and  as  it  moved  into  the  field  was  exposed  to 
a  flank  fire.  This  regiment,  inclining  to  the  left,  moved 
gallantly  to  the  attack,  and  continued  to  press  forward 
towards  the  main  position  at  the  redoubt  under  a  heavy 
fire  of  both  infantry  and  artillery;  but  the  other  regi- 
ments had  not  emerged  from  the  woods,  and  I  sent 
orders  for  them  to  move  up  to  the  support  of  the  24th. 
In  the  meantime  I  had  received  a  very  severe  wound 
in  the  shoulder  from  a  minie  ball  and  my  horse  had 
been  very  badly  shot,  having  one  of  his  eyes  knocked 
out.  I  then  rode  towards  the  right  for  the  purpose  of 
looking  after  the  other  regiments  and  ordering  them 
into  action,  and  met  the  5th  North  Carolina,  under 
Colonel  McRae,  advancing  in  gallant  style  towards  the 
enemy.  Upon  emerging  from  the  woods  and  finding 
no  enemy  in  his  immediate  front,  Colonel  McRae  had 
promptly  formed  line  to  the  left  and  moved  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  regiment  which  was  engaged,  traversing  the 
whole  front  which  should  have  been  occupied  by  the 
two  other  regiments.  He  advanced  through  an  open 
field  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy's  artillery  and 
infantry,  and  soon  became  hotly  engaged  by  the  side  of 
the  24th. 

70 


BATTLE  OF  WILLIAMSBURG 

Having  by  this  time  become  very  weak  from  loss 
of  blood,  and  suffering  greatly  from  pain,  I  rode  to 
the  second  redoubt  nearby,  in  full  view  of  the  fight 
going  on  and  but  a  few  hundred  yards  from  it,  for  the 
purpose  of  dismounting  and  directing  the  operations 
from  that  point.  When  I  attempted  to  dismount  I  found 
myself  so  weak,  and  my  pain  was  so  excruciating,  that 
I  would  not  have  been  able  to  remount  my  horse,  nor, 
from  these  causes,  was  I  then  able  to  direct  the  move- 
ments of  my  troops.  I  therefore  rode  from  the  field, 
to  the  hospital  at  Williamsburg,  passing  by  Fort  Ma- 
gruder,  and  informing  General  Longstreet,  whom  I  found 
on  the  right  of  it,  of  what  was  going  on  with  my  com- 
mand. 

The  24th  Virginia  and  5th  North  Carolina  Regiments 
continued  to  confront  the  enemy  at  close  quarters  for 
some  time  without  any  support,  until  Colonel  McRae,  who 
had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  brigade,  in  reply  to 
a  request  sent  for  reinforcements,  received  an  order 
from  General  Hill  to  retire.  The  23rd  North  Carolina 
Regiment,  as  reported  by  Colonel  Hoke,  had  received 
an  order  from  General  Hill  to  change  its  front  in  the 
woods,  doubtless  for  the  purpose  of  advancing  to  the 
support  of  the  regiment  first  engaged,  but  it  did  not 
emerge  from  the  woods  at  all,  as  it  moved  too  far  to  the 
left  and  rear  of  the  24th  Virginia,  where  it  encountered 
a  detachment  of  the  enemy  on  his  right  flank.  The 
38th  Virginia  Regiment,  after  some  difficulty,  succeeded 
in  getting  into  the  field,  and  was  moving  under  fire  to 
the  support  of  the  two  regiments  engaged,  when  the 
order  was  received  to  retire. 

At  the  time  this  order  was  received,  the  24th  Vir- 
ginia and  5th  North  Carolina  were  comparatively  safe 
from  the  enemy's  fire,  which  had  slackened,  as  they  had 
advanced  to  a  point  where  they  were  in  a  great  measure 
sheltered,  but  the  moment  they  commenced  to  retire  the 
enemy  opened  a  heavy  fire  upon  them,  and,  as  they  had 
to  retire  over  a  bare  field,  they  suffered  severely.    In 

71 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

going  back  through  the  woods,  some  of  the  men  lost 
their  way  and  were  captured  by  running  into  a  regiment 
of  the  enemy,  which  was  on  his  right  in  the  woods. 

From  these  causes  the  loss  in  those  two  regiments 
was  quite  severe.  Colonel  Wm.  R.  Terry  and  Lieutenant 
Colonel  P.  Hairston,  of  the  24th  Virginia,  were  severely 
wounded,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  J.  C.  Badham  of  the 
5th  North  Carolina  was  killed,  while  a  number  of  com- 
pany officers  of  both  regiments  were  among  the  killed 
and  wounded.  The  loss  in  the  23rd  North  Carolina  and 
38th  Virginia  was  slight,  but  Lieutenant  Colonel  Whittle 
of  the  latter  regiment  received  a  wound  in  the  arm. 
The  brigade  fell  back  to  the  position  from  which  it 
advanced,  without  having  been  pursued  by  the  enemy, 
and  was  there  re-formed.  The  troops  of  the  enemy  en- 
countered by  my  brigade  in  this  action  consisted  of 
Hancock's  brigade  and  some  eight  or  ten  pieces  of 
artillery. 

The  charge  made  by  the  24th  Virginia  and  the  5th 
North  Carolina  Regiments  on  this  force  was  one  of  the 
most  brilliant  of  the  war,  and  its  character  was  such  as 
to  elicit  applause  even  from  the  newspaper  correspond- 
ents from  the  enemy's  camps.  Had  one  of  the  brigades 
which  had  come  up  to  the  position  from  which  mine 
advanced  been  ordered  up  to  the  support  of  Colonel 
McRae,  the  probability  is  that  a  very  different  result 
would  have  taken  place,  and  perhaps  Hancock's  whole 
force  would  have  been  captured,  as  its  route  for  retreat 
was  over  a  narrow  mill-dam. 

McClellan,  in  a  telegraphic  dispatch  at  the  time, 
reported  that  my  command  had  been  repulsed  by  "a 
real  bayonet  charge,"  and  he  reiterates  the  statement  in 
his  report,  that  Hancock  repulsed  the  troops  opposed  to 
him  by  a  bayonet  charge,  saying:  " Feigning  to  retreat 
slowly,  he  awaited  their  onset,  and  then  turned  upon 
them :  after  some  terrific  volleys  of  musketry  he  charged 
them  with  the  bayonet,  routing  and  dispersing  their 
whole  force."  This  statement  is  entirely  devoid  of 
truth.     My   regiments   were  not  repulsed,   but  retired 

72 


BATTLE  OF  WILLIAMSBURG 

under  order  as  I  have  stated,  and  there  was  no  charge 
by  the  enemy  with  or  without  bayonets.  This  charging 
with  bayonets  was  one  of  the  myths  of  this  as  well  as  all 
other  wars.  Military  commanders  sometimes  saw  the 
charges,  after  the  fighting  was  over,  but  the  surgeons 
never  saw  the  wounds  made  by  the  bayonets,  except  in 
a  few  instances  of  mere  individual  conflict,  or  where 
some  wounded  men  had  been  bayoneted  in  the  field. 

Colonel  Ward  of  Florida  had  led  his  command  into 
action  on  the  right  of  Fort  Magruder,  and  he  was  killed 
soon  after  getting  under  fire.  He  was  a  most  accom- 
plished, gallant,  and  deserving  officer,  and  would  have 
risen  to  distinction  in  the  army  had  he  lived. 

This  battle  at  Williamsburg  was  participated  in  by 
only  a  small  part  of  our  army,  and  its  object  was  to  give 
time  to  our  trains  to  move  off  on  the  almost  impassable 
roads.  It  accomplished  that  purpose.  The  enemy's 
superior  force  was  repulsed  at  all  points  save  that  at 
which  I  had  been  engaged,  or  at  least  his  advance  was 
checked.  A  number  of  guns  were  captured  from  him  and 
his  loss  was  severe,  though  we  had  to  abandon  some  of  the 
captured  guns  for  the  want  of  horses  to  move  them. 

During  the  night,  the  rear  of  our  army  resumed  its 
retreat,  and  the  whole  of  it  succeeded  in  reaching  the 
vicinity  of  Richmond  and  interposing  for  the  defence 
of  that  city,  after  some  minor  affairs  with  portions  of 
the  enemy's  troops.  A  portion  of  our  wounded  had  to 
be  left  at  Williamsburg  for  want  of  transportation,  and 
surgeons  were  left  in  charge  of  them.  I  succeeded  in 
getting  transportation  to  the  rear,  and,  starting  from 
Williamsburg  after  12  o'clock  on  the  night  of  the  5th, 
and  deviating  next  day  from  the  route  pursued  by  our 
army,  I  reached  James  River,  near  Charles  City  Court- 
House,  and  there  obtained  transportation  on  a  steamer 
to  Richmond,  where  I  arrived  at  night  on  the  8th.  From 
Richmond  I  went  to  Lynchburg,  and,  as  soon  as  I  was 
able  to  travel  on  horseback,  I  went  to  my  own  county, 
where  I  remained  until  I  was  able  to  resume  duty  in  the 
field. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Battles  Aeound  Richmond. 

During  my  absence  from  the  army,  the  battle  of 
Seven  Pines,  or  Fair  Oaks,  as  the  enemy  called  it,  was 
fought  on  the  31st  of  May  and  the  1st  of  June,  and 
General  Johnston  had  been  wounded.  General  R.  E. 
Lee  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  army  of  Gen- 
eral Johnston,  and  it  was  now  designated  "The  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia." 

General  Lee's  army  had  received  some  reinforce- 
ments from  the  South;  and  General  Jackson  (after  his 
brilliant  campaign  in  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah, 
by  which  he  had  baffled  and  rendered  useless  large  bodies 
of  the  enemy's  troops,  and  prevented  McDowell  from 
being  sent  to  the  support  of  McClellan  with  his  force 
of  40,000  men)  had  been  ordered  to  move  rapidly  toward 
Richmond  for  the  purpose  of  uniting  in  an  attack  on 
McClellan 's  lines.* 

*  The  following  correspondence  shows  how  much  the  Federal 
authorities,  civil  and  military,  were  befogged  by  Jackson's  movements. 

"  Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  June  24,  12  p.m.,  1862. 
"  A  very  peculiar  case  of  desertion  has  just  occurred  from  the 
army.  The  party  states  he  left  Jackson,  Whiting,  and  Ewell,  fifteen 
brigades  (a)  at  G-ordonsville,  on  the  21st;  that  they  were  moving  to 
Frederick's  Hall,  and  that  it  was  intended  to  attack  my  rear  on  the 
28th.  I  would  be  glad  to  learn,  at  your  earliest  convenience,  the  most 
exact  information  you'  have  as  to  the  position  and  movements  of  Jack- 
son, as  well  as  the  sources  from  which  your  information  is  derived, 
that  I  may  the  better  compare  it  with  what  I  have." 

"  G.  B.  McClellan,  Major  General. 
"Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War." 

"  Washington,  June  25,.  2.35. 
"  Major  General  McClellan  : 

"We  have  no  definite  information  as  to  the  numbers  or  position 
of   Jackson's   force.      General   King   yesterday    reported    a    deserter's 

74 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND 

This  movement  had  been  made  with  such  dispatch 
and  secrecy,  that  the  approach  of  Jackson  towards 
Washington  was  looked  for  by  the  authorities  at  that 
city,  until  he  was  in  position  to  fall  on  McClellan's  rear 
and  left. 

Having  started  on  my  return  to  the  army,  without 
having  any  knowledge  of  the  contemplated  movement, 
on  my  arrival  at  Lynchburg  I  found  that  the  fighting 
had  already  begun  with  brilliant  results.  I  hastened 
on  to  Richmond  and  arrived  there  late  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  28th  of  June.    Though  hardly  able  to  take  the  field 

statement  that  Jackson's  force  was,  nine  days  ago,  forty  thousand 
men.  Some  reports  place  ten  thousand  rebels  under  Jackson  at 
Gordonsville;  others  that  his  force  is  at  Port  Republic,  Harrisonburg 
and  Luray.  Fremont  yesterday  reported  rumors  that  Western  Vir- 
ginia was  threatened,  and  General  Kelly  that  Ewell  was  advancing 
to  New  Creek,  where  Fremont  has  his  depots.  The  last  telegram 
from  Fremont  contradicted  this  rumor.  The  last  telegram  from  Banks 
says  the  enemy's  pickets  are  strong  in  advance  at  Luray.  The  people 
decline  to  give  any  information  of  his  whereabouts.  Within  the  last 
two  days  the  evidence  is  strong  that  for  some  purpose  the  enemy  is 
circulating  rumors  of  Jackson's  advance  in  various  directions,  with  a 
view  to  conceal  the  real  point  of  attack.  Neither  McDowell,  who  is 
at  Manassas,  nor  Banks  and  Fremont,  who  are  at  Middletown,  appear 
to  have  any  accurate  knowledge  of  the  subject.  A  letter  transmitted 
to  the  Department  yesterday,  purporting  to  be  dated  Gordonsville,  on 
the  fourteenth  (14th)  instant,  stated  that  the  actual  attack  was  de- 
signed for  Washington  and  Baltimore,  as  soon  as  you  attacked  Rich- 
mond; but  that  the  report  was  to  be  circulated  that  Jackson  had  gone 
to  Richmond  in  order  to  mislead.  This  letter  looked  very  much  like 
a  blind,  and  induces  me  to  suspect  that  Jackson's  real  movement  now 
is  towards  Richmond.  It  came  from  Alexandria,  and  is  certainly  de- 
signed, like  the  numerous  rumors  put  afloat,  to  mislead.  I  think, 
therefore,  that  while  the  warning  of  the  deserter  to  you  may  also  be 
a  blind,  that  it  could  not  safely  be  disregarded.  I  will  transmit  to  you 
any  further  information  on  this  subject  that  may  be  received  here. 
"  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War." 

(a)  Jackson's  command  consisted  of  nine  brigades  at  this  time. 
Whiting  with  two  brigades  and  Lawton  with  one  had  joined  him  after 
the  engagements  at  Cross  Keys  and  Port  Republic,  at  which  time  he 
had  only  six  brigades,  three  in  Ewell's  division,  and  three  in  his  own. 

75 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

and  advised  by  the  surgeon  not  to  do  so,  immediately  on 
my  arrival  in  Richmond  I  mounted  my  horse,  and  with 
my  personal  staff  rode  to  General  Lee's  headquarters 
at  Gaines'  house,  north  of  the  Chickahominy,  for  the 
purpose  of  seeking  a  command  and  participating  in 
the  approaching  battles  which  seemed  inevitable.  I 
arrived  at  General  Lee's  headquarters  about  11 
o'clock  on  the  night  of  the  28th,  and  found  him  in  bed. 
I  did  not  disturb  him  that  night  but  waited  until  next 
morning  before  reporting  to  him.  The  battles  of 
Mechanicsville  and  Chickahominy  *  had  been  fought  on 
the  26th  and  27th  respectively,  and  that  part  of  the 
enemy's  army  which  was  north  of  the  Chickahominy 
had  been  driven  across  that  stream  to  the  south  side. 

The  troops  which  had  been  engaged  in  this  work 
consisted  of  Longstreet's,  D.  H.  Hill's,  and  A.  P.  Hill's 
divisions,  with  a  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Stuart,  from 
the  army  around  Richmond,  and  Jackson's  command, 
consisting  of  his  own,  Ewell's,  and  Whiting's  divisions. 
All  of  these  commands  were  still  north  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy, and  Magruder's,  Huger's,  McLaw's,  and  D.  R/ 
Jones'  divisions  had  been  left  on  the  south  side  to  defend 
Richmond,  there  being  about  a  division  at  Drewry's  and 
Chaffin's  Bluffs  under  Generals  Holmes  and  Wise. 
Magruder's,  McLaw's  and  Jones'  divisions  consisted 
of  two  brigades  each,  and  were  all  under  the  command 
of  General  Magruder. 

A  reorganization  of  the  divisions  and  brigades  of 
the  army  had  been  previously  made,  and  my  brigade, 
composed  of  troops  from  two  different  States,  had  been 
broken  up,  and  my  regiments  had  been  assigned  to  other 
brigadier  generals.  On  reporting  to  General  Lee  on  the 
morning  of  the  29th  (Sunday),  I  was  informed  by  him 
that  all  the  commands  were  then  disposed  of,  and  no 

*  So  called  by  General  Lee,  though  designated  by  subordinate 
commanders  as  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor  or  Gaines'  Mill,  according 
to  the  part  of  the  ground  on  which  their  commands  fought. 

70 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND 

new  arrangement  could  take  place  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy;  but  he  advised  me  to  return  to  Richmond 
and  wait  until  a  vacancy  occurred,  which  he  said  would 
doubtless  be  the  case  in  a  day  or  two. 

I  rode  back  to  Richmond  that  day,  and  on  the  next 
day,  the  30th,  called  on  the  Secretary  of  War,  General 
Randolph,  who  gave  me  a  letter  to  General  Lee,  sug- 
gesting that  I  be  assigned  to  the  temporary  command 
of  Elzey's  brigade  of  Ewell's  division,  as  General  Elzey 
had  been  severely  wounded,  and  would  not  be  able  to 
return  to  duty  for  some  time.  On  the  day  before,  our 
troops  on  the  north  of  Chickahominy  had  crossed  to 
the  south  side  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and  were  march- 
ing towards  James  River,  and  Magruder  had  had  an 
engagement  with  the  rear  of  the  retreating  column  at 
Savage  Station  on  the  York  River  Railroad.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  30th,  I  rode  to  find  General  Lee  again, 
and,  being  guided  by  reports  of  the  movement  of  our 
troops  and,  as  I  got  nearer,  by  the  sound  of  artillery,  I 
reached  the  vicinity  of  the  battlefield  at  Frazier's  farm, 
just  about  the  close  of  the  battle  near  dark.  This  battle 
had  taken  place  between  Longstreet's  and  A.  P.  Hill's 
divisions  and  a  large  body  of  the  enemy's  retreating- 
forces.  There  had  been  a  failure  of  other  portions  of 
the  army  to  come  up  as  General  Lee  expected  them  to 
do,  but  the  enemy  had  been  driven  from  the  field  with  a 
loss  of  some  artillery  and  a  considerable  number  in 
killed,  wounded  and  prisoners  on  his  part. 

I  gave  General  Lee  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  next  morning  he  gave  me  an  order  to  report 
to  General  Jackson  for  the  purpose  of  being  assigned 
temporarily  to  Elzey's  brigade.  This  was  the  1st  of 
July,  and  I  rode  past  the  battlefield  of  the  day  before 
with  our  advancing  troops,  until  we  reached  the  road 
leading  from  across  White  Oak  Swamp  past  Malvern 
Hill  to  James  River,  where  I  found  the  head  of  General 
Jackson's  column.  I  rode  forward  and  found  the  Gen- 
eral on  the  road  towards  Malvern  Hill  with  a  cavalry 

77 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

escort,  awaiting  a  report  from  some  scouts  who  had 
been  sent  forward  to  ascertain  the  enemy's  position. 

On  reporting  to  General  Jackson,  he  directed  his 
adjutant  general  to  write  the  order  for  me  at  once, 
but  while  Major  Dabney,  the  then  adjutant  general, 
was  preparing  to  do  this,  the  enemy  opened  with  some 
of  his  guns  from  Malvern  Hill,  and  several  shells  fell 
near  us.  This  rendered  an  immediate  change  of  quarters 
necessary,  and  the  whole  party  mounted  at  once  and 
retired  to  the  rear,  followed  by  the  enemy's  shells  in 
great  profusion,  as  the  cloud  of  dust  arising  from  the 
movement  of  the  cavalry  enabled  him  to  direct  his  fire 
with  tolerable  precision.  As  soon  as  we  got  out  of 
immediate  danger,  Major  Dabney  wrote  me  the  neces- 
sary order,  on  his  knee,  in  a  hurried  manner,  and  I  thus 
became  attached  to  the  command  of  the  famous  "Stone- 
wall" Jackson.  I  found  General  Ewell's  division  in 
the  rear  of  Jackson's  column,  and  upon  reporting  to 
him  the  command  of  Elzey's  brigade  was  at  once  given 
me,  it  being  then  about  ten  o'clock  p.m. 

The  brigade  was  composed  of  the  remnants  of  seven 
regiments,  to-wit:  the  13th  Virginia,  the  25th  Virginia, 
the  31st  Virginia,  the  44th  Virginia,  the  52nd  Virginia, 
the  58th  Virginia,  and  the  12th  Georgia  Regiments.  The 
whole  force  present  numbered  1,052  officers  and  men, 
and  there  was  but  one  colonel  present  (Colonel  J.  A. 
Walker  of  the  13th  Virginia  Regiment),  and  two  lieu- 
tenant colonels  (of  the  25th  and  52nd  Virginia  Regiments 
respectively),  the  rest  of  the  regiments  being  com- 
manded by  captains.  General  Jackson's  command  at 
this  time  was  composed  of  his  own  division,  and  those 
of  Ewell,  D.  H.  Hill,  and  W.  H.  Whiting,  besides  a 
number  of  batteries  of  artillery.  Ewell's  division  was 
composed  of  Trimble's  brigade,  Taylor's  Louisiana 
brigade,  the  brigade  to  which  I  had  been  assigned,  and 
a  small  body  of  Maryland  troops  under  Colonel  Bradley 
T.  Johnson. 

After  remaining  for  some  time  in  the  rear,  we  finally 

78 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND 

moved  forward  past  Willis'  Church,  to  where  a  line  of 
battle  had  been  formed  confronting  the  enemy's  position 
at  Malvern  Hill.  D.  H.  Hill's  division  had  been  formed 
on  the  right  of  the  road  leading  towards  the  enemy,  and 
Whiting's  on  the  left,  with  an  interval  between  his 
right  and  the  road  into  which  the  Louisiana  brigade 
of  Ewell's  division  was  moved.  My  brigade  was  posted 
in  the  woods  in  rear  of  the  Louisiana  brigade,  and 
Trimble's  brigade  was  formed  in  rear  of  Whiting's  left, 
which  constituted  the  extreme  left  of  our  line.  Jack- 
son's division  was  held  in  reserve  in  rear  of  the  whole. 
The  enemy  soon  commenced  a  heavy  cannonade  upon 
the  positions  where  our  troops  were  posted,  and  kept  it 
up  continuously  during  the  rest  of  the  day.  From  the 
position  which  I  occupied,  the  enemy  could  not  be  seen, 
as  a  considerable  body  of  woods  intervened,  but  many 
shells  and  solid  shot  passed  over  us,  and  one  shell 
passed  through  my  line,  killing  two  or  three  persons. 

We  remained  in  this  position  until  about  sunset,  and, 
in  the  meantime,  D.  H.  Hill  on  our  immediate  right  and 
Magruder  on  his  right  had  attacked  the  enemy  and  be- 
come very  hotly  engaged.  Just  about  sunset  I  was 
ordered  to  move  my  brigade  rapidly  towards  the  right 
to  support  General  D.  H.  Hill.  General  Ewell  accom- 
panied me,  and  we  had  to  move  through  the  woods  in  a 
circle  in  rear  of  the  position  Hill  had  first  assumed,  as 
the  terrific  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  prevented  our 
moving  in  any  other  route.  As  we  moved  on  through 
intricate  woods,  which  very  much  impeded  our  progress, 
we  were  still  within  range  of  the  shells  from  the  enemy's 
numerous  batteries,  and  they  were  constantly  bursting 
in  the  tops  of  the  trees  over  our  heads,  literally  strewing 
the  ground  with  leaves. 

After  moving  through  the  woods  for  some  distance 
we  came  to  a  small  blind  road  leading  into  an  open  flat, 
where  there  had  once  been  a  mill  on  a  creek  which  ran 
through  swampy  ground  between  our  left  and  the  enemy. 
On  reaching  the  edge  of  the  open  flat  I  was  ordered  to 

79 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

halt  the  head  of  my  brigade,  until  General  Ewell  rode 
forward  with  a  guide,  who  had  been  sent  to  show  us 
the  way,  to  ascertain  the  manner  in  which  we  were  to 
cross  the  creek.  The  musketry  fire  was  now  terrific, 
and  reverberated  along  the  valley  of  the  creek  awfully. 
General  Ewell  soon  returned  in  a  great  hurry  and 
directed  me  to  move  as  rapidly  as  possible.  As  soon  as 
the  head  of  the  brigade,  led  by  Lieut.  Colonel  Skinner 
of  the  52nd  Virginia  Regiment,  emerged  into  the  open 
ground,  General  Ewell  turned  to  him  and  directed  him 
to  go  directly  across  the  flat  in  the  direction  he  pointed, 
cross  the  creek,  and  then  turn  to  the  left  through  the 
woods  into  the  road  beyond,  ordering  him  at  the  same 
time  to  move  at  a  double  quick.  Before  I  could  say 
anything  General  Ewell  turned  to  me  and  said,  "We 
will  have  to  go  this  way,"  and  he  dashed  off  in  a  gallop 
on  a  road  leading  to  our  right  along  the  old  dam  across 
the  creek  into  another  road  leading  in  the  direction  of 
the  battlefield. 

I  had  no  option  but  to  follow  him,  which  I  did  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  but  this  required  me  to  make  a 
considerable  circuit  to  get  to  the  point  where  I  expected 
to  meet  the  head  of  my  brigade.  There  were  now 
streams  of  our  men  pouring  back  from  the  battlefield, 
and  on  getting  into  the  road  leading  towards  it  I  lost 
sight  of  my  brigade,  as  a  woods  intervened.  I  did  not 
find  it  coming  into  the  road  at  the  point  where  I  ex- 
pected, and  after  some  fruitless  efforts  to  find  it,  in 
which  I  was  often  deceived  by  seeing  squads  from  the 
battlefield  come  out  of  the  woods  in  such  manner  as  to 
cause  me  to  mistake  them  for  the  head  of  my  brigade, 
I  rode  back  to  find  if  it  was  crossing  the  flat. 

I  saw  nothing  of  it  then,  and  the  fact  was,  as  after- 
wards ascertained,  that,  after  crossing  the  creek,  Colonel 
Skinner  had  turned  to  the  left  too  far,  and  moved 
towards  the  battlefield  in  a  different  direction  than  that 
indicated.  His  regiment  had  been  followed  by  three 
others,   the   13th,   44th,   and   58th  Virginia   Regiments, 

80 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND 

but  the  12th  Georgia  and  25th  and  31st  Virginia  Regi- 
ments, being  in  the  rear  in  the  woods  when  the  head  of 
the  brigade  moved  at  a  double  quick,  were  left  behind, 
and  when  they  reached  the  flat,  seeing  nothing  of  the 
rest  of  the  brigade,  they  crossed  the  creek  at  the  dam 
and  took  the  wrong  end  of  the  road.  In  the  meantime, 
while  I  was  trying  to  find  my  brigade,  General  Ewell 
had  rallied  a  small  part  of  Kershaw's  brigade  and 
carried  it  back  to  the  field.  I  saw  now  a  large  body  of 
men,  which  proved  to  be  of  Toombs'  brigade,  coming 
from  the  field  and  I  endeavored  to  rally  them,  but  with 
little  success. 

While  I  was  so  engaged,  the  12th  Georgia  of  my 
own  brigade  came  up,  after  having  found  that  it  had 
taken  the  wrong  direction,  and  with  that  regiment  under 
the  command  of  Captain  J.  G.  Rogers,  I  moved  on,  fol- 
lowed by  Colonel  Benning  of  Toombs'  brigade  with 
about  thirty  men  of  his  own  regiment.  Lieutenant 
Early,  my  aide,  soon  came  up  with  the  25th  and  31st 
Virginia  Regiments,  which  he  had  been  sent  to  find. 
On  reaching  the  field,  I  found  General  Hill  and  General 
Ewell  endeavoring  to  form  a  line  with  that  part  of 
Kershaw's  brigade  which  had  been  rallied,  while  Ran- 
som's brigade,  or  a  part  of  it,  was  moving  to  the  front. 

I  was  ordered  to  form  my  men  in  line  with  Kershaw's 
men,  and  this  was  done  in  a  clover  field  in  view  of  the 
flashes  from  the  enemy's  guns,  the  guns  themselves  and 
his  troops  being  concealed  from  our  view  by  the  dark- 
ness which  had  supervened.  General  Hill's  troops  had 
been  compelled  to  retire  from  the  field  as  had  been  the 
greater  part  of  Magruder's,  after  a  very  desperate 
struggle  against  immense  odds,  and  a  vast  amount  of 
heavy  siege  guns  and  field  artillery.  I  was  ordered  to 
hold  the  position  where  I  was  and  not  attempt  an 
advance. 

The  enemy  still  continued  a  tremendous  fire  of  artil- 
lery from  his  numerous  guns,  and  his  fire  was  in  a  circle 
diverging  from  the  main  position  at  Malvern  Hill  so  as 

6  81 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

to  include  our  entire  line  from  right  to  left.  This  fire 
was  kept  up  until  after  nine  o'clock,  and  shells  were 
constantly  bursting  in  front  and  over  us,  and  crashing 
into  the  woods  in  our  rear.  It  was  a  magnificent  dis- 
play of  fireworks,  but  not  very  pleasant  to  those  exposed 
to  it.  After  being  gone  some  time  the  part  of  Ransom's 
brigade  which  had  advanced  in  front  of  us,  retired  to 
the  rear.  Trimble's  brigade  had  arrived  from  the  ex- 
treme left,  and  was  posted  in  my  rear.  Generals  Hill 
and  Ewell  remained  with  us  until  after  the  firing  had 
ceased,  and  then  retired  after  giving  me  orders  to  re- 
main where  I  was  until  morning  and  await  further 
orders.  During  the  night  General  Trimble  moved  his 
brigade  back  towards  its  former  position,  and  General 
Kershaw  and  Colonel  Benning  retired  with  their  men 
for  the  purpose  of  looking  after  the  rest  of  their  com- 
mands. 

My  three  small  regiments,  numbering  a  little  over 
three  hundred  in  all,  were  left  the  sole  occupants  of  that 
part  of  the  field,  save  the  dead  and  wounded  in  our  im- 
mediate front.  My  men  lay  on  their  arms  in  the  open 
field,  but  they  had  no  sleep  that  night.  The  cries  and 
groans  of  the  wounded  in  our  front  were  truly  heart- 
rending, but  we  could  afford  them  no  relief.  We  ob- 
served lights  moving  about  the  enemy's  position  during 
the  whole  night,  as  if  looking  for  the  killed  and  wounded, 
and  the  rumbling  of  wheels  was  distinctly  heard  as  of 
artillery  moving  to  the  rear,  from  which  I  inferred  that 
the  enemy  was  retreating. 

At  light  next  morning  I  discovered  a  portion  of  the 
enemy's  troops  still  at  his  position  of  the  day  before, 
but  it  was  evidently  only  a  small  portion  and  it  turned 
out  to  be  a  heavy  rear  guard  of  infantry  and  cavalry 
left  to  protect  the  retreating  army.  The  position  which 
he  had  occupied  and  which  our  troops  had  attacked  was 
a  strong  and  commanding  one,  while  the  whole  country 
around,  over  which  our  troops  had  been  compelled  to 
advance,  was  entirely  open  several  hundred  yards  and 

82 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND 

swept  by  his  artillery  massed  on  the  crest  of  Malvern 
Hill. 

In  my  view  were  nearly  the  whole  of  our  dead  and 
wounded  that  had  not  been  able  to  leave  the  field,  as 
well  as  a  great  part  of  the  enemy's  dead,  and  the  sight 
was  truly  appalling.  While  watching  the  enemy's  move- 
ments I  observed  to  our  right  of  his  position  and  close 
up  to  it  a  small  body  of  troops  lying  down  with  their 
faces  to  the  enemy,  who  looked  to  me  very  much  like 
Confederates.  I  moved  a  little  further  to  my  right  for 
the  purpose  of  seeing  better  and  discovered  a  cluster 
of  Confederates,  not  more  than  ten  or  twelve  in  number, 
one  of  whom  was  also  looking  with  field  glasses  at  the 
body  which  I  took  to  be  a  part  of  our  troops.  On  riding 
up  to  this  party,  I  found  it  to  consist  of  General  Armi- 
stead  of  Huger's  division  with  a  few  men  of  his  brigade. 
In  answer  to  my  question  as  to  where  his  brigade  was, 
General  Armistead  replied,  "Here  are  all  that  I  know 
anything  about  except  those  lying  out  there  in  front." 
He  had  spent  the  night  in  a  small  cluster  of  trees  around 
some  old  graves  about  two  hundred  yards  from  my  right. 

After  viewing  them  with  the  glasses,  we  were  satis- 
fied that  the  troops  lying  so  close  up  to  the  position 
of  the  enemy  were  Confederates,  and  it  turned  out  that 
they  consisted  of  Generals  Mahone  and  Wright  of 
Huger's  division  with  parts  of  their  brigades.  The 
whole  force  with  them  only  amounted  to  a  few  hundred, 
and  this  body  constituted  the  whole  of  our  troops  mak- 
ing the  assault  who  had  not  been  compelled  to  retire. 
They  maintained  the  ground  they  had  won,  after  min- 
gling their  dead  with  those  of  the  enemy  at  the  very 
mouths  of  his  guns,  and  when  the  enemy  finally  retired 
this  small  body  under  Mahone  and  Wright  remained  the 
actual  masters  of  the  fight.  Before  the  enemy  did  retire, 
a  messenger  came  from  Generals  Mahone  and  Wright, 
with  a  request  for  the  commander  of  the  troops  on  the 
part  of  the  field  where  I  was  to  advance,  stating  that 
the  enemy  was  retreating  and  that  but  a  rear  guard 

83 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

occupied  the  position.  I  was,  however,  too  weak  to 
comply  with  the  request,  especially  as  I  was  informed 
that  their  ammunition  was  exhausted. 

Shortly  after  light,  General  Ewell  came  in  a  great 
hurry  to  withdraw  my  command  from  the  critical  posi- 
tion in  which  he  supposed  it  to  be,  but  I  informed  him 
that  the  enemy  had  been  retreating  all  night,  and  he  sent 
information  of  that  fact  to  General  Jackson. 

Early  in  the  morning  a  captain  of  Huger's  division 
reported  to  me  that  he  had  collected  nearby  about  one 
hundred  and  fifty  men  of  that  division,  and  he  asked 
me  what  he  should  do  with  them.  I  directed  him  to 
hold  them  where  they  were  and  report  to  General 
Armistead,  who  was  on  the  field.  About  this  time  a 
considerable  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  advanced 
towards  us  on  the  road  from  his  main  position  of  the 
day  before,  as  I  supposed  for  a  charge  upon  us,  and  I 
requested  General  Armistead  to  take  command  of  the 
detachment  from  Huger's  division  and  aid  me  in  re- 
pulsing the  charge,  but,  while  I  was  making  the  neces- 
sary preparations,  a  few  shots  from  a  small  party  of 
infantry  on  the  left  of  the  road  sent  the  cavalry  back 
again.  By  this  time  our  ambulance  details  had  com- 
menced to  pass  freely  to  the  front  for  our  dead  and 
wounded,  and  they  began  to  mingle  freely  with  those 
of  the  enemy  engaged  in  a  similar  work.  For  some 
time  a  sort  of  tacit  truce  seemed  to  prevail  while  details 
from  both  armies  were  engaged  in  this  sad  task,  but 
the  enemy's  rear  guard  finally  retired  slowly  from  our 
view  altogether,  on  the  road  toward  Harrison's  Landing. 

It  was  not  until  this  movement  that  I  discovered 
what  had  become  of  the  rest  of  my  brigade,  and  I  then 
ascertained  that  when  the  missing  regiments  had  arrived 
on  the  battlefield  at  a  different  point  from  that  intended, 
Colonel  Walker  had  taken  charge  of  them.  It  was  dark 
by  that  time,  and  they  got  in  amongst  some  of  the 
enemy's  regiments,  when  Colonel  Walker  quietly  with- 
drew them,  as  the  force  into  which  they  had  got  was 

84 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND 

entirely  too  strong  for  him  to  attack.  My  brigade  did 
not  draw  trigger  at  all,  but  it  sustained  a  loss  of  thirty- 
three  in  killed  and  wounded  from  the  artillery  fire  of 
the  enemy.  During  the  2nd  it  commenced  raining,  and 
before  night  the  rain  was  very  heavy,  continuing  all 
night.  After  being  employed  for  some  time  in  picking 
up  small  arms  from  the  battlefield,  my  command  was 
moved  to  a  position  near  where  we  had  been  in  line,  the 
day  before,  and  there  bivouacked  with  the  rest  of  the 
brigade,  which  had  returned  to  that  point  the  night 
before. 

At  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  the  whole  army  of 
McClellan  was  concentrated  at  a  very  strong  position, 
with  a  limited  front  and  both  flanks  effectively  pro- 
tected. General  Lee 's  entire  army  was  likewise  present, 
and  it  was  the  first  time  during  the  seven  days'  fighting 
around  Richmond  that  these  two  armies  had  thus  con- 
fronted each  other. 

McClellan 's  army,  however,  was  so  situated  that  each 
portion  of  it  was  in  ready  communication  with,  and  in 
easy  supporting  distance  of,  every  other  part,  so  that 
the  whole  was  available  for  defence  or  attack,  while 
such  was  the  nature  of  the  ground  over  which  General 
Lee's  army  had  to  move  to  get  into  position,  and  in 
which  it  was  drawn  up  after  it  got  in  position,  that 
communication  between  the  several  commands  was  very 
difficult,  and  movements  to  the  support  of  each  other 
still  more  difficult. 

General  Lee  made  the  attack,  and  it  was  his  pur- 
pose to  hurl  the  greater  part  of  his  army  against  the 
enemy,  but  there  had  been  much  delay  in  getting  some 
of  the  commands  into  position,  owing  to  the  difficulties 
of  the  ground  and  an  unfortunate  mistake  as  to  roads. 
When  the  attack  was  made,  it  was  very  late  in  the 
afternoon,  and  then,  from  the  want  of  concert  produced 
by  the  want  of  proper  communication,  only  a  portion 
of  our  troops  advanced  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy.  The 
troops  which  did  so  advance  consisted  alone  of  D.  H. 

85 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Hill's  division  of  Jackson's  command,  Magruder's  com- 
mand of  three  small  divisions  of  two  brigades  each, 
and  three  brigades  of  Huger's  division,  in  all  fourteen 
brigades. 

From  some  mistake  in  regard  to  the  signal  for  the 
advance,  D.  H.  Hill,  hearing  what  he  supposed  to  be 
that  signal,  and  was  probably  intended  as  such,  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack  on  the  enemy's  front  with  his  five 
brigades  alone,  and  for  some  time  confronted  the  whole 
force '  at  Malvern  Hill,  but  after  a  desperate  conflict 
and  a  display  of  useless  valor,  was  compelled  to  retire 
with  heavy  loss.  Magruder's  command,  including 
Huger's  three  brigades,  was  then  hurled  upon  the  enemy 
by  brigades,  one  after  the  other,  but  those  brigades 
were  likewise  compelled  to  retire  after  making  in  vain 
the  most  heroic  efforts  to  force  the  enemy  from  his 
position. 

In  the  meantime,  Holmes'  division  of  three  brigades, 
Jackson's  division  of  four  brigades,  Ewell's  division 
of  three  brigades,  and  Whiting's  division  of  two 
brigades,  were  inactive,  while  Longstreet's  and  A.  P. 
Hill's  divisions,  of  six  brigades  each,  were  held  in 
reserve  some  distance  in  the  rear.  It  is  true  two 
brigades  of  Ewell's  division,  and  Jackson's  whole 
division,  were  ordered  to  the  support  of  D.  H.  Hill  after 
his  command  had  been  compelled  to  retire,  but  it  was 
only  to  be  thrown  into  confusion  by  the  difficulties  of 
the  way  and  the  approaching  darkness,  and  to  be  ex- 
posed to  a  murderous  fire  of  artillery,  for  it  was  then 
too  late  to  remedy  the  mischief  that  had  been  done. 

In  addition  to  all  this,  our  troops  had  to  advance  over 
open  ground  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy's  front,  while 
exposed  to  a  most  crushing  fire  of  canister  and  shrap- 
nel from  his  numerous  batteries  of  heavy  guns  and  field 
pieces  massed  on  a  commanding  position,  as  well  as  to 
a  flank  fire  from  his  gunboats  in  James  River,  as  it  was 
impossible  from  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  the  posi- 
tion of  the  flanks  to  turn  and  attack  either   of  them. 

80 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND 

Moreover,  such  was  the  character  of  the  ground  occupied 
by  us  that  it  was  impossible  to  employ  our  artillery, 
as  in  attempting  to  bring  the  guns  into  action  on  the 
only  ground  where  it  was  possible  to  use  them,  they 
could  be  knocked  to  pieces  before  they  could  be  used 
with  effect,  and  such  was  the  result  of  the  few  experi- 
ments made.  Longstreet's  and  Hill's  divisions  were 
held  in  reserve  because  they  had  been  heavily  engaged 
at  Frazier's  farm  the  day  before,  but  why  the  rest  of 
Jackson's  command  was  not  thrown  into  action  I  can- 
not say,  unless  it  be  that  the  difficulty  of  communicating, 
and  the  impossibility  of  seeing  what  was  going  on  on 
our  right,  prevented  the  advance  from  that  quarter  from 
being  known  in  time.  Certain  it  is  that  I  was  not  aware 
of  the  fact  that  it  was  any  other  than  an  affair  of  artil- 
lery, until  ordered  to  General  Hill's  support,  as  the  roar 
of  the  artillery  drowned  the  sound  of  the  small  arms. 

General  Hill  states  that  his  division  numbered  ten 
thousand  men  at  the  commencement  of  the  fighting 
north  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  he  had  sustained  con- 
siderable loss  in  that  fighting.  General  Magruder  says 
his  force  of  three  divisions  (six  brigades)  numbered 
about  thirteen  thousand  men  when  the  movement  to  the 
north  of  the  Chickahominy  began,  and  he  had  been 
severely  engaged  at  Savage  Station.  Huger's  three 
brigades  numbered  perhaps  seven  or  eight  thousand, 
certainly  not  more.  Our  troops  engaged  could  not,  there- 
fore, have  numbered  over  thirty  thousand,  and  was 
probably  something  under  that  figure,  while  McClellan 
was  able  to  bring  into  action,  to  meet  their  assault  on 
his  strong  position,  his  whole  force,  or  very  nearly  the 
whole  of  it. 

The  loss  in  the  two  armies  was  very  probably  about 
equal,  and  we  were  left  in  possession  of  the  battlefield, 
and  all  the  abandoned  muskets  and  rifles  of  both  armies, 
besides  those  pieces  of  artillery  abandoned  on  the  re- 
treat, and  some  wagons  and  ambulances,  but  all  this 
did  not  compensate  us   for  the  loss  of  valuable  lives 

87 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

sustained,  which  were  worth  more  to  us  than  the  ma- 
terial of  war  gained  or  any  actual  results  of  the  battle 
that  accrued  to  our  benefit. 

Both  sides  claimed  the  victory,  but  I  do  not  think 
any  advantage  was  gained  by  either  army  from  the 
battle,  though  McClellan  made  good  the  retreat  of  his 
shattered  army  to  the  very  strong  position  at  Harrison's 
Landing.  If  General  Lee's  plans  for  the  battle  had  been 
carried  out,  I  have  no  doubt  that  it  would  have  resulted 
in  a  crushing  defeat  to  the  enemy. 

On  the  3rd  of  July  the  army  was  put  in  motion  again, 
and  Jackson's,  Ewell's,  and  Whiting's  divisions  moved 
around  to  the  left  and  approached  McClellan 's  new  posi- 
tion by  the  road  leading  from  Long  Bridge  to  Westover, 
Ewell's  division  being  in  front.  On  the  4th  we  arrived  in 
front  of  the  enemy,  and  advanced,  with  Ewell's  division 
in  line  of  battle,  and  skirmished  in  front,  until  we  en- 
countered the  enemy's  skirmishers,  when  our  progress 
was  arrested  by  an  order  from  General  Longstreet,  who 
had  come  up.  We  remained  in  line  skirmishing  heavily 
with  the  enemy  for  a  day,  when  we  were  relieved  by 
Whiting's  division.  It  was  now  judged  prudent  not  to 
attack  the  enemy  in  this  position,  as  it  was  a  strong  one 
with  very  difficult  approaches,  and  on  the  8th  our  army 
retired,  the  greater  part  of  it  returning  to  the  vicinity 
of  Richmond,  thus  leaving  McClellan  to  enjoy  the  con- 
solation of  having,  after  near  twelve  months  of  prepara- 
tion on  the  most  gigantic  scale  and  over  three  months 
of  arduous  campaigning,  accomplished  the  wonderful  feat 
of  "a  change  of  base." 

McClellan  in  his  report  (Sheldon  &  Co.'s  edition  of 
1864)  shows  that  there  was  an  aggregate  present 'in  his 
army  on  the  20th  of  June,  1862,  of  107,226,  of  which  there 
were  present  for  duty  4,665  officers  and  101,160  men, 
making  the  aggregate  present  for  duty  105,825.  See 
page  53.  On  page  239,  he  says:  "The  report  of  the 
Chief  of  the  'Secret  Service  Corps,'  herewith  forwarded, 
and  dated  26th  of  June,  shows  the  estimated  strength 

88 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND 

of  the  enemy,  at  the  time  of  the  evacuation  of  York- 
town,  to  have  been  from  100,000  to  120,000.  The  same 
report  puts  his  numbers  on  the  26th  of  June  at  about 
180,000,  and  the  specific  information  obtained  regarding 
their  organization  warrants  the  belief  that  this  estimate 
did  not  exceed  his  actual  strength." 

He  seems  to  have  been  troubled  all  the  time  with 
the  spectre  of  "overwhelming  numbers"  opposed  to  him, 
and  that  he  should  have  believed  so  when  he  had  "Pro- 
fessor Lowe"  with  his  balloons  to  make  reports  from 
the  clouds,  and  his  "Chief  of  the  Secret  Service"  and 
"intelligent  contrabands,"  to  fool  him  with  their  in- 
ventions, may  be  perhaps  conceded  by  some  charitable 
persons,  but  that  he  should  have  written  such  nonsense 
as  the  above  in  1863,  and  published  it  in  1864,  is  per- 
fectly ridiculous.  If  the  United  States  Government  with 
its  gigantic  resources  and  its  population  of  21,000,000 
of  whites  could  bring  into  the  field  for  the  advance  on 
Richmond  only  105,000  men,  and  some  fifty  or  sixty  thou- 
sand men  for  the  defence  of  Washington,  how  was  the 
Confederate  Government,  with  its  limited  means,  its 
blockaded  ports,  and  its  population  of  less  than  6,000,000 
of  whites,  to  bring  into  the  field,  to  oppose  this  one  of 
several  large  armies  of  invasion,  180,000  men,  and  if  it 
could  get  the  men  where  were  the  arms  to  come  from? 

When  I  was  at  General  Lee's  headquarters,  on  the 
night  of  the  28th  of  June,  at  Gaines'  house,  General 
Longstreet,  who  occupied  a  part  of  the  same  house  and 
had  accompanied  General  Lee  from  the  commencement 
of  the  operations  on  McClellan's  flank  and  rear,  in- 
formed me  that,  when  the  movement  commenced,  we  had 
about  90,000  men  in  all,  including  Jackson's  command, 
60,000  being  employed  in  the  movement  north  of  the 
Chickahominy,  and  30,000  being  left  on  the  south  side 
for  the  protection  of  Richmond.  This  latter  number  in- 
cluded the  troops  at  Drewry's  Bluff  and  Chamn's  Bluff. 
This  statement  was  elicited  in  reply  to  a  question  by  me, 
in  which  I  expressed  some  surprise  at  the  boldness  of  the 

89 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

movement,  and  asked  how  it  was  possible  for  General 
Lee  to  undertake  it  with  his  force.  General  Longstreet 
had  no  reason  to  underestimate  the  force  to  me,  and  his 
estimate  was  a  sanguine  one,  and,  I  think,  perhaps  rather 
too  large,  as  it  was  based  on  the  idea  that  General  Jack- 
son's force  was  stronger  than  it  really  was. 

The  very  active  campaign  and  rapid  marching  of 
that  part  of  Jackson's  command  which  had  been  em- 
ployed in  the  valley,  had  very  much  reduced  its  strength, 
and  the  brigades  and  regiments  were  very  weak.  The 
whole  force  was  probably  somewhere  between  eighty  and 
ninety  thousand,  and  certainly  did  not  exceed  the  latter 
number.  A  very  large  portion  of  the  army  was  armed 
with  smooth-bore  muskets,  and  it  was  not  until  after 
the  battles  around  Richmond,  and  of  second  Manassas, 
that  we  were  able  to  exchange  them  for  rifles  and  minie 
muskets  captured  from  the  enemy. 

The  movement  of  General  Lee  against  McClellan  was 
a  strategic  enterprise  of  the  most  brilliant  character, 
and  at  once  demonstrated  that  he  was  a  general  of  the 
highest  order  of  genius.  Its  results,  independent  of  the 
capture  of  artilleiw,  small  arms,  and  stores,  were  of  the 
most  momentous  consequences,  as  it  relieved  the  capital 
of  the  Confederacy  of  the  dangers  and  inconveniences 
of  a  regular  siege  for  a  long  while,  though  it  had  not 
resulted  in  the  destruction  of  McClellan 's  army  as  Gen- 
eral Lee  had  desired,  and  the  army  and  country  fondly 
hoped;  but  in  a  thickly  wooded  country,  where  armies 
can  move  only  along  the  regular  roads,  and  move  in 
line  of  battle  or  compact  columns  along  those  roads, 
there  are  facilities  for  the  escape  of  a  beaten  army  which 
one  accustomed  to  reading  of  European  wars  cannot  well 
understand.  This  was  peculiarly  the  case  in  the  country 
through  which  McClellan  retreated,  where  the  imprac- 
ticable character  of  the  swamps  and  woods  enabled  him 
to  conceal  his  movements  and  to  protect  his  trains,  rear, 
and  flanks  by  blocking  up  the  roads  and  destroying 
bridges. 

90 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND 

General  McClellan,  it  must  be  confessed,  displayed 
considerable  ability  in  conducting  the  retreat  of  his 
army  after  it  was  out-manceuvred  and  beaten,  notwith- 
standing the  excessive  caution  he  had  shown  on  the 
Potomac  and  at  Yorktown,  and  I  think  there  can  be  no 
doubt  he  was  the  ablest  commander  the  United  States 
had  in  Virginia  during  the  war,  by  long  odds.  During 
the  seven  days'  operations  around  Richmond,  the  two 
armies  were  more  nearly  equal  in  strength  than  they 
ever  were  afterwards. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
Battle  of  Cedar  Run. 

After  McClellan  had  been  safely  housed  at  his  new 
base  on  James  River,  Major  General  John  Pope,  of  the 
United  States  Army,  made  his  appearance  in  Northern 
Virginia,  between  the  Rappahannock  and  Rapidan  Rivers, 
at  th«  head  of  an  army  called  the  "Army  of  Virginia," 
and  composed  of  the  corps  of  McDowell,  Banks,  and 
Fremont,  the  latter  being  then  under  Sigel.  General 
Pope  issued  a  vain-giorious  address  to  his  troops,  in 
which  he  declared  that  he  had  never  seen  anything  of 
the  "rebels"  but  their  backs;  and  he  talked  largely  about 
making  his  "headquarters  in  the  saddle,"  and  looking 
out  for  the  means  of  advancing,  without  giving  thought 
to  the  "lines  of  retreat,"  which  were  to  be  left  to  take 
care  of  themselves.  He  certainly  was  producing  great 
commotion  in  the  poultry  yards  of  the  worthy  matrons, 
whose  sons  and  husbands  were  absent  in  the  service  of 
their  country,  when  General  Lee  sent  "Stonewall" 
Jackson  to  look  after  the  redoubtable  warrior. 

After  remaining  in  camp  several  days  near  Richmond, 
Swell's  and  Jackson's  divisions  were  ordered  to  Gor- 
donsville  under  General  Jackson,  and,  taking  the  lead, 
Ewell's  division  arrived  about  the  15th  of  Jul}T.  On 
the  next  da}7-  after  our  arrival,  a  body  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  having  crossed  the  Rapidan,  advanced  through 
Orange  Court-House  towards  Gordonsville,  and  my 
brigade  and  the  Louisiana  brigade  were  moved  out  with 
a  regiment  of  cavalry  for  the  purpose  of  intercepting  the 
retreat  of  this  body,  but  it  made  its  escape  across  the 
Rapidan  by  swimming  that  river,  as  the  water  was  high. 
Ewell's  division  went  into  camp  near  Libert}'  Mills  on 
the  Rapidan,  on  the  road  from  Gordonsville  to  Madison 
Court-House,  and  I  remained  there,  with  occasional 
movements   when    approaches   of  the   enemy's   cavalry 

02 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  RUN 

were  reported,  until  the  7th  of  August.  In  the  mean- 
time, Jackson's  force  had  been  reinforced  by  the 
division  of  A.  P.  Hill,  and  there  had  been  skirmishing 
and  fighting  between  our  cavalry  and  that  of  the  enemy 
in  Madison  County  and  at  Orange  Court-House. 

General  Jackson  ordered  a  forward  movement  to  be 
made  on  the  7th  of  August,  and  on  that  day  EwelPs 
division  crossed  into  Madison  at  Liberty  Mills,  and 
moved  down  the  Rapidan  toward  Barnett's  Ford, 
bivouacking  for  the  night  near  that  point.  Early  next 
morning,  we  moved  past  Barnett's  Ford,  driving  a  small 
detachment  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  from  the  Ford,  and 
took  the  road  for  Culpeper  Court-House.  General 
Beverly  Robertson's  cavalry  now  passed  to  the  front  and 
had  a  skirmish  and  some  artillery  firing  with  the  enemy's 
cavalry  at  Robinson's  River,  where  the  latter  retired. 
We  crossed  Robinson's  River  and  bivouacked  north  of  it 
at  the  mouth  of  Crooked  Creek,  Robertson's  cavalry 
going  to  the  front  some  two  or  three  miles. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  I  was  ordered  by  General 
Ewell  to  move  forward  in  advance  to  the  point  occupied 
by  our  cavalry  some  three  or  four  miles  ahead  of  us, 
and  to  put  out  strong  pickets  on  the  road  coming  in  from 
the  right  and  left.  My  brigade  had  now  increased  in 
strength  to  something  over  1,500  officers  and  men  for 
duty,  by  the  return  of  absentees.  As  we  moved  forward, 
the  44th  Virginia  Regiment  under  Colonel  Scott,  and  six 
companies  of  the  52nd  Virginia  were  detached  to  picket 
the  side  roads.  Robertson's  cavalry  was  found  at  a  posi- 
tion about  eight  or  nine  miles  from  Culpeper  Court- 
House,  not  far  from  Cedar  Run,  and  in  his  front,  in  some 
open  fields,  bodies  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  were  in  view, 
watching  his  movements.  On  our  right  was  Cedar  Run 
or  Slaughter's  Mountain,  and  between  it  and  Culpeper 
road  were  the  large  open  fields  of  several  adjacent  farms 
in  the  valley  of  Cedar  Run,  while  the  country  on  the 
left  of  the  road  was  mostly  wooded. 

After  General  Ewell  came  up,  my  brigade  was  moved 

93 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JTJBAL  A.  EARLY 

to  the  right  towards  the  mountain,  for  the  purpose  of 
reconnoitring,  and  a  section  of  the  battery  attached 
to  it  was  advanced  to  the  front  under  Lieutenant  Terry 
and  opened  on  the  cavalry  in  our  view.  This  elicited  a 
reply  from  some  of  the  enemy's  guns  concealed 
from  our  view  in  rear  of  his  cavalry,  but  no 
infantry  was  visible.  My  brigade  was  then  moved 
back  to  the  Culpeper  road  and  along  it  about  a  mile,  to 
its  intersection  with  a  road  coming  in  from  Madison 
Court-House,  where  it  remained  for  some  hours. 

Shortly  after  noon,  Captain  Pendleton,  of  General 
Jackson's  staff,  came  with  an  order  from  the  General, 
for  me  to  advance  on  the  road  towards  Culpeper  Court- 
Llouse,  stating  that  General  Ewell  would  advance  on  the 
right,  over  the  northern  end  of  Slaughter's  Mountain, 
with  the  rest  of  the  division,  and  that  I  would  be  sup- 
ported by  Brigadier  General  Winder  with  three  brigades 
of  Jackson's  division,  which  would  soon  be  up;  but  I 
was  ordered  not  to  begin  the  movement  until  I  received 
information  from  General  Winder  that  he  was  ready  to 
follow  me. 

While  waiting  for  the  message  from  General  Winder, 
General  Robertson  and  myself  reconnoitred  the  position 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  the  country  immediately  in 
my  front,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  how  I  would 
advance  so  as  to  surprise  the  force  immediately  in  front 
of  us.  Just  ahead  of  me,  the  Culpeper  road  crossed  a 
small  branch,  a  tributary  of  Cedar  Run,  and  then  passed 
for  some  distance  through  a  thick  woods,  leaving  a 
narrow  belt  on  the  right  of  it.  Between  this  belt  and 
the  mountain  the  country  was  an  undulating  valley,  con- 
sisting of  several  adjoining  fields. 

All  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  visible  was  in  the  field  in 
this  valley,  and  the  position  where  my  command  was 
posted  was  hidden  from  its  view  by  an  intervening  ridge, 
which  crossed  the  road  diagonally  from  the  woods  into 
the  fields  and  fell  off  into  the  low  grounds  on  the  small 
branch  mentioned.    No  infantry  had  yet  been  discovered, 

94 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  RUN 

and  we  were  in  doubt  whether  the  enemy  had  any  in  the 
vicinity.  On  the  left  of  the  road  was  a  long,  narrow 
meadow  on  the  branch,  and  as  my  brigade  could  not 
march  along  the  road  except  by  flank,  nor  without  great 
difficulty  through  the  woods  if  deployed  in  line,  I  de- 
termined to  form  it  in  the  meadow  out  of  view  of  the 
enemy,  and  then  advance  obliquely  across  the  road, 
against  his  cavalry,  following  it  through  the  fields  on  a 
route  parallel  to  the  road. 

About  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  a  messenger  came 
from  General  Winder  saying  that  he  was  ready  to  fol- 
low me,  and  I  commenced  my  movement.  The  brigade 
was  formed  in  line  in  the  meadow,  on  the  north  of  the 
branch,  with  the  13th  Virginia,  under  Colonel  Walker, 
thrown  out  as  skirmishers  to  cover  the  front  and  flank 
of  the  left  of  the  brigade,  which  had  to  pass  obliquely 
through  the  corner  of  the  woods.  It  then  advanced  to 
the  ridge  behind  which  the  enemy's  cavalry- was  posted, 
the  right  regiment  (12th  Georgia)  moving  by  flank  so  as 
to  avoid  observation,  and  forming  in  line  as  it  reached 
the  ridge,  when  the  whole  moved  over  the  crest  and  came 
in  view  of  the  cavalry,  which  scampered  off  in  a  great 
hurry,  receiving  as  it  went  a  slight  volley  at  long  range, 
by  which  one  or  two  saddles  were  emptied. 

The  brigade  then  swung  around  to  the  left  and  moved 
forward  in  line  for  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile,  until 
we  reached  a  farm  road  leading  from  Mrs.  Crittenden's 
house  on  our  right  across  the  Culpeper  road,  Colonel 
Walker  still  continuing  to  cover  the  left,  by  moving  with 
his  regiment  extended  as  skirmishers  into  the  woods 
across  the  road,  until  we  came  to  the  farm  road.  At  this 
latter  point  the  Culpeper  road  emerged  from  the  woods 
and  ran  along  the  left  of  a  field  in  our  front,  by  the  side  of 
the  woods  to  its  termination,  where  it  passed  between 
a  cornfield  on  the  right  and  a  wheatfield  on  the  left. 
Colonel  Walker  immediately  re-formed  his  regiment  on 
the  left  of  the  brigade  and  we  advanced  across  the  farm 
road  into  the  field  beyond,  to  the  crest  of  a  ridge,  where 

95 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

we  discovered  a  considerable  body  of  cavalry  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  wheatfield,  on  a  high  ridge  over 
which  the  Culpeper  road  ran,  and  three  batteries  of 
artillery  opened  on  us,  from  over  the  crest  of  the  ridge 
in  front. 

No  infantry  had  yet  been  seen,  but  the  boldness  with 
which  the  cavalry  confronted  us  and  the  opening  of  the 
batteries,  satisfied  me  that  we  had  come  upon  a  heavy 
force,  concealed  behind  the  ridge  on  which  the  cavalry 
was  drawn  up,  as  the  ground  beyond  was  depressed.  I 
therefore  halted  the  brigade,  causing  the  men  to  cover 
themselves  as  well  as  they  could  by  moving  back  a  little 
and  lying  down,  and  then  sent  word  for  General  Winder 
to  come  up.  The  position  which  I  now  occupied  was 
in  an  open  field  on  Mrs.  Crittenden's  farm.  Immediately 
to  my  right  and  a  little  advanced,  was  a  clump  of  cedars, 
and  from  that  point  the  ground  sloped  off  to  our  right 
to  a  bottom  on  a  prong  of  Cedar  Run,  the  whole  country 
between  us  and  Slaughter's  Mountain  consisting  of  open 
fields.  The  northern  end  of  the  mountain  was  opposite 
my  right  and  about  a  mile  distant.  On  my  left  was  the 
woods  mentioned,  which  was  very  dense  and  extended  for 
a  considerable  distance  to  the  left. 

In  front  of  this  woods,  about  a  hundred  yards  from 
my  left,  was  the  wheat  field,  in  a  hollow,  or  small  valley, 
and  immediately  in  my  front  was  the  cornfield,  and  a 
small  branch  ran  from  the  wheatfield  through  the  corn- 
field, to  which  the  ground  sloped.  On  the  farther  side  of 
the  wheatfield  was  the  high  ridge  on  which  the  enemy's 
cavalry  was  formed,  and  beyond  which  his  batteries 
were  posted;  and  it  extended  across  the  road  into  the 
fields  on  the  right,  but  was  wooded  on  the  left  of  the 
road.  It  was  on  and  behind  this  ridge  the  enemy's  bat- 
teries were  posted,  and  it  was  in  the  low  ground  beyond 
that  I  supposed,  and  it  subsequently  turned  out,  his  in- 
fantry was  masked. 

Immediately  after  sending  for  General  Winder,  I  sent 
back  for  some  artillery,  but  this  request  had  been  an- 

96 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  RUN 

ticipated,  and  Captain  Brown,  with  one  piece,  and  Captain 
Dement,  with  three  pieces  of  their  respective  batteries 
of  Maryland  artillery,  soon  came  dashing  up,  and  were 
posted  at  the  clump  of  cedars  on  my  right.  They  imme- 
diately opened  on  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  his  batteries, 
causing  the  former  speedily  to  retire  through  the  woods 
over  the  ridge.  Those  guns  continued  to  be  served  with 
great  efficiency  during  the  action  and  rendered  most 
effectual  service. 

As  there  was  a  long  interval  between  my  right  and 
the  northern  end  of  Slaughter's  Mountain,  where  Gen- 
eral Ewell  was,  I  posted  the  12th  Georgia  Regiment, 
under  Captain  Wm.  F.  Brown,  on  that  flank,  to  protect 
the  guns  which  were  operated  there.  During  all  this 
time  the  enemy  poured  an  incessant  fire  of  shells  upon 
us,  and  we  were  looking  anxiously  for  the  opening  of 
Ewell 's  guns  from  the  mountain,  and  the  arrival  of 
Winder.  General  Winder  came  up  as  rapidly  as  pos- 
sible, and,  when  he  arrived,  he  took  position  on  my  left, 
and  at  once  had  several  pieces  of  artillery  brought  into 
action  with  good  effect.  Ewell 's  guns  had  by  this  time 
opened  and  a  brisk  cannonading  ensued. 

From  the  position  I  occupied,  I  had  an  excellent  view 
of  the  whole  ground — except  that  beyond  the  ridge  where 
the  enemy's  infantry  was  kept  concealed, — and  seeing 
that  a  force  could  be  moved  from  our  left  around  the 
wheatfield,  under  cover,  so  as  to  take  the  enemy's  bat- 
teries in  flank,  I  sent  information  of  the  fact  to  General 
Winder ;  but,  in  a  very  short  time  afterwards,  the  glisten- 
ing bayonets  of  infantry  were  discovered  moving  stealth- 
ily to  our  left,  through  the  woods  on  the  ridge  beyond 
the  wheatfield,  and  I  sent  my  aide,  Lieutenant  Early,  to 
warn  General  Winder  of  this  fact,  and  caution  him  to 
look  out  for  his  flank.  Lieutenant  Early  arrived  to  find 
General  Winder  just  mortally  wounded  by  a  shell,  while 
superintending  the  posting  of  some  batteries  at  an  ad- 
vanced position,  and  the  information  was  given  to  Gen- 
eral Jackson  who  had  now  arrived  on  the  field. 

7  97 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

After  the  artillery  fire  had  continued  some  two  hours 
from  the  time  it  was  first  opened  on  me,  the  enemy's 
infantry  was  seen  advancing  through  the  cornfield  in  my 
front,  but  it  halted  before  getting  within  musket  range 
and  lay  down.  His  line  overlapped  my  right  and  I  sent 
a  request  to  General  Jackson  for  a  brigade  to  put  on  that 
flank,  which  was  promised. 

Before  it  arrived,  however,  several  pieces  of  the  artil- 
lery battalion  attached  to  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  which 
was  just  coming  up,  dashed  in  front  of  my  brigade  down 
the  slope  to  within  musket  range  of  the  enemy  in  the 
cornfield,  and  commenced  unlimbering,  when  the  enemy's 
whole  force  rose  up  and  moved  forward.  I  saw  at  once 
that  these  pieces  would  be  captured  or  disabled  unless 
relieved  immediately,  and  my  brigade  was  ordered 
forward  at  a  double  quick.  On  reaching  the  guns,  the 
brigade  halted  and  opened  fire  on  the  enemy,  checking 
his  advance  and  enabling  the  artillery  to  open  on  him 
with  canister.  At  the  same  time  a  heavy  force  of  in- 
fantry had  moved  through  the  wheatfield,  and  fire  was 
opened  on  it  from  the  brigades  of  Jackson's  division  on 
my  left,  which  were  posted  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  ad- 
joining the  field,  and  the  fight  became  general,  raging 
with  great  fury.  Brown's  and  Dement 's  guns  opened 
with  canister,  and  the  12th  Georgia  was  brought  from 
the  right  and  posted  on  the  crest  of  a  small  ridge,  lead- 
ing out  from  the  main  one  around  in  front  of  the  clump 
of  cedars  on  my  right,  so  as  to  have  a  flank  fire  on  the 
enemy  immediately  in  front  of  the  brigade. 

Just  as  I  had  made  this  arrangement,  Thomas' 
brigade  of  Hill's  division  came  up  to  my  support  as 
promised,  and  I  posted  it  on  the  right  of  the  12th  Georgia, 
behind  the  crest  of  the  same  ridge,  which  was  so  shaped 
that  Thomas'  line  had  the  general  direction  of  the  main 
line,  but  was  in  advance  of  it.  The  arrival  of  this 
brigade  was  very  timely,  as  the  enemy  was  advancing 
with  a  line  overlapping  my  right  considerably.  Thomas 
confronted  this  part  of  the  opposing  force,  and  effectu- 
ally checked  its  progress,  strewing  the  ground  with  the 

98 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  RUN 

killed.  While  posting  this  brigade,  the  left  of  my  own 
brigade  was  concealed  from  my  view,  and  as  soon  as  I 
had  given  Colonel  Thomas  his  instructions,  I  rode  to 
see  what  was  the  condition  of  things  on  that  part  of  the 
line.  On  getting  to  where  I  could  see,  I  discovered  that 
it  had  given  way,  and  the  men  of  several  regiments  were 
retiring  rapidly  to  the  rear,  while  a  portion  of  the  enemy 
had  crossed  the  little  stream  in  front  of  where  my  left 
had  been.  The  only  thing  now  standing,  as  far  as  I 
could  see,  was  Thomas'  brigade  on  my  right,  the  12th 
Georgia,  four  companies  of  the  52nd  Virginia,  and  part 
of  the  58th  Virginia. 

It  was  a  most  critical  state  of  things,  and  I  saw  that 
the  day  would  probably  be  lost,  unless  I  could  hold  the 
position  I  still  occupied.  I  could  not,  therefore,  go  to 
rally  my  retreating  men,  but  sent  my  Assistant  Adjutant 
General,  Major  Samuel  Hale,  to  rally  them  and  bring 
them  back,  while  I  rode  to  the  rest  of  my  troops  and 
directed  their  commanders  to  hold  on  to  their  positions 
at  all  hazards.  On  my  giving  the  directions  to  Captain 
Brown  of  the  12th  Georgia,  he  replied:  "General,  my 
ammunition  is  nearly  out,  don't  you  think  we  had  better 
charge  them?"  I  could  not  admit  the  prudence  of  the 
proposition  at  that  time,  but  I  fully  appreciated  its  gal- 
lantry. This  brave  old  man  was  then  65  years  old,  and 
had  a  son,  an  officer,  in  his  company.  The  position  was 
held  until  other  troops  were  brought  up  and  the  greater 
part  of  the  retreating  men  rallied,  and  the  day  was  thus 
prevented  from  being  lost. 

The  enemy  had  penetrated  into  the  woods  on  my 
left,  and  the  brigades  of  Jackson's  division  there  posted 
had  been  driven  back,  after  a  desperate  conflict.  The 
left  of  the  line  had  thus  given  way,  and  the  enemy  had 
got  possession  of  the  woods,  from  which  he  had  poured 
a  galling  fire  into  the  rear  of  my  regiments  on  the  flank, 
which  had  been  thrown  into  confusion,  and  compelled 
to  retire  in  some  disorder.  Colonel  Walker  of  the  13th 
Virginia  had  withdrawn  his  own  regiment  and  part  of 
the  31st  Virginia  in  good  order,  after  they  had  been 

99 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

almost  surrounded  by  the  enemy.  Only  my  own  brigade, 
Thomas'  brigade,  and  the  three  brigades  of  Jackson's 
division  had  been  engaged  up  to  this  time,  but  some 
of  the  other  brigades  of  Hill's  division  were  now  coming 
on  the  field,  and  being  at  once  ordered  into  action,  the 
temporary  advantage  gained  by  the  enemy  was  soon 
wrested  from  him,  and  he  was  forced  back  into  the  wheat- 
field,  and  then  across  it  over  the  ridge  beyond. 

Colonel  Walker  with  the  13th  Virginia,  and  part  of  the 
31st,  and  Captain  Robert  D.  Lilley  with  part  of  the  25th 
Virginia,  returned  to  the  attack  while  the  woods  on  our 
left  was  being  cleared  of  the  enemy,  and  participated  in 
his  final  repulse.  Finding  himself  being  driven  from  the 
field,  after  sunset,  the  enemy  made  a  desperate  effort 
to  retrieve  the  fortunes  of  the  day  by  a  charge  with 
cavalry.  We  had  no  regular  line  formed  at  this  time, 
and  our  men  were  much  scattered  in  advancing,  when  a 
considerable  body  of  cavalry  came  charging  along  the 
road  from  over  the  ridge,  towards  the  position  where 
the  left  of  my  brigade  and  the  right  of  Jackson's  division 
had  rested  during  the  action.  Without  being  at  all  dis- 
concerted or  attempting  to  make  any  formation  against 
cavalry,  small  regiments  nearby,  among  which  was  the 
13th  Virginia,  poured  a  volley  into  the  head  of  the  ap- 
proaching cavalry,  when  it  had  got  within  a  few  yards, 
causing  it  to  turn  suddenly  to  its  right  up  through  the 
wheatfield,  followed  by  the  whole  body,  which  made  its 
escape  after  encountering  a  raking  fire  from  our  troops 
further  to  the  left,  by  which  many  saddles  were  emptied. 
The  attack  on  the  enemy  was  thus  resumed  and  he  was 
driven  entirely  from  the  field. 

We  were  ordered  to  pursue  on  the  road  towards  Cul- 
peper  Court-House,  and  the  division  of  General  A.  P. 
Hill  was  placed  in  front,  my  brigade  following  it.  Pur- 
suit was  made  for  two  miles,  when  the  enemy's  reinforce- 
ments, coming  to  the  aid  of  the  beaten  troops,  were  en- 
countered, and  there  was  some  skirmishing  after  dark 
between  Hill's  leading  brigade  and  the  enemy,  and  an 
affair  between  one  of  our  batteries   and  some  of  the 

100 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  RUN 

enemy's  artillery,  but  night  put  an  end  to  any  further 
operations.  During  the  night,  General  Jackson  ascer- 
tained that  Pope's  whole  army  had  concentrated  in  his 
front,  and  he  therefore  determined  not  to  attack  him. 
In  moving  forward  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  from  the 
field,  my  brigade  rejoined  the  rest  of  the  division  under 
General  Ewell,  and,  after  operations  for  the  night  were 
suspended,  we  bivouacked  about  where  the  enemy's  in- 
fantry had  been  masked  when  I  first  encountered  his  bat- 
teries. The  two  brigades  with  General  Ewell  had  not 
been  engaged,  but  his  artillery  had  done  good  service, 
and  prevented  any  attempt  to  flank  us  on  the  right. 

On  the  morning  of  the  10th  (Sunday),  after  some 
manoeuvring  on  our  part,  and  a  little  shelling  from  the 
enemy,  we  moved  back  and  covered  the  battlefield  with 
our  troops,  while  the  wounded  were  being  carried  off, 
and  the  small  arms  abandoned  by  the  enemy  were  being 
gathered.  Later  in  the  day  we  moved  farther  back  and 
took  position  in  rear  of  the  battlefield,  E well's  division 
being  posted  on  the  end  and  side  of  Slaughter's  Moun- 
tain, and  the  other  divisions  crossing  the  Culpeper  road 
on  our  left.  We  remained  in  this  position  all  night  and 
next  day,  but  there  was  no  fighting,  as  each  army  awaited 
the  advance  of  the  other. 

On  Monday,  the  11th,  the  enemy  requested  a  truce 
for  the  purpose  of  burying  his  dead,  which  was  granted, 
until  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  subsequently  ex- 
tended, at  his  request,  to  give  him  time  to  complete  the 
burial — the  arrangements  on  our  side  being  under  the 
superintendence  of  General  Stuart,  and  on  the  side  of 
the  enemy  under  that  of  Brigadier  General  Milroy.* 

*  Milroy,  in  his  report,  states  that  the  truce  was  requested  by  us, 
but  General  Jackson  says  it  was  applied  for  by  the  enemy,  and  no  one 
will  doubt  his  word.  I  know  that  the  extension  was  applied  for  by 
Milroy  or  his  staff  officer,  for  I  was  on  the  ground  in  communication 
with  General  Stuart  at  the  time.  This  same  Milroy  was  himself  pre- 
vented by  me  from  riding  to  the  rear  of  the  ground  on  which  the 
enemy's  dead  lay,  and  he  witnessed  the  taking  from  the  field,  under 
my  directions,  of  very  large  quantities  of  small  arms,  which  had  been 
abandoned  by  Banks'  men  on  the  day  of  the  battle. 

101 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

I  went  on  the  field  under  General  Ewell's  orders,  to 
superintend  the  burial  of  a  portion  of  our  dead,  who  had 
not  been  buried  by  their  proper  commanders.  I  found 
on  the  field,  stacked  up,  a  very  large  quantity  of  excel- 
lent rifles,  which  the  division,  detailed  to  gather  them  up, 
omitted  to  carry  off.  Some  of  the  enemy's  men  were 
taking  these  rifles,  but  I  made  them  desist,  and  demanded 
that  a  part  already  carried  off,  under  direction  of  a  staff 
officer  of  General  Sigel,  should  be  brought  back,  which 
was  eomjDlied  with.  I  then  sent  for  a  detail  from  my 
brigade  and  had  these  arms  carried  off  in  wagons  sent 
to  me  from  the  rear,  there  being  six  full  wagon  loads. 
"While  this  work  was  going  on,  I  heard  a  Federal  soldier 
say:  "It  is  hard  to  see  our  nice  rifles  going  that  way," 
to  which  another  replied:  "Yes,  but  they  are  theirs, 
they  won  them  fairly." 

The  enemy  had  very  large  details  on  the  field,  and 
several  general  officers  rode  on  it,  while  the  burial  was 
going  on.  This  work  was  finally  concluded  a  little  before 
dark,  when  the  truce  was  concluded.  The  enemy  buried 
on  this  day  over  six  hundred  dead,  a  very  large  propor- 
tion of  which  were  taken  from  the  cornfield  in  front  of 
the  positions  occupied  by  Thomas'  and  my  brigade  on 
the  day  of  the  battle.  My  detail  buried  the  bodies  of 
98  of  our  men,  nearly  the  whole  of  which  were  taken 
from  the  woods  in  which  the  brigades  of  Jackson's 
division  had  been  engaged.  From  the  want  of  sufficient 
tools  on  our  part  and  the  hardness  of  the  ground  where 
we  buried  our  men,  our  work  was  not  completed  until 
about  the  same  time  the  enemy  completed  his. 

On  returning  to  my  brigade,  I  found  our  troops  pre- 
paring to  move  back  to  our  former  position  south  of  the 
Rapidan,  as  the  army  of  Pope  concentrated  in  our  front 
was  entirely  too  large  for  us  to  fight.  Our  movement  to 
the  rear  commenced  immediately  after  dark,  Hill's 
division  bringing  up  the  rear  of  the  infantry  and  our 
cavalry  that  of  the.  whole  army.  On  the  next  day,  the 
12th,  Ewell's  division  recrossed  at  Liberty  Mills  and 

102 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  RUN 

returned  to  its  old  camps  in  that  vicinity,  the  withdrawal 
of  our  entire  force  having  been  effected  without  serious 
molestation  from  the  enemy.  In  this  action,  Banks  com- 
manded the  Federal  troops  immediately  on  the  field,  but 
Pope  came  up  at  its  close  with  a  portion  of  McDowell's 
Corps  and  the  whole  of  Sigel's. 

The  loss  in  my  brigade  was  16  killed  and  145  wounded, 
and  the  loss  in  General  Jackson's  whole  command  was 
223  killed,  1,060  wounded  and  31  missing,  making  a 
total  loss  of  1,314.  The  enemy's  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  very  greatly  exceeded  ours,  and  we  captured 
400  prisoners,  including  one  Brigadier  General  (Prince), 
besides  securing  one  piece  of  artillery  and  more  than 
5,000  small  arms. 

Pope,  or  at  least  his  soldiers,  had  now  seen  some- 
thing more  of  the  "rebels"  than  their  backs,  and  he  was 
soon  to  see  other  sights. 

Shortly  after  our  return  from  the  battle,  Lawton's 
brigade  was  transferred  from  Jackson's  division  to 
Ewell's,  and  Starke's  Louisiana  Brigade,  newly  created 
out  of  regiments  which  had  been  attached  to  other 
brigades  during  the  battles  around  Richmond,  and  had 
accompanied  Hill's  division,  was  attached  to  Jackson's 
division.  General  Jackson's  command,  as  now  consti- 
tuted, was  composed  of  fourteen  brigades,  to-wit:  four 
in  his  own  and  Ewell's  divisions  each;  and  six  in  Hill's 
division,  besides  the  artillery  attached  to  the  divisions 
(about  four  batteries  to  each) ;  and  Robertson's  cavalry 
which  was  co-operating  with  us. 


CHAPTER  X. 

Operations  on  the  Rappahannock. 

The  presence  of  General  Jackson  in  the  vicinity  of 
Gordonsville,  again  bewildered  the  minds  and  excited 
anew  the  fears  of  the  Washington  authorities.  The 
spectre  of  ' ' overwhelming  numbers"  at  Richmond  and 
of  a  speedy  advance  on  the  Federal  Capital  now  assumed 
a  fearful  shape,  and  McClellan  was  ordered  to  remove 
his  army  from  Harrison's  Landing  to  Aquia  Creek  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  for  the  purpose  of  uniting  with  Pope, 
and  interposing  for  the  defence  of  Washington — Burn- 
side,  with  13,000  men  from  the  North  Carolina  coast  on 
his  way  to  join  McClellan  on  James  River,  having  been 
previously  diverted  from  that  point  to  Fredericksburg 
on  the  Rappahannock.* 

*  The  following  correspondence  taken  from  McClellan's  report  is 
interesting,  as  it  exhibits  the  bewilderment  of  the  Federal  authorities 
and  the  hallucination  under  which  McClellan  himself  continued  to 
labor  in  regard  to  the  strength  of  General  Lee's  forces : 

"  Washington,  July  30,  1862,  8  p.m. 
"  Major  General  G.  B.  McClellan  : 

"  A  dispatch  just  received  from  General  Pope,  says  that  deserters 
report  that  the  enemy  is  moving  south  of  James  River,  and  that  the 
force  in  Richmond  is  very  small.  I  suggest  that  he  be  pressed  in  that 
direction,  so  as  to  ascertain  the  facts  of  the  case. 

"  H.  W.  Halleck,  Major  General." 

"  Washington,  July  31,  1862,  10  a.m. 

"Major  General  G.  B.  McClellan: 

"  General  Pope  again  telegraphs  that  the  enemy  is  reported  to  be 
evacuating  Richmond,  and  falling  back  on  Danville  and  Lynchburg. 

"  H.  W.  Halleck,  Major  General." 
104 


OPERATIONS  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK 

The  execution  of  the  order  given  to  McClellan  on 
the  3rd  of  August  for  the  evacuation  of  his  base  on  James 
River,  was  not  completed  until  the  16th.  In  the  mean- 
time, General  Lee  had  ordered  the  divisions  of  Long- 
street,  Hood  (formerly  Whiting's),  D.  R.  Jones,  and 
Anderson  (formerly  Huger's),  to  Gordonsville  for  the 
purpose  of  advancing  against  Pope,  and  the  three  first 
named  arrived  about  the  15th  of  August,  Anderson's  fol- 
lowing later.  The  greater  part  of  Stuart's  cavalry  was 
also  ordered  to  the  same  vicinity. 

On  the  15th  Jackson's  command  moved  from  its 
camps  and  concentrated  near  Pisgah  Church  on  the  road 

"Washington,  August  6,  1862. 
"  Major  General  G.  B.  McClellan  : 

"  You  will  immediately  send  a  regiment  of  cavalry  and  small  bat- 
teries of  artillery  to  Burnside's  command  at  Aquia  Creek.  It  is  re- 
ported that  Jackson  is  moving  north  with  a  very  large  force. 

"  H.  W.  Halleck,  Major  General." 

The  following  is  an  extract  of  letter  from  Halleck  to  McClellan, 
dated  the  6th  of  August,  1862,  explaining  the  reason  for  the  order  for 
the  removal  of  the  troops  from  Harrison's  Landing  to  Aquia  Creek. 

"  Allow  me  to  allude  to  a  few  of  the  facts  in  the  case.  You  and 
your  officers,  at  our  interview,  estimated  the  enemy's  force  around 
Richmond  at  200,000  men.  Since  then  you  and  others  report  that  they 
have  and  are  receiving  large  reinforcements  from  the  South.  General 
Pope's  army,  now  covering  Washington,  is  only  about  40,000.  Your 
effective  force  is  only  about  ninety  thousand.  You  are  about  thirty 
miles  from  Richmond,  and  General  Pope  eighty  or  ninety,  with  the 
enemy  directly  between  you,  ready  to  fall  with  his  superior  numbers 
upon  one  or  the  other,  as  he  may  elect." 

"  Headquarters,  Army  op  the  Potomac,  Berkley, 

August  14,  1862,  11  p.m. 

"  Movement  has  commenced  by  land  and  water.     All  sick  will  be 

away  to-morrow  night.     Everything  done  to  carry  out  your  orders.     I 

don't  like  Jackson's  movements,  he  will  suddenly  appear  where  least 

expected.     Will  telegraph  fully  and  understandingly  in  the  morning. 

"  G.  B.  McClellan,  Major  General." 
"  Major  General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C." 

105 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

from  Orange  Court-House  to  Somerville  Ford  on  the 
Rapidan,  preparatory  to  the  movement  forward.  While 
here  the  49th  Virginia  Regiment,  Colonel  William  Smith, 
joined  my  brigade.  Pope's  army,  then  reinforced  by 
the  greater  part  of  Burnside's  Corps  under  Reno,  was 
in  the  County  of  Culpeper,  north  of  the  Rapidan;  but 
before  we  were  ready  to  move  it  commenced  to  fall  back 
to  the  northern  bank  of  the  Rappahannock. 

On  the  20th,  our  whole  army,  now  consisting  of  two 
wings  under  Longstreet  and  Jackson  respectively,  and 
Stuart's  cavalry,  crossed  the  Rapidan — Longstreet  at 
Raccoon  Ford,  and  Jackson  at  Somerville  Ford, — the 
cavalry  having  preceded  them  early  in  the  morning. 
Jackson's  wing,  comprising  the  same  force  he  had  at 
Cedar  Run,  camped  at  Stevensburg  on  the  night  of  the 
20th.  On  the  21st  he  moved  past  Brandy  Station  on 
the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad  in  .the  direction  of 
Beverly's  Ford  on  the  Rappahannock.  Jackson's  divi- 
sion under  Brigadier  General  Taliaferro  was  in  front 
and  moved  to  the  ford,  where  there  ensued  some  can- 
nonading, and  a  fight  between  a  portion  of  our  cavalry 
and  the  enemy  on  the  northern  bank.  Ewell's  division 
bivouacked  in  the  rear  of  Taliaferro  near  St.  James' 
Church. 

On  the  morning  of  the  22nd  the  division  moved  up 
to  the  vicinity  of  the  ford,  where  the  cannonading  still 
continued.  It  was  then  moved  to  the  left,  across  Hazel 
River  at  Wellford's  Mill,  towards  Freeman's  Ford, 
Trimble's  brigade  being  left  at  Hazel  River  to  protect 
our  trains  from  a  movement  of  the  enemy  from  across 
the  Rappahannock.  At  Freeman's  Ford,  a  portion  of 
Stuart's  cavalry  was  found,  and  an  artillery  fight  was 
progressing  with  the  enemy's  batteries  on  the  opposite 
bank.  The  three  remaining  brigades  passed  to  the  left 
from  Freeman's  Ford,  and  moved  by  a  circuitous  route 
through  the  woods  and  fields  towards  the  bridge  at  War- 
renton  Springs.  Late  in  the  afternoon,  Lawton's  brigade 
moved  to  the  bridge  at  the  Springs  for  the  purpose  of 

106 


MAJOR   ANDREW   L.   PITZER 


OPERATIONS  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK 

crossing,  and  my  brigade,  followed  by  Hays'  (formerly 
Taylor's)  under  Colonel  Forno  of  the  Louisiana  In- 
fantry, was  moved  to  the  right,  under  the  superintend- 
ence of  General  Ewell,  and  crossed  over  about  a  mile 
below  the  Springs,  on  an  old  dilapidated  dam. 

Hays'  brigade  was  to  have  followed,  but  as  it  was 
nearly  dark  when  my  brigade  succeeded  in  getting  over, 
and  the  crossing  was  very  difficult,  that  brigade  was 
left  on  the  south  bank  until  next  morning.  General 
Ewell  ordered  me  to  occupy  a  pine  woods  or  thicket  in 
front  of  the  place  at  which  I  had  crossed,  and  to  establish 
communications  with  General  Lawton,  the  whole  of 
whose  brigade  it  was  expected  would  be  crossed  over 
at  the  Springs.  There  had  been  a  hard  rain  before  I 
was  ordered  to  cross  the  river,  and  it  was  still  raining 
slightly.  As  soon  as  General  Ewell  left  me,  I  moved 
my  brigade  into  the  woods  indicated,  and  established 
my  left  near  a  road  found  leading  from  the  Springs 
towards  the  lower  fords,  throwing  out  pickets  on  the 
front  and  flanks.  By  this  time  it  had  become  intensely 
dark,  and  we  could  see  nothing  except  when  the  flashes  of 
lightning  gave  faint  glimpses  of  things  around. 

As  soon  as  the  brigade  was  established  in  its  position, 
Major  A.  L.  Pitzer,  a  volunteer  aide,  was  sent  to  seek 
General  Lawton  for  the  purpose  of  opening  communica- 
tions with  him.  After  he  had  been  gone  for  some  time,  he 
came  back  with  a  sergeant  and  six  privates  of  Federal 
cavalry  as  prisoners,  with  their  horses,  equipments  and 
arms  complete.  This  party  had  passed  up  the  road  a 
few  minutes  before  I  had  taken  position  near  it,  and,  on 
getting  near  the  Springs  and  finding  that  place  occupied 
by  a  portion  of  our  troops,  was  deliberating  as  to  what 
should  be  done  when  the  Major  rode  into  it.  He  was  at 
once  hailed  and  forced  to  surrender  himself  as  prisoner, 
and  his  captors  started  with  him  down  the  road  leading 
past  my  left.  On  getting  near  the  point  at  which  he 
knew  my  brigade  was  posted,  the  Major  told  the  party 
having  him  in  charge  that  they  must  reverse  positions, 

107 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

and  when  he  explained  the  condition  of  things  and  stated 
that  General  Lawton  was  on  the  right,  my  brigade  on 
the  left  with  pickets  all  around,  he  succeeded  in  inducing 
the  whole  of  it  to  surrender  to  him  and  come  quietly  into 
my  camp,  to  avoid  being  fired  upon  by  the  pickets.  After 
this  attempt,  as  it  was  very  dark  and  quite  late,  I  did  not 
renew  that  night  the  effort  to  communicate  with  General 
Lawton. 

During  the  night  there  was  a  very  heavy  rain,  and  by 
light  on  the  morning  of  the  23rd,  the  Rappahannock,  or 
Hedgeman's  River,  as  it  is  here  called,  was  so  much 
swollen  as  to  defy  all  attempts  at  crossing  except  by 
swimming,  as  the  bridge  at  the  Springs  had  been  burned 
by  the  enemy. 

A  messenger  sent  to  find  General  Lawton  soon  re- 
turned with  the  information  that  only  one  regiment  of 
Lawton 's  brigade,  the  13th  Georgia  under  Colonel 
Douglas,  and  Brown's  and  Dement 's  batteries  of  four 
guns  each,  had  crossed  at  the  Springs,  the  morning 
before.  As  soon  as  this  condition  of  things  was  ascer- 
tained, I  sent  a  messenger,  who  was  directed  to  swim 
the  river,  with  a  note  for  General  Ewell  or  Jackson, 
whichever  might  be  first  met  with,  stating  that  if  the 
enemy  advanced  upon  us  in  force,  the  whole  of  our 
troops  on  the  north  of  the  river  must  be  captured,  and 
suggesting  the  propriety  of  my  attempting  to  extricate 
them  by  moving  up  towards  Waterloo  bridge,  several 
miles  above. 

Before  this  note  could  be  delivered,  I  received  a 
verbal  message  from  General  Jackson,  which  had  been 
given  across  the  river  at  the  Springs  and  was  brought 
to  me  by  a  sergeant  of  one  of  the  batteries,  directing  me 
to  move  my  brigade  up  to  where  Colonel  Douglas'  was, 
take  command  of  the  whole  force,  and  prepare  for  de- 
fence, stating,  at  the  same  time,  that  there  was  a  creek 
running  a  short  distance  from  the  Springs  into  the  river 
below  me,  which  was  past  fording  also,  and  that  no  enemy 
was  in  the  fork  of  the  river  and  this  creek;    and  also 

108 


OPERATIONS  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK 

informing  me  that  he  was  having  the  bridge  repaired 
as  rapidly  as  possible.  Very  shortly  after  the  reception 
of  this  message,  I  received  a  note  from  General  Jackson, 
in  reply  to  mine,  containing  the  same  instructions  con- 
veyed by  his  message,  and  directing  me  in  addition,  in 
the  event  of  the  enemy's  appearance  in  too  heavy  force 
for  me  to  contend  with,  to  move  up  towards  Waterloo 
bridge,  keeping  close  to  the  river;  and  stating  that  he 
would  follow  along  the  opposite  bank  with  his  whole 
force,  to  cover  my  movement. 

I  at  once  moved  towards  the  Springs  and  found 
Colonel  Douglas  occupying  a  hill,  a  short  distance  below 
the  buildings,  which  extended  across  from  the  river  to 
Great  Run  (the  creek  alluded  to  by  General  Jackson). 
Colonel  Douglas,  on  crossing  the  morning  before,  had 
captured  a  portion  of  a  cavalry  picket  watching  the  ford, 
and  there  was  still  a  small  body  on  the  opposite  banks 
of  Great  Run  with  which  he  had  had  some  skirmishing. 
Colonel  Walker  with  the  13th  and  31st  Virginia  Regi- 
ments had  been  posted  across  the  road  leading  from 
below,  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  from  Colonel  Doug- 
las' position,  and  I  now  posted  the  remaining  regiments 
of  my  brigade  and  the  13th  Georgia  along  the  hill  occu- 
pied by  the  latter,  so  as  to  present  the  front  to  any  force 
that  might  come  from  the  direction  of  Warrenton,  across 
Great  Run  above,  resting  my  right  on  the  Run  and  my 
left  on  the  river.  The  artillery  was  also  posted  on  this 
line,  and  the  whole  concealed  as  much  as  possible  by  the 
woods.  In  this  position,  Colonel  Walker  guarded  my 
rear,  and  my  right  flank  was  the  only  one  exposed,  but 
that  was  safe  for  the  present,  as  the  creek  was  very  high 
and  Colonel  Douglas  had  commenced  the  destruction  of 
the  bridges  across  it,  which  was  soon  completed. 

The  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the  opposite  side 
of  Great  Run  continued  to  hover  about  my  right  flank 
all  the  morning,  and  some  companies  were  posted  on  that 
flank  to  watch  the  creek.  Some  time  during  the  morning, 
General  Jackson  sent  over  an  officer  familiar  with  the 

109 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

country,  to  pilot  one  of  the  staff  officers  over  the  route 
to  Waterloo  bridge,  which  it  might  be  necessary  to  pass 
over  in  case  of  emergency,  and  Major  Hale  was  sent  with 
him  to  ascertain  the  road. 

In  the  meantime,  the  creek  began  to  fall,  and  in  the 
afternoon  it  was  in  a  condition  to  be  crossed. 

It  now  began  to  be  evident  that  the  enemy  was  mov- 
ing up  from  below  in  very  heavy  force,  and  that  my 
command  was  in  a  critical  condition,  as  large  trains 
were  seen  moving  on  the  road,  east  and  north  of  us, 
towards  Warrenton.  Late  in  the  afternoon  a  heavy 
column  of  infantry  with  artillery  made  its  appearance 
on  the  hills  beyond  my  right,  but  it  moved  with  great 
caution,  and  the  enemy  was  evidently  of  the  impression 
that  my  force,  which  was  concealed  from  his  view,  was 
much  larger  than  it  really  was.  I  now  changed  my  front 
so  as  to  present  it  towards  the  force  in  sight,  but  this 
movement  was  so  made  as  to  be  concealed  from  the 
enemy's  view  by  the  intervening  woods. 

About  this  time,  General  Robertson,  who  had  accom- 
panied Stuart  on  a  raid  to  Catlett's  Station  and  upon 
Pope's  headquarters,  arrived  from  the  direction  of 
Warrenton  with  two  regiments  of  cavalry  and  two  pieces 
of  artillery.  After  consulting  with  me,  General  Robert- 
son posted  his  two  pieces  on  a  hill  north  of  the  Springs, 
which  commanded  a  view  of  the  enemy's  infantry  and 
opened  on  it.  This  fire  was  soon  replied  to  by  one  of 
the  enemy's  batteries,  and  I  sent  two  Parrott  guns  from 
Brown's  battery  to  the  aid  of  Robertson's  guns,  which 
were  of  short  range.  A  brisk  cannonade  ensued  and  was 
kept  up  until  near  sunset,  with  no  damage,  however,  to 
my  infantry  or  artillery,  but  one  or  two  shells  fell  into 
one  of  Robertson's  regiments  which  was  in  rear  of  the 
battery,  on  the  low  ground  near  the  Springs,  doing  some 
slight  damage. 

After  the  cessation  of  the  artiller}^  fire  and  very  near 
dark  about  a  brigade  of  the  enemy  was  seen  approaching 
the  bank  of  the  creek  opposite  where  my  brigade  was 

no 


OPERATIONS  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK 

posted,  and  in  a  few  moments  it  delivered  a  volley  into 
the  woods,  which  was  followed  by  three  cheers  and  a 
tiger  in  regular  style.  Two  of  Dement 's  Napoleons  were 
immediately  run  out  to  the  left  of  my  line,  and  opened 
with  canister  upon  the  enemy,  who  was  scarcely  visible 
through  the  mist  which  had  arisen.  This  fire  was,  how- 
ever, so  well  directed  and  so  rapid  that  the  enemy  was 
soon  driven  back  in  confusion,  and  his  cheering  was  ex- 
changed for  cries  and  groans,  which  were  distinctly 
audible  to  those  in  his  front.  The  volley  delivered  by 
the  enemy  was  entirely  harmless,  and  my  men  reserved 
their  fire  with  great  coolness,  until  there  should  be 
greater  need  for  it.  A  very  short  time  before  this  affair, 
the  60th  Georgia  Regiment  of  Lawton's  brigade,  under 
Major  Berry,  had  crossed  over  on  the  bridge,  which  was 
now  in  a  condition  for  the  passage  of  infantry,  though 
not  for  artillery  or  wagons,  and  had  been  placed  in 
position. 

There  was  no  further  attack  on  me,  but  it  was  now 
very  certain,  from  the  noise  of  moving  trains  and  artil- 
lery and  the  reports  of  scouts,  that  a  very  heavy  force 
was  being  massed  around  me,  with  a  view  of  cutting  me 
off.  I  drew  in  Colonel  Walker  closer  to  my  main  force, 
as  he  reported  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  creek  on 
the  road  he  was  guarding  and  were  massing  in  his  front ; 
and  I  sent  a  messenger  to  General  Jackson,  after  dark, 
with  information  of  the  condition  of  things  and  the  sug- 
gestion that  I  be  reinforced  sufficiently  to  hold  my 
ground  or  be  withdrawn.  The  remainder  of  Lawton's 
brigade  was  crossed  over  on  the  temporary  bridge,  and 
when  General  Lawton  himself  arrived,  which  was  about 
1  o'clock  a.m.  on  the  24th,  he  informed  me  that  he  had 
seen  written  instructions  to  General  Ewell,  directing  to 
cross  over  himself  at  daylight  in  the  morning,  and  if  it 
was  evident  that  the  enemy  was  in  heavy  force,  to  recross 
the  troops,  as  it  was  not  desired  to  have  a  general  en- 
gagement at  that  junction. 

On   receiving  this   information,   I  immediately  dis- 

lii 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

patched  a  messenger  to  General  Ewell,  to  inform  him 
that  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  the  enemy  was  in  very 
heavy  force,  and  if  I  was  to  be  withdrawn,  it  had  better 
be  done  that  night  without  waiting  for  daylight,  as  by 
moving  to  my  left  the  enemy  could  post  artillery,  so  as 
to  command  the  bridge  and  ford  completely,  and  prevent 
my  being  either  withdrawn  or  reinforced,  and  that  I  was 
satisfied  that  he  was  preparing  for  that  very  object.  In 
response  to  this,  General  Ewell  came  over  himself  a 
little  before  three  o'clock  a.m.,  and,  after  consultation 
with  me,  gave  the  order  for  recrossing,  which  was  begun 
at  once,  Lawton's  brigade  crossing  first  and  carrying 
over  the  artillery  by  hand,  and  my  brigade  following, 
so  as  to  complete  the  withdrawal  a  very  little  after  dawn. 

General  Ewell  had  not  been  entirely  satisfied  that  the 
enemy  was  in  such  strong  force  as  I  represented,  and 
he  was  rather  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  movements  I 
had  observed  indicated  a  retreating  army.  To  satisfy 
him,  we  remained  behind  until  the  advancing  skirmishers 
of  the  enemy  made  it  prudent  for  us  to  retire,  and  we 
then  rode  across  the  bridge  in  rear  of  my  brigade.  Soon 
Sigel's  whole  corps,  supported  by  those  of  Banks  and 
Reno,  moved  to  the  position  which  I  had  occupied,  and 
a  very  heavy  cannonading  followed. 

My  command  was  thus  rescued  from  inevitable  de- 
struction, for  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  General 
Jackson  to  have  crossed  his  troops  in  time  to  arrest  its 
fate,  as  his  only  means  of  crossing  the  river  consisted 
of  one  narrow,  temporary  bridge,  unsuitable  for  the  pas- 
sage of  artillery,  and  which  the  enemy  could  have  com- 
manded from  several  positions  beyond  the  reach  of  our 
artillery  on  the  south  bank.  Pope's  whole  army  was  in 
easy  supporting  distance  of  the  force  sent  against  me, 
and  I  had  in  part  confronted  that  army  on  the  23rd  and 
the  following  night. 

The  men  of  my  command,  including  Douglas'  regi- 
ment, had  had  very  little  to  eat  since  crossing  the  river, 
and  were  without  rations,  as  there  had  been  little  oppor- 

112 


OPERATIONS  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK 

tunity  for  cooking  since  leaving  the  Rapidan;  and  they 
had  lain  on  their  arms  during  the  night  of  the  22nd  in  a 
drenching  rain ;  yet  they  exhibited  a  determined  resolu- 
tion to  withstand  the  enemy's  attack  at  all  hazards, 
should  he  come  against  us. 

After  recrossing  the  river,  Lawton's  brigade  and  mine 
retired  to  the  vicinity  of  Jefferson  for  the  purpose  of 
resting  and  cooking  rations. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

Capture  of  Manassas  Junction. 

On  the  same  morning  I  had  crossed  the  river,  Stuart, 
with  a  portion  of  his  cavalry,  after  crossing  the  river 
above,  had  made  a  raid  to  Catlett's  Station  and  upon 
Pope's  headquarters  at  Warrenton  Junction,  and  among 
other  things  had  captured  Pope's  dispatch  book. 

The  captured  correspondence  showed  that  Pope  was 
being  reinforced  from  the  Kanawha  Valley  and  also  from 
McClellan's  army,  and  General  Lee  determined  to  send 
General  Jackson  to  the  enemy's  rear,  to  cut  the  rail- 
road, so  as  to  destroy  his  communications  and  bring  on 
a  general  engagement  before  the  whole  of  the  approach- 
ing reinforcements  could  arrive. 

Jackson's  wing  of  the  army  was  put  in  motion  early 
on  the  morning  of  the  25th,  with  no  wagons  but  the 
ordnance  and  medical  wagons,  and  with  three  days' 
rations  in  haversacks,  for  a  "cavalry  raid  with  in- 
fantry." Moving  with  Ewell's  division  in  front,  we 
crossed  the  river  at  Hinson's  Mill  above  Waterloo  bridge, 
and  marched  by  a  small  place  called  Orleans  to  Salem, 
near  which  place  we  bivouacked  after  a  very  long  day's 
march.  On  the  morning  of  the  26th,  we  moved,  with 
Ewell's  division  still  in  front,  past  White  Plains,  through 
Thoroughfare  Gap  in  Bull  Mountain  to  Gainesville  on 
the  Warrenton  Pike,  and  there  turned  off  to  the  right 
towards  Bristow  Station  on  the  Orange  &  Alexandria 
Railroad.  At  Haymarket,  before  reaching  Gainesville, 
we  halted  two  or  three  hours  to  wait  for  Stuart  to  come 
up  with  his  cavalry,  which  had  started  that  morning  to 
follow  us,  and  did  join  us  at  Gainesville.  Hays'  brigade, 
under  General  Forno,  was  in  the  advance  of  the  division 
on  this  day,  and  it  arrived  at  Bristow  Station  a  little 
before  sunset,  just  as  several  trains  were  approaching 
from  the  direction  of  Warrenton  Junction. 

114 


CAPTURE  OF  MANASSAS  JUNCTION 

There  was  but  a  small  force  of  cavalry  at  Bristow, 
which  Colonel  Forno  soon  dispersed,  and  he  then  arrested 
and  captured  two  trains  of  empty  cars  with  their  engines, 
the  first  train  which  approached  having  made  its  escape 
towards  Manassas  before  the  road  could  be  sufficiently 
obstructed,  and  other  trains  in  the  rear  running  back,  on 
hearing  the  alarm,  towards  Warrenton  Junction.  Gen- 
eral Trimble  was  sent,  soon  after  dark,  with  two  of  his 
regiments,  to  capture  Manassas  Junction,  and  in  con- 
junction with  General  Stuart  succeeded  in  taking  the 
place  and  securing  eight  pieces  of  artillery,  a  consider- 
able number  of  prisoners  and  horses,  a  long  train  of 
loaded  cars,  and  a  very  large  amount  of  stores  of  all 
kinds.  As  soon  as  the  remainder  of  Ewell 's  division 
arrived  at  Bristow,  it  was  placed  in  position  to  prevent 
a  surprise  by  the  enemy  during  the  night. 

Very  early  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  Hays '  brigade 
and  one  regiment  of  Lawton's  with  a  piece  of  artillery 
were  moved  towards  Kettle  Run  in  the  direction  of  War- 
renton Junction  on  a  reconnaissance,  and  a  train  of  cars 
was  seen  re-embarking  a  regiment  which  had  been  sent 
to  drive  off  the  "raiding  party,"  but,  on  finding  the 
strength  of  our  force,  was  about  retiring.  A  shot  from 
one  piece  of  artillery  sent  the  train  off  in  a  hurry,  and 
one  regiment  of  Hays'  brigade  was  left  on  picket  and 
another  regiment  to  tear  up  the  railroad,  with  orders  to 
fall  back  skirmishing  towards  the  main  body,  on  the  ap- 
proach of  the  enemy  in  force. 

Trimble's  other  regiment,  and  the  12th  Georgia, 
which  was  now  transferred  from  my  brigade  to  his,  were 
sent  to  him  at  Manassas  Junction  this  morning,  and  the 
two  other  divisions  of  Jackson's  command  were  ordered 
to  the  same  place.  General  Ewell  had  been  ordered  by 
General  Jackson  to  remain  at  Bristow  with  his  three 
remaining  brigades  to  check  any  advance  from  Pope's 
army  along  the  railroad,  but,  if  the  enemy  appeared  in 
heavy  force,  to  retire  upon  the  Junction,  as  he  did  not 
desire  a  general  engagement  at  this  time.    General  Ewell 

115 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

accordingly  disposed  his  command  across  the  railroad 
and  facing  towards  Warrenton  Junction  as  follows:  my 
brigade  on  the  right,  Lawton's  on  the  left  and  Hays'  in 
the  centre,  the  main  body  being  posted  on  a  slight  ridge 
covering  the  station.  The  49th  Virginia  Regiment  of  my 
brigade  was  moved  to  a  ridge  on  my  right,  on  the  road 
leading  to  and  past  Greenwich,  and  a  regiment  of  Law- 
ton's  brigade  (the  60th  Georgia),  with  one  piece  of 
artillery,  was  advanced  on  the  left  of  the  railroad  so 
as  to  support  Forno's  two  regiments  which  were  in 
front,  while  the  batteries  were  posted  so  as  to  command 
the  approaches  on  our  front  and  flanks. 

In  the  afternoon  indications  were  seen  of  the  ap- 
proach of  the  enemy  from  the  direction  of  Warrenton 
Junction,  and  the  wagons  were  ordered  to  Manassas.  In 
a  short  time  the  enemy  advanced  in  force  with  infantry 
and  artillery,  and  the  6th  and  8th  Louisiana  Regiments 
which  had  been  left  in  front  fell  back  to  a  woods  about 
three  hundred  yards  in  front  of  the  remainder  of  the 
brigade.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  got  within  range,  our 
batteries  opened  on  him  from  their  various  positions, 
and  the  6th  and  8th  Louisiana,  and  60th  Georgia  Regi- 
ments received  him  with  well  directed  volleys,  by  which 
two  columns  of  not  less  than  a  brigade  each  were  sent 
back.  The  5th  Louisiana  was  sent  to  reinforce  the  6th 
and  8th,  but  by  this  time  fresh  columns  of  the  enemy 
were  seen  advancing,  and  it  was  apparent  that  his  force 
was  larger  than  ours.  As  the  position  we  occupied  was 
a  weak  one,  and  the  enemy  could  very  easily  have  turned 
our  flank  by  moving  a  force  on  the  ridge  to  our  right, 
which  he  appeared  to  be  doing,  General  Ewell  determined 
to  retire  in  accordance  with  General  Jackson's  instruc- 
tions. The  order  for  the  withdrawal  across  Broad  Run 
was  given,  and  I  was  directed  to  cover  it  with  my  brigade. 

At  this  time  the  Louisiana  regiments  in  front  were 
actively  engaged,  and  a  heavy  column  of  the  enemy  was 
moving  against  them.  Lawton's  brigade  was  first  drawn 
back  across  the  ford  at  the  railroad  bridge  over  Broad 

116 


CAPTURE  OF  MANASSAS  JUNCTION 

Bun,  and  took  position  on  the  northern  bank.  Hays' 
brigade  then  followed,  the  regiments  engaged  in  front 
having  retired  in  good  order.  My  own  brigade  had  been 
withdrawn  from  a  pine  woods  in  which  it  was  posted, 
and  covered  the  movements  of  the  others  by  forming 
successive  lines  of  battle  back  to  the  ford,  and  was  then 
crossed  over  by  regiments  successively.  All  the  artillery 
was  successfully  withdrawn,  a  part  crossing  at  Milford 
several  hundred  yards  above  the  bridge,  at  which  point 
the  49th  Virginia  also  crossed. 

In  the  meantime,  the  enemy  had  been  advancing  in 
line  of  battle  on  both  sides  of  the  railroad,  preceded  by 
skirmishers,  and  keeping  up  a  constant  artillery  fire.  The 
13th  Virginia  had  been  deployed  as  skirmishers  to  keep 
those  of  the  enemy  in  check,  and  kept  them  from  ad- 
vancing beyond  the  station  until  all  the  rest  of  our  force 
had  crossed  the  Run,  when  it  also  retired.  Lawton's 
brigade  had  been  formed  in  line  on  the  north  bank  of 
the  Run,  and  some  batteries  put  in  position.  Hays' 
brigade  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Manassas  Junction 
as  soon  as  it  crossed,  and  my  brigade  was  moved  back 
about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  and  formed  in  line  on  a 
hill  commanding  the  road  to  the  Junction,  and  in  full 
view  of  the  enemy,  who  had  halted  on  the  ridges  near 
Bristow  Station. 

In  a  short  time  afterwards,  General  Ewell  with 
Lawton's  brigade  passed  through  my  line,  which  was 
across  the  road,  and  ordered  me  to  remain  in  position 
until  further  orders  should  be  sent  me.  He  left  a  battery 
with  me  and  directed  that  one  or  two  regiments  should 
be  so  moved  and  manoeuvred  as  to  present  the  appear- 
ance of  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  to  my  assistance. 
This  was  done,  and  a  small  party  of  the  enemy  which  had 
crossed  the  Run,  and  was  moving  along  the  railroad,  was 
driven  back  by  a  few  shots  from  the  artillery,  but  the 
enemy's  main  force,  which  consisted  of  the  advance 
division  of  Pope's  army  under  Hooker,  did  not  come 
further  than  the  station. 

117 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Shortly  after  dark,  under  orders  from  General  Ewell, 
I  retired  to  the  Junction,  where  my  men  filled  their  haver- 
sacks with  rations  of  hard  bread  and  salt  meat  from  the 
stores  captured  from  the  enemy,  but  this  was  all  of  the 
plunder  obtained  at  that  place  which  they  could  get. 

Our  loss  in  this  affair  was  comparatively  slight  and 
was  confined  almost  entirely  to  the  5th,  6th  and  8th 
Louisiana,  and  the  60th  Georgia  Regiments,  which  were 
the  only  troops  who  drew  trigger  on  our  side,  except  the 
13th  Virginia  when  deployed  as  skirmishers  to  cover  our 
withdrawal.     The  enemy  reported  his  loss  at  300. 

The  two  captured  trains  had  been  burned  in  the  early 
part  of  the  day,  and  the  railroad  bridge  across  Broad 
Run  had  been  destroyed.  A  brigade  of  the  enemy  which 
advanced  towards  Manassas,  after  having  been  landed 
from  a  train  coming  from  Alexandria,  had  been  met  by  a 
party  of  our  troops  moving  out  from  the  Junction  and 
routed,  its  commanding  officer  being  killed. 

As  soon  as  Ewell 's  division  had  rested  and  broiled 
a  little  meat,  it  moved  from  the  Junction  towards  Black- 
burn's Ford  on  Bull  Run,  and  the  brigades  became 
separated  and  bivouacked  at  different  places,  mine  lying 
down  in  the  open  field. 

The  other  divisions  had  previously  moved,  and 
Stuart  proceeded  to  burn  the  trains,  and  such  stores  as 
had  not  been  carried  off. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

The  Affair  at  Groveton. 

It  having  become  evident  that  Pope  had  found  it 
necessary  to  look  after  his  "lines  of  retreat,"  and  was 
moving  his  whole  army  back  for  the  purpose  of  falling 
upon  General  Jackson's  comparatively  small  force,  the 
latter  determined  to  move  to  the  left  so  as  to  be  in  a 
position  to  unite  with  the  right  wing  of  General  Lee's 
army  under  Longstreet.  Jackson's  division,  under 
Brigadier  General  W.  S.  Taliaferro,  had  therefore  been 
moved  on  the  night  of  the  27th  to  the  vicinity  of  the 
battlefield  of  the  21st  of  July,  1861,  and  A.  P.  Hill's  to 
Centreville,  with  orders  to  Ewell  to  move  up,  by  the 
northern  bank  of  Bull  Run,  to  the  same  locality  with 
Taliaferro  early  on  the  morning  of  the  28th.  At  dawn 
on  that  morning,  my  brigade  resumed  the  march,  moving 
across  Bull  Run  at  Blackburn's  Ford  and  then  up  the 
north  bank  to  Stone  Bridge,  followed  by  Trimble's 
brigade.  We  crossed  at  a  ford  just  below  Stone  Bridge, 
and  moved  across  the  Warrenton  Pike  and  through  the 
fields  between  the  Carter  house  and  the  Stone  Tavern, 
where  the  battle  of  the  21st  of  July  had  begun,  to  the 
Sudley  road,  near  where  Jackson's  division  was  already 
in  position. 

Lawton's  and  Hays'  brigades  had  by  mistake  taken 
the  road  to  Centreville,  but  had  now  rejoined  the  rest 
of  the  division,  and  the  whole  of  the  brigades  were  placed 
under  cover  in  the  woods,  north  of  the  Warrenton  Pike, 
through  which  the  Sudley  road  ran.  Hill's  division  came 
up  from  Centreville  subsequently.  In  the  meantime 
Pope's  whole  army  had  been  moving  by  various  roads 
upon  Manassas  Junction,  with  the  expectation  of  finding 
Jackson's  force  there,  but  in  the  afternoon  the  corps  of 
McDowell's  en  route  for  Manassas  had  been  ordered  to 
move  to  Centreville,  and  a  portion  of  it  marched  along 

119 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  Warrenton  Pike.  Very  late  in  the  afternoon,  Jack- 
son's division  under  Taliaferro  was  moved  along  parallel 
to  the  pike,  under  cover  of  the  woods,  across  the  track 
which  had  been  graded  for  a  railroad,  until  it  passed  the 
small  village  of  Groveton  on  our  left.  EwelPs  division 
followed  Jackson's  until  the  whole  had  crossed  the  rail- 
road track,  and  the  two  divisions  were  then  halted  and 
formed  in  line  facing  the  pike.  General  Ewell  ordered 
me  to  take  command  of  my  own  brigade  and  Hays'  and 
form  a  double  line  in  the  edge  of  a  piece  of  woods,  with 
my  left  resting  on  the  railroad,  and  to  await  orders; 
and  he  moved  to  the  right  with  Lawton's  and  Trimble's 
brigades. 

My  line  was  formed  as  directed,  with  my  own  brigade 
in  front  and  Hays'  in  rear  of  it,  and  as  thus  formed  we 
were  on  the  left  and  rear  of  Starke's  brigade  of  Jack- 
son's division,  whose  line  was  advanced  farther  towards 
the  pike.  About  sunset  a  column  of  the  enemy  com- 
menced moving  past  our  position,  and  Jackson's  division 
and  the  two  brigades  with  General  Ewell  moved  forward 
to  attack  him,  when  a  fierce  and  sanguinary  engagement 
took  place.  While  it  was  raging,  and  just  before  dark, 
I  received  an  order  from  General  Jackson,  through  one 
of  his  staff  officers,  to  advance  to  the  front,  which  I  com- 
plied with  at  once,  my  own  brigade  in  line  of  battle  being 
followed  by  that  of  Hays. 

While  advancing,  I  received  an  order  to  send  two 
regiments  to  the  right  to  General  Jackson,  and  I  de- 
tached the  44th  and  49th  Virginia  under  Colonel  Smith 
for  that  purpose.  On  reaching  the  railroad  cut  in  my 
forward  movement,  I  found  it  so  deep  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  cross  it,  and  I  had  therefore  to  move  to  the 
right  by  flank  until  I  found  a  place  where  I  could  cross. 
This  proved  to  be  a  ravine  with  embankments  on  both 
sides  for  a  bridge  or  culvert,  and  I  had  here  to  pass 
through  by  flank  and  form  by  file  into  line  in  front  of  a 
marsh  beyond.  This  brought  me  near  the  left  of  the 
position  to  which  Trimble's  brigade  had  advanced,  and  I 

120 


THE  AFFAIR  AT  GROVETON 

had  passed  a  part  of  Starke's  brigade  on  the  railroad 
track.  While  my  brigade  was  forming  in  line  it  was 
exposed  to  a  galling  fire  of  canister  and  shrapnel,  and 
before  it  was  ready  to  advance  the  enemy  had  begun  to 
retreat  and  it  had  become  so  dark  that  it  was  impossible 
to  tell  whether  we  should  encounter  friend  or  foe.  I 
therefore  advanced  no  farther  and  Hays'  brigade  was 
halted  on  the  railroad;  and  in  this  position  the  two 
brigades  lay  on  their  arms  all  night. 

A  short  distance  from  me  General  Ewell  was  found 
very  severely  wounded  by  a  ball  through  the  knee,  which 
he  had  received  while  leading  one  of  the  regiments  on 
foot,  and  I  had  him  carried  to  the  hospital,  after  having 
great  difficulty  in  persuading  him  to  go,  as  he  insisted 
upon  having  his  leg  amputated  before  he  left  the  ground. 

Lawton's  and  Trimble's  brigades  lay  on  their  arms 
a  short  distance  to  my  right,  near  the  points  where  they 
were  at  the  close  of  the  action,  and  both  had  suffered 
heavily.  The  enemy  had  retired  from  our  immediate 
front,  and  we  could  hear  the  rumbling  of  his  artillery 
as  he  was  moving  off  in  the  distance. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

Second  Battle  of  Manassas. 

Though  the  force  of  the  enemy,  consisting  of  King's 
division  of  McDowell's  Corps  moving  on  the  left  flank 
of  that  corps,  with  which  the  engagement  took  place  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  28th,  had  retreated  in  the  direction 
of  Manassas,  other  troops  had  moved  up  to  the  vicinity, 
and  early  next  morning  it  was  discovered  that  Pope  was 
moving  his  whole  army  against  us  from  the  direction 
of  Manassas  and  Centreville,  to  which  point  it  had  gone 
in  search  of  ns. 

It  now  became  necessary  to  change  our  front  to  meet 
the  approaching  columns,  and  Ewell's  division,  under  the 
command  of  Brigadier  General  Lawton  as  senior 
brigadier,  was  formed  in  line  facing  Groveton,  near 
where  it  had  lain  on  its  arms  the  night  before,  on  a  ridge 
running  nearly  at  right  angles  to  Warrenton  Pike,  with 
its  right,  my  brigade,  resting  on  the  pike.  The  other 
divisions  were  retired  behind  the  unfinished  railroad  on 
our  left,  and  the  whole  line  faced  towards  the  enemy.  At 
an  early  hour  the  enemy's  batteries  opened  on  us  and 
were  replied  to  by  ours.  After  this  artillery  firing  had 
continued  for  some  time,  the  position  of  Ewell's  division 
was  changed,  and  General  Jackson  in  person  ordered  me 
to  move  with  Hays'  brigade  and  my  own,  and  Johnson's 
battery  of  artillery,  to  a  ridge  north  of  the  Warrenton 
Pike  and  behind  the  railroad,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  turning  our  right  flank,  a  movement  from  Manassas 
indicating  that  purpose  having  been  observed.  Two  of 
my  regiments,  the  13th  Virginia  and  31st  Virginia,  under 
Colonel  Walker,  were  detached  by  General  Jackson's 
order  and  placed  in  position  south  of  the  pike,  for  the 
purpose  of  watching  the  movements  of  the  force  that 
was  advancing  from  the  direction  of  Manassas  towards 
our  right. 

122 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

Hays'  brigade  and  my  own  were  formed  in  line  on 
the  ridge  indicated,  in  the  edge  of  a  piece  of  woods,  and 
skirmishers  were  advanced  to  the  line  of  the  railroad, 
Johnson's  battery  being  placed  in  position  to  command 
my  front.  In  the  meantime  our  main  line  had  been 
established  on  the  railroad  a  mile  or  more  to  my  left, 
and  Lawton's  and  Trimble's  brigades  had  been  moved 
so  as  to  conform  thereto.  The  artillery  firing  had  con- 
tinued all  the  morning,  on  my  left  at  onr  main  position, 
and  there  had  been  some  infantry  fighting.  The  two 
regiments  under  Colonel  Walker,  by  skirmishing,  kept 
the  head  of  the  force  moving  from  Manassas  on  our 
right  in  check,  .until  the  appearance  of  the  leading 
division  (Hood's)  of  Longstreet's  force  on  the  Warren- 
ton  Pike  from  the  direction  of  Gainesville,  which  occurred 
about  ten  or  eleven  o'clock  a.m. 

I  remained  in  position  until  Longstreet's  advance  had 
moved  far  enough  to  render  it  unnecessary  for  me  to 
remain  longer,  and,  without  awaiting  orders,  I  recalled 
Colonel  Walker  with  his  two  regiments  about  one  o  'clock 
p.m.,  and  then  moved  the  two  brigades  to  the  left,  to 
rejoin  the  rest  of  the  division.  I  found  General  Lawton 
with  his  own  brigade  in  line  in  rear  of  the  railroad,  not 
far  from  the  position  I  had  occupied,  the  previous  morn- 
ing, before  the  fight,  and  Trimble's  brigade  was  in  line 
on  the  railroad  between  Jackson's  division  and  Hill's, 
the  former  being  on  the  right  and  the  latter  on  the  left. 
Along  this  railroad  Jackson's  line  was  mainly  formed, 
facing  to  the  southeast.  The  track  of  the  road  was 
through  fields  and  woods,  and  consisted  of  deep  cuts 
and  heavy  embankments,  as  the  country  was  rolling. 
The  two  brigades  with  me  were  formed  in  line  in  the 
woods,  in  rear  of  Lawton's  brigade,  with  flays'  on  the 
right  of  mine. 

We  remained  in  this  position  until  about  half-past 
three  p.m.,  and  in  the  meantime  the  enemy  was  making 
desperate  attempts  to  drive  our  troops  from  the  line  of 
the    railroad,    having    advanced    some    heavy    columns 

123 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

against  Hill's  brigades  and  been  repulsed;  and  the  battle 
was  raging  fiercely  in  our  front.  Just  about  half-past 
three,  Colonel  Forno,  with  Hays'  brigade,  was  ordered 
to  advance  to  the  assistance  of  one  of  Hill's  brigades 
which  had  been  forced  from  his  position,  and  he  did  so, 
driving  the  enemy  from  the  railroad  and  taking  position 
on  it  with  his  brigade.  He  was  subsequently  wounded 
very  seriously,  while  holding  this  position,  by  a  sharp- 
shooter, and  had  to  be  removed  from  the  field. 

'Some  time  after  Forno 's  advance,  a  messenger  came 
from  A.  P.  Hill,  with  the  information  that  one  of  his 
brigades,  whose  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted,  was 
being  very  heavily  pressed,  and  with  the  request  that  I 
should  advance  to  its  support.  I  did  so  at  once,  without 
waiting  for  orders,  and  moved  directly  ahead,  as  I  was 
informed  the  attack  was  immediately  in  my  front;  the 
8th  Louisiana  Regiment  under  Major  Lewis,  which  had 
been  sent  to  the  wagons  the  day  before  to  replenish  its 
ammunition  and  had  just  arrived,  accompanying  any 
brigade.  As  I  passed  Lawton's  brigade  I  found  the 
13th  Georgia  Regiment  preparing  to  move  forward  under 
the  General's  orders.  I  continued  to  advance  until  I 
came  to  a  small  field  near  the  railroad,  when  I  discovered 
that  the  enemy  had  possession  of  a  deep  cut  in  the  rail- 
road with  a  part  of  his  force  in  a  strip  of  woods  between 
the  field  and  the  cut.  General  Gregg's  and  Colonel 
Thomas'  brigades,  having  very  nearly  exhausted  their 
ammunition,  had  fallen  back  a  short  distance,  but  were 
presenting  a  determined  front  to  the  enemy. 

My  brigade,  with  the  8th  Louisiana  on  its  left,  ad- 
vanced at  once  across  the  field,  and  drove  the  enemy 
from  the  woods  and  the  railroad  cut,  dashing  across  the 
railroad,  and  pursuing  the  retreating  force  some  two 
or  three  hundred  yards  beyond,  before  I  could  arrest 
its  progress.  The  messenger  from  General  Hill  had 
stated  that  it  was  not  desired  that  I  should  go  beyond 
the  railroad,  but  should  content  myself  with  driving  the 
enemy  from  it,  as  General  Jackson's  orders  were  not  to 

124 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

advance  but  hold  the  line.  I,  therefore,  drew  my  men 
back  to  the  railroad  cut  and  took  position  behind  it. 
This  charge  was  made  with  great  dash  and  gallantry 
by  my  brigade  and  the  8th  Louisiana  Regiment,  and 
very  heavy  loss  was  inflicted  on  the  enemy  with  a  com- 
paratively slight  one  to  us,  though  two  valuable  officers, 
Colonel  William  Smith  of  the  49th  Virginia  and  Major 
John  C.  Higginbotham  of  the  25th  Virginia,  were  severely 
wounded.  At  the  time  my  brigade  crossed  the  railroad, 
the  13th  Georgia  advanced  further  to  the  right  and 
crossed  over  in  pursuit. 

This  was  the  last  of  seven  different  assaults  on  Gen- 
eral Hill's  line  that  day,  all  of  which  had  now  been 
repulsed  with  great  slaughter  upon  the  enemy,  and  he 
did  not  renew  the  attack,  but  contented  himself  with 
furiously  shelling  the  woods  in  which  we  were  located. 
Jackson's  division  had  also  repulsed  an  attack  on  his 
front,  and  General  Trimble  was  severely  wounded  dur- 
ing the  course  of  the  day  by  an  explosive  ball  from  a 
sharpshooter.  General  Jackson  had  accomplished  his 
purpose  of  resisting  the  enemy  until  General  Lee  with 
Longstreet's  force  could  effect  a  junction  with  him.  The 
latter  force  was  now  up  and  a  part  of  it  had  been  en- 
gaged just  about  night  with  one  of  the  enemy's  columns. 

Pope,  in  his  report,  claims  that  General  Jackson  was 
retreating  through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  when  his  attack 
arrested  this  retreat  and  compelled  Jackson  to  take  posi- 
tion to  defend  himself,  and  that  he  drove  our  troops 
several  miles,  but  there  was  no  thought  of  retreat,  and 
the  various  movements  of  our  troops  had  been  solely  for 
the  purpose  of  defence  against  the  enemy's  threatened 
attacks  as  he  changed  their  direction. 

Hill's  brigades,  to  whose  relief  I  had  gone,  went  to 
the  rear  to  replenish  their  cartridge  boxes  and  did  not 
return  to  relieve  me  after  the  close  of  the  fight  on  the 
29th.  I  had  therefore  to  remain  in  position  all  night  with 
my  men  lying  on  their  arms. 

I  had  understood  that  some  of  Hill's  brigades  were 

125 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

to  my  left,  but  it  turned  out  that  they  had  also  gone  to 
the  rear  to  get  ammunition  and  did  not  return ;  and  very 
early  in  the  morning  of  the  30th,  the  enemy's  sharp- 
shooters got  on  the  railroad  embankment  on  my  left 
and  opened  fire  on  that  flank,  killing  a  ve^ry  valuable 
young  officer  of  the  13th  Virginia  Regiment,  Lieutenant 
Leroy.  I  thus  discovered  for  the  first  time  that  my 
flank  was  exposed,  and  the  enemy's  sharpshooters  soon 
began  to  cross  the  railroad  on  my  left  and  advance 
through  a  cornfield.  I  immediately  sent  word  to  General 
Hill  of  this  state  of  things,  and,  after  some  delay,  some 
brigades  were  sent  to  occupy  positions  on  my  left,  who 
drove  the  sharpshooters  back.  During  the  morning  there 
was  very  heavy  skirmishing  in  my  front,  and  the 
skirmishers  of  my  brigade,  under  Captain  Lilley  of  the 
25th  Virginia,  drove  back  a  heavy  force  which  was  ad- 
vancing apparently  for  an  attack  on  our  position. 

Subsequently  our  troops  were  arranged  so  as  to  place 
Ewell's  division  in  the  centre,  leaving  Hill's  division  on 
the  left  and  Jackson's  on  the  right,  but  when  Lawton's 
brigade  was  moved  up,  there  was  left  space  for  only 
three  of  my  regiments,  and  leaving  the  44th,  49th  and 
52nd  Virginia  Regiments  on  the  line  under  General 
Smith  of  the  49th,  I  retired  about  150  yards  to  the  rear 
with  the  rest  of  the  brigade.  Hays'  brigade,  now  under 
Colonel  Strong,  had  been  sent  to  the  wagons  to  get 
ammunition  and  had  not  returned. 

The  fore  part  of  the  day  was  consumed  by  the  main 
body  of  the  enemy  and  Longstreet's  wing  of  the  army  in 
manoeuvring  and  cannonading,  but  about  four  o'clock 
p.m.  the  enemy  brought  up  very  heavy  columns  and 
hurled  them  against  Jackson's  line,  when  the  fighting 
became  very  severe,  but  all  of  the  attempts  to  force  our 
position  were  successfully  resisted,  and  a  very  heavy 
punishment  was  inflicted  on  the  enemy.  My  three  regi- 
ments under  Colonel  Smith,  participated  in  the  repulse 
of  the  enemy,  and  as  he  retired  they  dashed  across  the 
railroad  cut  in  pursuit,  very  unexpectedly  to  me,  as  I 

126 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

had  given  orders  to  Colonel  William  Smith  not  to  ad- 
vance until  the  order  to  do  so  was  given.  His  men,  how- 
ever, had  been  incapable  of  restraint,  but  he  soon  re- 
turned with  them.  In  the  meantime,  I  advanced  the 
other  regiments  to  the  front  of  the  line  that  had  been 
vacated.  Trimble's  brigade,  now  under  Captain  Brown 
of  the  12th  Georgia,  and  Lawton's  brigade  had  partici- 
pated in  this  repulse  of  the  enemy  likewise. 

The  attack  on  the  part  of  the  line  occupied  by  Jack- 
son's division  had  been  very  persistent,  but  Longstreet 
now  began  to  advance  against  the  enemy  from  the  right 
and  was  soon  sweeping  him  from  our  front.  Some  of 
Hill's  brigades  also  advanced  and  the  enemy  was  driven 
from  the  field  with  great  slaughter.  While  this  was  tak- 
ing place,  the  other  divisions  of  Jackson  were  ordered 
to  advance,  and  my  brigade  was  soon  put  in  motion  in 
the  direction  taken  by  Hill's  brigades,  advancing  through 
the  woods  in  our  front  to  a  large  field  about  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  from  the  railroad.  I  halted  at  the  edge  of  the 
woods  to  enable  the  other  brigades  to  come  up,  as  I  -was 
ahead  of  them,  when  General  Jackson  rode  up  and 
ordered  me  to  move  by  my  left  flank  to  intercept  a  body 
of  the  enemy  reported  moving  up  Bull  Run  to  our  left. 
I  did  so,  moving  along  with  skirmishers  ahead  of  the 
brigade  until  I  came  to  the  railroad,  and  then  along  that 
until  I  came  to  a  field. 

It  was  now  getting  dark,  and  as  my  skirmishers 
moved  into  the  field  they  were  fired  upon  from  their  left. 
This  fire  came  from  a  very  unexpected  quarter,  and  I 
immediately  sent  to  let  General  Jackson  know  the  fact, 
as  it  would  have  been  folly  to  have  advanced  in  the 
direction  I  was  going  if  it  came  from  the  enemy.  A 
message  was  soon  received  from  General  Jackson,  stat- 
ing that  the  fire  very  probably  came  from  some  of  Hill's 
troops,  and  directing  me  to  send  and  see.  This  had  been 
anticipated  by  sending  a  young  soldier  of  the  44th  Vir- 
ginia, who  volunteered  for  the  purpose,  and  he  soon  re- 
turned with  the  information  that  the  firing  was  from 

127 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  skirmishers  from  Gregg's  and  Branch's  brigades 
of  Hill's  division  who  mistook  us  for  the  enemy.  Fortu- 
nately no  damage  was  done,  and  I  was  moving  on  when 
I  received  an  order  to  advance  to  the  front  from  where 
I  was,  and  in  a  few  minutes  afterwards  another  to  move 
back  by  the  right  flank,  as  the  report  of  the  movement 
of  the  enemy  around  our  left  flank  had  proved  untrue. 
I  found  that  the  other  brigades  of  the  division  had 
bivouacked  near  where  I  had  left  them,  and  my  own 
did  the  same. 

The  enemy  had  been  driven  beyond  Bull  Run,  and 
was  in  retreat  to  Centreville,  our  pursuit  having  been 
arrested  by  the  approaching  darkness. 


CHAPTEE  XIV. 
Affair  at  Ox  Hill  or  Chantilly. 

Jackson's  command,  after  having  rested  on  the 
morning  of  the  31st,  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day  was 
put  in  motion  for  the  purpose  of  turning  the  enemy's 
position  at  Centreville.  Crossing  Bull  Eun  at  and  near 
Sudley's  Ford,  it  moved  to  the  left  over  a  country  road, 
Jackson's  division  in  front  followed  by  Ewell's  and  Hill's 
bringing  up  the  rear,  until  the  Little  Eiver  Turnpike 
was  reached,  when  we  turned  towards  Fairfax  Court- 
House  and  bivouacked  late  at  night.  Early  on  the  morn- 
ing of  September  the  1st,  the  march  was  resumed,  and 
continued  until  we  reached  the  farm  of  Chantilly  in  the 
afternoon.  The  enemy  was  found  in  position,  covering 
the  retreat  of  his  army,  near  Ox  Hill,  not  far  from 
Chantilly,  and  a  short  distance  beyond  which  the  Little 
Eiver  Pike,  and  the  pike  from  Centreville  to  Fairfax 
Court-House,  intersect. 

General  Jackson  at  once  put  his  troops  in  position  on 
the  ridge  on  the  east  of  the  Little  Eiver  Pike,  with  his 
own  division  on  the  left,  Hill's  on  the  right  and  Ewell's 
in  the  centre;  Hays'  and  Trimble's  brigades  only  of 
Ewell's  division  being  on  the  front  line,  Lawton's  and 
mine  being  formed  in  the  woods  in  their  rear.  As  we 
moved  into  position  the  enemy  opened  a  heavy  artillery 
fire  on  us,  and  soon  the  action  commenced  with  some  of 
Hill's  brigades  on  the  right,  extending  to  Trimble's  and 
Hays'  brigades.  During  this  action  a  severe  thunder 
storm  raged,  and  while  it  was  progressing,  General 
Starke,  then  in  command  of  Jackson's  division,  repre- 
sented to  me  that  a  heavy  force  was  threatening  his  left, 
between  which  and  the  pike  there  was  a  considerable 
interval,  and  requested  me  to  cover  it  with  my  brigade 
to  protect  him  from  the  apprehended  danger. 

After  examining  the  position  I  reluctantly  consented 

9  129 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

to  yield  to  General  Starke's  entreaty,  without  awaiting 
orders,  as  Hays'  brigade  was  in  my  front  and  lie  repre- 
sented his  situation  as  critical,  and  I  proceeded  to  move 
my  brigade  by  the  left  flank  to  the  point  designated  by 
him.  I  had  put  myself  on  the  leading  flank,  and  while 
moving  I  heard  a  considerable  musketry  fire,  but  as  the 
woods  were  very  thick  and  it  continued  to  rain  I  could 
see  only  a  short  distance,  and  took  it  for  granted  that 
the  firing  proceeded  from  the  troops  in  front  of  where  I 
had  been. 

On  reaching  the  position  General  Starke  desired  me 
to  occupy,  which  was  but  a  short  distance  from  the  place 
I  had  moved  from,  as  his  left  was  drawn  back  in  a  circle 
towards  the  pike,  I  discovered  that  the  13th,  25th  and 
31st  Virginia  Regiments  which  were  on  my  right  had 
not  followed  the  rest  of  the  brigade.  I  immediately  sent 
my  aide,  Lieutenant  Early,  back  to  see  what  had  become 
of  the  missing  regiments,  and  he  found  them  engaged 
with  a  body  of  the  enemy  in  their  front.  On  ascertain- 
ing this  fact,  I  moved  back  at  once  and  found  that  my 
regiment  had  repulsed  the  force  opposed  to  them  and 
inflicted  considerable  loss  on  it.  Hays'  brigade  under 
Colonel  Strong  had  fallen  back  in  considerable  confusion 
about  the  time  I  commenced  my  movement,  and  passed 
through  the  three  regiments  on  my  right,  followed  by  a 
considerable  force  of  the  enemy.  The  commanding  offi- 
cers had  very  properly  detained  those  regiments,  as  the 
affair  was  entirely  concealed  from  my  view,  and  they 
had  received  the  enemy's  onset  with  great  coolness, 
driving  him  back  out  of  the  woods. 

Colonel  Strong  had  attempted  to  change  front  when 
the  enemy  were  advancing  on  him,  and,  being  entirely 
inexperienced  in  the  management  of  a  brigade,  he  had 
got  it  into  such  confusion  that  it  was  compelled  to  retire. 
The  8th  Louisiana  Regiment,  under  Major  Lewis,  had 
been  halted  and  formed  into  line  immediately  in  rear 
of  my  regiments,  and  the  remaining  regiments  were  soon 
rallied  and  brought  back  by  their  respective  commanders. 
After  quite  a  severe  action,  in  which  the  enemy  lost  two 

130 


AFFAIR  AT  OX  HILL  OR  CHANTILLY 

general  officers,  Kearney  and  Stevens,  he  was  repulsed 
at  all  points,  and  continued  Ms  retreat  during  the  night. 
After  the  close  of  the  action,  Jackson's  division  was 
withdrawn  from  the  left  to  the  rear,  and  Ewell's  division 
covered  the  point  previously  covered  by  General  Starke, 
and  Hays'  and  Trimble's  brigades,  and  the  men  lay 
on  their  arms  during  the  night.  While  Trimble 's  brigade 
was  engaged,  the  gallant  old  Captain  Brown,  of  the  12th 
Georgia  Regiment,  in  command  of  the  brigade,  was 
killed,  and  Colonel  James  A.  Walker  of  the  13th  Virginia 
Regiment  was  subsequently  assigned  to  the  command  of 
the  brigade,  as  it  had  no  field  officer  present. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2nd  it  was  discovered  that  the 
enemy  had  retired  from  our  front,  and  during  that  day 
Pope  made  good  his  escape  into  the  fortifications  around 
Washington.  He  had  now  seen  the  "rebels"  in  various 
aspects  and  found  that  his  lines  of  retreat  would  not 
take  care  of  themselves;  and  very  soon  he  was  shipped 
and  sent  to  the  northwest  to  look  after  the  Indians  in 
that  quarter. 

This  affair  at  Ox  Hill  closed  the  series  of  engage- 
ments with  the  enemy  under  Pope,  and  it  was  again  the 
old  story  of  the  "rebels  in  overwhelming  numbers," 
opposed  to  a  small  army  of  "Union  soldiers."  Accord- 
ing to  Pope's  account,  his  army  was  wearied  out  and 
broken  down  by  the  fatigues  of  the  campaign  on  the 
Rappahannock,  and  the  incessant  marching  and  manoeu- 
vring to  confront  Lee's  army,  and  was  short  of  rations 
and  ammunition.  It  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to 
him  that  the  soldiers  of  the  army  which  thus  wearied  his 
own  were  at  all  susceptible  of  fatigue  or  hunger,  or  that 
when  his  own  rations  were  short,  their  chances  of  supply- 
ing themselves  were  slim. 

Pope's  army  had  at  the  time  of  the  battles  of  the 
27th,  28th,  29th  and  30th  of  August,  been  reinforced  by 
Burnside's  corps  under  Reno,  one  brigade  of  Sturgis' 
division  from  Alexandria,  and  the  following  troops 
from  McClellan's  army:  Heintzelman 's  corps,  Porter's 
corps,  and  the  division  of  Pennsylvania  reserves  com- 

131 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

manded  by  Reynolds.  At  the  time  of  the  affair  at  Ox 
Hill  he  had  been  further  reinforced  by  Franklin's  and 
Sumner's  corps  of  McClellan's  army,  leaving  but  one 
corps  of  that  army  (Keyes')  which  had  not  reached  him. 
His  consolidated  report  of  the  31st  of  July  showed  a 
strength  of  46,858  before  he  was  joined  by  any  of  those 
reinforcements  and  in  the  letter  of  Halleck  to  McClellan, 
dated  the  6th  of  August,  Pope's  army  is  stated  to  be 
about  40,000.  In  a  telegram  from  Halleck  to  McClellan, 
dated  the  12th  of  August,  Burnsicle's  force  is  stated  to  be 
nearly  13,000. 

General  Lee's  army  at  the  time  of  these  battles  near 
Manassas  consisted  of  Jackson's  wing  of  the  army  in 
which  there  were  three  divisions  of  infantry  containing 
fourteen  brigades,  Longstreet's  wing  in  which  there  were 
four  divisions  of  infantry  containing  fifteen  brigades,  and 
two  brigades  of  cavalry  under  Stuart.  There  was  about 
one  battery  of  artillery  of  four  guns  for  each  brigade 
attached  to  the  divisions,  and  there  was  a  reserve  force 
of  artillery  which  may  have  numbered  some  eight  or  ten 
batteries,  but  perhaps  not  so  many. 

Longstreet's  command  consisted  of  his  own  division, 
seven  brigades;  Hood's  division,  two  brigades;  Jones' 
division,  three  brigades;  and  Anderson's  division,  three 
brigades.  The  whole  of  those  brigades,  as  well  as  the 
force  of  Jackson,  had  been  in  the  battles  around  Rich- 
mond, except  Evans'  brigade — attached  to  Longstreet's 
division, — and  Drayton's  brigade,  attached  to  Jones' 
division.  Those  two  brigades  had  probably  been  brought 
from  the  South  since  those  battles,  or  they  may  have 
been  organized  out  of  regiments  attached  to  other 
brigades  at  that  time;  but  I  think  they  were  brought 
from  North  and  South  Carolina,  and  if  such  was  the 
fact,  they  were  the  only  reinforcements  which  I  ever 
heard  of  reaching  General  Lee  after  the  battles  around 
Richmond  or  before  or  during  the  campaign  against  Pope 
or  the  campaign  in  Maryland.  D.  H.  Hill's  division  of 
five  brigades;   McLaw's  division  of  four  brigades,  com- 

132 


AFFAIR  AT  OX  HILL  OR  CHANTILLY 

posed  of  his  own  and  Magruder's  consolidated;  and  the 
force  of  Holmes  and  Wise — all  of  which  had  constituted 
part  of  the  army  at  Richmond  during  the  battles, — had 
been  left  for  the  protection  of  that  city  until  the  whole 
of  McClellan's  force  moved  from  James  River. 

When  that  event  was  fully  ascertained,  Hill's  and 
McLaw's  division  and  two  of  Holmes'  brigades,  under 
Walker,  had  been  ordered  to  move  North,  but  Hill  and 
McLaws  got  up  on  the  2nd,  the  day  after  the  affair  at 
Ox  Hill,  and  Walker  later,  so  that  Pope  had  only  to 
confront  the  29  brigades  before  mentioned.  My  brigade 
was  fully  an  average  one,  and  my  effective  force  did 
not  exceed  1,500.  Some  idea  therefore  may  be  formed 
of  the  force  with  which  General  Lee  fought  the  second 
battle  of  Manassas ;  I  don't  think  it  could  have  exceeded 
50,000  effective  men  in  all,  including  artillery  and 
cavalry,  and  it  was  probably  considerably  under  that 
number. 

The  loss  in  Ewell's  division,  beginning  with  the  artil- 
lery fighting  on  the  Rappahannock  and  ending,  with  the 
affair  at  Ox  Hill,  was  in  killed  366,  wounded  1,169,  and 
missing  32,  the  loss  in  my  own  brigade  being  27  killed 
and  181  wounded. 

The  main  battle,  which  occurred  on  the  29th  and  30th 
of  August,  has  been  called  the  second  battle  of  Manassas, 
but  I  think  the  little  village  or  hamlet  of  Groveton  is 
entitled  to  the  honor  of  giving  its  name  to  that  great 
battle,  as  the  fighting  began  there  on  the  28th,  and  was 
all  around  it  on  the  29th  and  30th. 

The  first  battle  near  the  same  spot,  on  ground  which 
was  again  fought  over,  had  been  properly  named,  as 
Manassas  Junction  was  then  the  headquarters  and  cen- 
tral position  of  our  army,  and  was  the  objective  point 
of  the  enemy  during  the  battle.  Such  was  not  the  case 
with  either  army  at  the  last  battle,  and  the  Junction, 
several  miles  off,  had  no  more  relation  to  the  battle  than 
Bristow,  Gainesville  or  Centreville. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

Movement  into  Maryland. 

On  the  2nd  of  September  our  army  rested,  while  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  were  being  ascertained.  Pro- 
visions were  now  very  scarce,  as  the  supply  in  the 
wagons,  with  which  we  had  started,  was  exhausted.  The 
rations  obtained  by  Jackson's  command  from  the  enemy's 
stores,  at  Manassas,  which  were  confined  to  what  could 
be  brought  off  in  haversacks,  were  also  exhausted,  and 
on  this  day  boiled  fresh  beef,  without  salt  or  bread,  was 
issued  to  my  brigade,  which  with  an  ear  or  two  of  green 
corn  roasted  by  a  fire,  constituted  also  my  own  supply 
of  food,  at  this  time.  Longstreet's  wing  of  the  army  was 
in  a  worse  condition  than  Jackson's,  as  it  had  not  par- 
ticipated in  the  supply  found  at  Manassas. 

On  the  morning  of  the  3rd,  Jackson's  wing  com- 
menced the  march  towards  the  Potomac,  and  moved  to 
the  left  over  some  country  roads,  crossing  the  Loudoun 
&  Hampshire  Railroad  at  a  station,  above  Vienna,  until 
we  reached  the  turnpike  from  Georgetown  to  Leesburg 
in  Loudoun,  and  then  along  this  road  through  Draines- 
ville,  until  we  passed  Leesburg  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
4th,  and  bivouacked  near  Big  Springs,  two  or  three  miles 
from  the  latter  place,  at  night. 

On  the  5th  we  resumed  the  march  and  crossed  the 
Potomac  at  White's  Ford,  about  seven  miles  above  Lees- 
burg, into  Maryland.  This  ford  was  an  obscure  one  on 
the  road  through  the  farm  of  Captain  Elijah  White,  and 
the  banks  of  the  river  had  to  be  dug  down  so  that  our 
wagons  and  artillery  might  cross.  On  the  Maryland  side 
of  the  river  the  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Canal  runs  along  the 
bank,  and  the  canal  had  to  be  bridged  over  a  lock  to 
enable  our  wagons  to  pass,  as  they  could  not  get  through 
the  culvert  where  the  road  ran.  That  night  we  bivouacked 
near  Three  Springs  in  Maryland  on  the  road  leading 

134 


MOVEMENT  INTO  MARYLAND 

towards  Frederick  City,  and  after  my  brigade  had  lain 
down  I  received  a  message  from  General  Jackson  to  let 
my  men  get  green  corn  for  two  days,  but,  I  told  the  staff 
officer  bringing  it,  that  they  had  already  drawn  their 
rations  in  that  article,  which  was  all  they  had  now  to 
eat.  I  will  here  say  that  green  Indian  corn  and  boiled 
beef  without  salt  are  better  than  no  food  at  all  by  a 
good  deal,  but  they  constitute  a  very  weakening  diet  for 
troops  on  a  long  march,  as  they  produce  diarrhoea. 

On  the  6th  we  resumed  the  march  and  in  the  after- 
noon occupied  Frederick  City  and  the  Monocacy  Junction 
on  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad.  Jackson's  division 
took  position  near  the  city,  and  Hill's  and  Ewell's  near 
the  Junction,  which  is  about  three  miles  from  the  city 
in  the  direction  of  Washington.  Ewell's  division  cov- 
ered the  railroad  and  the  approaches  from  the  direction 
of  Baltimore,  and  Hill's  those  from  the  direction  of 
"Washington.  We  were  now  able  to  get  some  flour  and 
salt,  and  our  whole  army  was  in  a  day  or  two  concen- 
trated near  the  same  points. 

We  remained  in  position  until  the  10th,  and  on  that 
day  General  Jackson's  command  moved  through  Freder- 
ick westward,  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  Harper's 
Ferry  and  Maryland  Heights,  where  there  was  a  con- 
siderable force  of  the  enemy.  At  the  same  time,  McLaws, 
with  his  own  and  Anderson's  divisions,  including  three 
brigades  of  Longstreet's  attached  to  Anderson's  division, 
moved  towards  Maryland  Heights,  and  Brigadier  Gen- 
eral Walker  with  his  two  brigades  moved  towards 
Loudoun  Heights  on  the  south  of  the  Potomac,  for  the 
purpose  of  surrounding  Harper's  Ferry  and  co-operat- 
ing with  General  Jackson  in  its  capture. 

On  the  night  of  the  10th,  Ewell's  division  bivouacked 
between  Middletown  and  South  Mountain.  On  the  11th, 
we  moved  across  the  mountain  at  Boonsboro  Gap,  and 
through  Boonsboro  to  Williamsport,  where  we  crossed 
the  Potomac;  Hill's  division  moving  from  that  place 
directly  for  Martinsburg  on  the  pike,  and  Ewell's  and 

135 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Jackson's  divisions  for  North  Mountain  depot  on  the 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  some  miles  west  of  Martins- 
burg,  near  which  they  bivouacked.  On  the  morning  of 
the  12th  we  moved  for  Martinsburg,  and  found  that  a 
force  of  the  enemy  at  that  place  under  General  White 
had  retired  in  the  direction  of  Harper's  Ferry  on  the 
approach  of  Hill's  division.  We  passed  through  the 
town  in  the  direction  of  Harper's  Ferry  and  Ewell's 
division  bivouacked  on  the  banks  of  the  Opequon. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th  we  resumed  the  march, 
and  reached  the  turnpike  from  Charlestown  to  Harper's 
Ferry,  one  mile  above  Halltown,  and  bivouacked  in 
sight  of  the  enemy's  work  on  Bolivar  Heights,  covering 
the  town  at  the  ferry,  to  wait  until  McLaws  and  Walker 
should  get  in  position  on  Maryland  Heights  and  Loudon 
Heights  respectively,  both  of  which  overlooked  and  com- 
manded the  enemy's  position. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  McLaws  and  Walker 
having  previously  gotten  in  position  and  opened  fire 
with  their  artillery,  General  Jackson's  force  moved 
forward  to  invest  the  enemy's  works,  Hill's  division 
moving  on  the  right  along  the  Shenandoah,  Ewell's 
division  along  the  turnpike,  and  one  brigade  of  Jack- 
son's division  along  the  Potomac  on  the  left,  the  rest  of 
the  division  moving  in  support.  Ewell's  division  moved 
along  and  on  each  side  of  the  pike  in  three  columns  until 
it  passed  Halltown,  when  it  was  formed  in  treble  line  of 
battle  with  Trimble's  and  Hays'  brigades  on  the  front 
line,  and  Lawton's  and  my  brigade  in  their  rear,  Law- 
ton's  forming  the  second  line,  and  mine  the  third.  In 
this  order  we  moved  forward  through  some  fields  on 
the  right  of  the  road  until  we  reached  a  woods  on  a  hill 
called  School  House  Hill,  confronting  the  main  works 
on  Bolivar  Heights,  and  in  easy  range  for  artillery. 

This  was  done  without  opposition,  and  Hays'  brigade 
was  then  moved  to  the  left  of  the  road  and  mine  posted 
in  its  rear,  the  right  being  occupied  by  Trimble's  and 
Lawton's  brigades  in  the  same  order.    It  was  now  dark 

136 


MOVEMENT  INTO  MARYLAND 

and  the  artillery  firing  from  Maryland  and  Loudon 
Heights,  as  well  as  that  from  the  enemy's  works,  had 
ceased.  General  Hill  had  had  some  skirmishing  with  the 
enemy  on  our  right,  and  had  pushed  some  brigades  close 
to  the  enemy's  left  flank  to  favorable  positions  for 
assaulting  his  works,  and  taking  them  on  the  flank  and 
rear,  but  night  also  closed  his  operations. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  preparations  were 
made  for  the  assault,  and  the  batteries  from  Maryland 
Heights,  Loudon  Heights,  from  a  position  across  the 
Shenandoah  to  which  the  guns  belonging  to  Ewell's 
division  had  been  moved  during  the  night,  from  Hill's 
position,  from  each  side  of  the  pike  in  front  of  Ewell's 
division,  and  from  the  left  on  the  Potomac,  opened  on 
the  enemy.  In  front  of  the  position  occupied  by  Ewell's 
division  was  a  deep  valley  between  School  House  Hill 
and  Bolivar  Heights,  the  whole  of  which  was  cleared. 
On  the  opposite  side  the  ascent  to  the  enemy's  works 
was  steep  and  over  thick  brush  that  had  been  felled  so 
as  to  make  a  formidable  abattis.  It  was  over  this  ground 
we  would  have  had  to  move  to  the  assault,  and  the  pros- 
pect was  by  no  means  comforting. 

Very  early  in  the  morning,  Lawton's  brigade  had 
been  moved  to  the  right  and  then  by  flank  to  the  upper 
part  of  the  valley  in  front  of  us,  for  the  purpose  of 
supporting  an  attack  to  be  made  by  Hill's  division,  and 
the  latter  was  moving  to  the  assault,  when  the  white  flag 
was  hoisted  on  Bolivar  Heights.  This  indication  of  the 
enemy's  surrender  was  received  with  very  hearty  and 
sincere  cheers  all  along  the  line,  as  we  were  thus  saved 
the  necessity  of  an  assault,  which  if  stubbornly  resisted 
would  have  resulted  in  the  loss  of  many  lives  to  us. 

Under  the  directions  of  General  Jackson,  General  A. 
P.  Hill  received  the  surrender  of  the  enemy,  then  under 
the  command  of  Brigadier  General  White,  Colonel  Miles, 
the  commander  of  the  forces  at  Harper's  Ferry,  having 
been  mortally  wounded.  About  11,000  prisoners  were 
surrendered  and  paroled,  and  we  secured  about  12,000 

137 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

small  arms,   70  pieces   of  artillery,   and   a  very  large 
amount  of  stores,  provisions,  wagons  and  horses. 

The  victory  was  really  a  bloodless  one  so  far  as  Gen- 
eral Jackson's  command  was  concerned,  the  only  loss 
being  a  very  few  killed  and  wounded  in  Hill's  division, 
but  General  McLaws  had  had  heavy  work  in  taking 
Maryland  Heights,  and  had  been  engaged  severely  with 
the  enemy  coming  up  in  his  rear. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

Battle  op  Sharpsburg  or  Antietam. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  General  Lawton 
received  an  order  from  General  Jackson  to  move  the 
division  on  the  road  to  Boteler's  Ford,  on  the  Potomac 
below  Shepherdstown,  and  he  at  once  put  his  own  and 
Trimble's  brigade,  which  had  gotten  rations  from 
Harper's  Ferry,  in  motion,  and  ordered  me  to  follow 
with  my  own  and  Hays'  brigade  as  soon  as  they  were 
supplied  likewise  from  the  stores  of  the  enemy.  I  was 
detained  until  after  night  before  the  men  of  the  two 
brigades  could  be  supplied,  and  I  then  followed  General 
Lawton,  finding  him  just  before  morning  bivouacked 
about  four  miles  from  Boteler's  Ford.  Brigadier  Gen- 
eral Hays,  wounded  at  Port  Republic  while  Colonel  of 
the  7th  Louisiana,  had  returned  to  the  brigade  on  the 
15th  after  the  surrender  of  Harper's  Ferry  and  assumed 
command  of  his  brigade  before  we  started  on  this  march. 

The  division  moved  at  dawn  on  the  16th,  and,  cross- 
ing the  Potomac,  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Sharpsburg 
in  the  early  part  of  the  day,  and  stacked  arms  in  a  piece 
of  woods  about  a  mile  in  rear  of  Sharpsburg,  Jackson's 
division  having  preceded  it,  and  Hill's  being  left  behind 
to  dispose  of  the  prisoners  and  property  captured  at 
Harper's  Ferry. 

After  the  different  columns,  which  had  been  sent 
against  the  latter  place,  had  moved  from  the  vicinity  of 
Frederick,  the  residue  of  General  Lee's  army  had  moved 
across  South  Mountain  in  the  direction  of  Hagerstown, 
and  the  division  of  General  D.  H.  Hill  had  been  left  to 
defend  Boonsboro  Gap  against  the  Federal  Army,  com- 
posed of  Pope's  army  and  McClellan's  army  combined, 
and  heavy  reinforcements  which  had  arrived  to  their 
assistance,  now  approaching  under  General  McClellan. 
General  Hill  had  been  attacked  on  the  14th,  at  Boons- 

139 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

boro  Gap,  by  the  main  body  of  McClellan's  army,  and, 
after  a  very  obstinate  resistance  for  many  hours  to  the 
vast  forces  brought  against  him,  had,  with  the  reinforce- 
ments sent  to  his  assistance  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
day,  retired  late  at  night  to  Sharpsburg  on  the  western 
side  of  the  Antietam. 

A  position  had  been  taken  on  the  morning  of  the  15th 
by  the  force  north  of  the  Potomac,  consisting  of  D.  H. 
Hill's  division,  five  brigades;  the  three  remaining 
brigades  of  Longstreet's  division;  Hood's  division,  two 
brigades;  D.  R.  Jones'  division,  three  brigades;  and 
Evans'  brigade;  fourteen  brigades  in  all,  covering 
Sharpsburg  on  the  north  and  east,  with  the  right  rest- 
ing on  Antietam  Creek,  and  the  left  extending  to  the 
Hagerstown  pike;  and  the  enemy  had  gradually  moved 
his  whole  army  up  to  the  front  of  this  position.  This 
was  the  condition  of  things  when  Jackson's  two  divisions 
arrived  on  the  16th,  and  in  the  meantime  there  had  been 
some  skirmishing  and  artillery  firing. 

After  remaining  in  position  in  the  rear  for  some 
hours,  General  Lawton  was  ordered  to  move  to  the  right 
to  cover  a  bridge  over  the  Antietam,  but  after  the  move- 
ment had  commenced,  it  was  countermanded  and  an 
order  received  to  follow  Jackson's  division  to  the  left 
through  fields  until  we  struck  the  turnpike  from  Sharps- 
burg to  Hagerstown,  and  proceeding  along  this  we 
reached  a  piece  of  woods  on  the  west  of  the  pike  in  which 
there  was  a  Dunkard  or  Quaker  Church,  and  found,  some 
distance  beyond  the  church,  Jackson's  division  already 
posted  in  a  double  line  on  the  west  of  the  pike,  and  con- 
necting on  the  right  with  the  left  of  Hood's  division. 
General  Jackson  in  person  directed  me  to  place  my 
brigade,  which  was  at  the  head  of  the  division,  on  the 
left  of  his  own  so  as  to  protect  its  flank,  and  to  com- 
municate with  Brigadier  General  J.  R.  Jones,  then  in 
command  of  that  division. 

It  was  then  getting  near  dark,  and  there  was  heavy 
skirmishing  between  Hood's  troops  further  to  the  right 

140 


BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

and  the  enemy,  while  shells  were  flying  pretty  thick.  I 
had  some  difficulty  in  finding  General  Jones  or  his  left, 
but  after  a  while  succeeded  in  doing  so,  and  then  posted 
my  brigade  on  the  left  of  Starke's  brigade,  constituting, 
as  I  was  informed,  Jones'  left,  which  was  formed  on  the 
west  of  the  pike  extending  into  the  woods. 

My  brigade  was  posted  on  a  small  road  running 
along  the  back  of  the  woods  past  Starke's  left,  and 
thrown  back  at  right  angles  to  his  line.  Lawton's  and 
Trimble's  brigades  had  been  halted  near  the  church,  but 
General  Hays,  under  orders  from  General  Jackson,  re- 
ported to  me  with  his  brigade,  and  it  was  posted  in  rear 
of  mine.  The  artillery  firing  and  the  skirmishing  except 
occasional  shots  between  the  pickets  was  put  to  an  end 
by  the  darkness,  and  about  ten  or  eleven  o'clock  Lawton's 
and  Trimble's  brigades  took  the  place,  on  the  front  line, 
of  Hood's  two  brigades,  which  were  withdrawn  to  the 
rear. 

Very  shortly  after  dawn  on  the  morning  of  the  17th, 
I  was  ordered  by  General  Jackson  in  person  to  move 
my  brigade  to  the  front  and  left,  along  a  route  pointed 
out  by  him,  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  some  pieces 
of  artillery  which  General  Stuart  had  in  position  to 
operate  against  the  enemy's  right,  and  Hays  was  ordered 
to  the  support  of  Lawton's  and  Trimble's  brigades. 

Moving  along  the  route  designated  by  General  Jack- 
son, I  discovered  a  body  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers  close 
on  my  right  pushing  forward  as  if  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  around  the  left  flank  of  our  line,  and  I  sent  some 
from  my  own  brigade  to  hold  them  in  check  until  I  had 
passed.  I  found  General  Stuart  about  a  mile  from  the 
position  I  had  moved  from,  with  several  pieces  of  artil- 
lery in  position  on  a  hill  between  the  left  of  Jackson's 
division  and  the  Potomac  which  were  engaging  some  of 
the  enemy's  batteries.  At  his  suggestion,  I  formed  my 
line  in  rear  of  this  hill  and  remained  there  for  about  an 
hour,  when  General  Stuart  discovered  a  body  of  the 
enemy's  infantry  gradually  making  its  way  between  us 

141 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

and  the  left  of  our  main  line,  and  determined  to  shift 
his  position  to  a  hill  further  to  the  right  and  a  little  in 
rear  of  the  direction  of  our  line. 

This  movement  was  executed  by  passing  over  a  route 
to  the  rear  of  the  one  I  had  taken  in  the  morning,  the 
latter  being  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  and,  while  I  was 
forming  my  brigade  in  a  strip  of  woods  running  back  in 
an  elbow  from  the  northern  extremity  of  the  body  of 
woods  in  which  the  Dunkard  Church  was  located,  Gen- 
eral Stuart  informed  me  that  General  Lawton  had  been 
wounded,  and  that  General  Jackson  had  sent  for  me  to 
return  with  my  brigade  and  take  command  of  the  division. 
Leaving  the  13th  Virginia  Regiment,  numbering  less  than 
100  men,  with  General  Stuart,  I  moved  the  rest  of  the 
brigade  across  the  angle  made  by  the  elbow  with  the 
main  body  of  the  woods,  through  a  field  to  the  position 
I  had  started  from  early  in  the  morning. 

The  enemy  had  by  this  time  pushed  skirmishers  into 
the  northern  or  further  end  of  this  woods,  and  was 
moving  up  a  very  heavy  force  to  turn  our  left  flank. 
When  I  got  near  my  starting  point,  I  found  Colonel 
Grigsby  of  the  27th  Virginia  Regiment,  and  Stafford 
of  the  9th  Louisiana  rallying  some  two  or  three  hundred 
men  of  Jackson's  division  at  the  point  at  which  Starke's 
brigade  had  been  in  position  the  night  before.  As  I 
came  up  I  halted  my  brigade  and  formed  line  in  rear  of 
Grigsby  and  Stafford,  and  they  at  once  advanced  against 
the  enemy's  skirmishers,  who  had  penetrated  some  dis- 
tance into  the  woods,  driving  them  back. 

My  brigade  was  advanced  in  their  rear  until  we  came 
up  with  Grigsby  and  Stafford,  where  I  formed  line  on 
the  crest  of  a  slight  ridge  running  through  the  woods 
and  directed  them  to  form  on  my  left.  Heavy  bodies  of 
the  enemy  were  now  discovered  in  the  field  beyond  the 
woods  moving  up  to  it.  I  left  my  brigade  under  the  com- 
mand of  Colonel  William  Smith,  of  the  49th  Virginia, 
with  directions  to  resist  the  enemy  at  all  hazards,  and 
rode  across  the  Hagerstown  pike  towards  the  right  to 

142 


BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

find  the  brigades  which  had  been  engaged  early  in  the 
morning,  but  I  found  that  they  had  been  very  badly  cut 
up  and  had  gone  to  the  rear,  Hood  having  taken  their 
place  with  his  two  brigades.  Jackson's  division  had 
also  been  very  badly  used,  and  the  whole  of  it,  except 
the  few  men  rallied  by  Grigsby  and  Stafford,  had  retired 
from  the  field. 

The  facts  were,  as  I  subsequently  ascertained  from 
the  brigade  commanders,  that,  at  light,  after  skirmish- 
ing along  the  front  of  Lawton's  and  Trimble's  brigades 
in  a  piece  of  woods  occupied  by  him,  the  enemy  had 
opened  a  very  heavy  enfilading  fire  from  the  batteries 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Antietam,  and  then  advanced 
very  heavy  columns  of  infantry  against  them,  at  the 
same  time  pouring  a  destructive  fire  of  canister  and 
shells  into  their  ranks  from  the  front.  Hays'  brigade 
had  gone  to  the  support  of  the  others  and  this  terrible 
assault  from  the  front  with  the  flank  fire  from  the  bat- 
teries across  the  Antietam,  had  been  withstood  for  some 
time  with  obstinacy,  until  General  Lawton  was  severely 
wounded;  Colonel  Douglas,  commanding  his  brigade, 
killed;  Colonel  Walker,  commanding  Trimble's  brigade, 
had  had  his  horse  killed  under  him,  and  himself  been 
disabled  by  a  contusion  from  a  piece  of  shell;  all  the 
regimental  commanders  in  the  three  brigades  except  two 
had  been  killed  or  wounded;  and  Lawton's  brigade  had 
sustained  a  loss  of  very  nearly  one-half,  Hays'  of  more 
than  one-half,  and  Trimble 's  of  more  than  a  third.  Gen- 
eral Hood  then  came  to  their  relief  and  the  shattered 
remnants  of  these  brigades,  their  ammunition  being 
exhausted,  retired  to  the  rear. 

Jackson's  division  in  the  meantime  had  been  very 
heavily  engaged,  and  had  shared  a  like  fate,  all  of  it 
that  was  left  being  what  I  found  Grigsby  and  Stafford 
rallying,  after  General  Jones  had  retired  from  the  field 
stunned  by  the  concussion  of  a  shell  bursting  near  him, 
and  General  Starke,  who  had  succeeded  him,  had  been 
killed. 

143 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

After  having  discovered  that  there  was  nothing  of 
the  division  left  on  the  field  for  me  to  command  except 
my  own  brigade,  and  seeing  that,  what  I  supposed  were 
Hood's  troops,  were  very  hard  pressed,  and  would  prob- 
ably have  to  retire  before  overpowering  numbers,  I 
sent  Major  J.  P.  Wilson,  a  volunteer  aide  who  had  been 
serving  with  Generals  Ewell  and  Lawton,  to  look  after 
the  brigades  which  had  gone  to  the  rear,  and  I  rode  to 
find  General  Jackson  to  inform  him  of  the  condition  of 
things  in  front,  as  well  as  to  let  him  know  that  a  very 
heavy  force  was  moving  on  the  west  of  the  pike  against 
our  flank  and  rear,  confronted  by  my  brigade  and  the 
small  force  under  Grigsby  and  Stafford  alone. 

I  found  the  General  on  a  hill  in  rear  of  the  Dunkard 
Church,  where  some  batteries  were  posted,  and  when  I 
informed  him  of  the  condition  of  things,  he  directed  me 
to  return  to  my  brigade  and  resist  the  enemy  until  he 
could  send  me  some  reinforcements,  which  he  promised 
to  do  as  soon  as  he  could  obtain  them.  I  found  my 
brigade  and  Grigsby  and  Stafford's  force  at  the  point  I 
had  left  them,  and  the  movement  of  the  enemy  in  that 
quarter  was  assuming  very  formidable  proportions.  The 
woods  in  which  the  Dunkard  Church  was  located,  ran 
along  the  Hagerstown  pike  on  the  west  side  for  about 
a  quarter  of  a  mile  until  it  came  to  a  field  on  the  same 
side,  about  150  or  200  yards  wide.  Then  the  woods  fell 
back  to  the  left  at  right  angles  with  the  road,  and  then 
ran  parallel  to  it  on  the  other  side  of  the  field  for  about 
a  quarter  of  a  mile  further,  and  then  turned  to  the  left 
and  ran  some  distance  to  the  rear,  making  the  elbow 
before  spoken  of. 

The  field  thus  located  between  the  pike  and  the  woods 
formed  a  plateau  higher  than  the  adjacent  woods,  and 
the  latter  sloped  towards  a  small  road  at  the  further 
edge,  which  extended  through  the  elbow,  and  was  the 
one  on  which  I  had  been  posted  the  night  before,  and 
along  which  I  had  moved  to  the  support  of  Stuart  in 
the  early  morning.    The  line  formed  by  my  brigade  was 

144 


MAJOR    SAMUEL    HALE 


BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

entirely  in  the  woods,  with  its  right  flank  opposite  the 
middle  of  the  field .  or  plateau,  and  its  direction  was  a 
right  angle  with  the  Hagerstown  pike.  In  the  woods 
were  limestone  ledges  which  formed  very  good  cover 
for  troops,  and  they  extended  back  towards  the  church. 
From  my  position  the  forces  of  both  armies  on  my  right, 
or  rather  in  my  rear,  as  I  now  faced,  were  entirely  con- 
cealed from  view,  as  the  plateau  on  my  right  was  con- 
siderably higher  than  the  ground  on  which  my  brigade 
was  formed. 

After  my  return,  the  enemy  continued  to  press  up 
towards  the  woods  in  which  I  was,  in  very  heavy  force, 
and  I  sent  Major  Hale,  my  Assistant  Adjutant  General, 
to  let  General  Jackson  know  that  the  danger  was  im- 
minent, and  he  returned  with  the  information  that  the 
promised  reinforcements  would  be  sent  immediately. 
Just  as  Major  Hale  returned,  a  battery  opened  on  the 
Hagerstown  pike  where  the  field,  or  plateau,  and  woods 
joined.  This  was  in  rear  of  my  right  flank  and  not  more 
than  two  hundred  yards  from  it.  I  had  been  anxiously 
looking  to  my  front  and  left  flank,  not  dreaming  that 
there  was  any  immediate  danger  to  my  right,  as  I  had 
seen  our  troops  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  pike,  at  an 
advanced  position,  engaged  with  the  enemy,  and  I  took 
it  for  granted  that  this  was  one  of  our  batteries  which 
had  opened  on  the  enemy,  but  Major  Hale's  attention 
was  called  to  it  by  a  soldier  in  our  rear,  who  was  stand- 
ing on  the  edge  of  the  plateau,  and  informed  him  that  it 
was  one  of  the  enemy's  batteries.  Major  Hale  examined 
it  himself  and  immediately  informed  me  of  the  fact,  but 
I  doubted  it  until  I  rode  to  the  edge  of  the  woods  and 
saw  for  myself  that  it  was  really  one  of  the  enemy's 
batteries,  firing  along  the  pike  in  the  direction  of  the 
Dunkard  Church. 

"While  I  was  looking  at  it  for  a  minute  to  satisfy  my- 
self, I  saw  a  heavy  column  of  infantry  move  up  by  its 
side.  This  column  consisted  of  Green's  division  of  Mans- 
field's corps.     The  fact  was  that  Hood,  after  resisting 

10  145 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

with  great  obstinacy  immensely  superior  numbers,  had 
fallen  back  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Dunkard  Church,  and 
the  enemy  had  advanced  to  this  position.  My  position 
now  was  very  critical,  as  there  was  nothing  between  Hood 
and  myself,  thus  leaving  an  interval  of  from  a  quarter  to 
a  half  mile  between  my  command  and  the  rest  of  the 
army.  Fortunately,  however,  my  troops  were  concealed 
from  this  body  of  the  enemy,  or  their  destruction  would 
have  been  inevitable,  as  it  was  nearly  between  them  and 
the  rest  of  the  army,  and  the  body,  moving  up  on  the  left 
in  my  front,  had  now  got  into  the  woods.  Hoping  the 
promised  reinforcements  would  arrive  in  time,  I  quietly 
threw  back  my  right  flank  under  cover  of  the  woods  to 
prevent  being  taken  in  the  rear. 

The  situation  was  most  critical  and  the  necessity 
most  pressing,  as  it  was  apparent  that  if  the  enemy 
got  possession  of  this  woods,  possession  of  the  hills  in 
their  rear  would  immediately  follow,  and  then,  across 
to  our  rear  on  the  road  leading  back  to  the  Potomac, 
would  have  been  easy.  In  fact  the  possession  of  these 
hills  would  have  enabled  him  to  take  our  whole  line  in 
reverse,  and  a  disastrous  defeat  must  have  followed.  I 
determined  to  hold  on  to  the  last  moment,  and  I  looked 
anxiously  to  the  rear  to  see  the  promised  reinforcements 
coming  up,  the  column  on  my  right  and  rear  and  that 
coming  up  in  front,  with  which  my  skirmishers  were 
already  engaged,  being  watched  with  the  most  intense 
interest. 

While  thus  looking  out,  I  saw  the  column  on  my 
right  and  rear  suddenly  move  into  the  woods  in  the 
direction  of  the  rear  of  the  church.  I  could  not  now 
remain  still,  and  I  at  once  put  my  brigade  in  motion  by 
the  right  flank  on  a  line  parallel  to  that  of  the  enemy's 
movements,  directing  Grigsby  and  Stafford  to  fall  back 
in  line,  skirmishing  with  the  enemy  coming  up  on  the 
left.  The  limestone  ledges  enabled  my  troops  to  keep 
out  of  view  of  the  enemy  moving  in  the  woods  on  my 
right,  and  they  moved  rapidly  so  as  to  get  up  with  them. 

146 


BATTLE  OF  SIIARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

On  passing  from  behind  one  of  these  long  ledges,  we 
discovered  the  enemy  moving  with  flankers  thrown  out 
on  his  right  flank.  I  directed  Colonel  William  Smith, 
whose  regiment,  the  49th  Virginia,  was  in  the  lead,  to 
open  fire  on  the  flankers,  which  was  promptly  done,  and 
they  ran  in  on  the  main  body,  which  was  taken  by  sur- 
prise by  the  fire  from  the  unexpected  quarter  from  which 
it  came. 

I  now  saw  two  or  three  brigades  moving  in  line  to 
our  assistance,  at  the  further  end  of  the  woods,  and 
my  brigade  was  faced  to  the  front  as  soon  as  the  whole 
of  it  had  passed  from  behind  the  ledge,  and  opened  fire 
on  the  enemy,  who  commenced  retiring  towards  the  pike 
in  great  confusion,  after  delivering  one  or  two  volleys. 
I  had  not  intended  to  move  to  the  front  in  pursuit,  as 
I  saw  a  brigade  of  the  troops  coming  to  our  assistance 
moving  into  the  woods  at  its  further  end  on  my  right  so 
as  to  come  upon  the  flank  of  mine  if  it  advanced,  and  I 
was,  therefore,  afraid  that  both  would  be  thrown  into 
confusion  by  the  collision,  and  that  mine  would  be  ex- 
posed to  the  fire  of  the  other.  Moreover  the  enemy's 
other  column  was  advancing  on  my  left,  held  in  check, 
however,  by  Grigsby  and  Stafford  with  their  men,  aided 
by  the  31st  Virginia  Regiment,  which  was  on  that  flank. 
The  brigade,  however,  without  awaiting  orders,  dashed 
after  the  retreating  column,  driving  it  entirely  out  of 
the  woods,  and,  notwithstanding  my  efforts  to  do  so,  I 
did  not  succeed  in  stopping  it  until  its  flank  and  rear 
had  become  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  column  on  the  left. 
I  then  saw  other  troops  of  the  enemy  moving  rapidly 
across  the  plateau  from  the  pike  to  the  column,  opposed 
to  Grigsby  and  Stafford,  and  I  ordered  my  brigade  to 
retire  a  short  distance,  so  as  to  change  front  and  advance 
against  the  enemy  in  that  direction.  Just  as  I  was  re- 
forming my  line  for  that  purpose,  Semmes'  brigade,  and 
two  regiments  of  Barksdale's  brigade,  of  McLaws'  divi- 
sion, and  Anderson's  brigade  of  D.  R.  Jones'  division 
came  up,  and  the  whole,  including  Grigsby 's  and  Staf- 

147 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

ford's  small  command,  advanced  and  swept  the  enemy 
from  the  woods  into  the  fields,  and  the  enemy  retreated  in 
great  disorder  to  another  body  of  woods  beyond  that 
from  which  he  had  been  thus  driven.  As  soon  as  the 
enemy  had  been  thus  repulsed,  I  recalled  my  regiments 
and  caused  them  to  be  re-formed,  when  they  were  again 
posted  in  their  former  position  on  the  small  ridge  before 
mentioned.  As  soon  as  his  infantry  had  retired  the 
enemy  opened  a  tremendous  fire  with  canister  and  shell 
upon  the  woods  occupied  by  us,  which  was  continued  for 
some  time. 

The  troops  which  had  been  opposed  to  us  in  this  latter 
affair  consisted  of  Sedgwick's  division  of  Sumner's 
corps,  which  had  not  been  previously  engaged,  supported 
by  Mansfield's  corps,  under  Williams,  and  which  moved 
up  for  a  fresh  attack  on  our  extreme  left.  During  his 
advance,  the  enemy's  columns  had  received  a  galling  fire 
from  the  guns  under  General  Stuart  on  a  hill  in  the  rear 
of  our  left  which  contributed  very  materially  to  the  re- 
pulse, and  General  Stuart  pursued  the  retreating  force 
on  its  flank  for  some  distance,  with  his  pieces  of  artillery 
and  the  remnant  of  the  13th  Virginia  Regiment  under 
Captain  Winston.* 

*  McClellan  says  in  reference  to  this  affair  on  our  left,  his  right: 
"  Entering  the  woods  on  the  west  of  the  turnpike,  and  driving  the 
enemy  before  them,  the  first  line  was  met  by  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry 
and  shell  from  the  enemy's  breastworks  and  the  batteries  on  the  hill, 
commanding  the  exit  from  the  woods.  Meantime  a  heavy  column  of 
the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  crowding  back  the  troops  of  General 
Green's  division,  and  appeared  in  rear  of  the  left  of  Sedgwick's  divi- 
sion. By  command  of  General  Sumner,  General  Howard  was  forced 
the  third  time  to  the  rear,  preparatory  to  a  change  of  front,  to  meet 
the  column  advancing  on  the  left,  but  this  line,  now  suffering  from  a 
destructive  fire  both  in  front  and  on  its  left,  which  it  was  unable  to 
return,  gave  way  towards  the  right  and  rear  in  considerable  confusion, 
and  was  soon  followed  by  the  first  and  second  lines." 

There  was  nothing  in  the  shape  of  breastworks  in  the  woods  or 
in  its  rear  at  that  time,  and  the  fight  on  our  part  was  a  stand  up  one 
altogether.  The  slight  woi'ks,  made  mostly  of  rails,  which  McClellan 
saw  after  the  battle,  were  made  on  the  18th  when  we  were  expecting 
a  renewal  of  the  attack. 

148 


BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

My  brigade  at  that  time  numbered  less  than  1,000 
officers  and  men  present,  and  Grigsby  and  Stafford  had 
between  two  and  three  hundred;  yet  with  this  small 
force  we  confronted,  for  a  long  time,  Sumner's  formid- 
able column,  and  held  it  in  check  until  reinforcements 
arrived  to  our  assistance.  Had  we  retired  from  the  fear 
of  being  flanked  or  cut  off,  the  enemy  must  have  obtained 
possession  of  the  woods,  where  we  were,  and,  as  a  neces- 
sary consequence,  of  the  hills  in  their  rear,  which  would 
have  resulted  in  a  decisive  defeat  to  us,  and  a  probable 
destruction  of  our  army. 

While  these  operations  on  our  extreme  left  were 
going  on,  all  of  which  transpired  in  the  forenoon,  two 
other  divisions  of  Sumner's  corps,  French's  and  Rich- 
ardson's, had  been  moving  against  our  centre  occupied 
by  General  D.  H.  Hill,  and  were  forcing  it  back  after 
a  hard  struggle,  just  about  the  time  I  was  contending 
with  the  two  columns  of  the  enemy  in  the  woods.  A 
portion  of  this  force  moving  against  Hood  near  the 
Dunkard  Church,  was  met  and  repulsed  by  Kershaw's 
and  Cobb's  brigades  of  McLaws'  division,  the  portion  of 
Barksdale's  brigade  which  had  not  come  to  my  assist- 
ance, and  Ransom's  brigade  of  Walker's  division,  at  the 
same  time  that  the  force  opposed  to  me  was  repulsed. 

Not  long  after  my  brigade  had  been  re-formed  and 
placed  in  its  former  position,  Colonel  Hodges,  in  com- 
mand of  Armistead's  brigade  of  Anderson's  division, 
came  up  and  took  the  place  of  my  brigade,  which  latter 
was  then  posted  along  the  edge  of  the  plateau  on  Hodges' 
right,  facing  towards  the  Hagerstown  pike.  Subse- 
quently General  McLaws  posted  Barksdale's  brigade  on 
my  right,  and  Kershaw's  and  Cobb's  brigades  on  the 
left  of  Hodges'.  My  line  as  established  along  the  edge 
of  the  woods  and  plateau  after  the  repulse  of  the  enemy, 
extended  beyond  where  the  left  of  Jackson's  division 
rested  at  daylight,  and  embraced  inside  of  it  all  of  our 
killed  and  wounded,  and  nearly  the  whole  of  that  of  the 
enemy,  in  this  last  affair  on  our  left. 

149 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Major  Wilson  had  by  this  time  returned  with  the 
information  that  he  had  been  able  to  find  only  a  part  of 
Hays '  brigade,  which  was  under  General  Hays,  who  was 
with  General  Hood,  and  that  it  was  in  no  condition  to 
render  any  service.  He  further  stated  that  the  remnants 
of  the  other  brigades  had  gone  to  the  rear  for  the  pur- 
pose of  re-forming  and  gathering  up  stragglers,  but  that 
he  had  been  unable  to  find  them. 

The  enemy  continued  to  shell  the  woods  in  which  we 
were  for  some  time,  doing,  however,  little  or  no  damage, 
as  we  were  under  cover,  and  his  shot  and  shells  went 
over  our  heads.  Some  of  our  batteries,  which  had  been 
brought  up  to  the  hills  in  our  rear,  opened  fire  on  the 
woods  where  we  were,  on  two  occasions,  under  the  im- 
pression that  they  were  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  I 
had  to  send  and  have  it  stopped.  Some  pieces  of  our 
artillery  were  moved  into  the  angle  of  the  plateau  on 
my  right  and  opened  on  the  enemy,  but  were  soon  com- 
pelled to  retire  by  the  superior  metal  and  number  of 
guns  opposed  to  them. 

We  remained  in  position  during  the  rest  of  the  day, 
as  did  the  troops  on  my  left,  and  those  immediately 
on  my  right.  The  enemy  made  no  further  attack  on 
us  on  this  part  of  the  line,  but  there  were  several  demon- 
strations as  if  for  an  attack,  and  from  the  top  of  a  tree 
on  the  edge  of  the  woods  a  lookout  reported  three  lines 
of  battle  beyond  the  pike  with  a  line  of  skirmishers  ex- 
tending nearly  up  to  the  pike.  There  were,  however, 
some  attempts  against  our  line  further  to  the  right,  and 
late  in  the  afternoon  a  fierce  attack  was  made  on  our 
extreme  right  by  Burnside's  corps,  which  drove  some 
of  our  troops  from  the  bridge  across  the  Antietam  on 
that  flank,  and  was  forcing  back  our  right,  when  some  of 
A.  P.  Hill's  brigades,  which  were  just  arriving  from 
Harper's  Ferry,  went  to  the  assistance  of  the  troops 
engaged  on  that  flank,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  back  in 
considerable  confusion. 

This  affair,  which  terminated  just  before  dark,  closed 
the  fighting  on  the  16th,  and  after  a  most  protracted  and 

150 


BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

desperate  struggle,  our  centre  had  been  forced  back  to 
some  extent,  but  the  positions  on  our  flanks  were  main- 
tained. 

The  attack  on  Jackson's  command  in  the  early  morn- 
ing had  been  made  by  Hooker's  and  Mansfield's  corps, 
numbering,  according  to  McClellan's  statement,  24,982 
men  present  and  fit  for  duty,  and  this  force  had  been 
resisted  by  Jackson's  division  and  the  three  brigades  of 
Ewell's,  and  subsequently  by  Hood's  two  brigades,  aided 
by  those  of  D.  H.  Hill's  brigades  sent  to  the  assistance 
of  Hood,  until  Sumner's  corps,  numbering  18,813  men, 
came  up  about  nine  a.m.  to  the  assistance  of  Hooker's 
and  Mansfield's.  Hood  was  then  compelled  to  retire  to 
the  woods  near  the  Dunkard  Church,  and  Sumner,  in 
command  now  of  the  entire  right  wing  of  the  enemy, 
prepared  for  another  attack  with  his  corps  supported 
by  Hooker's  and  Mansfield's.  This  attack  was  made 
on  our  left  by  Sedgwick's  division  supported  by  Mans- 
field's corps,  and  on  the  centre  by  French's  and  Richard- 
son's divisions  supported  by  Hooker's  corps,  and  was 
repulsed  as  has  been  stated,  Hill,  however,  losing  ground 
in  the  centre  to  some  extent.  Franklin's  corps  number- 
ing 12,300  men  was  then  carried  to  the  support  of  Sum- 
ner, arriving  a  little  after  twelve  mv  and  a  new  attack 
on  the  woods  in  which  our  left  rested  was  projected,  but 
was  arrested  by  General  Sumner's  orders. 

Another  attack,  however,  was  made  on  Hill's  posi- 
tion in  the  centre,  which  met  with  some  success  by  reason 
of  the  removal  of  one  of  his  brigades,  by  mistake,  from 
its  position,  but  the  enemy's  progress  was  arrested  by 
Walker's  brigades  and  a  part  of  Anderson's  division, 
which  had  arrived  to  his  support.  The  enemy  had  then 
made  the  attack  with  Burnside's  corps,  numbering 
13,819,  on  Longstreet's  right,  on  the  Antietam,  held  by 
D.  R.  Jones'  division,  which  was  repulsed  on  the  arrival 
of  Hill's  brigades  as  stated.  The  above  is  a  condensed 
account  of  the  main  features  of  this  battle  taken  from 
the  reports  of  both  sides,  and  the  figures  in  regard  to  the 
strength  of  McClellan's  corps  are  taken  from  his  own 

151 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

report.     Porter's  corps  of  his  army,  numbering  12,930, 
was  held  in  reserve.* 

Late  in  the  afternoon,  after  it  had  become  apparent 
that  no  further  attack  on  our  left  was  to  be  made,  I  rode 
to  the  rear  in  search  of  the  missing  brigades  and  found 
about  one  hundred  men  of  Lawton's  brigade  which  had 
been  collected  by  Major  Lowe,  the  ranking  officer  of  the 
brigade  left,  and  I  had  them  moved  up  to  where  my 
own  brigade  was,  and  placed  on  its  right.  We  lay  on 
our  'arms  all  night,  and  about  light  on  the  morning  of 
the  18th,  General  Hays  brought  up  about  ninety  men  of 
his  brigade,  which  were  posted  on  my  left.  During  the 
morning  Captain  Feagins,  the  senior  officer  left  of 
Trimble 's  brigade,  brought  up  about  two  hundred  of  that 
brigade,  and  they  were  posted  in  my  rear. 

The  enemy  remained  in  our  front  during  the  whole 
day  without  making  any  show  of  an  attack  on  our  left, 
but  there  was  some  firing  between  the  skirmish  lines 
farther  to  right.  The  enemy  in  my  immediate  front 
showed  a  great  anxiety  to  get  possession  of  his  dead 
and  wounded  on  that  part  of  the  ground,  and  several 
flags  of  truce  approached  us,  but,  I  believe,  without 
authority  from  the  proper  source.  However,  a  sort  of 
informal  truce  prevailed  for  a  time,  and  some  of  the 
dead  and  very  badly  wounded  of  the  enemy  and  of  that 
part  of  our  army  which  had  been  engaged  first  on  the 
morning  of  the  17th,  were  exchanged  even  while  the 
skirmishers  were  firing  at  each  other  on  the  right.  This 
was  finally  stopped  and  the  enemy  informed  that  no  flag 
of  truce  could  be  recognized  unless  it  came  from  the 
headquarters  of  his  army.  We  remained  in  position  on 
the  18th  during  the  whole  day,  without  any  serious 
demonstration  by  the  enemy  on  any  part  of  our  line,  and 
after  dark  retired  for   the   purpose   of  recrossing   the 

*  Walker's  division  of  two  brigades  (his  own  and  Ransom's)  had 
reached  the  vicinity  of  the  battlefield  on  the  16th  and  McLaws'  divi- 
sion, and  Anderson's,  including  the  three  brigades  of  Longstreet's  with 
him,  did  not  get  np  until  after  the  battle  had  begun. 

152 


BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

Potomac.  I  held  my  position  until  my  skirmishers  in 
front  were  relieved  by  a  portion  of  Fitz.  Lee's  cavalry 
and  then  retired  in  pursuance  of  orders  previously  re- 
ceived from  General  Jackson,  carrying  with  me  Armi- 
stead's  brigade  under  Colonel  Hodges,  which  had  re- 
ceived no  orders  from  its  division  commander,  and  bring- 
ing up,  I  believe,  the  rear  of  the  infantry  of  our  entire 
army.  We  found  a  large  number  of  wagons  and  troops 
massed  at  Boteler's  Ford,  and  the  division  now  com- 
manded by  me  did  not  cross  until  after  sunrise.  After 
getting  over  the  river,  the  division  was  formed  in  line 
of  battle  on  the  Virginia  side,  under  direction  of  General 
Longstreet,  and  remained  in  position  several  hours,  until 
the  enemy  appeared  on  the  other  bank  and  opened  on  us 
with  artillery. 

I  was  subsequently  ordered  to  leave  Lawton's  brigade, 
now  increased  to  about  four  hundred  men  under  Colonel 
Lamar  of  the  61st  Georgia  Regiment  (who  had  returned 
after  the  battle  of  the  17th),  at  Boteler's  Ford,  under 
the  command  of  Brigadier  General  Pendleton,  who  was 
entrusted  with  the  defence  of  the  crossing,  and  I  was 
ordered  to  move  with  the  rest  of  the  division  towards 
Martinsburg. 

Our  whole  army  with  its  trains  had  been  safely  re- 
crossed  and  this  terminated  the  operations  properly  con- 
nected with  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg. 

In  that  battle,  Ewell's  division  had  lost  in  killed  119, 
in  wounded  1,115,  and  in  missing  38,  being  an  aggregate 
loss  of  1,352  out  of  less  than  3,400  men  and  officers  carried 
into  action.  The  loss  in  my  own  brigade  was  in  killed  18, 
and  in  wounded  156,  and  among  the  latter  were  Colonel 
Smith  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Gibson  of  the  49th  Vir- 
ginia Regiment,  both  severely,  and  the  former  receiving 
three  distinct  wounds  before  the  close  of  the  fight,  in 
which  he  was  engaged.  The  loss  in  our  whole  army  was 
heavy,  but  not  so  great  as  the  estimate  put  upon  it  by 
the  enemy. 

There  has  been  very  great  misapprehension,  both  on 

153 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  part  of  the  enemy  and  many  Confederates,  not 
familiar  with  the  facts,  about  the  strength  of  General 
Lee's  army  at  this  battle.  The  whole  of  the  troops  then 
constituting  that  army  had  belonged  to  the  army  which 
opposed  McClellan  in  the  battles  around  Richmond,  ex- 
cept Evans'  and  Drayton's  brigades,  and  such  absentees 
as  had  returned,  and  there  had  been  troops  then  belong- 
ing to  the  army,  which  had  not  left  Richmond,  exceeding 
the  number  in  the  said  two  brigades.  There  had  been 
heavy  losses  in  the  battles  around  Richmond;  and  the 
subsequent  losses  at  Cedar  Run,  on  the  Rappahannock, 
at  Manassas  and  in  the  vicinity,  at  Maryland  Heights 
and  in  Pleasant  Valley — where  McLaws  had  been 
severely  engaged, — and  at  South  Mountain,  had  very 
materially  weakened  the  strength  of  the  army.  Besides 
all  this,  since  crossing  the  Rappahannock  we  had  been 
without  regular  supplies  of  food,  and  had  literally  been 
living  from  hand  to  mouth.  Our  troops  were  badly 
shod  and  many  of  them  became  barefooted,  and  they  were 
but  indifferently  clothed  and  without  protection  against 
the  weather.  Many  of  them  had  become  exhausted  from 
the  fatigues  of  the  campaign,  and  the  long  and  rapid 
marches  which  they  had  made  while  living  on  short 
rations  and  a  weakening  diet — and  many  were  foot-sore 
from  want  of  shoes;  so  that  the  straggling  from  these 
causes,  independent  of  that  incident  to  all  armies,  had 
been  frightful  before  we  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  had 
continued  up  to  the  time  of  the  battle. 

Some  idea  of  the  diminution  from  these  various 
causes  may  be  found  from  the  following  facts:  That 
Christian  gentleman,  and  brave,  accomplished  soldier, 
General  D.  H.  Hill,  states  that  his  division,  which  num- 
bered ten  thousand  at  the  beginning  of  the  battles  around 
Richmond,  had  been  reduced  to  less  than  five  thousand 
which  he  had  at  the  battle  of  South  Mountain.  Yet  he 
had  reached  the  army  after  all  the  fighting  about  Manas- 
sas, and  he  states  that  on  the  morning  of  the  17th  of 
September  he  had  but  three  thousand  infantry.    Ewell's 

154 


BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

division,  with  Lawton's  brigade,  which  was  attached  to 
it  after  the  battle  of  Cedar  Run,  must  have  numbered,  at 
the  time  they  reached  McClellan's  right,  north  of  the 
Chickahominy,  eight  or  ten  thousand,  as  Lawton's 
brigade  was  then  a  very  large  one,  which  had  never  been 
in  action.  Yet  that  division  numbered  less  than  three 
thousand  four  hundred  on  the  morning  of  the  17th. 

General  Lee  says  in  his  report:  "This  great  battle 
was  fought  by  less  than  forty  thousand  men  on  our 
side,  all  of  whom  had  undergone  the  greatest  labors  and 
hardships  in  the  field  and  on  the  march."  This  certainly 
covered  our  entire  force  of  all  descriptions,  and  I  am 
satisfied  that  he  might  have  safely  stated  it  at  less  than 
thirty  thousand.  There  were  forty  brigades  of  infantry 
in  all  in  the  army,  one  of  which,  Thomas'  of  A.  P.  Hill's 
division,  did  not  cross  the  Potomac  from  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  the  nine  brigades  of  Ewell's  and  D.  H.  Hill's 
divisions,  numbering  in  the  aggregate  less  than  6,400 
officers  and  men,  were  fully  average  ones. 

General  D.  R.  Jones  states  that  his  command,  con- 
sisting of  his  division  of  three  brigades  and  three  of 
Longstreet's,  in  all  six  brigades,  numbering  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  17th,  2,430;  General  J.  R.  Jones  states  that 
Jackson's  division  of  four  brigades  numbered  less  than 
1,600 ;  General  McLaws  states  that  he  carried  into  action 
in  his  four  brigades,  2,893;  General  A.  P.  Hill  states 
that  his  three  brigades  actually  numbered  less  than 
2,000;  D.  H.  Hill's  five  brigades  numbered  3,000;  and 
Ewell's  four  brigades  numbered  less  than  3,400;  which 
gives  15,323  in  these  twenty-six  brigades,  leaving  thirteen 
other  brigades  on  the  field  whose  strength  is  not  stated, 
to-wit:  the  six  brigades  of  his  own  division  and  Long- 
street's  brought  up  by  General  Anderson;  A.  P.  Hill's 
other  two  brigades;  Hood's  two  brigades,  both  very 
small;  Walker's  two  brigades;  and  Evans'  brigade. 
General  Anderson  was  wounded,  and  there  is  no  report 
from  his  division  or  any  of  his  brigades,  but  General 
D.  H.  Hill  says  that  Anderson  came  to  his  support,  which 

155 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

was  before  Anderson's  division  became  engaged,  with 
some  three  or  four  hundred  men,  and  that  force  con- 
sisted of  five  brigades,  Armistead's  having  gone  to  the 
left.  Averaging  the  thirteen  brigades  from  which  no 
estimate  was  given  with  the  others  and  it  would  give  a 
strength  of  7,670,  which  would  make  our  whole  infantry 
force  on  the  field,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the 
battle,  twenty-three  thousand  at  the  outside.  Our  cavalry 
was  not  engaged,  as  it  had  merely  watched  the  flanks, 
but  six  thousand  would  fully  cover  the  whole  of  the 
cavalry  and  artillery  which  we  had  on  that  side  of  the 
river. 

McClellan  states  his  whole  force  in  action  at  87,164 
men  present  and  fit  for  duty,  and  he  estimates  General 
Lee's  at  97,445.  As  this  estimate  is  a  very  remarkable 
one  and  contains  some  very  amusing  features,  it  is  given 
here  in  his  own  language.    He  says : 

"  An  estimate  of  the  forces  under  the  Confederate  General  Lee, 
made  up  by  direction  of  General  Banks  from  information  obtained  by 
the  examination  of  prisoners,  deserters,  spies,  etc.,  previous  to  the  battle 
of  Antietam,  is  as  follows: 

General  T.  J.  Jackson's  corps 24,778  men. 

"        James  Longstreet's   corps 23,342  " 

"        D.  H.  Hill's  2nd  division   15,525  " 

"        J.  E.  B.  Stuart's  cavalry 6,400  " 

Ransom's  and  Jenkins'  brigades 3,000  " 

Forty-six  regiments  not  included  in  above 18,400  " 

Artillery,  estimated  at  400  guns 6,000  " 

Total    97,445      " 

It  is  to  be  presumed  that  this  estimate  was  made  by 
Banks  when  General  Jackson  was  figuring  around 
Pope's  rear,  as  he  did  not  have  a  command  in  McClellan 's 
army,  and  it  is  well  known  that  Banks  always  saw  things 
with  very  largely  magnifying  glasses  when  "Stonewall" 
Jackson  was  about. 

That  some  of  the  affrighted  civilians  who  magnified 

156 


BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

one  small  company  of  cavalry  at  the  first  battle  of  Manas- 
sas, called  the  Black  Horse  Cavalry,  into  20,000,  might 
be  misled  by  this  estimate  of  McClellan's,  or  Banks', 
might  well  be  believed,  but  that  the  Major  General  com- 
manding the  "Grand  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  should 
have  so  estimated  the  strength  of  General  Lee's  army  at 
Sharpsburg,  is  perfectly  amazing. 

Who  commanded  the  "  forty-six  regiments  not  in- 
cluded in  above,"  or  where  were  the  400  guns  to  come 
from? 

This  estimate  of  the  relative  strength  of  the  two 
armies  gives  rise  to  some  very  curious  reflections : 

It  must  be  recollected  that  Bragg  and  Kirby  Smith 
were  at  this  time  in  Kentucky,  moving  north,  and  if  the 
newly  established  Government  at  Richmond  had  been 
able  to  put  in  the  field  and  send  into  Maryland  from 
the  comparatively  small  population  of  the  Confederacy 
an  army  of  nearly  100,000  men  with  400  pieces  of  artil- 
lery, it  showed  a  wonderful  energy  on  the  part  of  that 
government;  while,  the  fact  that  the  powerful  Govern- 
ment at  Washington,  with  its  immense  resources  and  its 
very  large  population  to  draw  from,  after  a  call  for 
300,000  more  men,  and  after  taking  everything  in  the  way 
of  troops  from  the  Ohio  to  the  Atlantic,  had  been  able 
to  bring  into  the  field,  for  the  defence  of  the  National 
Capital  and  to  oppose  the  large  invading  army  of 
"rebels,"  only  a  force  numbering  less  than  90,000  men, 
displayed  a  weakness  not  at  all  flattering  to  the  energy 
of  the  head  of  the  War  Department  at  Washington,  or 
to  the  wisdom  of  the  occupant  of  the  White  House,  and 
a  want  of  "patriotism"  by  no  means  complimentary  to 
the  people  of  the  North. 

McClellan  had  stated  that  the  troops  in  and  about 
Washington  and  on  the  Maryland  shore  of  the  Potomac 
above  and  below,  including  those  in  Maryland  and 
Delaware,  amounted,  on  the  1st  of  March,  1862,  to  193,142 
present  for  duty  and  an  aggregate  present  and  absent 
of  221,987.     This  did  not  include  the  13,000  brought  by 

157 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Burnside  from  North.  Carolina,  nor  the  troops  brought 
by  Cox  from  the  Kanawha  Valley,  nor,  is  it  presumed, 
the  forces  of  Fremont  under  Sigel,  a  large  part  of  which 
were  probably  brought  from  Missouri;  and  there  had 
since  been  at  least  one  call,  if  not  more,  for  an  additional 
levy  of  300,000  men.  Now  the  question  very  naturally 
arises,  as  to  what  had  become  of  all  that  immense  force, 
with  the  reinforcements  and  recruits,  which  had  dwindled 
down  to  87,164  men  on  the  morning  of  the  17th  of  Sep- 
tember, 1862. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  account  previously  given 
that  on  the  15th  and  in  the  early  part  of  the  day  of  the 
16th,  McClellan's  large  army  was  confronted  by  a  very 
small  force  under  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill.  Jackson 
with  two  divisions  numbering  less  than  5,000  men,  and 
Walker,  with  his  two  brigades  arrived  on  the  16th,  and 
it  was  upon  the  force  consisting  of  these  reinforcements 
and  D.  H.  Hill's  and  Longstreet 's  troops,  including  in 
the  latter  Hood's  two  brigades,  and  Evans'  brigade,  that 
McClellan  's  army  had  been  hurled  on  the  morning  of  the 
17th.  McLaws  with  his  own  and  Anderson's  brigades, 
ten  in  all,  did  not  arrive  until  the  action  had  been 
progressing  for  some  hours.  McLaws  arrived  at  sun- 
rise, and  A.  P.  Hill,  with  his  five  brigades,  did  not  come 
up  until  late  in  the  afternoon. 

The  24,982  men  under  Hooker  and  Mansfield  had 
attacked  Jackson's  division  and  Lawton's,  Trimble's  and 
Hays'  brigades  of  Ewell's  division,  numbering  in  all 
4,000  men.  When  they  were  compelled  to  retire,  Hood 
with  his  two  brigades  supported  by  Ripley's,  Colquit's 
and  Garland's  and  D.  H.  Hill's  division  had  withstood 
the  enemy  until  Sumner  arrived  with  his  18,813  men, 
and  then  Hood  was  also  compelled  to  retire  to  the  Dunk- 
ard  Church.  Sumner  then  with  his  corps  and  what  was 
left  of  the  other  two,  attacked  my  brigade  of  less  than 
1,000  men,  a  remnant  of  about  two  or  three  hundred  of 
Jackson's  division,  and  what  was  left  of  D.  H.  Hill's 
and  Hood's  divisions,  when  McLaws  and  Walker  with 

158 


BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

their  six  brigades  came  to  our  assistance  immediately 
after  the  arrival  of  McLaws  upon  the  field.  Sumner  was 
repulsed  and  then  Franklin  with  his  12,300  arrived  to 
his  support,  and  the  attack  was  renewed  on  Hill  in  the 
centre,  when  Anderson  with  three  or  four  hundred  men 
and  one  brigade  of  Walker's  came  to  his  assistance. 
This  force  of  56,095  men  was  brought  against  a  force 
which  with  all  its  reinforcements,  from  first  to  last, 
amounted  to  less  than  18,000  men.  How  it  had  been 
served  will  appear  from  the  following  extract  from  Mc- 
Clellan's  report.  He  says:  "One  division  of  Sumner's 
corps,  and  all  of  Hooker's  corps,  on  the  right,  had,  after 
fighting  most  valiantly  for  several  hours,  been  over- 
powered by  numbers,  driven  back  in  great  disorder,  and 
much  scattered;  so  that  they  were  for  the  time  some- 
what demoralized.  In  Hooker's  corps,  according  to  the 
return  made  by  General  Meade,  commanding,  there  were 
but  6,729  men  present  on  the  18th,  whereas,  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  22nd,  there  were  13,093  present  for  duty  in 
the  same  corps,  showing  that  previous  to  and  during  the 
battle  6,364  men  were  separated  from  their  command." 

McClellan  was  not  able  to  renew  the  attack  on  the 
18th,  and,  according  to  his  own  showing,  had  to  wait  for 
reinforcements  before  doing  so;  yet  he  claims  a  great 
victory  at  Antietam,  alleging  that  he  had  accomplished 
the  object  of  the  campaign,  to-wit:  "to  preserve  the 
National  Capital  and  Baltimore,  to  protect  Pennsylvania 
from  invasion,  and  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  Maryland." 
This  was  a  singular  claim  on  the  part  of  the  General  who, 
scarce  three  months  before,  had  boastingly  stated  that 
the  advance  of  his  army  was  within  five  miles  of  the 
Confederate  Capital. 

The  truth  is  that  the  substantial  victory  was  with  us, 
and  if  our  army  had  been  in  reach  of  reinforcements,  it 
would  have  been  a  decisive  one;  but  we  were  more  than 
200  miles  from  the  point  from  which  supplies  of  am- 
munition were  to  be  obtained,  and  any  reinforcements 
which  could  have  been  spared  to  us  were  much  further 

159 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

off,  while  large  reinforcements  were  marching  to  Mc- 
Clellan's  aid.    We  had,  therefore,  to  recross  the  Potomac. 

The  question  had  been  mooted  as  to  the  propriety  of 
the  campaign  into  Maryland,  and  in  regard  thereto  I  will 
say:  General  Lee,  on  assuming  command  of  the  army 
at  Richmond,  had  found  that  city,  the  seat  of  the  Con- 
federate Government,  beleaguered  by  a  vast  army,  while 
all  Northern  Virginia,  including  the  best  part  of  the 
beautiful  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  was  held  by  the 
enemy.  With  a  herculean  effort,  he  had  broken  through 
the  cordon  surrounding  his  army,  and  with  inferior 
numbers  fallen  upon  the  beleaguering  enemy,  and  sent  it 
cowering  to  the  banks  of  the  lower  James.  He  had  then 
moved  north,  and,  after  a  series  of  hard  fought  battles, 
had  hurled  the  shattered  remains  of  the  army  that  had 
been  marauding  through  Northern  Virginia,  with  all  the 
reinforcements  sent  from  the  lately  besieging  army,  into 
the  fortifications  around  Washington.  With  the  dimin- 
ished columns  of  the  army  with  which  he  accomplished 
all  this,  he  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  captured  an  impor- 
tant stronghold  defended  by  a  strong  force,  securing  a 
large  amount  of  artillery,  small  arms,  and  stores  of  all 
kinds,  and  had  fought  a  great  battle  with  the  newly 
reorganized  and  heavily  reinforced  and  recruited  army 
of  the  enemy,  which  later  was  so  badly  crippled  that  it 
was  not  able  to  resume  the  offensive  for  near  two  months. 

He  now  stood  defiantly  on  the  southern  banks  of  the 
Potomac,  the  extreme  northern  limit  of  the  Confederacy, 
and  the  result  of  all  these  operations,  of  which  the  march 
into  Maryland  was  an  important  part,  had  been  that  not 
only  the  Confederate  Capital  had  been  relieved  from  the 
presence  of  the  besieging  army,  a  danger  to  which  it  was 
not  subjected  again  for  two  years;  but  the  enemy'3 
Capital  had  been  threatened,  his  territory  invaded,  and 
the  base  of  operations  for  a  new  movement  on  Richmond 
had  been  transferred  to  the  north  banks  of  the  Potomac 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  from  which  there  was  an  overland 
route  of  more  than  two  hundred  miles.    When  that  move- 

160 


BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG  OR  ANTIETAM 

ment  did  take  place,  General  Lee  was  in  a  position  to 
interpose  his  army,  and  inflict  a  new  defeat  on  the  enemy, 
as  was  verified  by  subsequent  events. 

The  following  extracts  from  McClellan's  report  will 
give  some  idea  of  the  results  obtained.  Speaking,  as  of 
the  morning  of  the  18th,  he  says : 

"  At  that  moment — Virginia  lost,  Washington  menaced,  Maryland 
invaded — the  national  cause  could  afford  no  risks  of  defeat.  Our 
battle  lost,  and  almost  all  would  have  been  lost."  And  he  subsequently 
says: 

"  The  movement  from  Washington  into  Maryland,  which  cul- 
minated in  the  battles  of  South  Mountain  and  Antietam,  was  not  a 
part  of  an  offensive  campaign,  with  the  object  of  the  invasion  of  the 
enemy's  territory,  and  an  attack  on  his  capital,  but  was  defensive  in 
its  purposes,  although  offensive  in  its  character,  and  would  be  tech- 
nically called  a  '  defensive-offensive  '  campaign." 

"  It  was  undertaken  at  a  time;  when  our  army  had  experienced 
severe  defeats,  and  its  object  was  to  preserve  the  national  capital  and 
Baltimore,  to  protect  Pennsylvania,  and  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of 
Maryland.  These  purposes  were  fully  and  finally  accomplished  by 
the  battle  of  Antietam,  which  brought  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  into 
what  might  be  termed  an  accidental  position  on  the  upper  Potomac."* 

It  was  a  great  deal  gained  to  force  the  enemy  into  a 
"defensive-offensive"  campaign  in  his  own  territory 
and  place  the  "Army  of  the  Potomac"  in  that  accidental 
position,  though  we  did  fail  in  arousing  Maryland,  or 
getting  any  reinforcements  from  that  State. 

*  In  a  telegram  to  Halleck,  dated  September  22nd  (Part  II, 
Conduct  of  the  War,  p.  495),  McClellan  said:  "When  I  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  this  army  in  Washington,  it  was  suffering  under 
the  disheartening  influence  of  defeat.  It  had  been  greatly  reduced 
by  casualties  in  General  Pope's  campaign,  and  its  efficiency  had  been 
much  impaired.  The  sanguinary  battles  of  South  Mountain  and  An- 
tietam Creek  had  resulted  in  a  loss  to  us  of  ten  general  officers  and 
many  regimental  and  company  officers,  besides  a  large  number  of 
enlisted  men.  The  army  corps  had  been  badly  cut  up  and  scattered 
by  the  overwhelming  numbers  brought  against  them  in  the  battle  of 
the  17th  instant,  and  the  entire  army  had  been  greatly  exhausted  by 
unavoidable  overwork,  and  want  of  sleep  and  rest."  (See  also  his 
testimony  same  volume,  pages  439,  440  and  441.) 
11  161 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

Preparations  about  Fredericksburg. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  19th,  after  leaving  Lawton's 
brigade  at  Boteler's  Ford,  I  marched  with  the  three 
other  brigades  on  the  road  towards  Martinsburg,  about 
six  miles  from  Shepherdstown,  and  bivouacked. 

During  the  night  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  Potomac  and  capturing  four  of  General  Pendleton's 
guns  near  Shepherdstown,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
20th  I  was  ordered  to  move  back  to  Boteler's  Ford.  On 
arriving  near  there,  by  order  of  General  Jackson,  my 
three  brigades  were  formed  in  line  of  battle  in  rear  of 
General  A.  P.  Hill's  division  which  had  preceded  me, 
and  were  moving  against  the  force  of  the  enemy 
which  had  crossed  over  to  the  south  bank.  My  three 
brigades  were  posted  in  pieces  of  woods  on  each  side 
of  the  road  leading  towards  the  ford,  and  remained 
there  within  range  of  the  enemy's  guns  on  the  opposite 
side  until  late  in  the  afternoon.  In  the  meantime  Hill's 
division  advanced,  under  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  from 
across  the  river,  and  drove  the  enemy's  infantry  on  the 
southern  bank  pell-mell  into  the  river,  inflicting  upon 
him  a  very  severe  punishment  for  his  rashness  in  under- 
taking to  pursue  us  and  making  him  pay  very  dearly 
for  the  guns  he  had  taken.  One  officer  in  my  command, 
Captain  Frazier  of  the  15th  Alabama  Regiment, — the 
only  regimental  commander  in  Trimble's  brigade  who 
had  not  been  killed  or  wounded  at  Sharpsburg, — was 
severely  wounded  by  a  shell,  which  was  all  the  damage  I 
sustained. 

Late  in  the  afternoon,  I  was  ordered  to  move  back, 
and  that  night  we  marched  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Opequon 
not  far  above  its  mouth.  We  remained  at  this  position 
until  the  24th,  when  we  moved  across  the  Opequon  to 
the  Williamsport  pike,  and  on  the  next  day  to  the  vicinity 
of  Martinsburg.    On  the  27th,  General  Jackson's  whole 

162 


PREPARATIONS  ABOUT  FREDERICKSBURG 

command  was  moved  to  Bunker  Hill  on  the  road  from 
Martinsburg  to  Winchester,  and  went  into  camp  in  that 
vicinity.  By.  this  time  our  baggage  wagons,  which  had 
been  sent  from  Manassas  to  the  valley,  when  we  moved 
into  Maryland,  had  reached  us. 

We  were  now  able  to  obtain  supplies  of  flour,  by 
threshing  wheat,  of  which  there  was  a  good  supply  in 
the  valley,  and  having  it  ground.  While  our  camps  were 
located  at  Bunker  Hill,  Jackson's  command  destroyed 
the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  from  North  Mountain  to 
within  five  miles  of  Harper's  Ferry,  which  latter  place 
had  been  re-occupied  by  the  enemy.  More  than  twenty 
miles  of  the  road  was  thus  destroyed,  and  it  was  done 
effectively.  The  Winchester  &  Potomac  Railroad  was 
also  destroyed  to  within  a  short  distance  of  the  Ferry. 
Previous  to  this  there  was  a  slight  engagement  between 
the  Stonewall  brigade  of  Jackson's  division  and  a  small 
force  of  the  enemy  on  the  railroad  near  Kearneysville, 
but  the  enemy  did  not  make  a  serious  effort  to  molest 
us,  either  while  we  were  engaged  in  destroying  the  rail- 
road or  subsequently. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  now  organized 
into  two  regular  corps  of  four  divisions  each,  Genera] 
Longstreet  being  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  first 
corps,  and  General  Jackson  to  the  command  of  the  second 
corps,  both  with  the  rank  of  Lieutenant  General.  D.  H 
Hill's  division  was  attached  to  the  second  corps,  and 
two  divisions  were  formed  out  of  Longstreet 's,  D.  R. 
Jones'  and  Hood's  divisions,  under  the  command  of 
Generals  Pickett  and  Hood  respectively,  they  having  been 
promoted.  The  first  corps  consisted  of  the  divisions  of 
McLaws,  Anderson,  Pickett  and  Hood,  and  the  second 
corps  of  the  divisions  of  Ewell,  D.  H.  Hill,  A.  P.  Hill, 
and  Jackson  (Ewell 's  division  being  under  my  command 
and  Jackson's  under  J.  R.  Jones). 

For  some  time  the  second  corps  remained  camped 
near  Bunker  Hill,  and  the  first  corps  was  camped  in  the 
vicinity  of  Winchester. 

McClellan   in   the  meantime   had   concentrated   the 

163 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

main  body  of  his  army  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Potomac 
near  Harper's  Ferry,  and  was  engaged  in  preparing  for 
a  new  campaign  into  Virginia,  while  Maryland  and 
Bolivar  Heights  were  very  strongly  fortified  by  him. 

A  short  time  after  the  middle  of  October,  General 
Stuart,  with  a  portion  of  his  cavalry,  made  a  successful 
expedition  through  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  to  the 
rear  of  and  around  McClellan's  army. 

Towards  the  last  of  October  McClellan  began  to  move 
across  the  Potomac  on  the  east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge, 
with  a  view  to  another  approach  to  Richmond.  His  army 
had  been  largely  recruited,  and  superbly  equipped.  The 
army  of  General  Lee  had  been  considerably  increased  by 
the  return  of  stragglers  and  convalescents,  but  it  con- 
tinued to  be  indifferently  supplied  with  clothing  and 
shoes,  of  which  articles  there  was  a  great  deficiency. 

As  soon  as  McClellan's  movement  was  ascertained, 
Jackson's  corps  was  moved  towards  the  Shenandoah, 
occupying  positions  between  Charlestown  and  Berry- 
ville,  and  one  division  of  Longstreet's  corps  was  sent 
across  the  Blue  Ridge  to  watch  the  enemy.  When  the 
enemy  began  to  move  eastwardly  from  the  mountain,  the 
whole  of  Longstreet's  corps  moved  across  the  ridge  for 
the  purpose  of  intercepting  his  march.  D.  H.  Hill's 
division  of  Jackson's  corps  was  subsequently  moved 
across  the  ridge  to  watch  the  enemy's  movements.  A.  P. 
Hill's  division  had  been  put  in  position  near  Berryville, 
covering  the  Shenandoah,  at  Snicker's  or  Castleman's 
Ferry,  where  it  had  an  engagement  with  a  body  of  the 
enemy  that  had  crossed  the  ridge  as  McClellan  was  mov- 
ing on.  Ewell's  division  (under  my  command)  was  at 
first  posted  on  A.  P.  Hill's  left,  near  a  church,  while 
Jackson's  division  was  on  the  Berryville  and  Charles- 
town  pike  in  my  rear,  but  as  the  enemy's  covered  our 
front  I  moved  above,  first  to  Millwood,  and  then  to 
Stone  Bridge,  near  White  Post,  and  Jackson's  division 
moved  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Occoquon  between  the  posi- 
tions of  the  other  divisions  and  Winchester. 

164 


PREPARATIONS  ABOUT  FREDERICKSBURG 

After  the  enemy  had  left  the  vicinity  of  the  Blue 
Ridge,  D.  H.  Hill's  division  recrossed  the  ridge  and 
moved  up  on  the  east  side  of  the  Shenandoah  to  the 
vicinity  of  Front  Royal.  While  my  camp  was  at  Stone 
Bridge,  my  division  destroyed  the  Manassas  Gap  Rail- 
road from  Front  Royal  to  Piedmont  on  the  east  side  of 
the  Blue  Ridge,  a  distance  of  twenty  miles,  and  D.  H. 
Hill's  division  destroyed  it  from  Front  Royal  to  Stras- 
burg. 

In  the  meantime  McClellan's  army  had  been  con- 
centrated in  the  vicinity  of  Warrenton,  and  McClellan 
had  been  succeeded  in  the  command  by  Burnside.  Long- 
street  had  previously  taken  position  at  or  near  Culpeper 
Court-House. 

About  the  15th  of  November  Burnside  began  the 
movement  of  his  army  towards  the  lower  Rappahannock 
opposite  Fredericksburg.  When  this  movement  was  dis- 
covered Longstreet's  corps  was  moved  towards  Freder- 
icksburg to  dispute  the  enemy's  crossing,  and  orders 
were  sent  to  General  Jackson  to  move  his  corps  across 
the  Blue  Ridge.  This  movement  of  the  latter  corps 
began  about  the  20th  of  November,  and  we  moved  up 
the  valley  to  New  Market  and  then  across  Massanutten 
Mountain,  the  Shenandoah  and  the  Blue  Ridge  to  the 
vicinity  of  Madison  Court-House.  The  weather  had  now 
become  quite  cool,  and  our  daily  marches  were  long  and 
rapid,  and  very  trying  to  the  men.  On  this  march  I  saw 
a  number  of  our  men  without  shoes,  and  with  bleeding 
feet  wrapped  with  rags.  We  remained  in  the  vicinity 
of  Madison  Court-House  for  two  or  three  days,  and  it 
was  here  that  General  Jackson  wore,  for  the  first  time, 
a  new  regulation  coat  with  the  wreath,  and  a  hat,  and 
his  appearance  in  them  caused  no  little  remark  and 
amusement  among  the  men.  His  dress  hitherto  had 
been  a  rusty  grey  coat,  intended  for  a  colonel,  and  a  little 
dingy  cloth  cap  which  lay  flat  on  his  head,  or  rather 
forehead. 

From  Madison  Court-House  we  moved  past  Orange 

165 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Court-House  and  along  the  plank  road  to  the  vicinity 
of  Fredericksburg,  arriving  there  on  the  1st  of  December. 

Long-street's  corps  was  found  guarding  the  Rappa- 
hannock against  Burnside's  army  which  had  concen- 
trated on  the  opposite  bank.  My  division  was  moved  to 
the  vicinity  of  Guiney's  depot  on  the  R.,  F.  &  P.  Railroad, 
as  was  Jackson's.  After  remaining  here  two  or  three 
days,  I  was  ordered  to  move  towards  Port  Royal  to 
support  D.  H.  Hill,  whose  division  had  been  ordered  to 
the  vicinity  of  that  place,  to  watch  some  gun-boats  there 
and  prevent  a  crossing.  Port  Royal  is  some  eighteen  or 
twenty  miles  below  Fredericksburg  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock. I  first  took  position  some  six  or  eight  miles  from 
Port  Royal  on  the  road  from  Guiney's  depot,  but  sub- 
sequently moved  to  the  vicinity  of  Buckner's  Neck  on 
the  Rappahannock  a  few  miles  above  Port  Royal,  for  the 
jDurpose  of  watching  the  river  and  acting  in  concert  with 
General  Hill.  The  latter,  by  the  use  of  one  Whitworth 
gun  and  some  other  artillery,  had  driven  the  enemy's 
gunboats  from  Port  Royal,  and  in  revenge  they  fired 
into  the  houses  in  the  little  village  of  Port  Royal  and 
some  others  below  as  they  passed  down  the  river. 

While  I  was  watching  the  river  at  Buckner's  Neck, 
which  is  in  a  bend  of  the  river,  and  commanded  by  high 
ground  on  the  opposite  side,  so  as  to  afford  a  good  posi- 
tion for  forcing  a  passage,  the  enemy  hauled  some 
timbers  to  a  place  called  the  Hop  Yard  on  the  northern 
bank,  as  if  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  a  bridge  at 
that  place,  but  this  proved  a  feint.  Jackson's  division 
had  been  left  near  Guiney's  depot,  and  A.  P.  Hill's  had 
been  camped  in  rear  of  Hamilton's  Crossing  for  the  pur- 
pose of  supporting  Longstreet's  right,  which  rested  at 
the  latter  place.  The  different  divisions  of  Jackson's 
corps  were  thus  posted,  immediately  preceding  the  battle 
of  Fredericksburg. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

Battle  of  Fredericksburg. 

Fredericksburg  is  located  on  the  southern  bank  of 
the  Rappahannock  River  at  the  head  of  tide  water,  and 
the  river  is  navigable  to  that  point  for  steamboats  and 
small  vessels.  On  the  northern  bank,  opposite,  above, 
and  below  Fredericksburg,  are  what  are  called  the  Staf- 
ford Heights,  which  are  close  to  the  river,  and  completely 
command  the  southern  bank.  Fredericksburg's  exact 
location  is  on  a  narrow  strip  of  low  land  between  the 
river  and  a  range  of  hills  in  the  rear.  These  hills  leav- 
ing the  river  opposite  the  small  village  of  Falmouth, 
which  is  a  short  distance  above  Fredericksburg  and  on 
the  northern  bank,  diverge  from  it  below,  and  gradually 
declining,  extend  nearly  to  the  Massaponix  Creek,  which 
empties  into  the  river  four  or  five  miles  below  the  town. 

The  river  flats  or  bottoms  immediately  below  Fred- 
ericksburg widen  out  considerably  and  continue  to  widen 
until  they  are  from  one  and  a  half  to  two  miles  in  width 
at  the  lower  end  of  the  range  of  hills,  where  they  unite 
with  similar  but  not  so  wide  flats  on  the  Massaponix, 
which  extend  back  for  some  distance  in  rear  of  the  range 
of  hills  mentioned.  Below  the  mouth  of  the  Massaponix 
there  are  other  hills  which  approach  near  to  the  bank  of 
the  river,  and  extend  down  it  for  a  considerable  distance. 
Hazel  Run,  rising  southeast  of  Fredericksburg,  runs 
through  the  range  of  hills  along  a  narrow  valley,  or 
ravine  rather,  and  passing  close  on  the  east  of  the  town, 
empties  into  the  river.  Deep  Run  rises  below  in  the 
range  of  hills,  and  runs  across  the  wide  bottoms  through 
a  deep  channel  likewise  into  the  river,  something  over 
a  mile  below  the  town.  The  hills  just  in  rear  of  the  town 
were,  at  the  time  of  which  I  am  speaking,  nearly  denuded 
of  growing  timber,  but  below,  to  the  end  of  the  range, 
they  were  for  the  most  part  covered  with  woods.     The 

167 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

bottoms  were  entirely  cleared  and  in  cultivation,  furnish- 
ing several  extensive  farms,  and  np  Deep  Run  to  its 
sources  is  a  valley  making  a  large  re-entering  angle  in 
the  line  of  hills,  which  valley  was  then  also  cleared  and 
in  cultivation. 

From  the  town  a  road,  called  the  Telegraph  Road, 
runs  south,  crossing  Hazel  Run  and  then  ascending  the 
hills  passes  towards  Richmond  by  the  way  of  Hanover 
Junction.  Another  road  called  the  Plank  Road  ascends 
the  hills  above  Hazel  Run  and  runs  westward  by  Chan- 
cellorsville  to  Orange  Court-House.  A  third  road,  called 
the  River  Road,  runs  from  the  lower  end  of  the  town, 
crossing  Hazel  Run  and  Deep  Run,  and,  passing  through 
the  bottoms  about  half  way  from  the  river  to  the  foot 
of  the  hills,  in  a  direction  very  nearly  parallel  to  the 
river,  it  crosses  the  Massaponix  not  far  above  its  mouth, 
where  it  forks,  one  fork  going  to  Port  Royal  below  and 
the  other  by  Bowling  Green  in  the  direction  of  Richmond. 
This  is  a  wide  road,  and  where  it  passes  through  the 
bottoms  there  were  on  both  sides  high,  thick,  and  firm 
embankments  thrown  up  for  fences  or  enclosures  to  the 
adjacent  fields. 

The  Richmond,  Fredericksburg  &  Potomac  Railroad, 
leaving  the  Potomac  at  the  mouth  of  Aquia  Creek, 
crosses  the  river  into  Fredericksburg  and  then  runs 
through  the  bottoms  below  the  town  between  the  river 
road  and  the  hills,  which  latter  it  approaches  closely  at 
their  lower  end,  and  then  passes  around  at  their  foot 
to  take  the  direction  to  Richmond.  Just  at  the  rear  of 
the  foot  of  the  lower  end  of  the  hills,  a  country  road 
leading  from  the  Telegraph  Road  and  passing  along  the 
east  of  the  ridge  crosses  the  railroad  to  get  into  the 
River  Road,  and  this  is  called  "Hamilton's  Crossing," 
from  a  gentleman  of  that  name  formerly  residing  near 
the  place.  A  canal  runs  from  the  river  along  the  foot  of 
the  hills  above  the  town  to  the  rear  of  it,  for  the  purpose 
of  supptying  water  to  several  mills  and  factories  in  it, 

168 


BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 

and  this  canal  connects  by  a  drain  ditch  with  Hazel  Run, 
over  which  ditch  the  Plank  Road  crosses. 

What  is  called  Marye's  Heights  or  Hill  lies  between 
Hazel  Run  and  the  Plank  Road,  and  at  the  foot  of  it  is 
a  stone  wall,  behind  which  and  next  to  the  hill,  the  Tele- 
graph Road  runs.  Above  Marye's  Hill  on  the  east  of 
the  Plank  Road  are  what  are  called,  respectively, 
Cemetery,  Stansbury's  and  Taylor's  Hills,  all  overlook- 
ing the  canal.  In  rear  of  these  hills  and  overlooking 
and  commanding  them  are  higher  eminences.  On  the 
east  of  Hazel  Run  and  the  Telegraph  Road  is  quite  a 
high  hill  farther  back  than  Marye's  Hill  and  overlooking 
it  and  nearly  the  whole  ground,  to  which  the  name  of 
Lee's  Hill  has  been  given,  because  it  was  the  position 
generally  occupied  by  General  Lee  during  the  battle. 

Burnside's  army  had  taken  position  on  and  in  rear 
of  Stafford  Heights,  and  the  heights  themselves,  from 
Falmouth  to  a  point  very  nearly  opposite  the  mouth  of 
the  Massaponix,  were  covered  with  numerous  batteries 
of  heavy  guns,  while  the  nature  of  the  ground  was  such 
as  to  afford  easy  access  to  the  river  by  his  troops.  Long- 
street's  corps  occupied  the  hills  in  rear  of  Fredericks- 
burg to  Hamilton's  Crossing,  and  positions  for  some 
distance  above,  while  strong  pickets  were  established  in 
the  town  and  on  the  river  bank  above  and  below  to  watch 
the  enemy  and  impede  a  crossing. 

It  was  impossible  to  resist  successfully  a  crossing, 
as  the  river  is  only  between  two  and  three  hundred 
yards  wide,  and  the  banks  are  so  deep,  and  the  river  so 
accessible,  on  the  north  bank  by  means  of  ravines  running 
into  it,  that  our  artillery,  posted  on  the  hills  occupied 
by  our  troops,  could  not  play  upon  the  bridges  either 
during  the  progress  of  the  construction  or  afterwards, 
while  the  enemy's  batteries  were  able,  by  a  concentrated 
fire,  to  drive  off  the  small  bodies  watching  the  river,  or 
to  prevent  any  aid  being  sent  to  them  over  the  wide 
open  plains  formed  by  the  bottoms.    In  addition  to  all 

169 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

this,  the  bottoms  towards  the  lower  end  of  our  lines  were 
so  wide  that  we  had  no  guns  which  would  do  effective 
firing  across  them,  while  the  enemy's  heavy  guns  from 
the  north  bank  of  the  river  completely  swept  the  whole 
of  our  front,  and  reached  over  beyond  our  line. 

On  the  morning  of  the  11th  of  December  the  enemy 
commenced  his  movement,  and  by  the  use  of  his  artillery 
drove  the  regiments  which  were  guarding  the  river  from 
its  banks  after  an  obstinate  resistance,  and  succeeded  in 
laying  down  their  pontoon  bridges,  one  at  the  mouth  of 
Deep  Creek,  and  the  other  two  at  Fredericksburg.  The 
first  was  laid  early  in  the  afternoon,  but  the  latter  two 
not  until  near  night,  and  during  night  and  the  next  day 
the  enemy  crossed  in  heavy  force. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  12th  I  received  an  order  from 
General  Jackson  to  move  at  once  to  the  vicinity  of 
Hamilton's  Crossing,  which  I  did  by  marching  nearly 
all  night,  and  a  short  time  before  day  I  bivouacked 
some  two  miles  in  rear  of  the  crossing  where  the  division 
had  a  little  time  to  rest.  At  light  on  the  morning  of  the 
13th  I  moved  up  to  the  crossing,  and  found  our  army  in 
position  confronting  the  enemy.  Longstreet's  line  had 
been  constructed  from  the  right,  and  General  A.  P.  Hill's 
division,  which  was  much  the  largest  in  Jackson's  corps, 
now  occupied  the  right  of  the  line  which  rested  near  the 
crossing.  He  was  in  the  front  skirts  of  the  woods  which 
covered  the  hills,  and  on  his  left  was  Hood's  division. 

On  the  right  of  Hill's  line  was  a  small  hill  cleared 
on  the  side  next  the  enemy,  on  which  were  posted  some 
fourteen  pieces  of  artillery  under  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Walker,  which  were  supported  by  Field's  brigade,  under 
Colonel  Brockenborough,  while  Archer's  brigade  was  on 
the  left  of  the  guns.  On  Archer's  left  there  was  an 
interval  of  several  hundred  yards  in  front  of  which  was 
a  low  flat  marshy  piece  of  woodland  extending  across 
the  railroad  out  into  the  bottom  which  was  supposed  to 
be  impracticable,  and  was  therefore  not  covered  by  any 
body  of  troops,  but  Gregg's  brigade  was  posted  in  re- 

170 


BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 

serve  in  rear  of  this  interval,  without,  however,  being 
in  the  line  of  battle.  On  the  left  of  the  interval  were 
the  other  three  brigades  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  Lane's 
brigade  being  next  to  it,  but  in  advance  of  the  general 
line  a  considerable  number  of  pieces  of  artillery  were 
posted  along  the  left  of  Hill's  line,  but  they  were  on 
low  and  unfavorable  ground,  as  there  were  no  good 
positions  for  guns  on  that  part  of  the  line. 

On  my  arrival,  my  division  was  posted  on  a  second 
line  several  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  A.  P.  Hill's,  with 
Jackson's,  now  under  Brigadier  General  Taliaferro,  on 
my  left.  My  right  rested  on  the  railroad  at  the  crossing, 
and  extended  along  the  ridge  road,  which  here  crossed 
the  railroad,  for  a  short  distance  and  then  into  the  woods 
on  my  left.  Hays'  brigade  was  on  my  right,  with 
Trimble 's  brigade  under  Colonel  R.  F.  Hoke  immediately 
in  its  rear,  Lawton's  brigade  under  Colonel  N.  N.  Atkin- 
son in  the  centre,  and  my  own  brigade  under  Colonel  J. 
A.  Walker  on  the  left.  In  this  position  there  was  a  thick 
woods  intervening  between  my  division  and  the  enemy, 
and  the  consequence  was  that  he  was  entirely  excluded 
from  our  view  as  we  were  from  his.  D.  H.  Hill's  division, 
which  had  followed  mine  from  below,  was  posted  in  a 
third  line  in  the  open  ground  in  my  rear  beyond  the 
hills. 

The  weak  point  in  our  position  was  on  our  right,  as 
there  was  the  wide  open  plain  in  front  of  it  extending 
to  the  river  and  perfectly  covered  and  swept  by  the 
enemy's  heavy  batteries  on  the  opposite  heights,  and  to 
the  right,  extending  around  to  our  rear,  were  the  open 
flats  of  the  Massaponix,  here  quite  wide  and  incapable 
of  being  covered  by  any  position  we  could  take.  There 
was  very  great  danger  of  our  right  being  turned  by  the 
enemy's  pushing  a  heavy  column  down  the  river  across 
the  Massaponix.  The  plains  on  that  flank  were  watched 
by  Stuart  with  two  brigades  of  cavalry  and  his  horse 
artillery. 

A  heavy  fog  had  concealed  the  two  armies  from  each 

171 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

other  during  the  early  morning,  but  about  nine  o'clock  it 
began  to  rise,  and  then  the  artillery  fire  opened,  which 
was  just  as  my  division  was  moving  into  position.  The 
enemy's  fire  at  first  was  not  directed  towards  the  place 
where  my  division  was  posted,  but  after  a  short  interval 
the  shells  began  to  fall  in  our  vicinity,  and  the  division 
remained  exposed  to  a  random  but  quite  galling  can- 
nonading for  two  or  three  hours. 

Shortly  after  noon  we  heard  in  our  front  a  very  heavy 
musketry  fire,  and  soon  a  courier  from  General  Archer 
came  to  the  rear  in  search  of  General  A.  P.  Hill,  stating 
that  General  Archer  was  very  heavily  pressed  and  wanted 
reinforcements.  Just  at  that  moment,  a  staff  officer 
rode  up  with  an  order  to  me  from  General  Jackson,  to 
hold  my  division  in  readiness  to  move  to  the  right 
promptly,  as  the  enemy  was  making  a  demonstration 
in  that  direction.  This  caused  me  to  hesitate  about  send- 
ing a  brigade  to  Archer's  assistance,  but  to  be  prepared 
to  send  it  if  necessary,  I  ordered  Colonel  Atkinson  to 
get  his  brigade  ready  to  advance,  and  the  order  had  been 
hardly  given,  before  the  adjutant  of  Walker's  battalion 
of  artillery  came  galloping  to  the  rear  with  the  informa- 
tion that  the  interval  on  Archer's  left  (an  awful  gulf  as 
he  designated  it)  had  been  penetrated  by  heavy  columns 
of  the  enemy,  and  that  Archer's  brigade  and  all  our 
batteries  on  the  right  would  inevitably  be  captured  unless 
there  was  instant  relief.  This  was  so  serious  an  emer- 
gency that  I  determined  to  act  upon  it  at  once  notwith- 
standing the  previous  directions  from  General  Jackson 
to  hold  my  division  in  readiness  for  another  purpose, 
and  I  accordingly  ordered  Atkinson  to  advance  with  his 
brigade. 

I  was  then  entirely  unacquainted  with  the  ground  in 
front,  having  been  able  when  I  first  got  up  to  take  only 
a  hasty  glance  at  the  country  to  our  right,  and  I  asked 
Lieutenant  Chamberlain,  Walker's  adjutant,  to  show  the 
brigade  the  direction  to  advance.  In  reply  he  stated  that 
the  column  of  the  enemy  which  had  penetrated  our  line 

172 


BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 

was  immediately  in  front  of  the  brigade  I  had  ordered 
forward,  and  that  by  going  right  ahead  there  could  be 
no  mistake.  The  brigade,  with  the  exception  of  one  regi- 
ment, the  13th  Georgia,  which  did  not  hear  the  order, 
accordingly  moved  off  in  handsome  style  through  the 
woods,  but  as  it  did  so  Lieutenant  Chamberlain  informed 
me  that  it  would  not  be  sufficient  to  cover  the  entire  gap 
in  our  line,  and  I  ordered  Colonel  Walker  to  advance 
immediately  with  my  own  brigade  on  the  left  of  Atkinson. 

The  enemy's  column  in  penetrating  the  interval 
mentioned  had  turned  Archer's  left  and  Lane's  right, 
while  they  were  attacked  in  front,  causing  Archer's  left 
and  Lane's  entire  brigade  to  give  way,  and  one  column 
had  encountered  Gregg's  brigade,  which,  being  taken 
somewhat  by  surprise,  was  thrown  into  partial  confusion, 
resulting  in  the  death  of  General  Gregg,  but  the  brigade 
was  rallied  and  maintained  its  ground.  Lawton's  brigade 
advancing  rapidly  and  gallantly  under  Colonel  Atkinson, 
encountered  that  column  of  the  enemy  which  had  turned 
Archer's  left,  in  the  woods  on  the  hill  in  rear  of  the  line, 
and  by  a  brilliant  charge  drove  it  back  down  the  hill, 
across  the  railroad,  and  out  into  the  open  plains  beyond, 
advancing  so  far  as  to  cause  a  portion  of  one  of  the 
enemy's  batteries  to  be  abandoned.  The  brigade,  how- 
ever, on  getting  out  into  the  open  plain  came  under 
the  fire  of  the  enemy's  heavy  guns,  and  the  approach  of 
a  fresh  and  heavy  column  on  its  right  rendered  it 
necessary  that  it  should  retire,  which  it  did  under  orders 
from  Colonel  Evans,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  command 
by  reason  of  Atkinson's  being  severely  wounded. 

Two  of  Brockenborough's  regiments  from  the  right 
participated  in  the  repulse  of  the  enemy.  Colonel 
Walker  advanced,  at  a  double  quick,  further  to  the  left, 
encountering  one  of  the  columns  which  had  penetrated 
the  interval,  and  by  a  gallant  and  resolute  charge  he 
drove  it  back  out  of  the  woods  across  the  railroad  into 
the  open  plains  beyond,  when,  seeing  another  column  of 
the  enemy  crossing  the  railroad  on  his  left,  he  fell  back 

173 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

to  the  line  of  the  road,  and  then  deployed  the  13th 
Virginia  Regiment  to  the  left,  and  ordered  it  to  advance 
under  cover  of  the  timbers  to  attack  the  advancing 
column  on  its  flank.  This  attack  was  promptly  made 
and  Thomas'  brigade,  attacking  in  front  at  the  same 
time,  the  enemy  was  driven  back  with  heavy  loss. 

As  soon  as  Atkinson  and  Walker  had  been  ordered 
forward,  Hoke  was  ordered  to  move  his  brigade  to  the 
left  of  Hays,  but  before  he  got  into  position,  I  received 
a  message  stating  that  Archer's  brigade  was  giving  way 
and  I  ordered  Hoke  to  move  forward  at  once  to  Archer's 
support,  obliquing  to  the  right  as  he  moved.  Just  as 
Hoke  started,  I  received  an  order  from  General  Jackson, 
by  a  member  of  his  staff,  to  advance  to  the  front  with 
the  whole  division,  and  Hays'  brigade  was  at  once 
ordered  forward  in  support  of  Hoke.  The  13th  Georgia 
Regiment  which  had  been  left  behind  on  the  advance  of 
Lawton's  brigade  was  ordered  to  follow  Hoke's  brigade 
and  unite  with  it. 

Hoke  found  a  body  of  the  enemy  in  the  woods  in  rear 
of  Archer's  line  on  the  left,  where  the  regiments  on  that 
flank,  which  had  been  attacked  in  rear,  had  given  way, 
but  Archer  still  held  the  right  with  great  resolution, 
though  his  ammunition  was  exhausted.  Upon  a  gallant 
charge,  by  the  brigade  under  Hoke,  the  enemy  was  driven 
out  of  the  woods  upon  his  reserves  posted  on  the  railroad 
in  front,  and  then  by  another  charge,  in  which  General 
Archer  participated,  the  railroad  was  cleared  and  the 
enemy  was  pursued  to  a  fence  some  distance  beyond, 
leaving  in  our  hands  a  number  of  prisoners,  and  a  large 
number  of  small  arms  on  the  field. 

The  movements  of  the  three  brigades  engaged  have 
been  described  separately  from  the  necessity  of  the  case, 
but  they  were  all  engaged  at  the  same  time,  though  they 
went  into  action  separately  and  in  the  order  in  which 
they  have  been  mentioned,  and  Lawton's  brigade  had 
advanced  further  out  into  the  plains  than  either  of  the 
others. 

174 


BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 

On  riding  to  the  front,  I  directed  Lawton's  brigade, 
which  was  retiring,  to  be  re-formed  in  the  woods — Colonel 
Atkinson  had  been  left  in  front  severely  wounded  and 
he  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands.  Captain  E.  P.  Lawton, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General  of  the  brigade,  a  most  gal- 
lant and  efficient  officer,  had  also  been  left  in  front  at 
the  extreme  point  to  which  the  brigade  advanced,  mor- 
tally wounded,  and  he  likewise  fell  into  the  enemy's 
hands. 

I  discovered  that  Hoke  had  got  too  far  to  the  front 
where  he  was  exposed  to  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  also 
to  a  flank  movement  on  his  right,  and  I  sent  an  order 
for  him  to  retire  to  the  original  line,  which  he  did,  an- 
ticipating the  order  by  commencing  to  retire  before  it 
reached  him.  Two  of  his  regiments  and  a  small  bat- 
talion were  left  to  occupy  the  line  of  the  railroad  where 
there  was  cover  for  them  and  his  other  two  regiments, 
along  with  the  13th  Georgia,  which  had  not  been  en- 
gaged, were  put  in  the  slight  trenches  previously  occupied 
by  Archer's  brigade.  Walker  continued  to  hold  the  posi- 
tion on  the  railroad  which  he  had  taken  after  repulsing 
the  enemy.  Lawton's  brigade  was  sent  to  the  rear  for 
the  purpose  of  resting  and  replenishing  its  ammunition. 
Hays '  brigade,  which  had  advanced  in  rear  of  Hoke,  had 
not  become  engaged,  but  in  advancing  to  the  front  it 
had  been  exposed  to  a  severe  shelling  which  the  enemy 
began,  as  his  attacking  colmnns  were  retiring  in  confusion 
before  my  advancing  brigades.  Hays  was  posted  in  rear 
of  Hoke  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  the  right  in 
the  event  of  another  advance.  When  I  had  discovered 
Lawton's  brigade  retiring,  I  sent  to  General  D.  H.  Hill 
for  reinforcements  for  fear  that  the  enemy  might  again 
pass  through  the  unprotected  interval,  and  he  sent  me 
two  brigades,  but  before  they  arrived  Brigadier  General 
Paxton,  who  occupied  the  right  of  Taliaferro's  line,  had 
covered  the  interval  by  promptly  moving  his  brigade 
into  it. 

The  enemy  was  very  severely  punished  for  this  attack, 

175 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

which  was  made  by  Franklin's  grand  division,  and  he 
made  no  further  attack  on  our  right.  During  this  en- 
gagement and  subsequently  there  were  demonstrations 
against  A.  P.  Hill's  left  and  Hood's  right  which  were 
repulsed  without  difficulty.  Beginning  in  the  forenoon 
and  continuing  until  nearly  dark,  there  were  repeated 
and  desperate  assaults  made  by  the  enemy  from 
Fredericksburg  against  the  positions  at  Marye's  Hill  and 
the  one  to  our  right  of  it,  but  they  were  repulsed  with 
terrible  slaughter,  mainly  by  the  infantry  from  Long- 
street's  corps  posted  behind  the  stone  wall  at  the  foot 
of  Mayre's  Hill,  and  the  artillery  on  that,  and  on  the 
neighboring  heights.  The  loss  to  the  enemy  here  was 
much  heavier  than  that  on  our  right,  while  our  own  loss 
at  the  same  point  was  comparatively  slight. 

My  two  brigades,  Trimble's  under  Hoke,  and  my  own 
under  Walker,  and  the  13th  Georgia  Regiment  held  their 
positions  on  the  front  until  night,  while  Hays  retained 
his  position  immediately  in  rear  of  Hoke,  but  there  was 
no  further  attack  made  on  that  part  of  the  line,  or  on 
any  part  of  Hill's  front,  except  the  demonstrations  on 
his  left  which  have  been  mentioned  and  which  resulted 
in  some  skirmishing  and  artillery  firing. 

When  my  division  was  first  put  in  position  on  the 
second  line  as  described,  having  no  use  for  my  artillery, 
I  ordered  Captain  J.  W.  Latimer,  my  acting  chief  of 
artillery,  to  report  to  Colonel  Crutchfield,  Chief  of  Artil- 
lery for  the  Corps,  with  the  six  batteries  attached  to  the 
division,  to-wit:  Carrington's,  Brown's,  Garber's, 
D'Aquin's,  Dement 's,  and  his  own.  Of  these  Brown's 
and  Latimer's  were  posted  on  Hill's  left,  under  the  im- 
mediate charge  of  Captain  Latimer,  and  did  most  effective 
service,  and  D'Aquin's  and  Garber's  were  sent  to  Major 
Pelham,  Stuart's  Chief  of  Artillery,  on  the  right,  where 
they  likewise  did  good  service,  Captain  D'Aquin  losing 
his  life  while  taking  part  in  the  artillery  firing  in  that 
quarter.  Just  before  sunset  of  the  day  of  the  battle, 
after  having  seen  that  all  was  quiet  in  my  front,  I  rode 

176 


BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 

a  little  to  the  rear  and  discovered  General  D.  H.  Hill's 
division  moving  to  the  front  through  the  woods. 

On  my  inquiring  the  meaning  of  the  movement,  Gen- 
eral Colquitt,  in  command  of  the  front  brigade,  informed 
me  that  orders  had  been  given  for  the  advance  of  the 
whole  line,  and  that  Hill's  division  was  ordered  to  ad- 
vance in  support.  General  D.  H.  Hill  himself  rode  up 
in  a  few  minutes,  and  confirmed  the  information.  This 
was  the  first  intimation  I  had  received  of  the  order,  as  it 
had  not  reached  me.  While  General  Hill  and  myself 
were  speaking  of  the  matter,  Lieutenant  Morrison,  aide- 
de-camp  to  General  Jackson,  rode  up  and  stated  that  the 
General 's  orders  were  that  I  should  hold  my  command  in 
readiness  to  advance;  and  immediately  afterwards  one 
of  my  own  staff  officers  came  to  me  with  the  information 
that  General  Jackson  wished  me  to  take  command  of 
all  the  troops  on  the  right  and  advance,  regulating  the 
distance  to  which  I  should  go,  by  the  effect  produced 
on  the  enemy  by  our  artillery  which  was  to  open. 

I  rode  immediately  to  where  Hoke's  brigade  was 
posted  and  found  General  Jackson  himself,  who  repeated 
in  person  the  orders  to  me,  stating  that  I  was  to  advance 
in  support  of  some  artillery  which  he  was  about  to  send 
forward.  I  informed  him  of  the  condition  of  my  com- 
mand, the  separation  of  Walker  from  the  rest,  the  fact 
of  Lawton's  brigade  being  in  the  rear,  and  that  Hoke's 
and  Hays'  brigades  and  the  13th  Georgia  were  the  only 
troops  immediately  available.  He  told  me  to  advance 
with  the  latter  and  that  he  would  give  me  abundant 
support;  I  accordingly  prepared  to  advance  with  Hoke's 
brigade  and  the  13th  Georgia  in  front,  followed  by  Hays ' 
brigade.  The  programme  was  that  a  number  of  pieces 
of  artillery  should  be  run  out  in  front,  and  open  on  the 
enemy's  infantry,  when  I  was  to  advance  and  the  artil- 
lery to  be  again  moved  forward,  followed  by  my  infantry. 

The  movement  with  the  artillery  was  commenced,  and 
as  soon  as  it  left  the  woods  the  enemy  opened  with 
numerous  batteries  from  the  plains  and  from  behind  the 

12  177 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

embankments  on  the  river  road.  This  fire  was  terrific 
and  many  shells  went  crashing  past  us  into  the  woods  in 
our  rear,  where  D.  H.  Hill's  division  was  massed.  Our 
own  guns  opened  and  continued  to  fire  for  a  brief  space, 
and  a  part  of  Hoke's  brigade  advanced  to  the  railroad, 
but  General  Jackson  soon  became  satisfied  that  the  ad- 
vance must  be  attended  with  great  difficulties  and  per- 
haps disastrous  results,  and  abandoned  it.  It  was  well 
that  he  did.  The  enemy  had  very  heavy  forces  massed 
behind  the  embankments  on  the  river  road,  the  one  near- 
est us  being  pierced  with  embrasures  for  numerous 
pieces  of  artillery.  We  would  have  had  to  advance  nearly 
a  mile,  over  an  entirely  bare  plain  swept  by  all  this 
artillery,  as  well  as  cannonaded  by  the  heavy  guns  on 
Stafford  Heights,  and  if  we  had  been  able  to  force  back 
the  bodies  of  infantry  and  the  artillery  occupying  posi- 
tions on  the  plain  between  us  and  the  woods,  still  when 
we  reached  the  road  itself  we  would  have  found  a  vastly 
superior  force  behind  a  double  line  of  very  strong  breast- 
works. 

Nothing  could  have  lived  while  passing  over  that 
plain  under  such  circumstances,  and  I  feel  well  assured 
that,  while  we  were  all  ready  to  obey  the  orders  of  our 
heroic  commander,  there  was  not  a  man  in  the  force 
ordered  to  advance,  whether  in  the  front  or  in  support, 
who  did  not  breathe  freer  when  he  heard  the  orders 
countermanding  the  movement. 

I  have  subsequently  examined  this  ground  with  great 
care,  and  this  examination  has  strengthened  the  position 
first  entertained.  It  may  perhaps  be  asked  why  our  troops 
had  not  occupied  the  line  of  this  road,  to  which  I  will 
reply  that  the  road  and  the  embankments  on  each  side  of 
it  were  perfectly  commanded  by  the  batteries  of  Staf- 
ford Heights,  which  rendered  the  position  untenable  for 
us,  and  the  retreat  from  it  most  hazardous,  while  it 
afforded  safe  protection  to  the  enemy  from  our  guns. 

Shortly  after  the  termination  of  this  effort  to  advance, 
I  received  a  notification  from  General  Jackson  to  move 

178 


BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 

my  troops  to  the  rear  for  the  purpose  of  resting  and 
getting  provisions  as  soon  as  they  should  be  relieved  by 
the  troops  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division  which  had  at  first 
occupied  the  positions  now  held  by  me,  but  no  troops 
came  to  my  relief,  and  I  therefore,  remained  in  position. 
Orders  were  received  during  the  night  for  Taliaferro 
to  relieve  Hill's  troops  in  the  front  line  beginning  from 
the  left,  and  for  me  to  occupy  the  remainder  of  the  line 
on  the  right  which  Taliaferro  could  not  fill  out.  In  ac- 
cordance with  these  directions,  before  dawn  on  the  14th, 
Paxton  relieved  Walker,  Hays  took  the  position  which 
Paxton  vacated,  Hoke  remained  stationary,  Lawton's 
brigade  under  Colonel  Evans  was  posted  on  Hoke's 
right,  and  Walker  was  moved  from  the  left  and  placed 
in  reserve  behind  Hoke.  The  evening  before,  Carrington's 
battery  had  relieved  Latimer's  and  Brown's  on  the  left, 
and  still  remained  in  position,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
14th,  Dement 's  battery  relieved  one  of  the  batteries  on 
the  right  which  had  been  engaged  the  day  before. 

During  the  14th  the  enemy  remained  in  position  on 
the  plains  and  at  Fredericksburg,  an  occasional  shot 
being  exchanged  by  the  artillery  and  some  firing  from 
the  skirmishers  taking  place  on  portions  of  the  line,  but 
none  in  my  front. 

Before  light  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  D.  H.  Hill's 
division  relieved  Taliaferro 's  and  mine  on  the  front  line, 
and  we  moved  to  the  rear  in  reserve,  A.  P.  Hill's  division 
occupying  the  second  line. 

There  was  quiet  on  the  15th,  the  enemy  still  retaining 
his  position,  but  early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th,  as  I 
was  moving  into  position  on  the  second  line  in  accord- 
ance with  previous  orders,  it  was  discovered  that  the 
enemy  had  re-crossed  the  river  during  the  night,  taking 
up  his  bridges,  and  I  was  ordered  to  move  at  once  to  the 
vicinity  of  Port  Royal  to  guard  against  the  possible 
contingency  of  the  enemy's  attempting  to  turn  our  right 
by  crossing  the  river  near  that  place ;  and  I  commenced 
the  march  immediately. 

179 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

The  loss  in  the  division  under  my  command  in  this 
battle  was  in  killed  89  and  wounded  639,  to-wit:  in 
Hays'  brigade,  5  killed  and  40  wounded;  Trimble's 
brigade  (Hoke's),  8  killed  and  98  wounded;  Lawton's 
brigade,  55  killed  and  369  wounded;  my  own  brigade 
(Walker's),  17  killed  and  114  wounded;  and  in  the  artil- 
lery of  the  division  3  killed  and  18  wounded.  Among 
the  killed  were  Lieutenant  Colonel  Scott  of  the  12th 
Georgia  Regiment,  and  Captain  D ' Aquin  of  the  artillery, 
and  among  the  wounded  were  Colonel  Atkinson  of  the 
26th  Georgia  Regiment  (in  the  hands  of  the  enemy), 
Captain  E.  P.  Lawton,  A.  A.  G.  Lawton's  brigade  (Law- 
ton  mortally  wounded  and  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy) 
and  Colonel  Lamar,  61st  Georgia  Regiment. 

General  Lee's  entire  loss  in  the  battle  was  in  killed 
458,  and  wounded,  3,743,  to-wit:  in  Longstreet's  corps, 
130  killed,  1,276  wounded;  in  Jackson's  corps,  328  killed 
and  2,454  wounded;  and  13  wounded  in  Stuart's  cavalry. 

The  enemy's  loss  was  very  much  heavier,  and  over 
900  prisoners,  more  than  9,000  stand  of  arms  and  a  large 
quantity  of  ammunition  fell  into  our  hands. 

The  failure  of  General  Lee  to  attempt  to  destroy  the 
enemy's  army  after  its  repulse  has  been  much  criticised, 
and  many  speculations  about  the  probable  result  of  an 
attempt  to  drive  the  enemy  into  the  river  have  been 
indulged  in  by  a  number  of  writers.  In  the  first  place, 
it  must  be  recollected  that  no  man  was  more  anxious  to 
inflict  a  decisive  blow  on  the  enemy  than  General  Lee 
himself,  and  none  understood  better  the  exact  condition 
of  things,  and  the  likelihood  of  success  in  any  attempt 
to  press  the  enemy  after  his  defeat  on  the  13th.  That 
defeat  was  a  repulse  with  very  heavy  loss,  it  is  true, 
but  it  was  not  a  rout  of  the  enemy's  army;  and  candid 
persons  ought  to  presume  that  General  Lee  knew  what 
he  was  about  and  had  very  good  and  sufficient  reasons 
for  not  sallying  from  his  line  of  defence,  upon  the  ex- 
posed plains  below,  to  make  the  attempt  to  convert  the 
repulse  into  a  rout. 

180 


BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 

If  attention  is  given  to  the  previous  description  of 
the  ground  on  which  the  two  armies  were  operating,  it 
must  be  seen  that  an  attempt  to  pass  over  the  wide 
plain  intervening  between  our  line  and  the  enemy's 
position  below  the  town,  while  exposed  to  the  fire  of 
150  heavy  guns  on  the  Stafford  Heights,  and  the  num- 
erous field  pieces  securely  masked  in  the  River  road, 
would  inevitably  have  resulted  in  disaster,  unless  the 
enemy's  forces  had  become  so  paralyzed  as  to  be  in- 
capable of  an  effort  at  defence.  Burnside's  army  was 
composed  of  about  150,000  men  in  the  grand  divisions 
under  Sumner,  Franklin,  and  Hooker,  respectively. 

In  none  of  the  assaults  on  our  lines  were  the  whole 
of  these  grand  divisions  engaged,  but  when  columns  of 
attack  were  sent  forward,  there  were  always  very  heavy 
reserves  for  the  attacking  columns  to  fall  back  upon  in 
case  of  repulse;  Sumner's  and  Franklin's  grand  divi- 
sions had  been  mainly  engaged  and  Hooker's  scarcely  at 
all.  General  Lee's  army  was  not  half  as  large  as  Burn- 
side's  and  if  he  had  at  any  time  made  an  attempt  to 
advance,  any  force  that  he  could  have  massed  for  that 
purpose  without  abandoning  his  line  of  defence  entirely 
would  in  all  likelihood  have  still  encountered  a  superior 
force  of  infantry  behind  a  strong  line  of  defence,  in 
addition  to  the  artillery. 

As  I  have  stated,  General  Jackson  made  the  attempt 
to  advance  on  the  right  late  in  the  day  on  the  13th,  but 
he  was  compelled  to  desist,  very  fortunately,  before  any 
disaster  happened.  Above  the  town,  the  same  canal,  at 
the  foot  of  the  range  of  hills,  which  had  furnished  an 
insurmountable  obstacle  to  any  attack  by  the  enemy  on 
our  extreme  left,  likewise  furnished  the  same  obstacle 
to  an  advance  on  our  part.  The  only  other  quarter  from 
which  the  advance  could  have  been  made  was  from  the 
hills  immediately  in  rear  of  the  town  upon  the  enemy  in 
the  town,  and  there  the  difficulties  were  greater  even 
than  below.  Any  attacking  columns  from  that  quarter 
must  either  have  moved  down  the  rugged  face  of  the 

181 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

base  hills,  or  by  flank  along  the  Telegraph  and  Plank 
roads,  and  then  they  would  have  been  so  much  scat- 
tered by  the  artillery  from  the  north  bank,  which  would 
then  have  had  a  more  effective  range  than  even  on  the 
plains,  that  it  would  not  have  required  the  reserves, 
posted  behind  the  houses  and  defences  in  the  town,  to 
complete  the  repulse  and  disaster. 

As  to  a  night  attack,  that  is  a  very  easy  thing  to  talk 
about  but  a  most  hazardous  experiment  to  try,  espe- 
cially on  dark  nights  such  as  we  then  had.  Such  attacks 
cannot  be  ventured  on  with  safety  unless  with  the  most 
thoroughly  trained  troops,  and  then  not  in  large  bodies, 
for  fear  of  confusion  and  firing  into  each  other,  the  very 
dread  of  which  often  paralyzes  very  brave  troops. 

It  has  been  said  that  General  Lee  might  have  in- 
flicted tremendous  damage  upon  the  enemy  by  forcing 
hot  shot  and  shell  into  Fredericksburg  while  the  enemy's 
troops  were  massed  there.  The  heroic  and  patriotic 
people  of  that  town,  when  it  was  threatened  with  a 
bombardment  by  Sumner,  had  not  appealed  to  the  com- 
mander of  their  country's  army  to  cause  the  danger  to 
be  removed  from  them  by  not  resisting  its  occupation 
by  the  enemy,  but  had  exhibited  most  commendable  un- 
selfishness by,  in  most  cases,  abandoning  their  homes 
without  a  murmur,  while  there  were  some  too  poor  to 
move  elsewhere,  and  others  who  chose  to  remain  and 
share  all  the  dangers  of  the  approaching  struggle;  it 
was  not  in  the  heart  of  the  noble  commander  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  to  doom,  by  his  own  act,  the  re- 
maining few  of  that  devoted  people  and  the  homes  of 
the  absent  to  destruction,  for  the  sake  of  killing  and 
wounding  a  few  thousand  of  the  enemy,  and  causing 
dismay  among  the  remainder. 

Is  this  forbearance  one  to  be  criticised  with  severity 
as  a  grievous  military  blunder! 

It  is  probable  that  if  General  Lee  had  known  that 
the  enemy  was  evacuating  the  town,  his  artillery  might 
have  inflicted  considerable  damage,  but  the  enemy  had 

182 


BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 

given  no  indication  of  such  a  purpose,  and  he  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  darkness  of  the  night  and  the  prevalence 
of  a  storm  and  wind  to  make  good  his  retreat,  when  the 
noise  attending  the  movement  could  not  be  heard. 

General  Lee  accomplished  all  that  was  possible  with 
the  means  under  his  control,  except,  indeed,  the  useless 
destruction  of  what  the  enemy  had  left  of  the  town  of 
Fredericksburg. 

There  was  a  ridiculous  story  about  General  Jackson, 
to  which  currency  was  given  by  the  newspapers,  which 
represented  that,  at  a  council  of  war  called  by  General 
Lee  on  the  night  after  the  battle,  General  Jackson  fell 
into  a  doze  while  the  very  grave  question  of  what  ought 
to  be  done  under  the  circumstances  was  being  discussed, 
and  after  all  the  rest  had  given  their  opinion,  General 
Lee  turned  to  General  Jackson  and  asked,  "Well,  Gen- 
eral, what  is  your  opinion1?"  to  which  the  latter,  waking 
out  of  his  nap,  replied,  "Drive  'em  in  the  river,  drive 
'em  in  the  river. ' '  This  story  is  by  no  means  creditable 
to  General  Jackson,  yet  it  obtained  a  wide  circulation, 
and  the  narrators  of  it  seemed  to  think  it  was  very 
characteristic. 

General  Jackson  was  a  most  able  commander  and 
heroic  soldier,  and  it  was  not  at  all  likely  that  he  would 
have  acted  so  much  like  a  besotted  member  of  a  council 
of  war  called  by  his  chief.  I  presume  after  the  facts  that 
I  have  before  stated,  it  is  not  necessary  to  assert  that 
no  such  incident  occurred. 

Had  Burnside  moved  down  the  river  to  the  Mas- 
saponix,  after  crossing,  or  had  thrown  other  bridges 
across  at  or  near  the  mouth  of  that  stream,  and  crossed 
one  of  his  grand  divisions  there,  he  would  inevitably 
have  forced  us  to  abandon  our  line  of  defence,  and. 
fight  him  on  other  ground. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

Operations  in"  Winter  and  Spring,  1862-63. 

On  the  16th  of  December,  as  soon  as  it  was  discov- 
ered that  the  enemy  had  recrossed  the  river,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  orders  received,  I  moved  to  the  vicinity 
of  Port  Royal,  arriving  by  nightfall. 

The  enemy  was  content  with  the  experiment  he  had 
made,  and  did  not  attempt  any  further  movement  at 
that  time.  I  proceeded  the  next  day  to  picket  the  river 
from  a  place  called  the  Stop-Cock,  near  the  Rappahan- 
nock Academy,  to  the  vicinity  of  Port  Tobacco,  below 
Port  Royal,  the  river  having  been  watched  on  this  line 
previous  to  my  arrival  by  some  of  Brigadier  General 
Wm.  H.  F.  Lee's  cavalry,  which  I  relieved. 

My  division  was  encamped  in  the  vicinity  of  Port 
Royal,  on  the  hills  back  from  the  river,  and  when  it 
was  ascertained  that  the  enemy  was  not  preparing  for 
a  new  movement  in  any  short  time,  the  different  brigades 
built  permanent  winter  quarters  at  suitable  places. 
After  a  careful  examination  of  the  country,  I  proceeded 
to  fortify  the  banks  of  the  river  at  points  likely  to 
afford  facilities  for  crossing,  and  I  established  a  line 
of  defence  also  along  the  main  road  running  parallel 
with  the  river,  where  high  embankments  with  cedar 
hedges  on  them  afforded  good  cover  for  troops  and 
excellent  breastworks.  This  line  commenced  at  the  up- 
per end  of  the  Hazelwood  estate,  the  former  residence 
of  that  distinguished  Virginian,  John  Taylor  of 
Caroline,  and  with  the  defences  on  the  river  extending 
to  Camden,  the  residence  of  Mr.  Pratt,  some  distance 
below  Port  Royal,  passing  in  rear  of  that  town,  which 
was  now  nearl}^  abandoned  on  account  of  the  depreda- 
tions of  the  enemy's  gunboats  and  the  fear  of  their 
repetition.  New  roads  were  constructed  in  rear  of  the 
line  of  defence  out  of  reach  of  artillery  from  the  op- 

184 


OPERATIONS  IN  WINTER  AND  SPRING,  1862-1863 

posite  bank,  for  the  purpose  of  facilitating  communica- 
tion between  the  different  positions,  and  two  Whitworth 
guns  under  Captain  W.  W.  Hardwick  were  placed  on  a 
high  hill  in  rear  of  Port  Royal,  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
venting the  gunboats  which  were  below  from  ascend- 
ing the  river;  and  subsequently  torpedoes  were  placed 
in  the  bed  of  the  river  some  two  or  three  miles  below 
Port  Royal  under  the  superintendence  of  some  one  sent 
from  headquarters. 

The  enemy  established  a  line  of  cavalry  pickets  on 
the  opposite  bank  of  the  river  as  far  down  as  ours 
reached,  and  the  two  were  in  sight  of  each  other.  The 
river  at  Port  Royal  is  between  six  and  eight  hundred 
yards  wide,  and  immediately  opposite  Port  Royal  is 
the  small  village  of  Port  Conway,  which  was  occupied 
by  the  enemy's  pickets. 

We  were  compelled  to  haul  our  supplies  in  wagons 
from  Guiney's  depot  on  the  railroad,  and  as  the  winter 
was  a  severe  one  with  much  snow  and  rain,  the  country 
roads,  which  we  had  to  use,  became  almost  impassable 
from  the  mud,  and  we  were  compelled  to  employ  the 
men  for  a  considerable  time  in  corduroying  them  at  the 
worst  places. 

In  the  month  of  January,  1863,  I  was  promoted  to 
the  rank  of  Major  General  and  was  assigned  to  the 
permanent  command  of  Ewell's  division,  the  name  of 
which  was  now  changed.  Colonel  R.  F.  Hoke  of  the 
21st  North  Carolina  Regiment,  who  had  commanded 
Trimble's  brigade  since  the  termination  of  the  Mary- 
land campaign,  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  Brigadier 
General  and  assigned  to  the  brigade  he  already  com- 
manded, and  the  name  of  that  also  was  changed.  The 
brigade  had  previously  consisted  of  the  21st  North 
Carolina,  the  12th  and  21st  Georgia,  and  the  15th  Ala- 
bama Regiments,  and  a  North  Carolina  battalion  of 
two  companies.  The  12th  and  21st  Georgia  were  now 
transferred  to  a  Georgia  brigade  in  D.  H.  Hill 's  division, 
and  the  15th  Alabama  to  a  brigade  in  Hood's  division, 

185 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  6th,  54th,  and  57th  North  Carolina  Regiments  from 
Hood's  division,  taking  the  place  in  Hoke's  brigade  of 
those  transferred  from  it. 

The  25th  and  44th  Virginia  Regiments  were  trans- 
ferred from  my  own  brigade  to  that  of  J.  R.  Jones,  in 
Jackson's  division,  and  subsequently  Colonel  William 
Smith  of  the  49th  Virginia,  who  had  been  so  severely 
wounded  at  Sharpsburg  and  had  not  yet  returned,  was 
appointed  Brigadier  General  and  assigned  to  my  old 
brigade  as  it  remained  after  the  transfer  of  the  two 
regiments.  The  organization  of  the  artillery  was  now 
changed,  and  in  the  place  of  the  batteries  which  had 
heretofore  been  attached  to  brigades,  battalions  were 
organized,  which  were  to  be  under  the  general  control 
of  the  Chief  of  Artillery  for  the  Corps,  and  a  battalion 
to  be  assigned  to  a  division  on  an  active  campaign,  or 
when  required  for  defence.  In  consequence  of  this 
arrangement,  a  number  of  promotions  took  place  among 
the  artillery  officers,  and  Captain  J.  W.  Latimer,  a 
youthful  but  most  gallant  and  efficient  officer,  was  made 
a  Major  of  Artillery,  a  promotion  which  he  had  richly 
earned,  though  he  was  scarcely  twenty-one  years  old. 
All  the  batteries  heretofore  attached  to  the  division, 
except  Latimer's,  were  sent  to  the  rear  of  Bowling 
Green  to  winter,  in  order  to  be  more  convenient  to  forage. 
Latimer's  battery  was  retained  to  be  used  in  case  of 
need,  and  it  became  Tanner's  by  virtue  of  the  promo- 
tion of  the  first  lieutenant. 

My  assistant  adjutant  general,  while  I  was  a 
brigadier  general,  Captain  F.  Gardner,  had  resigned 
the  previous  summer,  and  my  aide,  Lieutenant  S.  H. 
Early,*  had  resigned  while  we  were  in  the  valley  after 
the  Maryland  campaign,  as  he  was  over  fifty  years  of 
age,  and  the  condition  of  his  family  required  his  pres- 

*  Lieutenant  Early,  at  General  Early's  request  (and  accompanied 
by  his  young-  son,  John  Cabell  Early,  aged  fifteen  years),  rejoined  the 
army  in  1863  during  its  northern  invasion,  and  was  severely  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

18C 


CAPTAIN   SAMUEL   H.    EARLY 


OPERATIONS  IN  WINTER  AND  SPRING,  1862-1863 

ence  at  home.  I  had  had  no  regular  personal  staff  since 
then.  I  found  no  assistant  adjutant  general  with 
E well's  division  when  I  succeeded  to  the  command  at 
Sharpsburg,  and  Major  Samuel  Hale,  who  held  the  com- 
mission of  a  commissary,  had  been  acting  in  that 
capacity  for  me  while  I  commanded  the  brigade  and  con- 
tinued to  do  so  while  I  commanded  the  division.  I  found 
with  the  division  Major  J.  P.  Wilson  and  Mr.  Henry 
Heaton,  who  had  been  acting  as  volunteer  aides  to 
General  Ewell  and  then  to  General  Lawton,  and  they 
continued  with  me  in  that  capacity  until  after  my 
promotion. 

After  I  was  assigned  to  the  division  as  major  gen- 
eral, Major  Hale  received  the  commission  of  adjutant 
general  with  the  rank  of  major,  and  A.  L.  Pitzer  and 
Wm.  G.  Callaway  were  commissioned  as  aides  with  the 
rank  of  first  lieutenants. 

My  division  staff  as  then  organized  consisted  of  the 
following  officers,  all  of  whom  except  those  above 
designated  had  been  with  General  Ewell  as  members  of 
his  staff: 

Lieutenant  Colonel  J.  M.  Jones,  Inspector  General. 

Major  Samuel  Hale,  Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

Lieutenant  A.  L.  Pitzer,  Aide. 

Lieutenant  Wm.  G'.  Callaway,  Aide. 

Major  C.  E.  Snodgrass,   Quartermaster. 

Major  Ben  H.  Green,  Commissary. 

Captain  William  Thornton,  Assistant  Commissary. 

Captain  C.  W.  Christie,  Ordnance  Officer. 

Captain  Henry  Richardson,  Engineer  Officer. 

Subsequently,  in  the  spring,  Major  John  W.  Daniel, 
who  had  been  commissioned  at  my  instance,  was  also 
assigned  to  me  as  an  assistant  adjutant  general.  Lieu- 
tenant Robert  D.  Early,  who  had  been  acting  as  aide 
in  one  of  the  brigades  in  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  also  re- 
ported to  me  during  the  winter,  as  acting  aide,  and  con- 
tinued in  that  capacity  until  he  was  made  an  assistant 
adjutant  general  to  a  brigade  in  Jackson's  old  division. 

187 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

A  company  of  mounted  men  organized  as  scouts, 
couriers  and  guides  by  General  Ewell,  had  remained  at- 
tached to  the  division  under  the  command  of  Captain 
W.  F.  Randolph,  but  it  was  transferred  in  the  spring 
to  General  Jackson's  headquarters.  My  division,  as  it 
remained  after  the  changes  above  mentioned,  was  com- 
posed of  four  brigades,  to-wit:  Hays'  Louisiana  brigade, 
Hoke's  North  Carolina  brigade,  Lawton's  Georgia 
brigade  (commanded  by  Colonel  Evans),  and  Smith's 
Virginia  brigade,  organized  as  follows: 

Hays '  brigade :  5th,  6th,  7th,  8th,  and  9th  Louisiana 
Regiments. 

Hoke's  brigade:  6th,  21st,  54-th,  and  57th  North 
Carolina  Regiments  and  Wharton's  North  Carolina 
battalion. 

Lawton's  brigade:  13th,  26th,  31st,  38th,  60th,  and 
61st  Georgia  Regiments. 

Smith's  brigade:  13th,  31st,  49th,  52nd,  and  58th 
Virginia  Regiments. 

In  a  few  days  after  the  battle,  the  other  divisions 
of  Jackson's  corps  were  moved  to  positions  above  me, 
covering  the  river  from  the  mouth  of  Massaponix  to  my 
left,  Jackson's  old  division  being  on  my  immediate  left, 
then  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  and  then  D.  H.  Hill's.  In 
January  General  Trimble,  who  had  been  severely 
wounded  near  Groveton  on  the  29th  of  August  previous, 
was  made  a  Major  General  and  assigned  to  Jackson's 
division,  which  had  always  heretofore  remained  without 
a  regular  division  commander,  even  while  General  Jack- 
son was  a  Major  General,  as  his  command  had  included 
other  troops. 

The  enemy  made  no  demonstration  whatever  on  my 
front,  and  we  had  nothing  to  disturb  our  quiet  during 
the  winter,  except  a  little  incident  by  which  two  officers 
were  captured  by  the  enemy  in  rather  a  singular  manner. 
There  were  a  considerable  number  of  ducks  on  the  river, 
and  Major  Wharton,  commander  of  the  battalion  in 
Hoke's    brigade,    and    Captain    Adams,    the    assistant 

188 


MAJOR    JOHN   WARWICK    DANIEL 

From  a  photograph  taken  late  in  life 

The  Cross  of  Honor  was  bestowed  hy  U.  D.  C. 


OPERATIONS  IN  WINTER  AND  SPRING,  1862-1863 

adjutant  general  of  the  brigade,  took  it  into  their  heads 
to  go  shooting.  There  were  several  boats  at  Port  Royal 
which  I  had  directed  to  be  hauled  up  on  the  bank  with 
orders  to  the  pickets  to  keep  watch  over  them  and  not 
permit  them  to  be  launched. 

On  the  day  the  Major  and  the  Captain  took  for  their 
sport,  the  picket  at  Port  Royal  happened  to  be  from 
their  brigade,  and  they  easily  induced  the  sentinel  on 
duty  to  let  them  have  the  use  of  one  of  the  boats,  to  row 
into  the  mouth  of  a  creek  above,  on  our  side,  where  the 
ducks  were  most  numerous.  The  day  was  a  very  windy 
one  with  the  wind  blowing  across  towards  the  enemy. 
By  keeping  near  the  bank  they  avoided  the  effect  of 
the  wind  until  they  got  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  creek, 
when  it  struck  their  boat  and  forced  it  out  into  the 
stream.  Not  being  expert  boatmen,  and  moreover  being 
excited  by  the  danger,  they  lost  control  of  the  boat  and 
were  driven  helplessly  to  the  northern  bank  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy's  pickets,  and  of  course  were  made 
prisoners.  The  Major  having  an  old  newspaper  with  him, 
pulled  it  out  when  he  reached  the  shore  and  proposed  an 
exchange,  a  practice  sometimes  prevailing  with  the 
pickets  in  spite  of  all  orders,  but  the  Federal  on  post 
was  rather  too  shrewd  to  have  that  game  played  on 
him,  insisting  that  it  was  not  exactly  a  case  for  ex- 
change of  such  civilities.  This  was  a  caution  to  all  per- 
sons disposed  to  sporting  and  to  interfere  with  the  orders 
to  the  pickets;  and  we  had  no  more  duck  shooting  in 
boats. 

Burnside  made  an  abortive  effort  in  January  to  ad- 
vance again  by  flanking  us  on  the  left,  but  he  stuck  in 
the  mud,  and  we  were  not  put  to  any  inconvenience  by 
the  movement.  About  the  last  of  the  month  he  was 
relieved  of  his  command,  and  a  new  commander  for  the 
Federal  Army  was  selected,  in  the  person  of  Major  Gen- 
eral Joseph  Hooker,  called  "Fighting  Joe." 

Though  we  passed  the  winter  without  the  excitement 
attending  an  advance  of  the  enemy,  still  we  were  not 

189 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

without  some  excitements  of  our  own,  and  I  may  as  well 
relate  the  following  occurrence  to  show  how  men  who 
had  passed  through  the  stirring  scenes  of  the  previous 
year,  who  had  fought  with  Jackson  in  the  valley,  around 
Richmond,  at  Manassas,  Sharpsburg,  and  Fredericks- 
burg, could  amuse  themselves  in  winter  quarters. 

We  had  several  severe  snow  storms  during  the  winter, 
and  after  one  of  them,  when  the  snow  lay  deep  on  the 
ground,  Hoke's  brigade  challenged  Lawton's  for  a  battle 
with  snow  balls,  which  challenge  was  accepted.  The  two 
brigades  were  marshalled  under  their  respective  com- 
manders— Hoke  on  the  one  side,  and  Colonel  Eivans  on 
the  other.  Evans  stood  on  the  defensive  in  front  of  his 
camp  and  Hoke  advanced  against  him.  Evans'  force 
was  much  the  larger,  but  being  Georgians  who  had  been 
brought  from  Savannah  in  the  beginning  of  the  previous 
summer,  his  men  were  not  accustomed  to  the  fleecy 
element.  Hoke's  men  were  more  experienced,  and  when 
they  made  a  bold  dash  at  the  Georgians,  pelting  them 
most  unmercifully  with  their  well  pressed  balls,  and 
giving  the  usual  Confederate  yell,  there  was  no  with- 
standing the  shock  of  the  onset.  Evans'  men  gave  way 
in  utter  confusion  and  rout,  and  Hoke's  men  got  pos- 
session of  their  camp. 

The  Georgians  seeing  that  their  camp  and  all  their 
effects  were  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  who  seemed  to 
be  inclined  to  act  on  the  maxim  that  "to  victors  belong 
the  spoils,"  took  courage,  rallied,  and  came  back  with 
such  vim  that  Hoke's  men  in  their  turn  were  routed, 
and  retreated  in  utter  dismay.  No  time  was  given  for 
them  to  rally,  but  they  were  pursued  to  their  own  camp, 
their  leader  having  been  captured  in  the  pursuit.  Evans' 
men  did  not  deem  it  prudent  to  press  their  victory  too 
far,  but  retired,  though  in  good  order.  They  acted  mag- 
nanimously and  released  the  leader  of  their  opponents 
on  his  parole  of  honor,  not,  however,  without  his  having 
been  well  wallowed  in  the  snow. 

There  was  no  official  report  of  this  battle,  but  all  the 

190 


OPERATIONS  IN  WINTER  AND  SPRING,  1862-1863 

particulars  were  related  at  division  headquarters  by  one 
of  the  aides  who  happened  to  be  present,  and  who  was 
himself  captured  under  suspicious  circumstances  on 
Hoke's  retreat,  but  begged  off  on  the  ground  that  he  was 
a  neutral  and  a  mere  spectator.  He  was  much  joked 
by  the  other  young  men  at  headquarters,  who  charged 
him  with  skulking  on  the  occasion,  and  there  was  some 
reason  to  suspect  that  he  did  not  stand  the  storm  of 
snow  balls  as  well  as  he  did  that  of  shot  and  shell  on 
many  another  occasion.  Many,  very  many  of  the  poor 
fellows  who  shared  in  this  pastime  poured  out  their 
life's  blood  on  subsequent  battlefields,  and  a  small  rem- 
nant were  surrendered  at  Appomattox  Court-House  with 
arms  in  their  hands,  and  tears  rolling  down  their  cheeks. 

About  the  first  of  March  my  division  was  moved  to 
Hamilton's  Crossing  to  take  place  of  Hood's,  which  had 
been  sent  with  Longstreet  south  of  James  River,  and 
a  body  of  cavalry  took  the  place  of  my  division  on  the 
right.  In  my  new  position,  it  was  my  duty  to  picket 
and  watch  the  river  from  the  mouth  of  Hazel  Run  at  the 
lower  end  of  Fredericksburg  to  the  mouth  of  Massaponix, 
which  was  done  with  three  regiments  at*  a  time,  posted 
at  different  positions  on  the  bank.  These  pickets  were 
in  full  view  of  and  in  musket  range  of  the  enemy's 
pickets  on  the  opposite  bank,  and  also  under  the  fire  of 
the  guns  on  Stafford  Heights,  but  by  a  tacit  arrange- 
ment there  was  never  any  firing  from  either  side  on 
ordinary  occasions,  but  the  picketing  detachments  on 
both  sides  were  moved  into  position  and  regularly  re- 
lieved without  molestation. 

In  the  month  of  April  the  31st  Virginia  Regiment 
of  Smith's  brigade,  in  company  with  the  25th  Virginia 
of  Jones'  brigade,  Trimble's  division,  was  sent  to  the 
valley  for  the  purpose  of  accompanying  an  expedition 
into  Northwestern  Virginia  under  General  Imboden,  and 
did  not  return  until  late  in  May. 

The  growing  timber  on  the  range  of  hills  which  had 
constituted  our  line  of  defence  at  the  battle  of  Freder- 

191 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

icksburg  had  been  almost  entirely  cut  down  during  the 
winter  to  construct  tents,  and  furnish  firewood  for 
Hood's  division,  and  there  were  left  only  a  few  scattering 
trees  on  the  hills  and  a  thin  skirt  in  front.  Shortly  after 
my  removal,  General  Jackson,  whose  headquarters  had 
been  below,  near  Moss  Neck,  removed  also  to  the  vicinity 
of  Hamilton's  Crossing. 

Brigadier  General  J.  B.  Gordon,  who  had  been  Colonel 
of  the  6th  Alabama  Regiment  in  Rodes'  brigade,  D.  H. 
Hill's  division,  and  very  severely  wounded  at  Sharps- 
burg,  was  assigned  in  April  to  the  command  of  Lawton's 
brigade,  which  took  his  name. 

There  was  perfect  quiet  along  the  river  front  until 
the  night  of  the  28th  of  April,  though  Fitz.  Lee's  brigade 
of  Stuart's  cavalry  had  a  fight  with  the  enemy  at  Kelley's 
Ford  in  Culpeper  in  March,  and  there  was  another  affair 
with  the  cavalry  in  April. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

Battle  of  Chancellorsville. 

Before  light  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  of  April,  the 
enemy,  having  moved  three  corps  of  his  army  up  during 
the  night,  by  taking  advantage  of  a  heavy  fog  that  over- 
hung the  river,  threw  a  brigade  across  in  boats,  just 
below  the  mouth  of  Deep  Run,  and  the  54th  North 
Carolina  Regiment  on  picket  at  that  point,  being  unable 
to  cope  with  the  force  brought  against  it,  was  forced 
to  retire,  which  it  did  without  loss.  The  movement  had 
been  conducted  with  so  much  secrecy,  the  boats  being 
brought  to  the  river  by  hand,  that  the  first  intimation 
of  it,  to  the  regiment  on  picket,  was  the  landing  of  the 
force.  Bridges  were  then  rapidly  laid  down  at  the  same 
crossing  used  by  Burnside  at  this  point  and  a  division 
of  infantry  with  some  artillery  was  crossed  over. 

About  a  mile  lower  down  below  the  house  of  Mr.  Pratt, 
a  similar  crossing  was  attempted,  but  that  was  discov- 
ered, and  resisted  by  the  13th  Georgia  Regiment  under 
Colonel  Smith  until  after  sunrise,  when  that  regiment 
was  relieved  by  the  6th  Louisiana  under  Colonel  Mona- 
ghan  going  on  picket  in  its  regular  time.  The  latter 
regiment  continued  to  resist  the  crossing  successfully 
until  the  fog  had  risen,  when  the  enemy's  guns  were 
brought  to  bear,  and  by  a  concentrated  fire  that  regiment 
was  compelled  to  retire,  not,  however,  without  sustain- 
ing a  considerable  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  as  well  as 
prisoners,  the  latter  being  captured  in  rifle  pits  at  points 
below  the  crossing,  which  was  effected  by  the  enemy's 
eoming  up  in  their  rear  before  they  had  received  notice 
of  his  being  across.  The  13th  Georgia  had  also  sustained 
some  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  prisoners  captured 
in  the  same  way,  who  had  not  been  relieved.  The  re- 
sistance made  at  this  point  delayed  the  enemy  so  that 
the  bridges  there  were  not  laid  until  after  10  o  'clock  a.m. 

13  193 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

A  little  after  light,  information  reached  me  of  the 
crossing  at  Deep  Run,  and  I  sent  notice  of  it  at  once  to 
General  Jackson.  Without,  however,  waiting  for  orders, 
I  ordered  my  division  to  the  front,  and  as  soon  as  it  was 
possible  put  it  in  line  along  the  railroad,  with  my  right 
resting  near  Hamilton's  Crossing  and  my  left  extending 
to  Deep  Run.  Three  regiments  were  sent  to  the  front 
and  deployed  along  the  River  road  as  skirmishers.  The 
13th  Virginia  Regiment,  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ter- 
rill,  on  picket  between  the  mouths  of  Hazel  and  Deep 
Runs,  was  drawn  back  to  the  line  of  the  River  road 
above  Deep  Run,  and  remained  there  until  relieved  by 
McLaws'  division,  when  it  was  brought  up. 

As  soon  as  the  enemy  had  laid  down  his  bridges  at 
the  lower  crossing,  a  division  of  infantry  and  some 
artillery  were  crossed  over  at  that  point.  When  the 
fog  rose,  the  slopes  of  the  opposite  hills  were  semi- 
covered  with  troops  the  whole  distance  from  opposite 
Fredericksburg  to  a  point  nearly  opposite  the  mouth 
of  the  Massaponix.  The  question  was  whether  they 
were  ostentatiously  displayed  as  a  feint,  or  whether  they 
were  massed  for  crossing.  The  troops  which  had  crossed 
were  seen  throwing  up  breastworks  covering  the  bridges 
and  also  epaulments  for  artillery;  but  it  was  impossible 
to  discover  the  strength  of  the  force  already  across,  as 
below  the  deep  banks  of  the  river  there  was  ample  space 
for  massing  a  large  body  of  troops  out  of  our  sight. 
There  appeared  no  attempt  to  make  a  crossing  at  Fred- 
ericksburg, or  to  move  up  towards  the  town. 

Some  artillery  was  put  in  position  on  the  hill  near 
Hamilton's  Crossing  on  my  right,  and  in  rear  of  my 
left.  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  now  under  command  of 
Brigadier  General  Rodes,  was  soon  brought  up,  and  put 
in  position  on  my  right,  extending  across  the  Mas- 
saponix, one  brigade  being  placed  below  that  creek  across 
the  River  road,  so  as  to  guard  the  ford.  A  Whitworth 
gun,   of  very  long  range,   was   also   posted   below  the 

194 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Massaponix  out  of  range  of  the  enemy's  guns  across 
the  river  and  in  position  to  partially  enfilade  them. 

The  remaining  divisions  of  Jackson's  corps  were 
brought  up  during  the  day,  and  A.  P.  Hill's  was  put  in 
position  in  a  second  line  in  rear  of  mine.  Trimble's 
division  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General 
Colston  arrived  very  late  in  the  afternoon  and  was  placed 
in  reserve  in  the  rear.  Barksdale's  brigade  already 
occupied  the  town  of  Fredericksburg,  and  the  remaining 
brigades  of  McLaws'  division  were  brought  up  and 
placed  in  position  on  the  left  of  my  line,  one  of  his 
brigades  connecting  with  my  left,  which  was  now  drawn 
back  from  the  railroad,  and  a  shorter  line  made  across 
to  Deep  Eun,  to  connect  it  with  McLaws'  right.  For 
the  greater  part  of  the  way  the  railroad  track  furnished 
a  very  good  protection,  and  it  was  strengthened  by 
throwing  up  embankments,  the  line  being  advanced  a 
little  in  front  on  the  left  of  my  centre  where  there  was 
a  rise  in  the  ground  above  the  level  of  the  road.  In 
order  to  occupy  the  whole  of  the  line  my  brigades  had 
to  be  extended  out,  as  the  division  was  not  strong  enough 
to  man  it  fully. 

During  the  day  the  enemy  made  no  attempt  to  ad- 
vance against  us  in  force  with  his  infantry,  and  his 
skirmishers  were  effectually  kept  from  the  River  road 
by  mine,  and  on  the  right  Rodes'  skirmishers,  which  ex- 
tended from  the  right  of  mine  around  to  the  river  above 
the  Massaponix,  prevented  any  movement  in  that  direc- 
tion. There  was  some  artillery  firing,  and  one  Whit- 
worth  gun  from  across  the  Massaponix  played  with  very 
considerable  effect  on  the  bottoms  on  the  enemy's  left. 
Large  bodies  of  the  infantry  on  the  opposite  slopes  oc- 
casionally moved  down  towards  the  river,  where  they 
were  concealed  from  our  view  by  the  bank  on  the  south 
side,  which  is  the  highest. 

I  retained  my  position  on  the  front  line  during  the 
night,  which  passed  quietly.     The  next  day  there  was 

195 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

very  little  change  in  the  appearances  in  front.  The 
enemy  had  made  strong  tetes  du  pont  covering  his 
bridges,  and  was  constructing  a  line  of  entrenchments 
connecting  the  two,  passing  in  front  of  the  Pratt  and 
Bernard  houses,  and  extending  below  the  lower  bridge. 

There  was  this  day  some  apparent  diminution  of  the 
infantry  in  view  on  the  opposite  slopes,  but  there  were 
many  heavy  guns  in  battery  on  the  heights  and  a  very 
large  force  of  infantry  still  visible.  There  were  some 
demonstrations  with  the  infantry  on  the  north  bank, 
some  skirmish  firing,  and  some  artillery  firing  also,  but 
the  enemy  on  the  south  bank  did  not  appear  at  all  en- 
terprising, and  rather  contracted  his  lines  on  his  left, 
his  skirmishers  retiring  before  ours  which  were  pushed 
forward  on  that  flank.  The  indications  were  that  it  was 
a  mere  demonstration  on  our  front,  to  cloak  a  more 
serious  move  in  some  other  quarter,  and  so  it  turned 
out  to  be.  When  this  was  discovered,  it  is  quite  prob- 
able that  we  might  have  destroyed  the  comparatively 
small  force  on  the  south  bank  by  a  movement  against  it 
from  our  line,  but  this  would  not  have  compensated  us 
for  the  loss  we  would,  in  all  probability,  have  sustained 
from  the  enemy's  heavy  guns. 

General  Lee  had  ascertained  that  by  far  the  largest 
portion  of  Hooker's  army  had  crossed  the  Rappahannock 
and  Rapidan  Rivers  above  their  junction,  and  were  mov- 
ing down  on  his  left.  He  therefore  determined  to  move 
up  with  the  greater  part  of  his  own  army  to  meet  that 
force,  which  was  watched  by  Anderson's  division  of 
Longstreet's  corps  and  a  portion  of  Stuart's  cavalry. 
Accordingly  late  on  the  afternoon  of  the  30th  I  was 
instructed  by  General  Jackson  to  retain  my  position  on 
the  line,  and,  with  my  division  and  some  other  troops  to 
be  placed  at  my  disposal,  to  watch  the  enemy  confronting 
me  while  the  remainder  of  the  army  was  absent.  Barks- 
dale's  brigade  occupying  Fredericksburg  and  the  heights 
in  rear,  was  directed  to  retain  his  position,  as  was  also 
a  portion  of  General  Pendleton's  reserve  artillery,  which 

196 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

occupied  positions  on  Marye's  and  Lee's  Hills,  and  the 
whole  was  placed  under  my  command.  In  addition,  Gra- 
ham's battery  of  artillery  of  four  guns,  two  twenty 
pounders  and  two  ten  pounders,  Parrots,  posted  on  the 
hill  on  my  right,  was  left  with  me,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Andrews  was  ordered  to  report  to  me  with  his  battalion 
of  four  batteries  with  twelve  pieces,  to-wit:  six 
Napoleons,  four  three-inch  rifles,  and  two  ten  pounder 
Parrots.  A  Whitworth  gun  under  Lieutenant  Tunis  was 
also  left  at  my  disposal  and  posted  on  the  right  across 
the  Massaponix.  With  the  rest  of  the  army  near  Fred- 
ericksburg comprising  the  other  three  divisions  of  Jack- 
son's corps,  and  three  brigades  of  McLaws'  division, 
General  Lee  moved  on  the  night  of  the  30th  and  the 
morning  of  the  1st  of  May  towards  Chancellorsville  to 
meet  Hooker. 

Before  leaving,  General  Lee  instructed  me  to  watch 
the  enemy  and  try  to  hold  him;  to  conceal  the  weak- 
ness of  my  force,  and  if  compelled  to  yield  before  over- 
powering numbers,  to  fall  back  towards  Guiney's  depot 
where  our  supplies  were,  protecting  them  and  the  rail- 
road; and  I  was  further  instructed  to  join  the  main  body 
of  the  army  in  the  event  that  the  enemy  disappeared 
from  my  front,  or  so  diminished  his  force  as  to  render 
it  prudent  to  do  so,  leaving  at  Fredericksburg  only  such 
force  as  might  be  necessary  to  protect  the  town  against 
any  force  the  enemy  might  leave  behind. 

The  force  which  had  made  the  demonstration  on  our 
front  consisted  at  first  of  the  1st,  3rd,  and  6th  corps  of 
Hooker's  army,  under  the  command  of  Major  General 
Sedgwick.  The  3rd  corps  moved  to  join  Hooker  during 
the  30th,  but  the  1st  and  6th  remained  in  my  front  still 
demonstrating.  In  his  testimony  before  the  Congres- 
sional Committee  on  the  war,  Hooker  stated  that  the 
6th  corps,  according  to  the  returns  of  the  30th  of  April, 
1863,  numbered  26,233  present  for  duty.  Sedgwick  says 
that  the  6th  corps  numbered  only  22,000  when  it  crossed 
the    river.      Taking    the    medium    between    them,    the 

197 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

effective  strength  may  be  put  down  at  24,000,  which 
General  A.  P.  Howe,  commanding  one  of  the  divisions, 
says  he  was  informed,  at  headquarters  of  the  corps,  it 
was.  The  first  corps  must  have  numbered  at  least  16,000 
and  perhaps  more,  so  that  I  must  have  been  left  con- 
fronting at  least  40,000  men  in  these  two  corps,  besides 
the  stationary  batteries  on  Stafford  Heights  and  Gib- 
bon's division  of  the  2nd  corps  which  was  just  above, 
near  Falmouth,  and,  according  to  Hooker's  statement, 
numbered  over  6,000  for  duty  on  the  30th. 

My  division  by  the  last  tri-monthly  field  return  which 
was  made  on  the  20th  of  April,  and  is  now  before  me,  had 
present  for  duty  548  officers  and  7,331  enlisted  men, 
making  a  total  of  7,879.  It  had  increased  none,  and  I 
could  not  have  carried  into  action  7,500  in  all,  officers  and 
men,  and  not  more  than  7,000  muskets,  as  in  camp  when 
everything  was  quiet,  a  number  of  men  reported  for  duty, 
who  were  not  actually  able  to  take  the  field.  I  had  already 
lost  about  150  men  in  the  resistance  which  was  made  at 
the  lower  crossing.  Barksdale's  brigade  did  not  prob- 
ably exceed  1,500  men  for  duty,  if  it  reached  that  number. 
I  haa,  therefore,  not  exceeding  9,000  infantry  officers 
and  men  in  all,  being  very  little  over  8,000  muskets ;  and 
in  addition  I  had  Anderson's  battalion  with  twelve  guns; 
Graham's  four  guns;  Tunis',  Whitworths,  and  portions 
of  Watson's;  Cabell's  and  Cutt's  battalions  under  Gen- 
eral Pendleton,  not  numbering  probably  thirty  guns.  I 
think  45  guns  must  have  covered  all  my  artillery,  and 
these  were  nothing  to  compare  with  the  enemy's  in  weight 
of  metal. 

The  foregoing  constituted  the  means  I  had  for  occupy- 
ing and  holding  a  line  of  at  least  six  miles  in  length, 
against  the  enemy's  heavy  force  of  infantry,  and  his  far 
more  numerous  and  heavier  and  better  appointed  artil- 
lery. It  was  impossible  to  occupy  the  whole  line,  and 
the  interval  between  Deep  Run  and  the  foot  of  Lee's  Hill 
had  to  be  left  vacant,  watched  by  skirmishers,  protected 
only  by  a  cross  fire  of  artillery.     I  could  spare  no  in- 

198 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

fantry  from  the  right,  as  that  was  much  the  weakest 
point  of  the  line,  and  the  force  which  had  crossed,  and 
which  exceeded  my  whole  strength,  was  below  Deep  Run, 
and  confronting  my  own  division.  Andrews'  artillery 
was  placed  in  position  on  the  morning  of  the  1st  as  fol- 
lows: four  Napoleons  and  two  rifles  were  placed  under 
Major  Latimer,  near  the  left  of  the  line  occupied  by  my 
division,  behind  some  epaulments  that  had  been  made  on 
that  part  of  the  line ;  two  Parrots  were  placed  with  Gra- 
ham's  guns  on  the  hill  on  my  right,  and  two  Napoleons 
and  two  rifles  were  posted  to  the  right  of  Hamilton '3 
Crossing,  near  a  grove  of  pines,  the  Whitworth  gun 
being  posted  on  a  height  across  the  Massaponix  so  as 
to  have  a  flank  fire  on  the  enemy  if  he  advanced,  and  it 
was  without  support.  Colonel  Andrews  had  charge  of 
all  of  the  artillery  on  this  part  of  the  line,  that  on 
Marye's  and  Lee's  Hills  was  under  the  immediate  super- 
intendence of  General  Pendleton,  and  some  of  the  bat- 
teries were  so  posted  as  to  have  a  cross  fire  on  the  upper 
part  of  the  valley  of  Deep  Run. 

The  enemy  remained  quiet  on  the  1st,  except  in 
demonstrating  by  manoeuvres  of  his  troops,  ana1  there 
was  no  firing  on  that  day.  His  line  of  entrenchments, 
covering  the  two  bridges,  had  been  completed,  and  he 
still  displayed  a  heavy  force  of  infantry,  consisting  of 
the  two  corps  under  Sedgwick.  The  ensuing  night  also 
passed  quietly,  and  during  it  a  battery  of  four  Napoleons 
was  sent  by  General  Pendleton  to  report  to  Colonel 
Andrews,  and  was  posted  with  the  four  guns  near  the 
pines  on  the  right  of  the  crossing. 

The  morning  of  the  2nd  opened  with  appearances 
pretty  much  the  same  as  they  had  been  the  day  before ; 
if  anything  there  was  more  infantry  in  view  on  the  north 
bank  than  had  appeared  the  previous  day.  Colonel 
Andrews  was  ordered  early  in  the  day  to  feel  the  enemy 
with  his  guns,  and  accordingly  Latimer  opened  with  his 
two  rifle  guns  on  the  enemy's  position  near  Deep  Run, 
and  Graham's  and  Brown's  Parrots  opened  on  the  in- 

199 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

fantry  and  batteries  below  and  near  the  Pratt  house. 
Latimer's  fire  was  not  returned,  but  Graham's  and 
Brown's  was  responded  to  by  two  of  the  batteries  on 
the  north  bank  and  some  guns  on  the  south  side.  Shortly 
afterwards  the  infantry  and  artillery  at  the  lower  cross- 
ing disappeared  behind  the  bank  of  the  river,  and  that 
crossing  was  abandoned. 

During  the  morning  I  rode  to  Lee's  Hill  for  the  pur- 
pose of  observing  the  enemy's  movements  from  that 
point,  and  I  observed  a  considerable  portion  of  his  in- 
fantry in  motion  up  the  opposite  river  bank.  While  I 
was,  in  company  with  Generals  Barksdale  and  Pendle- 
ton, observing  the  enemy's  manoeuvre  and  trying  to  ascer- 
tain what  it  meant,  at  about  11  o'clock  a.m.,  Colonel  R. 
H.  Chilton,  of  General  Lee's  staff,  came  to  me  with  a 
verbal  order  to  move  up  immediately  towards  Chancel- 
lorsville  with  my  whole  force,  except  a  brigade  of  infantry 
and  Pendleton's  reserve  artillery,  and  to  leave  at  Fred- 
ericksburg the  brigade  of  infantry  and  a  part  of  the 
reserve  artillery  to  be  selected  by  General  Pendleton, 
with  instructions  to  the  commander  of  this  force  to  watch 
the  enemy's  movements,  and  keep  him  in  check  if  pos- 
sible, but  if  he  advanced  with  too  heavy  a  force  to  retire 
on  the  road  to  Spottsylvania  Court-House — General 
Pendleton  being  required  to  send  the  greater  part  of  his 
reserve  artillery  to  the  rear  at  once. 

This  order  took  me  very  much  by  surprise,  and  I 
remarked  to  Colonel  Chilton  that  I  could  not  retire  my 
troops  without  their  being  seen  by  the  enemy,  whose 
position  on  Stafford  Heights  not  only  overlooked  ours, 
but  who  had  one  or  two  balloons  which  he  was  constantly 
sending  up  from  the  heights  to  make  observations,  and 
stated  that  he  would  inevitably  move  over  and  take 
possession  of  Fredericksburg  and  the  surrounding 
Heights.  The  Colonel  said  he  presumed  General  Lee 
understood  all  this,  but  that  it  was  much  more  important 
for  him  to  have  troops  where  he  was,  than  at  Fredericks- 
burg, and  if  he  defeated  the  enemy  there  he  could  easily 

200 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

retake  Fredericksburg;  he  called  my  attention  to  the 
fact,  which  was  apparent  to  us  all,  that  there  was  a  very 
heavy  force  of  infantry  massed  on  the  slopes  near  Fal- 
mouth which  had  moved  up  from  below,  and  stated  that 
he  had  no  doubt  the  greater  portion  of  the  force  on  the 
other  side  was  in  motion  to  reinforce  Hooker.  He  re- 
peated his  orders  with  great  distinctness  in  the  presence 
of  General  Pendleton,  and  in  reply  to  questions  from  us, 
said  that  there  could  be  no  mistake  in  his  orders. 

This  was  very  astounding  to  us,  as  we  were  satisfied 
that  we  were  then  keeping  away  from  the  army,  opposed 
to  General  Lee,  a  much  larger  body  of  troops  than  my 
force  could  engage  or  neutralize  if  united  to  the  army 
near  Chancellorsville.  It  is  true  that  there  was  the  force 
massed  near  Falmouth  and  the  indications  were  that  it 
was  moving  above,  but  still  there  was  a  much  larger  force 
of  infantry  stationed  below,  which  evinced  no  disposi- 
tion to  move.  While  we  were  conversing,  information 
was  brought  me  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  his  lower 
crossing,  and  that  our  skirmishers  had  advanced  to  the 
Pratt  house,  but  he  still,  however,  maintained  his  position 
at  the  mouth  of  Deep  Creek  with  a  division  of  infantry 
and  a  number  of  guns  on  our  side  of  the  river. 

The  orders  as  delivered  to  me  left  me  no  discretion, 
and  believing  that  General  Lee  understood  his  own  neces- 
sities better  than  I  possibly  could,  I  did  not  feel  justified 
in  acting  on  my  own  judgment,  and  I  therefore  de- 
termined to  move  as  directed.  It  subsequently  turned 
out  that  Colonel  Chilton  had  misunderstood  General 
Lee's  orders,  which  were  that  I  should  make  the  move- 
ment indicated  if  the  enemy  did  not  have  a  sufficient 
force  in  my  front  to  detain  the  whole  of  mine,  and  it 
was  to  be  left  to  me  to  judge  of  that,  the  orders,  in  fact, 
being  similar  to  those  given  me  at  first.  It  also  turned 
out  that  the  troops  seen  massed  near  Falmouth  were  the 
1st  corps  under  Reynolds,  moving  up  to  reinforce  Hooker, 
and  that  the  6th  corps,  Sedgwick's  own,  remained  behind. 

When  Colonel  Chilton  arrived,  General  Pendleton  was 

201 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

making  arrangements  to  move  some  artillery  to  the  left 
to  open  on  the  columns  massed  near  Falmouth,  but  the 
order  brought  rendered  it  necessary  to  desist  from  that 
attempt  in  order  to  make  preparations  for  the  with- 
drawal. 

My  division  occupied  a  line  which  was  in  full  view 
from  the  opposite  hills  except  where  it  ran  through  the 
small  strip  of  woods  projecting  beyond  the  railroad, 
and  the  withdrawal  had  to  be  made  with  the  probability 
of  its  being  discovered  by  the  enemy.  I  determined  to 
leave  Hays'  brigade  to  occupy  the  hills  in  rear  of  Fred- 
ericksburg with  one  regiment  deployed  as  skirmishers 
on  the  River  road  confronting  the  force  at  the  mouth 
of  Deep  Run,  and  also  to  leave  one  of  Barksdale's  regi- 
ments, which  was  already  in  Fredericksburg  and  along 
the  bank  of  the  river,  picketing  from  Falmouth  to  the 
lower  end  of  the  town. 

The  orders  were  given  at  once  and  the  withdrawal 
commenced,  but  it  had  to  be  made  with  great  caution  so 
as  to  attract  as  little  attention  as  possible  and  therefore 
required  much  time.  General  Pendleton  was  to  remain 
at  Fredericksburg,  according  to  the  orders,  and  the  with- 
drawal of  such  of  his  artillery  as  was  to  be  sent  to  the 
rear  was  entrusted  to  him  and  executed  under  his  direc- 
tions. The  Whitworth  gun  was  ordered  to  the  rear 
with  the  reserve  artillery  and  Andrews'  battalion  and 
Graham's  battery  were  ordered  to  follow  my  column, 
Richardson's  battery,  which  was  on  the  right,  being  re- 
turned to  General  Pendleton's  control.  When  the  with- 
drawal commenced,  the  enemy  sent  up  a  balloon  and  I 
felt  sure  that  he  had  discovered  the  movement,  but  it 
turned  out  that  he  did  not.*  It  was  late  in  the  afternoon 
before  my  column  was  in  readiness  to  move,  and  Barks- 
dale  was  ordered  to  bring  up  the  rear  with  the  three 
regiments  left  after  detaching  the  one  on  picket,  as  soon 

*  Professor  Lowe's  balloon  reconnaissances  so  signally  failed  on 
this  occasion  and  in  the  operations  at  Chancellorsville,  that  they  were 
abandoned  for  the  rest   of  the  war. 

202 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

as  lie  was  relieved  by  Hays.  As  soon  as  the  troops  were 
in  readiness  the  three  brigades  of  my  division  moved 
along  the  Ridge  road  from  Hamilton's  Crossing  to  the 
Telegraph  road,  and  then  along  a  cross-road  leading  into 
the  Plank  road,  Barksdale  going  out  on  the  Telegraph 
road  to  join  the  column.  Upon  getting  near  the  Plank 
road,  a  little  before  dark,  I  received  a  note  from  General 
Lee  which  informed  me  that  he  did  not  expect  me  to 
join  him  unless,  in  my  judgment,  the  withdrawal  of  my 
troops  could  be  made  with  safety,  and  I  think  he  used 
the  expression  that  if  by  remaining  I  could  neutralize 
and  hold  in  check  a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  I  could  do 
as  much  or  perhaps  more  service  than  by  joining  him. 

I  had  proceeded  so  far  that  I  determined  to  go  on, 
as  the  probability  was  that  if  the  enemy  had  discovered 
my  movement,  the  mischief  would  be  done  before  I  could 
get  back,  and  that  I  would  not  be  able  to  recover  the 
lost  ground,  but  might  deprive  General  Lee  entirely  of 
the  use  of  my  troops.  When  the  head  of  my  column  had 
reached  the  Plank  road  and  moved  up  it  about  a  mile,  a 
courier  came  to  me  from  General  Barksdale,  stating  that 
the  enemy  had  advanced  against  Hays  with  a  very  large 
force,  and  that  the  latter  and  General  Pendleton  had 
sent  word  that  all  of  the  artillery  would  be  captured 
unless  they  had  immediate  relief.  The  courier  also  stated 
that  General  Barksdale  had  started  back  with  his  own 
regiments. 

I  determined  to  return  at  once  to  my  former  position, 
and  accordingly  halted  the  column,  faced  it  about  and 
moved  back,  sending  my  Adjutant  General,  Major  Hale, 
to  inform  General  Lee  of  the  fact.  The  fact  turned  out 
to  be  that  just  before  dark  Sedgwick  had  crossed  the 
remainder  of  his  corps  and  moved  towards  the  River 
road  below,  called  also  the  Bowling  Green  road,  forcing 
from  it  the  7th  Louisiana  Regiment,  under  Colonel  Penn, 
which  occupied  that  road  and  fell  back  to  the  line  on 
the  railroad  after  skirmishing  sharply  with  the  enemy. 
There  had  been  no  advance  against  Hays  at  Fredericks- 

203 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

burg,  and  Sedgwick  had  halted  with  his  whole  force 
and  formed  line  on  the  river,  occupying  with  his  advance 
force  the  road  from  which  Colonel  Penn  had  been  driven. 

We  regained  our  former  lines  without  trouble  about 
ten  or  eleven  o'clock  at  night,  throwing  out  skirmishers 
towards  the  River  road.  Barksdale  occupied  his  old 
position  and  Hays'  returned  during  the  night  to  the 
right  of  my  line.  The  night  passed  quietly  on  the  right 
after  my  return  except  some  picket  firing  on  the  front, 
but,  just  before  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  the  3rd,  I 
was  informed  by  General  Barksdale  that  the  enemy  had 
thrown  a  bridge  across  at  Fredericksburg  and  was  mov- 
ing into  the  town.  The  General  had  ridden  to  see  me 
in  person  to  request  reinforcements,  and  I  ordered  Hays' 
brigade  to  return  to  the  left  as  soon  as  possible,  directing 
General  Barksdale  to  post  the  brigade  where  it  was 
needed,  as  he  understood  the  ground  thoroughly.  In 
reply  to  a  question  from  me,  he  informed  me  that  the 
crossing  had  not  been  resisted  by  his  regiment,  which 
had  retired  skirmishing  on  the  approach  of  the  enemy, 
as  the  struggle  was  deemed  useless,  and  it  undoubtedly 
would  have  been.  This  was  a  mistake  about  the  bridge 
being  laid  at  that  time,  but  it  was  a  very  natural  one, 
as  Sedgwick  moved  a  portion  of  his  force  up  the  river 
into  the  town,  while  doubtless  preparations  were  making 
for  laying  down  the  bridge  early  in  the  morning. 

Barksdale 's  brigade  was  then  posted  as  follows: 
the  21st  Mississippi  Regiment  occupied  the  trenches  on 
Marye's  Hill  between  Marye's  house  and  the  Plank 
road;  the  18th,  the  stone  wall  at  the  foot  of  the  hill, 
where  it  was  subsequently  reinforced  by  three  companies 
from  the  21st;  the  17th,  the  trenches  on  the  front  slope 
of  Lee's  Hill;  and  the  13th,  the  trenches  further  to  the 
right.  Squires'  battery  of  the  Washington  Artillery  was 
posted  in  the  works  on  Marye's  Hill,  and  the  rest  of 
Pendleton's  guns  on  Lee's  Hill  on  the  front  crest  and 
at  positions  further  to  the  right,  so  as  to  cover  the  in- 
terval between  the  hills  and  the  upper  part  of  Deep 

204 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Run.  There  were  no  troops  on  the  left  of  the  Plank 
road  along  the  crest  overlooking  the  canal.  Very  soon 
after  daylight,  the  head  of  Sedgwick's  column,  which 
had  moved  up  during  the  night  from  below,  emerged  from 
the  town  and  advanced  against  the  defences  at  Marye's 
Hill,  but  was  repulsed  by  the  fire  of  Barksdale's  infantry 
and  the  artillery  posted  there. 

When  it  became  sufficiently  light  to  see,  it  was  dis- 
covered by  us  that  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river  was 
bare  of  troops  and  it  was  very  apparent  that  the  enemy's 
whole  force  lately  confronting  us  on  that  side  was  across 
for  the  purpose  of  a  serious  move,  and  the  question  was 
as  to  where  it  would  be  made.  The  heaviest  force  in 
view  was  in  front  of  the  crossing  below  the  mouth  of 
Deep  Run,  and  there  were  at  that  point  a  number  of 
pieces  of  artillery.  The  enemy,  however,  was  also  demon- 
strating against  Marye's  Hill  with  both  infantry  and 
artillery,  but  the  mass  of  his  infantry  there  was  con- 
cealed from  our  view,  and  there  were  indications  also 
as  if  he  might  attempt  to  pass  up  the  valley  of  Deep  Run 
on  the  left  bank.  The  fact  was  that  there  was  one 
division  covering  the  bridge,  one  between  Deep  Run  and 
Hazel  Run,  and  one  masked  in  Fredericksburg.  The 
skirmishers  from  my  division  succeeded  in  getting  to  the 
River  road  on  the  right,  but  the  position  next  Deep  Run 
was  held  by  too  strong  a  force  to  be  dislodged. 

Very  shortly  after  light  the  enemy  commenced  demon- 
strating at  Deep  Run  as  if  to  turn  the  left  of  my  division 
held  by  Hoke's  brigade,  and  threw  bodies  of  troops  up 
the  ravine  formed  by  the  high  banks  of  the  run,  while 
there  were  demonstrations  also  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
run.  Latimer  opened  with  his  guns  on  the  ravine  and 
the  advancing  bodies  of  infantry  where  they  could  be 
seen ;  but  a  considerable  body  succeeded  in  getting  up  to 
that  part  of  the  railroad  next  to  the  run  and  took  posi- 
tion behind  it,  where  they  were  protected  against  the 
fire  of  our  artillery.  The  enemy  opened  with  two  or 
three  batteries  on  Latimer's  guns,  and  there  ensued  a 

205 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

brisk  artillery  duel.  Andrews  brought  Graham's  and 
Brown's  guns  from  the  right  to  replace  Latimer's 
Napoleons,  and  also  Carpenter's  two  rifles  to  take  posi- 
tion with  Latimer's  two,  and  the  firing  was  continued 
for  some  time,  as  well  against  the  enemy's  infantry  as 
against  his  artillery.  Finally  Smith's  brigade,  which  was 
on  the  right  of  Hoke's,  moved  out  and  dislodged  the 
infantry  which  had  taken  position  behind  the  railroad 
embankment,  and  as  it  retired  the  artillery  played  on 
it.  This  ended  the  demonstrations  at  Deep  Run,  and 
soon  heavy  bodies  of  infantry  were  seen  passing  up 
towards  Fredericksburg,  upon  which  Andrews'  batteries 
opened. 

I  had  remained  on  the  right  with  my  division,  as  I 
knew  that  that  was  the  weakest  part  of  our  line,  and  I 
was  very  apprehensive  that  the  enemy  would  attempt  to 
cut  my  force  in  two  by  moving  up  Deep  Run,  which 
would  have  been  the  most  dangerous  move  to  us  he  could 
have  made.  I,  however,  kept  a  lookout  upon  the  move- 
ments above  and  was  in  constant  communication  with 
Generals  Barksdale  and  Pendleton,  from  whom  I  received 
several  reports  that  they  had  repulsed  all  the  attacks 
upon  their  position,  and  thought  they  could  hold  it. 
Shortly  after  sunrise,  and  after  the  repulse  of  the  first 
attack  on  Barksdale 's  position,  Gibbon's  division,  of  the 
enemy's  2nd  corps,  was  crossed  over  into  Fredericksburg 
on  the  bridge  which  had  been  laid  there,  and  it  was  then 
moved  above  the  town  for  the  purpose  of  turning  the 
position  on  that  flank,  but  this  effort  was  balked  by  the 
canal,  over  which  there  was  no  bridge ;  it  then  attempted 
to  effect  the  movement  by  repairing  a  bridge  over  the 
canal,  the  planking  from  which  had  been  torn  up,  but 
Hays '  brigade  had  arrived  by  that  time,  and  four  of  his 
regiments  filed  into  the  trenches  on  the  left  of  the  Plank 
road  just  in  time  to  thwart  this  attempt,  and  another 
made  shortly  afterwards  to  cross  the  canal  at  the  upper 
end  of  the  same  division. 

Hays'  brigade  had  had  a  long  distance  to  march  in 
order  to  avoid  the  enemy,  and  when  it  arrived  General 

206 


f  c 

°  § 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Barksdale  placed  one  of  the  regiments,  the  6th  Louisiana, 
Colonel  Monaghan,  on  his  right  in  the  trenches  near 
what  was  known  as  the  Howison  house,  and  the  other 
four  were  sent  to  man  the  trenches  along  the  crest  of  the 
hills  on  the  left  of  the  Plank  road,  where  they  arrived  just 
in  time  to  thwart  the  attempt  to  cross  the  canal  as 
before  stated.  The  enemy's  guns  from  the  north  side 
of  the  river,  as  well  as  from  positions  on  the  south  side 
above  and  below  the  town,  continued  to  fire  upon  the 
positions  occupied  by  Barksdale 's  men  and  our  artillery, 
but  the  latter  generally  reserved  its  fire  for  the  infantry. 
An  attempt  to  turn  the  right  of  the  position  by  the 
right  bank  of  Hazel  Eun  was  repulsed  by  Pendleton's 
artillery  and  every  effort  to  get  possession  of  the  heights 
was  baffled  and  repulsed  until  after  11  a.m.,  when  two 
large  attacking  columns  of  a  division  each  were  formed, 
one  of  the  divisions  from  below  being  brought  up  for 
that  purpose.  One  of  these  columns  moved  against 
Marye's  Hill  and  the  other  against  Lee's  Hill,  both  at 
the  same  time,  while  Gibbon's  division  demonstrated 
against  the  heights  above  with  storming  parties  in  front. 
The  column  that  moved  against  Marye's  Hill,  consisting 
of  Newton's  division,  made  its  attack  on  the  famous  stone 
wall  defended  by  a  regiment  and  three  companies,  and 
its  storming  parties  were  twice  broken  and  driven  back 
in  disorder  by  the  gallant  little  band  that  held  that 
position,  but  constantly  returning  to  the  attack  with 
overwhelming  numbers  the  enemy  finally  succeeded  in 
carrying  the  work,  after  having  sustained  terrible 
slaughter.*    Then  passing  around  the  foot  of  the  hill  a 

*  Sedgwick,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Congressional  Committee 
on  the  War,  says :  "  I  lost  a  thousand  men  in  less  than  ten  minutes' 
time  in  taking  the  heights  of  Fredericksburg." 

General  Barksdale  informed  me  that  just  before  this  final  attack 
was  made  the  enemy  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to  Colonel  Griffin,  commanding 
the  force  behind  the  stone  wall,  asking  permission  to  take  care  of  his 
wounded  lying  in  front  under  our  fire,  which  permission  was  im- 
prudently granted  by  Colonel  Griffin,  without  his  knowledge,  and  that 
the  weakness  of  the  force  at  that  point  was  thus  discovered,  and 
immediately  af  terwards  the  assaulting  columns  advanced. 

207 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

portion  of  the  attacking  column  came  up  in  the  rear,  cap- 
turing Squires'  guns  (which  had  been  fought  to  the 
last  minute),  and  along  with  them  the  Captain  and  his 
company. 

The  column  sent  against  Lee's  Hill  did  not  succeed  in 
carryiDg  it  by  assault,  but  was  kept  at  bay  until  Marye's 
Hill  had  fallen,  when  the  position  being  untenable,  the 
regiments  defending  it  were  withdrawn  up  the  hill,  and 
the  enemy  was  thus  able  to  take  possession  of  that  also. 
The  artillery  on  both  hills  had  done  good  service  in  aid- 
ing to  repel  all  the  previous  assaults  and  to  resist  this. 
The  companies  of  the  21st  Mississippi  in  the  trenches 
on  the  left  of  Marye's  Hill  were  compelled  to  retire  to 
prevent  being  surrounded  and  captured,  as  were  also 
Hays'  regiments  in  the  trenches  further  to  the  left,  the 
latter  being  compelled  to  cross  the  Plank  road  higher  up, 
as  their  retreat  on  the  Telegraph  road  was  cut  off.  The 
enemy  got  on  Hays'  flank  and  rear  before  he  was  aware 
the  hill  on  his  right  was  taken,  and  the  consequence  was 
that  he  lost  a  few  prisoners.  He  succeeded,  however,  in 
making  good  his  retreat. 

General  Barksdale  partially  rallied  his  regiments  and 
made  obstinate  resistance  to  the  enemy's  advance  on  the 
Telegraph  road,  falling  back  gradually  before  the  large 
force  opposing  him.  The  greater  portion  of  the  guns 
on  Lee's  Hill  were  carried  off,  but  some  were  lost  be- 
cause the  horses  belonging  to  them  had  been  carried  to 
the  rear  to  be  out  of  reach  of  the  enemy's  shells,  and 
could  not  be  got  up  in  time  to  carry  off  the  pieces.  Ten 
guns  were  lost  in  all,  including  those  taken  at  Marye's 
Hill,  but  two  were  subsequently  recovered,  making  our 
final  loss  in  that  respect  eight  pieces. 

Wilcox's  brigade  was  above  at  Banks'  Ford,  but  not 
under  my  command,  and  was  about  to  move  up  to  Chan- 
cellorsville,  but  hearing  that  the  enemy  was  advancing 
up  the  river,  General  Wilcox  hurried  to  the  vicinity  of 
Taylor's  house  at  the  extreme  left  of  the  line  with  two 
pieces  of  artillery  and  sixty  men,  and  putting  his  guns 

208 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

in  position,  opened  with  effect  on  a  portion  of  Gibbon's 
division  when  it  was  trying  to  effect  a  crossing  of  the 
canal  at  the  upper  end.  He  then  detained  his  brigade, 
and  subsequently  started  a  regiment  to  Barksdale's 
assistance  at  his  request,  but  before  it  arrived  Marye's 
Hill  had  been  taken  and  it  therefore  retired.  General 
Wilcox  subsequently  did  good  service  in  resisting  the 
enemy's  advance  up  the  Plank  road. 

While  these  events  were  transpiring  above,  I  was 
near  the  left  of  the  line  occupied  by  my  division,  and  in  a 
position  from  which  I  could  observe  a  good  deal  of  the 
movements,  but  could  not  see  Marye's  Hill  very  well. 
After  what  was  supposed  to  be  the  enemy's  effort  to 
move  up  Deep  Run  and  thus  break  our  lines  had  been 
thwarted,  and  when  I  saw  the  infantry  moving  up 
towards  Fredericksburg,  I  sent  one  of  my  aides,  Lieu- 
tenant Callaway,  to  Lee's  Hill,  to  give  notice  to  Generals 
Barksdale  and  Pendleton  and  to  ascertain  how  they  were 
getting  on.  After  he  had  been  gone  some  time,  I  became 
uneasy  and  determined  to  ride  up  myself. 

While  I  was  on  my  way  some  one  came  galloping  up 
in  my  rear  and  stated  that  some  person  below  had  seen 
the  enemy's  troops  and  flag  go  up  on  Marye's  Hill.  I 
did  not  think  this  could  be  so,  but  rode  on  rapidly,  hoping 
that  the  statement  was  untrue.  I  soon  met  a  courier  from 
General  Pendleton  with  a  note  stating  that  they  had  so 
far  repulsed  any  attack  and  could  hold  their  position. 
This  relieved  me  for  an  instant,  but  in  a  few  minutes 
Lieutenant  Callaway  came  galloping  with  the  informa- 
tion that  the  enemy  certainly  had  carried  the  heights, 
and  that  he  had  seen  his  attacking  column  ascending  them 
at  Marye's  house,  a  very  few  minutes  after  parting  with 
Generals  Barksdale  and  Pendleton,  who  were  on  Lee's 
Hill  and  who  had  just  stated  to  him  that  they  thought 
they  could  hold  the  position. 

I  at  once  sent  an  order  to  General  Gordon,  who  occu- 
pied my  right,  to  move  up  as  soon  as  possible  with  three 
of  his  regiments  over  the  road  I  was  following,  which  was 

14  209 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  nearest  practicable  one.  I  then  galloped  to  the 
Telegraph  road,  and  soon  met  Pendleton's  artillery  going 
rapidly  to  the  rear,  and  ordered  it  to  be  halted.  Going 
on  I  found  General  Barksdale  on  the  ridge  immediately 
in  rear  of  Lee's  Hill  rallying  his  men  and  skirmishing 
with  the  enemy  who  had  ascended  the  hill,  and  before 
whom  they  were  retiring  gradually  but  obstinately. 
Barksdale 's  men  were  rather  scattered,  but  the  6th 
Louisiana  had  retired  in  good  order  and  I  directed  it  to 
form  a  line,  and  Barksdale  to  halt  and  get  his  men  in 
line,  which  he  did.  I  also  ordered  a  battery  of  artillery 
to  be  brought  forward  into  action  and  soon  one  was  by 
my  side  and  unlimbered  but  did  not  fire. 

There  was  a  line  of  the  enemy  in  front  a  few  hundred 
yards  on  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and  I  turned  to  the  officer 
commanding  the  battery  and  asked  him  why  he  did  not 
fire,  to  which  he  replied,  "I  have  no  ammunition,  sir." 
I  ordered  another  to  be  brought  forward,  and  a  battery 
of  Howitzers,  from  Cabell's  battalion,  was  brought  up 
and  opened  with  canister.  The  enemy's  advance  had  been 
checked  by  the  demonstration,  but  he  soon  brought  up 
some  artillery  and  opened  on  us  at  short  range  with 
shrapnel  and  canister,  and  I  ordered  the  line  to  retire 
a  short  distance,  which  it  did  in  good  order,  taking  up 
another  position.  In  this  manner  we  continued  to  retire 
along  the  Telegraph  road  from  point  to  point,  taking  ad- 
vantage of  favorable  portions  of  the  ground  to  make  a 
stand  until  the  enemy  ceased  to  pursue.  I  then  ordered 
General  Barksdale  to  take  position  at  Cox's  house,  about 
two  miles  in  rear  of  Lee's  Hill,  where  the  first  cross- 
road leaves  the  Telegraph  road  to  get  into  the  Plank 
road,  and  to  establish  Hays  (to  whom  I  had  sent  a  mes- 
sage to  come  around  to  the  Telegraph  road)  on  the  line, 
as  well  as  Gordon's  regiments,  when  they  arrived. 

By  obtaining  possession  of  Lee's  Hill,  the  enemy  had 
obtained  a  position  from  which  he  could  completely 
enfilade  my  line  on  the  right,  and  as  soon  as  the  fore- 
going arrangements  were  made,  I  rode  rapidly  to  the 

210 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

right  and  threw  back  the  troops  there  into  a  second  line 
which  had  been  previously  prepared  in  the  rear,  and 
which  was  not  enfiladed;  and  Colonel  Andrews  was 
ordered  to  take  position  with  all  of  his  guns  on  the 
ridge  at  the  head  of  the  Deep  Run  valley,  so  as  to  protect 
the  left  flank  of  my  division  and  the  right  of  Barksdale's 
line. 

All  these  movements  were  made  without  molestation 
from  the  enemy.  Of  course  I  did  not  know  what  the 
purposes  of  the  enemy  were,  and  took  my  measures  to 
provide  as  well  as  I  could  for  any  emergency  that  might 
present  itself.  I  had  met  Gordon  with  his  three  regi- 
ments immediately  after  leaving  Barksdale,  and  directed 
him  to  join  the  latter.  After  making  the  dispositions  on 
the  right,  I  rode  back  to  Barksdale's  position  and  found 
his  line  established  with  Hays  and  Gordon  in  position. 

It  had  been  now  ascertained  that  the  enemy  was 
moving  up  the  Plank  road,  and  I  rode  out  to  a  position 
across  Hazel  Run,  from  which  I  could  see  the  moving 
columns  and  discovered  that  it  was  moving  very  slowly, 
and  that  it  finally  halted.  Lieutenant  Pitzer,  one  of 
my  aides,  had  been  at  Lee's  Hill  when  the  heights  were 
carried,  and  knowing  the  importance  of  the  affair  to 
General  Lee,  had  gone  at  once  to  give  him  the  informa- 
tion, as  he  knew  that  it  would  be  some  time  before  I 
could  be  informed  so  as  to  send  a  messenger  myself,  and 
thus  judiciously  anticipated  me  in  putting  General  Lee 
on  his  guard. 

While  the  events  thus  detailed  were  transpiring  on 
the  line  occupied  by  me,  a  great  battle  had  been  fought 
between  General  Lee's  forces  and  the  main  body  of 
Hooker's  army.  Hooker  had  crossed  the  river  above  and 
concentrated  four  corps  at  Chancellorsville  in  a  strong 
position,  and  Anderson's  division  of  Longstreet's  corps, 
Longstreet  himself  being  still  absent  with  two  of  his 
divisions,  had  watched  the  movement  of  the  enemy  and 
resisted  his  advance  column,  taking  position  on  the  Plank 
road  at  Tabernacle  Church.    McLaws'  division  and  the 

211 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

three  divisions  of  Jackson's  corps  had  moved  up  during 
the  night  of  the  30th  of  April  and  the  morning  of  the 
1st  of  May  and  united  with  Anderson.  Our  troops  had 
thus  moved  forward  on  the  Plank  road  and  the  stone 
turnpike,  Anderson's  and  McLaws'  divisions  in  front, 
and  Jackson's  divisions  following  Anderson's  on  the 
Plank  road,  and  had  driven  an  advanced  line  of  the 
enemy  back  to  within  a  mile  of  Chancellorsville  upon  his 
main  force. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  2nd,  Anderson's  and 
McLaws'  divisions,  with  the  exception  of  Wilcox's 
brigade  of  Anderson's  division,  which  had  been  sent  back 
to  Banks'  Ford,  and  Barksdale's  brigade  of  McLaws' 
division  which  was  at  Fredericksburg,  were  left  to  con- 
front the  enemy  on  the  side  next  to  Fredericksburg,  and 
Jackson  moved  with  his  three  divisions,  by  a  circuitous 
route  to  the  left,  to  gain  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  right. 
Late  in  the  afternoon,  General  Jackson  reached  the  rear 
of  the  enemy's  right  flank  about  three  miles  beyond 
Chancellorsville,  and  with  Rodes  in  front — followed  by 
Colston  with  Trimble's  division,  and  A.  P.  Hill, — ad- 
vanced at  once  with  great  vigor,  driving  the  enemy  before 
him,  carrying  position  after  position,  routing  entirely 
one  corps,  and  capturing  a  number  of  guns  and  prisoners, 
until  his  advance  was  arrested  by  the  abattis  in  front 
of  the  central  position  near  Chancellorsville.  Night  had 
come  on  by  this  time,  and  General  Jackson  ordered  A.  P. 
Hill's  division,  which  was  following  in  rear  of  the  other 
two,  to  the  front  to  take  the  place  of  the  latter.  He 
himself  went  to  the  front  to  reconnoitre  for  the  purpose 
of  ordering  another  advance,  and,  having  sent  an  order 
to  Hill  to  press  on,  while  returning  in  the  darkness  was 
shot  and  dangerously  wounded  *  under  an  unfortunate 
mistake,  by  a  part  of  Hill's  advancing  troops.    General 

*  Captain  R.  E.  Welbourn  : 

Some  conflicting  accounts  of  the  manner  in  which  General  Jackson 
was  shot  have  been  published,  and  as  you  were  with  him,  I  will  be 

212 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

A.  P.  Hill  was  soon  after  disabled  and  the  advance  was 
thus  arrested. 

When  Jackson's  guns  opened,  our  troops  on  the  right 
pressed  the  enemy's  left  heavily  to  prevent  any  troops 
being  sent  from  that  flank  against  Jackson,  but  no  attack 
in  front  was  made  then  and  night  put  an  end  to  the 
operations  in  that  quarter.  Hooker  had  been  joined 
during  the  day  by  the  1st  corps  brought  up  from  opposite 

very  much  obliged,  if  you  will  give,  me  all  the  details  of  the  affair. 
With  pleasant  recollections  of  your  official  connection  with  me, 

Yrs.  very  truly 
Lynchburg,  Feb.  12,  1873.  J.  A.  Early. 

General  J.  A.  Early: 

I  give  you  the  facts  relating  to  the  wounding  of  General  T.  J. 
Jackson.  As  the  details  of  the  battle  are  familiar  to  you,  I  will  begin 
with  Jackson's  movements  after  the  battle  was  over,  and  all  seemed 
quiet,  the  enemy  having  disappeared  from  our  immediate  front,  and 
all  firing  consequently  having  ceased.  Jackson  took  advantage  of  this 
lull  in  the  storm  to  relieve  Rodes'  troops  (who  had  been  fighting  and 
steadily  advancing  and  making  repeated  charges  from  the  time  the 
fight  began),  and  had  ordered  General  Hill  to  the  front  to  Relieve 
Rodes  with  his  fresh  troops,  directing  the  change  to  be  made  as 
quickly  as  possible.  We  were  within  a  half  mile  of  the  open  fields 
near  Chancellorsville,  where  the  enemy  was  supposed  to  be  strongly 
entrenched.  While  the  change  was  being  made  Jackson  manifested 
great  impatience  to  get  Hill's  troops  into  line  and  ready  to  move 
promptly,  and  to  accomplish  this  he  sent  the  members  of  his  staff 
with  orders  to  Hill  and  other  general  officers  to  hurry  up  the  move- 
ment. From  the  orders  sent  to  General  Stuart  it  was  evident  that 
his  intention  was  to  storm  the  enemy's  works  at  Chancellorsville  as 
soon  as  the  lines  were  formed,  and  before  the  enemy  recovered  from 
the  shock  and  confusion  of  the  previous  fighting,  and  to  place  the  left 
of  his  army  between  Hooker  and  the  river.  While  these  orders  were 
being  issued  Jackson  sat  on  his  horse  just  in  front  of  the  line  on  the 
pike.  From  this  point  he  sent  me  with  an  order  to  General  Hill.  I 
galloped  back  and  met  Hill,  in  about  50  yards,  riding  along  the  pike 
towards  General  Jackson.  I  turned  and  rode  with  him  to  his  lines,  he 
stopping  within  a  few  feet  of  their  front.  I  then  rode  immediately 
on  to  General  Jackson,  who  was  in  sight,  and  only  a  few  paces  in 
front  of  Hill,  just  in  the  position  I  had  left  him.  As  I  reached  him, 
he  sent  off  the  only  staff  officer  present,  with  orders  to  Hill  to  move 

213 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Fredericksburg,  but  at  the  close  of  the  fight  his  lines  had 
been  very  much  contracted,  and  his  troops  on  his  right 
greatly  scattered ;  and  early  in  the  night  he  telegraphed 
to  Sedgwick  to  cross  the  river  and  move  up  to  Chan- 
cellorsville  on  the  Plank  road,  which  dispatch  found 
Sedgwick  already  across. 

General  Jackson  had  been  entirely  disabled  by  his 
wound,  and  General  A.  P.  Hill  was  so  injured  as  to  be 
unable  to  command  in  the  field.    Brigadier  General  Rodes 

forward  as  soon  as  possible,  and  then  started  slowly  along  the  pike 
towards  the  enemy.  I  rode  at  his  left  side,  two  of  my  signal  men 
just  behind  us,  followed  by  couriers,  etc.,  in  columns  of  twos.  General 
Jackson  thought,  while  awaiting  Hill's  movements,  that  he  would  ride 
to  the  front,  as  far  as  the  skirmish  line,  or  pickets,  and  ascertain  what 
could  be  seen  or  heard  of  the  enemy  and  his  movements, — supposing 
there  was  certainly  a  line  of  skirmishers  in  front,  as  his  orders  were 
always  very  imperative  to  keep  a  skirmish  line  in  front  of  the  line  of 
battle.  When  we  had  ridden  only  a  few  rods  and  reached  a  point 
nearly  opposite  an  old  dismantled  house  in  the  woods  (near  the  road 
to  our  right)  and  while  I  was  delivering  to  him  General  Hill's  reply 
to  his  order — given  a  few  moments  before, — to  our  great  surprise  our 
little  party  was  fired  upon  by  about  a  battalion  or  probably  less  of 
our  troops,  a  little  to  our  right  and  to  the  right  of  the  pike,  the  balls 
passing  diagonally  across  the  pike  and  apparently  aimed  at  us.  There 
seemed  to  be  one  gun  discharged,  followed  almost  instantly  by  this 
volley.  The  single  gun  may  have  been  discharged  accidentally,  but 
seemed  to  have  been  taken  as  a  signal  by  the  troops,  to  announce  the 
approach  of  the. enemy.  I  hardly  think  the  troops  saw  us,  though 
they  could  hear  our  horses'  feet  on  the  pike  and  probably  fired  at 
random  in  the  supposed  direction  of  the  enemy.  However,  the  origin 
of  the  firing  is  mere  conjecture,  but  it  came  as  above  stated,  and  many 
of  the  escorts  and  their  horses  were  shot  down.  At  the  firing  our 
horses  wheeled  suddenly  to  the  left  and  General  Jackson,  at  whose 
side  I  rode,  galloped  away — followed  by  the  few  who  were  not  dis- 
mounted by  the  first  firing, — into  the  woods  to  get  out  of  range  of 
the  bullets,  and  approached  our  line  a  little  obliquely,  but  had  not  gone 
over  20  steps  beyond  the  edge  of  the  pike,  into  the  "thicket,  ere  the 
brigade  just  to  the  left  of  the  turnpike  (on  our  right  as  we  approached 
from  the  direction  of  the  enemy),  drawn  up  within  30  yards  of  us, 
fired  a  volley  in  their  turn,  kneeling  on  the  right  knee,  as  shown  by  the 
flash  of  their  guns,  as  though  prepai-ed  to  guard  against  cavalry.  By 
this  fire  General  Jackson  was  wounded.     These  troops  evidently  mis- 

214 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

was  the  officer  next  in  rank,  but  having  a  very  natural 
hesitation  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  so  large  and 
important  a  command,  Major  General  Stuart  of  the 
cavalry,  who  was  operating  in  connection  with  General 
Jackson,  was  requested  to  assume  command,  which  he 
did.  During  the  night  the  enemy  strengthened  his  con- 
tracted line  with  breastworks  and  abattis,  and  strongly 
fortified  other  positions  in  his  rear  nearer  the  Kappa- 
hannock. 

took  us  for  the  enemy's  cavalry.  We  could  distinctly  hear  General 
Hill  calling,  at  the  top  of  his  voice,  to  his  troops  to  make  them  cease 
firing.  He  knew  that  we  had  just  passed  in  front  of  him,  as  did  the 
troops  immediately  on  the  pike,  and  I  don't  think  these  latter  fired. 
I  was  alongside  of  Jackson,  and  saw  his  arm  fall  at  his  side,  loosing 
the  rein,  when  the  volley  came  from  the  left.  His  horse  wheeled  sud- 
denly and  ran  through  the  bushes  toward  the  enemy.  The  limb  of  a 
tree  took  off  his  cap  and  threw  him  flat  on  the  back  on  his  horse.  I 
rode  after  him,  passing  under  the  same  limb,  which  took  off  my  hat 
also,  but  Jackson  soon  regained  his  seat,  caught  the  bridle  in  his  right 
hand,  and  turning  his  horse  towards  the  pike  and  our  men,  somewhat 
checked  his  speed.  As  he  turned  to  the  pike,  it  gave  me  the  inside 
track,  and  I  caught  his  horse  as  he  reached  the  pike,  which  he  was 
approaching  at  an  acute  angle.  Just  as  I  caught  the  reins,  Captain 
Wynn  rode  up  on  the  opposite  side  of  him  and  caught  hold  of  the 
reins  on  that  side,  almost  simultaneously.  By  this  time  the  confusion 
was  over  and  all  was  quiet,  and  looking  up  arid  down  the  pike  in  every 
direction,  no  living  creature  could  be  seen  save  us  three. 

As  soon  as  I  could  check  Jackson's  horse,  I  dismounted,  and  see- 
ing that  he  was  faint,  I  asked  him  what  I  could  do  for  him,  or  if  he 
felt  able  to  ride  as  far  as  into  our  lines.  He  answered,  "  You  had  best 
take  me  down,"  leaning,  as  he  spoke,  toward  me  and  then  falling, 
partially  fainting  from  loss  of  blood. 

I  was  on  the  side  of  the  broken  arm,  while  his  horse  had  his  head 
turned  towards  the  enemy  and  about  where  we  were  when  first  fired 
upon,  and  would  not  be  kept  still,  as  he  was  frightened  and  suffering 
from  his  own  wounds.  As  General  Jackson  fell  over  on  me,  I  caught 
him  in  my  arms,  and  held  him  until  Captain  Wynn  could  get  his  feet 
out  of  the  stirrups,  then  we  carried  him  in  our  arms  some  10  or  15 
steps  north  of  the  pike,  where  he  was  laid  on  the  ground,  resting  his 
head  in  my  lap,  while  I  proceeded  to  dress  his  wounds,  cutting  off  his 
coat  sleeves,  and  binding  a  handkerchief  tightly  above  and  below  his 
wound  and  putting  his  arm  in  a  sling.     Wynn  went  for  Dr.  McGuire 

215 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  3rd,  Stuart  renewed  the 
attack  with  Jackson's  division  on  the  left,  while  Ander- 
son pressed  forward  with  his  right  resting  on  the  Plank 
road,  and  McLaws  demonstrated  on  the  right.  The  enemy 
was  forced  back  from  numerous  strongholds  until  Ander- 
son's  left  connected  with  Stuart's  right,  when  the  whole 
line  attacked  with  irresistible  force,  driving  the  enemy 
from  all  his  fortified  positions  around  Chancellorsville 
with  very  heavy  loss,  and  forcing  him  to  retreat  to  the 

and  an  ambulance,  and  I  was  left  alone  with  him  until  General  Hill 
came  up.  Just  before  Hill  reached  us,  Jackson  revived  a  little  and 
asked  me  to  have  a  skilful  surgeon  attend  him.  When  I  told  him 
what  had  been  done  he  said  "  Very  good." 

The  enemy  evidently  thought  the  firing  had  thrown  our  men  into 
confusion  and  resolved  to  take  advantage  of  it  by  making  a  determined 
attack  at  this  time,  so  in  a  few  minutes,  it  was  announced  by  Lieu- 
tenant Morrison,  who  had  joined  Jackson  while  he  was  lying  on  the 
ground,  and  now  ran  up  in  a  very  excited  manner,  crying  out,  "  The 
enemy  is  within  50  yards  and  advancing.  Let  us  take  the  General 
away."  Jackson  was  still  lying  with  his  head  in  my  lap,  I  had  finished 
tying  up  his  arm  where  it  was  broken,  and  asked  him  where  his  other 
wound  was,  a\id  what  I  should  do  for  that,  when  he  replied,  "  In  my 
right  hand,  but  never  mind  that,  it  is  a  mere  trifle."  He  said  nothing 
about  the  wound  in  his  left  wrist,  and  did  not  seem  aware  of  it, 
doubtless  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  arm  was  broken  above.  Upon 
hearing  Morrison's  warning,  I  sprang  up,  and  said,  "  Let  us  take  the 
General  in  our  arms,  and  carry  him  back,"  to  which  he  replied,  "  No, 
if  you  will  help  me  up,  I  can  walk."  He  had  only  gone  a  few  steps,  when 
we  met  a  litter  and  placed  him  on  it.  He  was  being  borne  off  on  foot, 
supported  by  Captain  Lee  and  one  or  two  others,  I  walking  between 
them  and  the  pike,  and  leading  three  horses,  trying  to  keep  the  troops, 
then  moving  down  the  pike,  from  seeing  who  it  was,  but  found  this 
impossible,  and  we  met  some  men  with  this  litter  before  we  had  gone 
ten  steps.  While  placing  Jackson  on  it,  the  enemy  opened  fire  on  us 
at  short  range,  from  a  battery  planted  on  the  pike  and  with  infantry; 
a  terrific  fire  of  grape,  shell,  minie  balls,  etc.,  and  advancing  at  a 
rapid  rate.  Everything  seemed  to  be  seized  with  a  panic,  and  taken 
by  surprise,  our  line  was  thrown  into  confusion.  It  recoiled  and  for 
awhile  continued  to  give  way,  and  the  enemy  pressed  forward.  Such 
was  the  disorder  that  I  thought  that  General  Jackson  and  party  would 
certainly  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The  horses  jerked  loose, 
and  ran  in  every  direction,  and  before  we  proceeded  far  one  of  the 

216 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

new  fortifications  nearer  the  Rappahannock.  By  ten 
o  'clock  a.m.  General  Lee  was  in  full  possession  of  Chan- 
cellorsville  and  the  field  of  battle.  He  then  proceeded  to 
reorganize  his  troops  for  an  advance  against  the  enemy's 
new  position,  to  which  the  latter  had  been  able  to  retreat 
under  shelter  of  the  dense  woods,  which  covered  all  the 
ground,  and  also  rendered  an  advance  by  our  troops  in 
line  of  battle  very  difficult  and  hazardous. 

General  Lee  had  just  completed  his  arrangements  to 
renew  the  attack,  when  he  received  the  intelligence  of 
the  capture  of  Marye's  Hill  by  Sedgwick's  force  and  the 

litter  bearers  was  shot,  having  both  of  his  arms  broken,  and  General 
Jackson  fell  to  the  ground.  As  he  lay  there  he  grew  faint  from  loss 
of  blood,  having  fallen  on  his  wounded  side,  and  his  arm  began  to 
bleed  afresh.  I  rode  away  to  try  to  get  some  whiskey  for  the  purpose 
of  reviving  him,  and  at  a  short  distance  met  Dr.  McGuire  and  Colonel 
Pendleton,  to  whom  I  told  what  had  happened,  as  we  rode  towards 
the  place  where  I  left  Jackson.  The  ambulance  came  up;  we  hurried 
it  to  the  front,  and,  reaching  Jackson,  placed  him  in  it.  As  soon  as 
the  ambulance  left,  I  was  ordered  by  Colonel  Pendleton,  after  consul- 
tation with  General  Rodes,  to  go  to  General  Lee  as  quickly  as  possible 
and  communicate  the  intelligence  to  him,  explaining  our  position,  what 
had  been  accomplished,  who  had  taken  command;  and  ask  him  to 
come  to  that  place. 

During  the  attack  on  our  forces  so  many  of  our  men  had  gone 
past  us  that  we  seemed  to  be  left  with  no  troops  between  us  and  the 
enemy,  and  I  made  up  my  mind  to  remain  with  the  General  to  nurse 
him,  as  it  seemed  we  should  soon  be  in  their  hands.  However,  the 
gallant  Pender — in  command  after  the  wounding  of  General  Hill — 
soon  rallied  his  line  and  pressed  forward,  driving  the  enemy  back  to 
his  works,  at  which  quiet  was  restored  for  the  night,  the  fight  having 
ended  as  suddenly  as  it  began. 

Many  people  have  thought  it  strange  that  Jackson  should  give  an 
order  to  troops  to  fire  at  everything,  especially  cavalry  approaching 
from  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  and  then  place  himself  in  a  situation 
to  have  himself  fired  upon.  I  heard  of  no  such  order,  and  feel  sure 
that  none  such  was  given.  If  such  had  been  the  order  it  would  have 
been  given  to  the  skirmish  line,  and  there  could  have  been  no  necessity 
for  such  an  order  to  them,  as  they  would  do  this  anyway. 

R.  E.  Welbourn. 
(Chief    Signal    Officer,    2nd   Army    Corps,    1863,   Lieutenant   General 
Jackson,  commanding.) 

217 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

advance  of  his  column ;  and  he  found  it  necessary  to  look 
after  the  new  opponent.  Sedgwick  had  moved  up  the 
Plank  road  held  by  Wilcox's  brigade,  which  gradually 
retired,  and  finally  made  a  stand  at  Salem  Church  on  the 
Plank  road,  about  five  miles  from  Fredericksburg,  when, 
by  a  gallant  resistance,  the  head  of  the  column  was  held 
at  bay  until  the  arrival  of  McLaws  with  four  brigades, 
and  the  further  advance  of  the  enemy  was  effectually 
opposed.* 

It  will  be  thus  seen  of  what  importance  to  General 
Lee's  own  movements  were  those  below  at  Fredericks- 
burg, and  how  the  capture  of  the  heights  in  rear  of  the 
two  affected  him.  A  force  of  at  least  30,000  men  had 
been  detained  from  Hooker's  army  by  considerably  less 
than  10,000  on  our  side.  It  is  true  that  Sedgwick  had 
finally  broken  through  the  force  opposed  to  him  and  com- 
menced an  advance  up  towards  the  rear  of  General 
Lee's  army,  but  he  had  not  done  so  until  the  latter  had 
had  time  to  gain  a  brilliant  victory,  and  drive  Hooker 
to  a  position  of  defence  from  which  he  could  not  ad- 
vance except  under  great  disadvantages. 

Sedgwick's  column  had  thus  been  detained  by  Wil- 
cox until  a  force  was  brought  down  to  arrest  its  progress 
entirely,  and  time  was  given  to  make  arrangements  to 
fall  upon  Sedgwick  while  separated  from  the  rest  of 
Hooker's  army.  Barksdale's  brigade  and  the  artillery 
posted  with  it  had  resisted  all  assaults  upon  their  posi- 
tion for  at  least  six  hours,  thus  giving  General  Lee  the 
requisite  time  to  gain  his  victory,  and  in  being  finally 


*  In  this  condition  of  things,  Lincoln  telegraphed  to  General 
Hooker's  Chief  of  Staff,  who  was  on  the  north  bank  near  Falmouth, 
as  follows: 

"  War  Department,  Washington  City,  May  3,  1863. 
"  Major  General  Butterfield  : 

"Where  is  General  Hooker?  Where  is  Sedgwick?  Where  is 
Stoneman?  A.  Lincoln. 

"  Sent  4.35  p.m."  (See  report  Committee  on  the  War.) 

218 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

compelled  to  succumb  to  overwhelming  numbers  that 
brigade  had  lost  no  honor.  It  was  impossible  for  me  to 
reinforce  Barksdale  with  a  larger  force  than  I  sent  to 
him,  and  I  then  weakened  very  much  the  defences  on  the 
right.  Had  Sedgwick  communicated  his  purposes  to  me 
and  informed  me  that  he  would  assault  Marye's  and 
Lee's  Hills  and  those  positions  alone,  then  I  would  have 
moved  my  whole  force  to  those  points  and  held  them 
against  his  entire  force. 

As  it  was,  a  division  of  Sedgwick's  corps  larger  than 
my  own  immediately  confronted  the  position  occupied 
by  the  three  brigades  of  my  division  left  after  Hays 
had  been  sent  to  Barksdale,  and  if  that  position  had  been 
abandoned  and  the  brigades  defending  it  moved  to  the 
left,  the  division  confronting  it,  and  which  was  con- 
stantly demonstrating  towards  it,  would  have  moved  up, 
taken  possession  of  the  line,  and  then  moved  upon  my 
rear,  compelling  me  to  abandon  the  works  on  the  left 
practically  without  a  struggle,  or  submit  to  a  much 
greater  disaster  than  that  which  occurred.  Sedgwick 
would  hardly  have  been  so  blind  as  to  rush  his  troops 
up  against  the  strong  positions  at  Marye's  and  Lee's 
Hill's  while  defended  by  a  force  sufficiently  large  to  hold 
them,  when  there  would  have  been  an  easy  way  open 
to  him  for  their  capture  and  that  of  the  whole  force 
defending  them  by  simply  moving  a  portion  of  troops 
to  the  rear.  Marye's  Hill  would  have  fallen  much  sooner 
than  it  did,  if  it  had  been  occupied  by  my  whole  force, 
or  if  a  force  sufficiently  strong  to  prevent  the  position 
from  being  turned  had  not  been  retained  on  the  right. 
By  holding  the  position  on  the  right,  therefore,  the  fall 
of  Marye's  Hill  and  the  consequent  advance  of  Sedg- 
wick's column  above  were  both  very  considerably  re- 
tarded, and  when  the  catastrophe  did  happen  there  was 
left  a  considerable  force  to  threaten  and  fall  upon  Sedg- 
wick's rear.  I  think  I  may  claim  that  the  force  entrusted 
to  my  command  had  accomplished  all  that  could  reason- 

219 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

ably  have  been  expected,  of  it  under  the  circumstances 
in  which  it  was  placed. 

I  will  now  return  to  my  own  position.  Just  as  I 
was  returning  from  observing  Sedgwick's  column  I  en- 
countered, at  Hazel  Run,  one  of  General  McLaws'  staff 
officers,  Major  Costin,  coming  down  under  an  escort  of 
cavalry,  and  he  informed  me  that  General  McLaws  had 
moved  down  the  Plank  road  to  meet  the  enemy,  and 
that  General  Lee  wished  him  and  myself  to  attack  Sedg- 
wick in  conjunction  and  endeavor  to  overwhelm  him,  and 
there  was  a  note  or  message  from  General  McLaws  re- 
questing information  as  to  my  position  and  that  of  the 
euemy,  and  asking  what  place  I  proposed,  for  attacking 
the  enemy. 

I  think  there  was  a  note  received  later  from  General 
Lee  communicating  his  wishes  in  regard  to  the  proposed 
attack,  similar  to  information  brought  by  Major  Costin — 
at  any  rate  the  information  of  his  views  and  wishes  was 
brought  by  Lieutenant  Pitzer  on  his  return.  It  was  about 
an  hour  before  sunset  when  Major  Costin  reached  me,  and 
that  part  of  my  division  on  the  right  was  more  than  three 
miles  from  the  position  at  Cox's,  so  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  accomplish  anything  that  night.  I  imme- 
diately sent  a  note  to  General  McLaws  informing  him 
that  I  would  concentrate  all  my  force  that  night  and 
move  against  the  enemy  very  early  next  morning,  drive 
him  from  Lee's  and  Marye's  Hills,  and  extend  my  left 
while  advancing  so  as  to  connect  with  his  (McLaws') 
right,  and  continue  to  move  against  the  enemy  above, 
after  his  connection  with  Fredericksburg  was  severed; 
and  I  asked  General  McLaws'  co-operation  in  this  plan. 
During  the  night,  I  received  a  note  from  him  assenting 
to  my  plan  and  containing  General  Lee's  approval  of 
it  also. 

As  soon  as  the  first  communication  had  been  received 
from  General  McLaws,  my  troops  from  the  right  were 
ordered  up,  but  it  was  after  night  before  they  were  all 
concentrated.    Andrews'  artillery  was  brought  up  before 

220 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

night,  one  battery  being  left  on  the  ridge  so  as  to  cover 
my  right  flank  on  the  line  across  the  Telegraph  road, 
and  a  regiment  of  infantry  being  posted  so  as  to  guard 
against  a  surprise  on  that  flank,  if  the  enemy  should 
move  around  Lee's  Hill  up  the  left  of  Deep  Run.  Just 
before  dark,  we  discovered  a  piece  of  artillery  advancing 
along  the  Telegraph  road  in  our  front,  followed  by  a  few 
wagons.  The  men  in  charge  of  the  piece  of  artillery 
came  on  so  deliberately,  though  in  full  view  of  our  line, 
that  we  took  it  for  granted  that  it  must  be  one  of  the 
pieces  supposed  to  be  captured,  with  a  forge  or  two,  that 
had  been  probably  able  to  elude  the  vigilance  of  the 
enemy  by  concealment  in  some  of  the  ravines. 

The  approaching  darkness  rendered  objects  very  in- 
distinct, and  we  therefore  watched  the  approaching  piece 
until  it  got  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  us,  when  the 
drivers  suddenly  discovered  who  we  were,  wheeled 
rapidly  and  dashed  to  the  rear,  and  we  became  then 
aware  that  it  was  one  of  the  enemy's  pieces.  Some  of 
Andrews'  guns  which  were  ready  opened  fire,  but  the 
piece  of  artillery  got  off,  though  some  of  the  mules  to 
a  wagon  and  to  a  forge  were  killed,  and  we  found  and 
secured  the  latter  the  next  day  with  several  fine  mules. 

The  night  passed  quietly  with  us,  and  at  light  on  the 
morning  of  the  4th  I  prepared  to  advance.  My  plan 
was  to  advance  along  the  Telegraph  road  with  Gordon's 
brigade  in  line  in  front,  followed  by  Andrews'  battalion 
of  artillery  and  Graham's  battery,  with  Smith's  and 
Barksdale's  brigades  following  in  the  rear,  forming  a 
second  line,  and  to  throw  Hays'  and  Hoke's  brigades 
across  Hazel  Run  opposite  my  present  position  so  as  to 
move  down  the  left  bank,  as  the  column  moved  along 
the  Telegraph  road  against  the  heights,  both  of  which  I 
took  it  for  granted  the  enemy  held,  as  the  affair  just  at 
dusk  the  evening  before  must  have  given  him  notice  of 
my  presence. 

It  was  my  purpose,  as  soon  as  the  heights  were  taken 
and  the  enemy's  connection  with  Fredericksburg  cut,  to 

221 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

advance  with  Gordon's  and  Smith's  brigades  up  the 
Plank  road  and  river,  and  for  Hays  and  Hoke  to  advance 
across  towards  the  Plank  road  extending  to  the  left 
to  connect  with  McLaws,  while  Barksdale 's  brigade  and 
some  of  Pendleton's  artillery  should  be  posted  to  hold 
Marye's  and  Lee's  Hills  and  protect  my  rear  from  the 
direction  of  Fredericksburg.  The  ravine  of  Hazel  Run  is 
so  rugged  that  it  was  impossible  to  cross  it  except  where 
there  were  roads,  and  therefore  it  was  necessary  to  pass 
Hays'  and  Hoke's  brigades  over  at  the  ford  on  my  left. 

Gordon's  brigade  was  placed  in  line  at  light,  and 
Andrews'  artillery  immediately  in  its  rear,  while  Smith 
and  Barksdale  were  ordered  to  take  their  positions  and 
be  in  readiness  to  follow.  I  then  went  with  General  Hays 
and  Hoke,  whose  brigades  were  put  in  motion,  across 
Hazel  Run  to  point  out  to  them  the  positions  they  were 
to  take  and  how  they  were  to  move.  After  doing  this, 
I  rode  back  and  found  to  my  surprise  that  Gordon  had 
moved  off  under  a  misapprehension  of  my  order,  as  he 
was  to  have  waited  until  all  was  ready,  and  I  designed 
accompanying  him.  Andrews  had  followed  him  and  I 
immediately  put  Smith  and  Barksdale  in  motion,  the 
former  along  the  road  by  flank,  and  Barksdale  in  line  of 
battle  on  the  right. 

The  line  of  hills  composed  of  Marye's,  Cemetery, 
Stansbury's,  and  Taylor's  Hills  descends  towards  the 
Marye's  Hill,  which  is  the  lowest,  Taylor's,  bordering 
on  the  river  at  the  upper  end  of  the  canal,  being  much 
the  highest.  Stansbury's,  Cemetery,  and  Marye's  Hills 
are  separated  from  a  higher  range  on  the  southwest 
by  a  very  small  stream  which  rises  between  Taylor's 
Hill  and  the  Plank  road  and  runs  across  that  road  into 
Hazel  Run,  some  distance  above  the  crossing  of  the 
Telegraph  road  over  that  run.  Cemetery  and  Marye's 
Hills  slope  back  gradually  to  the  little  stream,  and  from 
the  latter,  on  the  southwest,  rise  steep  hills  terminating 
in  a  high,  wide  ridge,  along  which  the  Plank  road  runs ; 
and  the  face  of  these  hills  fronting  towards  Cemetery 

222 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

and  Marye's  Hills  is  intersected  by  a  number  of  deep 
ravines,  up  one  of  which  the  Plank  road  ascends  to  get 
on  the  main  ridge.  On  the  south  side  of  the  road  and 
a  little  distance  from  it  the  main  ridge  terminates  in  a 
high  hill  which  descends  abruptly  to  Hazel  Run,  the  face 
towards  the  run  being  wooded.  At  the  lower  front  of 
the  base  of  this  hill  is  a  mill  called  the  Alum  Spring 
Mill.  Just  at  the  upper  part  of  the  base  of  the  hill  a 
branch  of  Hazel  Run  comes  in,  uniting  with  the  main 
stream.  This  branch  rises  some  distance  above  near 
the  Plank  road,  and  runs  nearly  parallel  to  it,  through 
a  deep  valley  to  its  junction  with  the  main  stream. 

On  the  south  of  this  valley  is  another  long  wide  ridge 
which  extends  for  some  distance  parallel  to  that  along 
which  the  Plank  road  runs  and  also  terminates  with  an 
abrupt  descent  to  Hazel  Run.  On  the  south  of  the  Plank 
road,  and  on  the  same  ridge  with  it,  is  situated  Mr. 
Guest's  house  some  two  or  three  miles  from  Fredericks- 
burg, and  nearly  opposite  to  it  on  the  other  ridge  is  Mr. 
Downman's  house.  On  the  extremities  of  the  lesser 
ridges,  projecting  out  from  that  on  which  the  Plank 
road  is  located,  was  a  line  of  small  works  and  epaulments 
for  artillery,  extending  from  the  river  at  Taylor's  Hill 
to  and  across  the  Plank  road,  which  had  been  previously 
made  by  our  troops,  and  this  line  completely  commanded 
the  crests  and  rear  slopes  of  Marye's,  Cemetery  and 
Stansbury's  Hills,  being  much  higher. 

The  Plank  road  crosses  the  little  stream,  with  a 
high  embankment  extending  for  some  distance  on  both 
sides,  the  stream  passing  through  a  culvert.  The  Tele- 
graph road  passes  towards  Fredericksburg  from  Cox's 
house,  where  I  was,  along  a  ridge  to  Lee's  Hill  and 
descends  the  hill  on  the  side  of  the  slope  next  to  Hazel 
Run. 

Gordon,  when  he  started,  advanced  rapidly  along  the 
Telegraph  road,  and  when  he  reached  Lee's  Hill,  it  was 
found  unoccupied,  but  a  body  of  infantry  was  moving 
along  the  Plank  road  from  the  town  between  Marye's 

223 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Hill  and  the  ridge  above,  which  halted  and  took  position 
behind  the  embankment  of  the  road.  In  the  valley  be- 
tween Guest's  and  Downman's  houses,  was  observed  a 
considerable  body  of  infantry,  and  at  Downman's  house  a 
battery  of  artillery.  Gordon  threw  out  his  skirmishers 
and  made  preparations  to  descend  the  hill  and  cross  over 
Hazel  Run  above  Marye's  Hill.  Andrews  placed  Gra- 
ham's battery  in  position  on  the  road  and  opened  on  the 
infantry  in  the  valley,  which  moved  out  of  the  way. 
Two  large  bodies  of  infantry,  supposed  to  be  brigades, 
each  then  moved  over  the  ridge  just  beyond  the  Alum 
Spring  Mill,  threatening  Gordon's  left,  as  he  was  ad- 
vancing. Graham  turned  his  guns  on  them  and  soon 
drove  them  off  up  the  ridge.  Gordon  then  made  a  dash 
across  the  run  and  after  a  sharp  engagement  drove  off 
the  infantry  behind  the  road  embankment,  capturing 
some  prisoners  and  securing  several  baggage  and  sub- 
sistence wagons,  a  battery  wagon,  and  a  forge — with 
their  teams, — which  were  passing  up  the  road  with  the 
infantry  he  encountered. 

This  gave  us  the  possession  of  Marye's  and  Cemetery 
Hills  again,  and  cut  the  enemy's  connection  with  Fred- 
ericksburg. Arriving  soon  after  with  Smith's  brigade  I 
threw  it  across  Hazel  Run  to  the  support  of  Gordon, 
the  batteries  from  the  Stafford  Heights  opening  a  heavy 
fire  on  it  as  it  descended  Lee's  Hill.  Barksdrle's  brigade, 
which  had  halted  in  the  rear  without  orders,  was  then 
sent  for,  to  occupy  the  stone  wall  at  the  foot  of  Marye's 
Hill,  and  General  Barksdale  was  ordered  to  move  rapidly 
into  the  town  if  not  held  by  too  large  a  force,  get  pos- 
session of  the  bridge,  and  secure  a  camp  of  wagons  seen 
at  the  lower  part  of  the  town.  When  Graham's  guns 
were  operating  upon  the  bodies  of  infantry  in  the  valley 
between  Guest's  and  Downman's  houses  and  those  threat- 
ening Gordon's  flank,  the  enemy's  battery — at  Down- 
man's  house,— opened  fire  on  them,  but  as  soon  as  the 
infantry  was  disposed  of,  Graham  turned  his  two  20 
pounder  Parrots  on  the  enemy's  guns,  which  returned 

224 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

across  the  valley  and  took  position  near  Guest's  house 
where  they  were  out  of  reach. 

Seeing  the  enemy's  wagons  moving  off  from  the 
town  and  not  hearing  Barksdale's  rifles,  I  sent  a  staff 
officer  to  repeat  the  orders,  and  received  a  reply  that  he 
was  preparing  to  send  forward  his  skirmishers ;  a  second 
messenger  sent  to  him  returned  with  the  information  that 
his  skirmishers  reported  a  heavy  force  holding  the  town, 
entrenched  within  rifle  pits.  The  enemy's  wagon  trains 
had  thus  made  their  escape,  and  I  sent  orders  to  Barks- 
dale  to  desist  from  the  attack  on  the  town  and  to  dis- 
pose of  his  brigade  so  as  to  resist  any  advance  from  that 
direction.  It  turned  out  that  the  town  was  held  by  Gib- 
bon's division  which  had  been  left  behind. 

I  had  listened  anxiously  to  hear  the  sound  of  McLaws' 
guns  or  some  indication  of  his  being  engaged,  but  heard 
nothing.  The  enemy  had  not  expected  us  in  this  direc- 
tion, and  he  was  therefore  evidently  taken  by  surprise, 
but  Gordon's  advance,  which  was  so  handsomely  made, 
being  sooner  than  I  had  intended,  had  given  the  enemy 
time  to  form  his  troops  in  line,  to  meet  any  further 
advance  I  could  make  after  my  arrival ;  and  as  the  char- 
acter of  the  ground  was  such  that  considerable  bodies  of 
troops  could  be  concealed  from  my  view  from  any  point 
that  was  accessible  to  me,  I  could  not  tell  what  force  I 
would  have  to  encounter  on  ascending  the  hills  above. 

I  could  see  that  all  the  little  works  on  the  heights 
were  occupied  by  infantry,  making  a  line  extending  across 
from  Taylor's  Hill  to  the  brow  of  the  hill  beyond  and 
above  the  Alum  Spring  Mill.  Gordon's  and  Smith's 
brigades  had  taken  position  in  the  trenches  along  the 
crests  from  the  Plank  road  towards  Taylor 's  Hill,  facing 
towards  the  enemy  above  and  with  their  backs  towards 
Fredericksburg.  The  enemy  did  not  open  then  with 
artillery,  and  as  they  were  very  much  exposed,  I  thought 
possibly  he  did  not  have  any  on  that  flank,  and  I  there- 
fore determined  to  feel  him  and  make  him  develop  what 
he  had. 

15  225 


l 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Smith  was  ordered  to  advance  his  brigade  towards 
the  heights  occupied  by  the  enemy  above ;  two  regiments, 
the  13th  and  58th  Virginia,  advanced  against  one  of  the 
positions  which  appeared  to  be  occupied  by  the  strongest 
force,  and  the  49th  and  52nd  separately  against  other 
points.  The  regiments  advanced  to  the  base  of  the  hills 
and  commenced  ascending,  when  the  enemy  appeared 
in  force  on  their  crests,  and  also  opened  with  artillery 
from  the  neighborhood  of  Taylor's  house.  The  13th  and 
58th  Regiments  became  heavily  engaged,  and  the  49th 
and  52nd  slightly. 

It  was  now  apparent  that  the  hills  were  held  in  strong 
force,  and  as  an  attempt  to  carry  them  from  that  direc- 
tion, as  my  troops  were  then  located,  would  have  been 
under  great  disadvantage  and  attended  with  great  diffi- 
culty, I  ordered  the  regiments  to  be  withdrawn.  The 
49th  and  52nd  were  withdrawn  without  difficulty  and 
with  but  slight  loss,  the  13th  and  58th  being  on  the  right 
and  more  exposed  to  the  enemy's  guns  were  withdrawn 
with  more  difficulty  and  heavier  loss.  The  13th  lost  17 
prisoners  and  58th  71,  including  the  color  bearer  of 
the  latter  with  his  colors,  the  most  of  the  men  captured, 
including  the  color  bearer  of  the  58th,  taking  refuge  in 
a  house  at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  under  the  fire  of  the 
enemy's  guns  as  well  as  his  infantry,  and  declining  to 
fall  back  over  the  plain  while  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
artillery. 

They  were  thus  captured  by  their  own  misconduct, 
the  enemy  sending  to  take  possession  of  them,  which  I 
could  not  prevent  without  bringing  on  a  heavy  engage- 
ment under  disadvantageous  circumstances,  and  thus  in- 
curring a  much  heavier  loss  of  men.  The  brigade  re- 
sumed its  position  after  this  affair,  and  I  sent  Lieutenant 
Pitzer  to  General  McLaws  to  apprise  him  of  what  had 
been  done  and  my  position,  with  a  request  for  him  to 
begin  his  attack  on  the  enemy  and  the  information  that 
I  could  move  two  brigades,  Hays'  and  Hoke's,  across 
towards  the  Plank  road  extending  to  the  left  as  they 

226 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

advanced  to  connect  with  his  right,  and,  as  soon  as  the 
enemy  was  engaged  so  as  to  make  it  practicable,  I  would 
move  up  from  below  with  my  other  two  brigades,  Gor- 
don's and  Smith's;  Hays'  and  Hoke's  brigades  had 
moved  down  the  left  bank  of  Hazel  Run  and  were  put  in 
position  to  co-operate  with  McLaws'  attack,  when  made, 
by  moving  across  the  ridge  on  which  Downman's  house 
was  located,  and  orders  were  given  them  accordingly. 
General  McLaws  did  not  make  the  attack,  and  Lieutenant 
Pitzer  returned  with  the  information  that  Anderson's 
division  was  coming  down,  and  with  instruction  for  me 
to  wait  until  he  was  in  position,  when  at  a  signal  given 
by  firing  three  guns  rapidly  in  succession,  a  simultaneous 
attack  should  be  made  by  the  whole  force. 

When  Anderson's  force  began  to  arrive,  I  was  able 
to  draw  Hays  and  Hoke  nearer  to  my  right,  and  I  there- 
fore brought  Hays'  brigade  across  the  branch  of  Hazel 
Run,  which  has  been  mentioned,  and  put  his  brigade  in 
line  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  near  Alum  Spring  Mill,  so  that 
it  might  move  up  the  wooded  face  of  the  hill  on  to  the 
plain  above,  which  was  occupied  by  a  part  of  the  enemy's 
force.  Hoke's  brigade  was  placed  in  line  just  in  the  edge 
of  the  woods  on  the  rear  slope  of  the  lower  end  of  the 
ridge  on  which  Downman's  house  was,  facing  towards 
the  Plank  road,  concealed  from  the  view  of  the  enemy, 
as  was  Hays'. 

General  Lee  came  down  himself  before  the  signal  was 
given,  and  sent  for  me  to  meet  him  towards  my  left.  We 
examined  the  position  of  the  enemy  together,  as  well  as 
we  could,  and  I  explained  to  him  my  plan  of  attacking 
with  my  force,  which  was,  for  Hays  to  move  up  the  hill 
at  foot  of  which  he  was  and  directly  forward,  which 
would  carry  him  to  the  Plank  road,  and  up  on  the  right 
side;  for  Hoke  to  move  over  the  ridge  below  Downman's 
house  and  across  the  valley  to  the  other  ridge,  as  far  as 
the  Plank  road,  where  he  was  to  change  direction  so  as 
to  move  up  on  the  left  of  the  road ;  and  when  the  signal 
was  heard,  Gordon  was  to  move  rapidly  by  the  flank  to 

227 


i  i 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JIJBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  ravine  up  which  the  Plank  road  runs,  and  then 
diagonally  towards  Taylor's  house  so  as  to  sweep  all  the 
crests  in  front  of  him  and  Smith  as  they  were  then 
posted,  and  turn  the  enemy's  left  which  rested  near  the 
river.  Smith  was  to  remain  stationary  so  as  to  re- 
inforce the  brigades  engaged,  or  Barksdale  as  might  be 
necessary.  General  Lee  approved  my  plan  and  directed 
me  to  carry  it  out  as  soon  as  the  signal  should  be  given, 
and  then  left  me. 

Sedgwick's  line  covered  the  Plank  road  for  some 
distance  on  the  south  side;  being  in  the  centre  along 
the  ridge  or  plateau  on  which  the  road  is  located,  and 
bending  back  across  it  with  both  flanks  which  rested 
near  the  river,  above  and  below.  Guest's  house  was  in 
his  line  and  some  artillery  was  posted  near  it,  while 
Downman's  house,  and  the  ridge  on  which  it  was  located 
were  occupied  by  his  skirmishers.  In  advance  of  the 
part  of  the  line  facing  towards  me,  which  was  his  left 
wing,  there  was  an  advanced  line  occupying  the  crests 
of  the  hills  towards  me,  extending  across  from  Taylor's 
Hill  to  the  lower  end  of  the  valley  which  has  been  men- 
tioned, with  artillery  posted  near  the  left  of  this  ad- 
vanced line. 

The  plateau,  on  the  ridge  where  Downman's  house  was 
located,  was  entirely  cleared  of  timber  below  the  house, 
as  was  the  valley  between  the  two  ridges.  The  ridge 
along  which  the  Plank  road  runs  was  cleared  on  the 
south  side  of  it,  and  from  the  direction  of  Fredericks- 
burg up  to  within  a  short  distance  below  Guest's  house, 
from  which  point  bodies  of  woodland  extended  up  the 
road  for  some  distance  and  across  towards  Taylor's 
house,  with  occasional  intervals  of  cleared  land. 

We  waited  for  the  signal,  but  it  was  not  given  until 
a  short  time  before  sunset.  When  it  was  heard,  Hoke 
moved  at  once  across  the  plateau  in  his  front  between 
Downman's  house  and  Hazel  Run,  then  down  the  slope, 
across  the  valley,  and  up  the  steep  ascent  of  the  next 
ridge   towards    the    Plank   road,    driving   the    enemy's 

228 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

skirmishers  before  him,  while  the  guns  at  Guest's  house 
played  upon  his  advancing  line  without  disturbing  his 
beautiful  order.  Hays  rapidly  ascended  the  hill  in  front, 
immediately  encountering  the  right  of  the  enemy's  front 
line,  which  he  swept  before  him,  and  continued  his  ad- 
vance without  a  halt.  It  was  a  splendid  sight  to  see 
the  rapid  and  orderly  advance  of  these  two  brigades, 
with  the  enemy  flying  before  them.  The  officers  and 
men  manning  the  artillery  which  had  been  posted  on 
eminences  along  the  Telegraph  road  and  on  the  right 
bank  of  Hazel  Run  so  as  to  protect  the  infantry  retreat 
in  case  of  disaster,  debarred  from  an  active  partici- 
pation in  the  action,  could  not  refrain  from  enthusiasti- 
cally cheering  the  infantry,  as  it  so  handsomely  swept 
everything  in  front. 

In  the  meantime  Gordon,  as  soon  as  the  signal  was 
heard,  moved  his  brigade  by  flank  rapidly  to  the  Plank 
road,  formed  in  line  up  the  ravine  and  swept  on  towards 
Taylor's  house,  clearing  the  crests  of  the  enemy,  com- 
pelling his  artillery  on  that  flank  to  retire  rapidly  and 
driving  the  enemy's  extreme  left  from  its  position  back 
towards  Banks'  Ford.  On  getting  near  the  point  of 
woods  below  Guest's  house,  Hays'  and  Hoke's  brigades 
approached  each  other.  The  artillery  at  Guest's  house 
had  been  compelled  to  fly  in  order  to  prevent  capture, 
and  the  enemy  was  retiring  in  confusion  on  all  parts 
of  the  line  confronting  them  and  Gordon,  but  just  then 
Hoke  fell  from  his  horse,  with  his  arm  badly  shattered 
by  a  ball  near  the  shoulder  joint. 

The  brigade  thus  losing  its  commander,  to  whom 
alone  the  instruction  had  been  given,  and  without  any 
one  to  direct  its  movement  at  that  particular  crisis, 
pushed  on  across  the  Plank  road,  encountered  Hays' 
brigade  in  the  woods  still  advancing,  and  the  two  com- 
mingling together  were  thrown  into  confusion.  They 
crossed  each  other's  paths  in  this  condition,  but  still 
continued  to  advance,  getting  far  into  the  woods.  Hays ' 
brigade  pressed  on  in  its  proper  direction,  but  Hoke's, 

229 

i 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

now  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Avery  of  the  6th 
North  Carolina,  had  got  to  its  right.  The  regiments 
of  both  brigades  had  lost  their  organization,  and  in  the 
woods  it  was  impossible  to  restore  it.  Portions  of  both 
brigades  penetrated  a  considerable  distance  into  the 
woods,  still  driving  the  enemy  before  them,  but  when 
scattered  they  came  across  a  portion  of  the  retiring  force 
which  had  been  rallied,  and  the  advance  parties  were 
compelled  to  retire  themselves,  leaving  some  prisoners 
in  the  enemy's  hands,  many  of  whom  had  become  so 
exhausted  by  their  rapid  advance  that  they  were  unable 
to  get  out  of  the  way,  and  were  picked  up  after  the 
fighting  was  over.  Other  portions  of  the  brigades,  hear- 
ing Gordon's  firing  on  the  right  and  not  aware  of  his 
movements,  thought  the  enemy  was  in  their  rear  and 
retired  also.  The  brigades  were  then  rallied  and  re- 
formed on  the  Plank  road  just  below  Guest's  house.  I 
had  taken  my  position  on  the  heights  near  the  Telegraph 
road  opposite  the  Alum  Spring  Mill,  from  which  point 
I  could  see  the  movement  of  all  three  brigades,  and 
when  I  discovered  them  all  in  motion  and  driving  the 
enemy  as  described,  I  rode  across  Hazel  Run  in  the 
direction  taken  by  Hays'  brigade. 

I  arrived  just  as  the  first  men  of  that  brigade  were 
emerging  from  the  woods,  and  directed  the  re-formation 
of  the  two  brigades.  Two  regiments  of  Smith's  brigade, 
the  49th  and  52nd,  were  ordered  up,  but  when  they 
arrived  and  the  two  brigades  had  been  reorganized  it 
had  become  too  dark  to  make  any  further  advance,  and 
I  did  not  hear  either  of  the  other  two  divisions  engaged. 
Gordon's  progress  was  also  arrested  by  the  approach 
of  night,  and  he  halted  and  assumed  a  position  above 
Taylor's  house  confronting  the  enemy's  left,  which  he 
had  driven  back  very  considerably.  Hays'  and  Hoke's 
brigades  were  put  in  line  of  battle  across  the  Plank 
road,  at  the  point  where  they  had  been  rallied,  with 
Smith's  two  regiments  advanced  to  the  front. 

McLaws'  division  had  not  advanced  at  all.     Ander- 

230 


> 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

son's  division  had  advanced  on  Hoke's  left,  driving  the 
enemy's  skirmishers,  fronting  his  centre,  from  Down- 
man's  house  and  the  upper  part  of  the  ridge,  but  it 
did  not  cross  to  the  Plank  road  until  dark,  when  I  saw 
Posey's  brigade  moving  up  the  hill  on  my,  then,  left 
from  the  direction  of  Downman's  house,  and  it  took 
position  above  me  on  the  Plank  road,  the  enemy  having 
retired  from  that  road.  Wright's  brigade  was  subse- 
quently moved  across  to  the  Plank  road  at  eight  or 
nine  o'clock  and  took  position  on  Posey's  left.  The  main 
attack  had  been  made  by  my  three  brigades.* 


*  The  force  which  I  encountered  in  front  in  this  action  was 
Howe's  division.  Brigadier  General  Howe  testified  before  the  Com- 
mittee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 

After  speaking  of  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  as  a  sharp 
skirmish,  and  claiming  all  the  credit  for  capturing  Marye's  Hill,  though 
his  division  advanced  against  Lee's  Hill  alone,  and  further  claiming 
to  have  done  all  the  fighting  on  the  4th,  he  says : 

"  The  prisoners  taken  all  agreed  that  it  was  Early's,  Anderson's, 
and  McLaws'  divisions  that  attacked  my  division,  and  that  the  move- 
ment was  led  by  General  Lee,  who  told  them  that  it  would  be  a  good 
thing  to  destroy  the  6th  corps,  or  capture  it;  that  it  would  not  get  out 
the  Chancellorsville  way,  and  that  the  movements  in  our  rear  would 
cut  us  off." 

It  was  my  three  brigades  alone  that  attacked  him,  McLaws'  divi- 
sion being  above  confronting  Sedgwick's  right,  and  Anderson's  advanc- 
ing against  the  centre.    Again  he  says: 

"  Some  time  after  this  movement,  after  we  had  returned  to  our 
old  camps,  I  met  General  Hooker,  and  spoke  to  him  of  the  movements 
we  had  made  and  the  positions  we  held.  I  stated  to  him  that  after  the 
fight  on  the  4th  of  May,  I  could  have  gone  with  my  division  on  to  the 
heights  at  Fredericksburg,  and  held  them,  or,  if  necessary,  could  have 
recrossed  that  way.  He  was  surprised  that  those  heights  could  have 
been  held  the  night  of  the  4th,  and  said :  '  If  I  had  known  that  you 
could  have  gone  on  those  heights  and  held  them,  and  would  have  held 
them,  I  would  have  reinforced  you  with  the  whole  army.'  That  was  the 
key  of  the  position,  and  there  was  no  difficulty  in  holding  it.  I  told 
him  that  if  I  had  not  received  orders  to  go  back  to  Banks'  Ford,  but 
had  been  allowed  to  go  to  the  Fredericksburg  heights,  I  could  have 
marched  there  uninterruptedly  after  nine  o'clock  that  night;  for  after 
the  fight  we  had  had,  the  rebels  abandoned  the  heights,  and  there  was 
nothing  to  be  seen  of  them.    There  was  a  bright  moon  that  night,  and 

231 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

After  dark  General  Lee  sent  for  me  to  go  to  him  at 
Downman's  house,  where  he  had  established  his  head- 
quarters for  the  night.  After  informing  him  of  the 
condition  of  things  on  my  front,  he  directed  me  to  leave 
two  of  my  brigades  in  line  on  the  north  of  the  road,  at 
right  angles  with  it  and  facing  the  enemy,  and  to  rein- 

we  could  see  an  object  of  the  size  of  a  man  or  a  horse  at  a  great 
distance." 

Verily  General  Howe  had  accomplished  wonders  according  to  his 
own  showing.  He  had  with  his  solitary  division  routed  the  greater 
part  of  Lee's  army,  notwithstanding  the  rough  handling  it  had  been 
able  to  give  Hooker's  five  corps  above.  Perhaps  if  he  had  made  the 
attempt  to  march  to  the  heights,  he  might  have  encountered  the  brigades 
of  Gordon  and  Hoke  which  occupied  a  line  extending  from  above 
Taylor's  house  towards  the  Plank  road  at  Guest's  house,  and  which  had 
escaped  his  observation  notwithstanding  the  light  of  the  "  bright  moon 
that  night."  He  might  also  have  encountered  Barksdale's,  Hays',  and 
Smith's  brigades  holding  the  heights,  and  disturbed  my  own  head- 
quarters on  the  left  of  Lee's  Hill,  which  had  been  assumed  at  12  at 
night  after  I  had  ridden  along  his  whole  front  with  my  staff  at  a  late 
hour,  posting  Hoke's  brigade  on  Gordon's  left  and  examining  the 
position  of  the  latter.  General  Howe  was  either  mistaken  or  he  was 
star  gazing. 

Hooker,  in  his  examination  before  the  Congressional  Committee  in 
regard  to  the  battle,  made  the  following  statement : 

"  Our  artillery  had  always  been  superior  to  that  of  the  rebels,  as 
was  also  our  infantry,  except  in  discipline,  and  that,  for  reasons  not 
necessary  to  mention,  never  did  equal  Lee's  anny.  "With  a  rank  and 
file  mostly  inferior  to  our  own,  intellectually  and  physically,  that  army 
has,  by  discipline  alone,  acquired  a  character  for  steadiness  and  effi- 
ciency unsurpassed,  in  my  judgment,  in  ancient  or  modern  times.  We 
have  not  been  able  to  rival  it,  nor  has  there  been  any  near  approxima- 
tion to  it  in  the  other  rebel  armies." 

Their  artillery  certainly  surpassed  ours  far  in  numbers  of  guns, 
weight  of  metal,  and  the  quality  of  the  ammunition,  and  at  long  range 
their  firing  was  admirable,  while  ours  was  defective  from  the  defect 
in  the  ammunition,  but  when  Ave  came  to  close  range  so  that  our  guns 
could  tell,  their  gunners  lost  their  coolness  and  ours  surpassed  them  in 
the  accuracy  of  the  firing,  always  getting  the  advantage  under  such 
circumstances  unless  the  odds  were  too  great.  . 

Hooker  did  not  complain  that  he  was  overpowered  by  numbers, 
and  he  was  the  first  of  the  commanders  of  that  amiy  who  had  not  made 
that  complaint. 

232 


i   M 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

force  Barksdale  at  Fredericksburg  with  the  other  two. 
Hoke's  brigade  was  moved  to  the  right  and  placed  on 
line  with  Gordon's  on  its  left,  and  Hays'  brigade  was 
moved  back  and  placed  in  the  trenches  at  Lee's  Hill  on 
Barksdale 's  right,  and  Smith's  two  regiments  rejoined 
the  others  and  took  position  in  the  trenches  on  the  left 
of  the  Plank  road  overlooking  the  canal. 

During  the  night  General  Barksdale  reported  to  me, 
once  by  his  aide  and  once  in  person,  that  the  enemy  was 
crossing  troops  and  artillery  into  the  town,  and  asked  for 
more  reinforcements.  I  told  him  I  had  no  doubt  the 
enemy  was  recrossing  and  would  be  gone  in  the  morn- 
ing, and  that  I  had  no  more  reinforcements  to  give  him. 
When  it  became  light  the  enemy  was  gone  from  the 
town  and  his  bridge  was  taken  up.  Sedgwick  had  also 
recrossed  during  the  night  his  whole  force  on  bridges 
laid  at  Banks'  Ford  and  nothing  remained  on  the  south 
bank  but  Hooker's  force  above.  Some  of  McLaws' 
brigades  had  advanced  toward  Banks'  Ford  during  the 
night,  picking  up  some  prisoners,  and  some  pieces  of 
artillery  had  opened  on  the  enemy's  bridge  as  he  was 
recrossing.  Posey's  and  Wright's  brigades  had  also 
advanced  towards  Banks'  Ford,  picking  up  some  pris- 
oners. Next  morning  a  number  of  prisoners  were  gath- 
ered who  had  been  left  behind  when  the  main  force 
crossed,  some  of  them  being  taken  on  the  river  by  de- 
tachments from  Gordon's  brigade. 

On  the  5th,  after  it  had  been  ascertained  that  all  of 
Sedgwick's  force  was  gone,  I  was  ordered  to  move  up 
the  Plank  road  towards  Chancellorsville,  leaving  Barks- 
dale at  Fredericksburg.  I  moved  up  to  the  vicinity  of 
Salem  Church,  and  was  halted,  remaining  there  some 
time,  when  I  was  ordered  to  return  to  my  old  position. 
In  doing  so  my  brigades  were  heavily  shelled  by  the 
enemy's  batteries  from  across  the  river,  as  they  were 
crossing  Hazel  Run  to  the  Telegraph  road.  Smith's 
brigade  was  left  with  Barksdale  in  the  position  it  had 
occupied  the  night  before,  and  the  others  moved  to  their 

233 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

former  positions,  which  they  regained  in  the  morning,  in 
a  tremendous  storm  of  rain. 

General  Lee  had  moved  all  his  troops  back  to  oppose 
Hooker,  who  had  been  confronted  during  the  operations 
against  Sedgwick  by  Jackson's  three  divisions  alone, 
but  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  he  was  found  gone  also, 
having  recrossed  under  cover  of  the  storm  and  dark- 
ness of  the  previous  night.  The  whole  army  then  re- 
turned to  its  former  camps,  and  Hooker  resumed  his 
position  opposite  Fredericksburg. 

My  loss  in  the  different  actions  around  Fredericks- 
burg at  this  time  was,  in  my  own  division,  125  killed  and 
721  wounded,  total  846;  in  Andrews'  artillery  7  killed 
and  21  wounded,  total  28;  in  Barksdale's  brigade  45 
killed  and  181  wounded,  total  226. 

A  little  over  500  prisoners  were  lost  in  my  division, 
more  than  half  of  which  were  lost  in  resisting  the  cross- 
ing at  the  enemy's  lower  bridge;  from  Hays'  brigade 
at  the  time  of  the  fall  of  Marye's  Hill ;  and  from  Smith's 
brigade  in  forcing  the  enemy's  position  on  the  morning 
of  the  4th;  and  the  residue  from  Hays'  and  Hoke's 
brigades  in  the  attack  on  Sedgwick  above  Fredericks- 
burg. Barksdale's  brigade  lost  a  little  over  300  pris- 
oners captured  from  the  17th  and  21st  Mississippi  Regi- 
ments at  Marye's  Hill.  General  Lee's  entire  loss  in 
killed  and  wounded  was  1,581  killed  and  8,700  wounded. 
Hooker's  loss  far  exceeded  it  in  killed  and  wounded,  and 
we  secured  several  thousand  prisoners,  thirteen  pieces  of 
artillery,  over  twenty  thousand  stand  of  arms,  besides  a 
large  amount  of  ammunition,  accoutrements,  etc. 

Hooker's  army  was  more  than  double  General  Lee's, 
which  did  not  exceed,  including  my  force,  50,000  muskets 
and  including  all  arms  was  under  60,000;  yet  Hooker, 
on  returning  to  his  camps,  issued  a  general  order  con- 
gratulating his  troops  on  their  achievements,  and  stat- 
ing that  they  had  added  new  laurels  to  their  former 
renown,  though  on  first  crossing  the  river  he  had  issued 
an  address  to  his  troops  intimating  that  General  Lee's 

234 


BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

army  was  then  in  his  power  and  that  he  would  proceed 
to  destroy  it. 

During  the  operations  at  Chancellorsville  and  Fred- 
ericksburg, the  enemy's  cavalry  in  large  force  under 
Stoneman,  having  crossed  the  rivers  higher  up,  made  a 
raid  in  the  direction  of  Richmond  which  accomplished 
nothing  of  consequence,  but  merely  frightened  and  depre- 
dated upon  the  unarmed  country  people.  Stoneman 's 
force  was  glad  to  make  its  escape  back  to  its  former 
position. 

On  our  part,  our  rejoicings  over  the  brilliant  and 
important  victory  that  had  been  gained  were  soon  damp- 
ened by  the  sad  news  of  the  death  of  General  Jackson. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

Invasion  of  Pennsylvania. 

Upon  returning  to  our  camps  after  Hooker  had  re- 
crossed  the  Rappahannock,  the  old  positions  were  re- 
sumed, General  A.  P.  Hill,  as  senior  major  general,  being 
now  in  command  of  the  corps. 

Nothing  of  consequence  occurred  in  our  front  during 
the  month  of  May.  On  the  30th  of  the  month,  a  general 
order  was  issued,  organizing  the  army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia into  three  corps  of  three  divisions  each.  General 
James  Longstreet,  who  had  returned  from  the  south 
of  James  River,  retained  command  of  the  1st  corps,  now 
composed  of  McLaws',  Hood's,  and  Pickett's  divisions. 
General  Richard  S.  Ewell  was  made  a  lieutenant  gen- 
eral and  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  2nd  corps,  now 
composed  of  my  division,  and  those  of  Rodes  and  John- 
son— Brigadier  General  Robert  E.  Rodes  having  been 
promoted  and  assigned  to  the  command  of  D.  H.  Hill's 
division, — and  Brigadier  General  Edward  Johnson  hav- 
ing been  promoted  and  assigned  to  the  command  of 
Trimble's  division,  formerly  Jackson's. 

A  third  corps  was  formed,  composed  of  the  division 
of  Anderson  (taken  from  the  1st  corps),  Heth's  and 
Pender's;  and  General  A.  P.  Hill  was  made  lieutenant 
general  and  assigned  to  the  command  of  it,  and  two 
divisions  of  four  brigades  each  were  formed  out  of  it 
and  two  brigades,  one  of  which  was  brought  from  North 
Carolina  and  the  other  formed  of  Mississippi  regiments 
taken  from  other  brigades,  to  the  command  of  which 
division  Brigadier  Generals  Heth  and  Pender  were  pro- 
moted, respectively. 

My  inspector  general,  Lieutenant  Colonel  John  M. 
Jones,  and  Colonel  James  A.  Walker  of  the  13th  Virginia 
Regiment  were  made  brigadier  generals,  and  the  former 
was  assigned  to  J.  R.  Jones'  brigade  in  Johnson's  divi- 

236 


INVASION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 

sion,  and  the  latter  to  Rodes'  (the  old  Stonewall  brigade), 
in  the  same  division,  both  promotions  well  deserved. 

General  Lee  now  determined  to  make  a  campaign 
across  the  Potomac  by  turning  the  enemy's  right  flank, 
so  as  to  transfer  the  war  into  the  enemy's  country  and 
compel  his  army  to  withdraw  from  Virginia.  Long- 
street's  corps  was  moved  to  Culpeper  in  advance  of  the 
others,  the  two  divisions  which  had  been  south  of  the 
James  having  moved  from  Richmond  by  the  way  of 
Gordonsville  on  the  railroad. 

On  the  4th  of  June,  Swell's  corps  took  up  its  line 
of  march  towards  Culpeper  Court-House — my  division 
moving  by  the  way  of  Spottsylvania  Court-House,  fol- 
lowed by  Johnson's  and  Rodes'  by  the  way  of  Chancel- 
lorsville.  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  was  left  to  watch  and  amuse 
Hooker's  army.  The  first  day  of  the  march  I  passed 
Spottsylvania  Court-House  and  camped  beyond  it.  On 
the  second  day,  during  the  march,  I  received  an  order 
to  halt  and  wait  for  further  orders,  as  the  enemy  had 
crossed  a  force  at  Fredericksburg  in  front  of  Hill.  I 
accordingly  went  into  camp  after  crossing  the  Catharpin 
Creek  and  remained  stationary  until  the  next  day  (the 
6th  of  June).  In  the  afternoon  of  the  6th,  I  received 
orders  to  move  on,  and  did  so,  continuing  the  march  to 
Culpeper  Court-House  by  the  way  of  Verdierville,  and 
Somerville  Ford  on  the  Rapidan,  and,  passing  the  Court- 
House  on  the  8th,  camped  three  or  four  miles  west  of 
that  place.  We  remained  stationary  near  the  Court- 
House  for  two  days.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  9th,  my 
division  was  moved  to  the  vicinity  of  Brandy  Station 
during  a  fight  between  our  cavalry  and  that  of  the  enemy, 
but  not  being  needed,  it  returned  to  its  camps  at  night. 

The  31st  Virginia  had  returned  just  before  our  march 
from  Fredericksburg.  The  official  tri-monthly  report 
of  my  division  of  the  10th  of  June,  made  at  this  place, 
shows  present  for  duty  610  officers  and  6,616  enlisted 
men,  total  7,226.  The  brigade  inspection  reports  of  the 
same  date  show  about  the  same  number  of  effectives 

237 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

present.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hilary  P.  Jones'  battalion 
of  artillery  of  four  batteries,  numbering  in  all  thirteen 
guns,  had  been  assigned  to  duty  with  my  division  just 
before  starting. 

My  division  was  fully  an  average  one  for  the  whole 
army,  and  perhaps  more  than  an  average  one.  Sixty- 
five  thousand  officers  and  men  may  therefore  be  set  down 
as  covering  the  whole  of  General  Lee's  infantry  with 
which  he  commenced  the  campaign,  perhaps  sixty  thou- 
sand would  cover  the  effective  strength.  Ten  thousand 
men  would  fully  cover  the  artillery  and  cavalry  and  per- 
haps considerably  overgo  it — (The  return  for  the  31st 
of  May,  just  four  days  before  the  commencement  of  the 
movement,  shows  the  infantry  to  have  been  54,356  for 
duty,  cavalry  9,536,  and  artillery  4,460,  total  68,352.  This 
return  was  not  accessible  to  me  when  the  within  was 
written.) — 150  guns  would  cover  all  of  our  artillery, 
and  they  consisted  of  field  pieces,  the  most  of  which  had 
been  captured  from  the  enemy.  The  largest  guns  we 
had  were  a  very  few  twenty  pounder  Parrots.  The 
brigade  inspection  reports  in  my  division  show  that 
about  one-third  of  the  men  were  without  bayonets,  and 
this  deficiency  existed  in  the  rest  of  the  army,  owing 
in  a  great  measure  to  the  fact  that  nearly  all  of  our  small 
arms  had  been  taken  from  the  enemy  on  the  various 
battlefields.  There  was  a  very  great  deficiency  in  shoes 
for  the  infantry,  a  large  number  of  the  men  being  in- 
differently shod,  and  some  barefooted.  A  like  deficiency 
existed  in  regard  to  the  equipment  of  the  men  in  other 
respects,  the  supply  of  clothing,  blankets,  etc.,  being 
very  limited. 

On  the  11th  of  June,  Ewell's  corps  resumed  the 
march,  taking  the  road  from  the  lower  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley across  the  Blue  Ridge  at  Chester  Gap.  Johnson's 
division,  followed  by  mine,  moved  on  the  road  by  Sperry- 
ville,  and  Little  Washington  through  the  gap,  and  Rodes' 
division  on  a  road  further  to  the  right  through  the  same 
gap.    Late  in  the  day  of  the  12th,  my  division  reached 

238 


INVASION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 

Front  Royal,  Rodes'  and  Johnson's  having  preceded  it, 
crossing  both  forks  of  the  Shenandoah  near  that  place. 
Two  of  my  brigades,  Hoke's  and  Smith's,  were  crossed 
over  both  of  the  forks  that  night.  Hays'  and  Gordon's 
and  Jones'  artillery  with  the  division  trains  remained 
on  the  east  side  of  the  South  Branch. 


a   *> 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

Capture  of  Winchester. 

Very  early  in  the  morning  of  the  13th,  the  remainder 
of  my  division  crossed  over  the  Shenandoah,  and  I  re- 
ceived orders  from  General  Ewell  to  move  to  the  Valley 
pike  at  Newtown,  and  along  that  road  against  the 
enemy  then  occupying  Winchester,  while  Johnson  moved 
along  the  direct  road  from  Front  Royal  to  the  town, 
Rodes  being  sent  to  the  right  to  Berryville,  where  there 
was  also  a  force.  Milroy  occupied  the  town  of  Win- 
chester with  a  considerable  force  in  strong  fortifications, 
and  my  orders  were  to  move  along  the  pike  to  Kerns- 
town,  and  then  to  the  left,  so  as  to  get  a.  position  on  the 
northwest  of  Winchester  from  which  the  main  work  of 
the  enemy  could  be  attacked  with  advantage. 

This  main  work  was  on  a  hill  a  little  outside  of  the 
town  on  the  northwest,  being  an  enclosed  fort,  with  em- 
brasures for  artillery,  and  I  was  informed  that  there 
was  a  high  hill  on  the  northwest  which  commanded  it, 
and  of  which  I  was  directed  to  get  possession,  if  I  could. 
Six  main  roads  centre  at  Winchester,  to-wit:  the  Front 
Royal  road  on  which  we  were,  coming  in  from  the  south- 
east and  uniting  with  the  Millwood  road  a  mile  or  two 
before  it  reaches  town ;  the  Valley  pike  coming  in  on  the 
south  and  uniting  with  the  Cedar  Creek  pike  between 
Kernstown  and  Winchester,  Kernstown  being  about  two 
miles  from  the  town ;  the  Romney  or  Northwestern  pike 
coming  in  on  the  west  side;  the  Pughtown  road  coming 
in  on  the  northwest;  the  Martinsburg  pike  coming  in 
on  the  north,  and  uniting  with  the  direct  Charlestown 
and  Harper's  Ferry  roads,  three  or  four  miles  from 
town ;  and  the  Berryville  road  coming  in  on  the  east. 

Lieutenant  Barton  of  the  2nd  Virginia  Regiment, 
Walker's  brigade,  Johnson's  division,  who  had  been 
raised  in  the  neighborhood,  was  furnished  me  as  a  guide, 

240 


CAPTURE  OF  WINCHESTER 

and  Brown's  battalion  of  reserve  artillery,  under  Captain 
Dance,  was  ordered  to  accompany  my  division  in  addition 
to  Jones'. 

Having  received  my  orders,  and  leaving  all  my 
wagons,  except  the  regimental  ordnance  and  medical 
wagons,  at  Cedarville  on  the  Front  Royal  road,  I 
diverged  from  that  road  at  a  little  place  called  Ninevah 
and  reached  the  Valley  pike  at  Newtown.  On  moving 
along  the  latter  road  past  Bartonsville  towards  Kerns  - 
town,  I  found  Lieutenant  Colonel  Herbert  of  the  Mary- 
land line  occupying  a  ridge  between  the  two  places 
with  his  battalion  of  infantry,  a  battery  of  artillery  and 
a  part  of  a  battalion  of  Maryland  cavalry,  and  engaged 
in  occasional  skirmishing  with  a  body  of  the  enemy's 
troops  which  had  taken  position  in  and  near  Kernstown. 

This  force  of  the  enemy  covered  the  road  which  I 
had  to  take  to  get  to  the  west  of  Winchester,  and  it  was 
therefore  necessary  to  dislodge  it  to  enable  me  to  get 
into  that  road,  and  to  drive  it  back  upon  the  main  body 
in  order  that  my  movement  should  be  unobserved. 
Colonel  Herbert  could  not  inform  me  of  the  strength 
of  the  force  in  his  immediate  front,  and  I  therefore  halted 
my  division  and  formed  it  in  line  across  the  pike,  and 
proceeded  to  reconnoitre.  The  only  force  in  sight  when 
I  arrived  was  a  cavalry  force,  but  I  was  informed  that 
a  strong  infantry  picket  occupied  the  town,  and  the  sup- 
position was  that  a  stronger  force  was  in  the  neighbor- 
hood. Just  beyond  Kernstown  and  Pritchard's  Hill  and 
a  ridge  extending  from  it  to  our  left,  which  was  covered 
with  trees,  being  the  position  occupied  by  Shields'  troops 
when  General  Jackson  attacked  him  on  the  23rd  of 
March,  1862.  It  was  a  position  on  which  a  considerable 
body  of  troops  might  be  posted  out  of  our  view,  and  I 
soon  discovered  a  battery  of  artillery  on  Pritchard's  Hill 
which  opened  on  us. 

I  then  reconnoitred  the  ground  carefully,  and,  after 
doing  so,  I  moved  Hays'  brigade  to  the  left,  through 
a  skirt  of  woods  and  a  meadow,  to  a  small  road  coming 

16  241 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

in  from  Bartonsville  towards  the  Cedar  Creek  pike,  and 
then  along  that  to  a  suitable  position  for  advancing 
against  the  artillery  on  Pritchard's  Hill;  and  ordered  it 
to  advance  and  get  possession  of  the  hill.  Whilst  ad- 
vancing General  Hays  sent  rne  word  that  the  enemy  had 
a  considerable  infantry  force  on  the  ridge  to  his  left. 
I  immediately  moved  Gordon's  brigade  over  the  same 
route  Hays'  brigade  had  taken,  and  ordered  him  to 
advance  and  clear  the  ridge  on  Hays'  left,  sending  an 
order  to  the  latter,  who  had  advanced  to  Pritchard's 
Hill,  compelling  the  artillery  and  the  force  supporting  it 
to  retire,  to  wait  until  Gordon  had  got  up  and  cleared 
the  ridge  on  his  left.  Gordon  advanced  handsomely,  as 
directed,  encountering  a  considerable  force  of  infantry, 
which,  in  conjunction  with  a  body  of  skirmishers  sent 
out  by  Hays,  he  drove  from  behind  a  stone  fence,  and 
then  swept  over  the  fields  beyond  the  ridge,  inclining,  as 
he  moved,  to  the  Valley  pike,  and  forcing  the  enemy 
across  the  Cedar  Creek  pike  and  Abraham's  Creek,  which 
here  crosses  the  Valley  pike,  to  Bower's  Hill  on  the 
north  of  the  creek  under  Burton's  Mill,  where  there 
were  some  reserves.  Hays,  in  the  meantime,  advanced 
to  the  front,  thus  coming  up  on  Gordon's  left  after  the 
latter  had  reached  the  Valley  pike.  As  soon  as  Hays 
and  Gordon  were  both  in  motion,  Hoke's  and  Smith's 
brigades  were  advanced  to  the  front  on  each  side  of  the 
Valley  pike  past  Kernstown. 

The  enemy  had  strong  position  on  Bower's  Hill, 
held  by  infantry  and  artillery,  and  it  was  difficult  of 
access,  from  the  nature  of  Abraham's  Creek,  a  boggy 
stream,  running  at  its  base,  and  the  steep  ascent  to  the 
hill  on  the  other  side.  Gordon  formed  his  brigade  in  line 
across  the  Valley  pike.  Hays  was  posted  on  his  left 
along  a  ridge  between  Cedar  Creek  pike  and  Abraham's 
Creek,  and  Hoke's  and  Smith's  brigades  were  brought 
up  and  the  latter  placed  on  Hays'  left,  with  a  view  to 
further  operations  against  the  enemy,  in  order  to  drive 
him  from  Bower's  Hill;  Hoke's  brigade,  under  Colonel 

242 


CAPTURE  OF  WINCHESTER 

Avery  of  the  6th  North  Carolina  being  held  in  reserve. 
During  these  arrangements  the  enemy  shelled  my 
brigades  heavily  from  his  guns  on  Bower's  Hill;  and 
by  the  time  they  were  made  it  became  too  dark  to  pro- 
ceed farther.  Colonel  Avery  was  then  ordered  back  to 
Kernstown,  with  his  brigade,  where  it  was  placed  in 
position  to  protect  the  ambulances,  ordnance  and  medical 
wagons,  and  the  artillery  from  any  movement  around 
our  left,  and  Colonel  Herbert  was  ordered  to  take  posi- 
tion with  his  battalion  of  infantry  on  Gordon's  right, 
which  extended  across  the  Valley  pike.  The  troops  then 
lay  down  on  their  arms  and  spent  the  night  in  a  drench- 
ing rain. 

General  Ewell  had  moved  with  Johnson's  division  on 
the  Front  Royal  road  to  the  vicinity  of  Winchester,  and, 
after  I  had  arranged  my  troops,  I  endeavored  to  reach 
him  by  riding  across  the  country,  but  the  storm  was  so 
violent  and  the  night  so  dark  that  I  was  compelled  to 
desist  and  return. 

During  the  night,  the  enemy  withdrew  his  artillery 
and  the  main  body  of  his  infantry  from  Bower's  Hill  to 
the  town,  leaving  only  a  body  of  skirmishers  confronting 
us.  Very  early  on  the  morning  of  the  14th,  I  ordered 
Hays  and  Gordon  to  advance  each  a  regiment  across  the 
creek  to  drive  the  enemy's  skirmishers  from  Bower's 
Hill,  which  was  done  after  some  sharp  skirmishing.  At 
the  same  time  Smith's  skirmishers  were  advanced  across 
the  creek  on  the  left,  and  we  got  possession  of  the  works 
on  the  hill.  While  these  operations  were  going  on  at 
Bower's  Hill,  Major  Goldsborough,  with  the  skirmishers 
of  the  Maryland  battalion,  advanced  on  the  right  into 
the  outskirts  of  Winchester,  but  fearing  that  the  enemy, 
whose  principal  force  had  taken  position  in  and  near  the 
main  fort,  might  shell  the  town,  I  ordered  him  to  retire. 

General  Ewell  came  up  immediately  after  my  skir- 
mishers had  advanced  to  Bower's  Hill,  and  together  we 
proceeded  to  reconnoitre  from  that  point,  from  which  we 
had  a  very  distinct  view  of  the  works  about  Winchester. 

243 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

We  discovered  that  the  hill  on  the  northwest,  which  I 
had  been  ordered  to  occupy,  had  been  fortified  with 
works  facing  in  the  direction  from  which  I  would  have 
to  approach  it,  and  that  they  were  occupied.  It  became 
necessary  then  to  take  this  hill,  which  was  the  key  to 
the  position,  by  assault,  and  having  discovered  a  ridge 
back  of  it  from  which  it  might  be  attacked,  I  was  ordered 
to  leave  a  brigade  and  some  artillery,  whero  I  then  was, 
to  amuse  the  enemy  in  front,  while  I  moved  the  rest  of 
my  command  around  by  the  left  to  the  point  from  which 
I  could  make  the  assault,  taking  care  to  conduct  my 
movement  with  secrecy  so  that  the  enemy  would  not 
discover  it.  I  accordingly  left  Gordon  to  occupy  Bower's 
Hill,  and  I  left  with  him  besides  his  own  brigade  the 
Maryland  battalion  and  battery,  and  another  battery 
(Hupp's)  of  Brown's  battalion,  and  with  the  other  three 
brigades  and  the  rest  of  the  artillery  I  moved  to  the 
left,  following  the  Cedar  Creek  pike  for  a  mile  or  two 
and  then  passing  through  fields  and  the  woods,  which 
latter  was  here  sufficiently  open  to  admit  of  the  passage 
of  the  artillery,  and  crossing  the  Romney  road  at  Lup- 
ton's  house,  about  three  miles  west  of  Winchester,  and 
half  a  mile  from  a  point  at  which  I  was  informed  by  Mr. 
Lupton  that  the  enemy  had  had  a  picket  the  night  before, 
and  probably  had  one  then. 

Leaving  the  54th  North  Carolina  Regiment  of  Hoke 's 
brigade  at  the  point  where  I  crossed  the  Romney  road, 
to  watch  my  rear,  I  moved  on  along  a  small  obscure  road 
to  the  rear  of  the  position  from  which  I  wished  to  assault 
the  enemy's  works,  and  I  found  it  a  very  favorable  one 
for  the  purpose.  My  route  had  been  a  very  circuitous 
one,  in  order  to  check  the  enemy's  vigilance,  and  I  was 
conducted  over  it  by  a  very  intelligent  and  patriotic 
citizen,  Mr.  James  C.  Baker,  who  had  a  son  in  the  service, 
and  who  had  been  made  to  feel  the  tyranny  of  Milroy. 
Mr.  Baker  thoroughly  understood  the  object  in  view,  and 
fully  appreciated  the  advantage  of  the  position  I  was 
seeking  to  reach;    and  it  was  mainly  owing  to  the  in- 

244 


CAPTURE  OF  WINCHESTER 


telligent  and  skilful  manner  in  which  he  guided  me  that  I 
was  able  to  get  there  without  attracting  the  slightest 
attention  from  the  enemy. 

Having  conducted  me  to  the  desired  point,  he  thought 
it  prudent  to  retire,  as  he  was  of  no  further  use  as  a 
guide,  and  his  residence  was  in  the  immediate  neighbor- 
hood of  the  town.  On  the  route  we  had  not  seen  a 
solitary  man  from  the  enemy's  force,  whether  straggler, 
scout  or  picket.  We  had  met  two  very  ordinary  looking 
men  in  the  roads,  and  from  prudential  motives  they 
were  carried  with  us  and  left  at  Lupton's  with  in- 
junctions to  keep  them. 

After  that  the  only  person  we  saw  was  a  young  girl 
of  about  thirteen  years  of  age  whom  we  met  on  horse- 
back with  her  young  brother  behind  her.  She  was 
carrying  before  her  a  large  bundle  of  clothes  tied  up  in 
a  sheet,  and  when  she  unexpectedly  came  upon  us  she 
was  at  first  very  much  frightened,  but  soon  discovering 
that  we  were  Confederates,  she  pulled  off  her  bonnet, 
waved  it  over  her  head  and  ' '  hurrahed, ' '  and  then  burst 
into  tears.  She  told  us  that  the  enemy  had  been  shelling 
the  woods  all  around,  firing  occasionally  into  her  father's 
house,  and  that  she  had  been  sent  from  home  by  her 
father  and  mother  to  get  out  of  the  way.  She  said  that 
they  had  not  been  able  to  imagine  what  the  shelling 
meant,  as  they  did  not  know  that  any  of  "our  soldiers," 
as  she  called  us,  were  anywhere  in  the  neighborhood. 
It  was  not  necessary  to  use  any  precaution  as  to  her, 
and  she  was  permitted  to  pass  on,  feeling  much  happier 
for  the  encounter. 

To  return  from  this  digression: — the  position  which 
I  reached  proved  to  be  a  long  ridge  bordering,  at  the 
further  end,  on  the  Pughtown  road  and  immediately  con- 
fronting the  fortified  hill  which  I  wished  to  carry,  and 
within  easy  range  of  it  for  our  pieces.  Where  it  imme- 
diately confronted  the  enemy's  work  it  was  wooded,  the 
trees  having  been  partially  cut  down,  and  we  found 
posted    at    different    points    notices    to    the    following 

245 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

effect:  "General  Milroy  orders  all  of  the  timber  east 
of  this  point  to  be  cleared  off."  Enough,  however,  re- 
mained to  conceal  our  movements  and  enabled  me  to 
push  forward  a  brigade  under  cover  to  within  a  short 
distance  of  the  base  of  the  hill  on  which  was  the  enemy's 
work. 

On  the  left  of  this  woods,  near  the  Pughtown  road, 
was  a  cornfield  on  Mr.  Brinly's  land,  facing  towards 
the  enemy's  position  and  affording  an  excellent  position 
for  posting  artillery  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  bearing 
on  the  enemy.  On  the  right  of  the  woods,  on  the  crest 
of  the  ridge,  was  an  old  orchard  and  the  remains  of  an 
old  house,  called  "Folk's  old  house,"  with  the  slope  in 
front  cleared,  which  furnished  another  good  position 
for  artillery  to  bear  on  the  other  flank  of  the  enemy.  I 
reached  this  position  about  four  o'clock  p.m.,  and  as  the 
day  was  exceedingly  hot,  and  the  men  had  marched  a 
circuit  of  eight  or  ten  miles  without  meeting  with  water 
to  drink,  and  were  very  much  exhausted,  I  massed  them 
in  the  woods  in  the  rear  of  the  position  and  gave  them 
time  to  rest. 

In  the  meantime  I  proceeded  to  reconnoitre  the 
enemy's  position  and  the  ground  over  which  I  would 
have  to  move.  The  enemy  had  no  pickets  thrown  out 
in  the  direction  where  I  was,  and  did  not  seem  to  be 
keeping  any  lookout  that  way.  The  main  work  on  the 
hill  presented  a  bastion  front  towards  us,  and  appeared 
as  if  it  might  be  an  enclosed  work.  It  was  on  the  south 
of  the  Pughtown  road,  and  there  was  a  line  of  works 
running  across  that  road  from  the  flank  of  the  main 
one  along  a  ridge,  a  small  redoubt  which,  about  150 
yards  from  the  main  work,  was  occupied  by  two  guns 
supported  by  infantry.  On  the  other  flank  were  rifle 
pits  on  the  slope  of  the  hill.  The  men  constituting  the 
force  occupying  the  works  in  our  front  did  not  seem  to 
apprehend  any  danger  in  their  immediate  neighbor- 
hood, but  were  looking  intently  in  the  direction  of  Gor- 
don's position,  against  which  a  gradual  advance  was 

246 


CAPTURE  OF  WINCHESTER 

being  made  with  skirmishers  supported  by  a  body  of 
infantry  and  some  pieces  of  artillery,  which  were  firing 
in  that  direction. 

Colonel  Jones,  who  had  been  entrusted  with  the  com- 
mand of  all  the  artillery,  had  been  quietly  getting  it 
into  position  out  of  sight,  so  as  to  be  pushed  by  hand 
rapidly  to  the  front  when  the  time  arrived  to  open  on 
the  enemy.  When  the  men  had  become  sufficiently  re- 
freshed, Hays'  brigade,  which  was  selected  to  make  the 
assault,  was  moved  to  the  front  near  to  the  edge  of  the 
woods  next  the  enemy's  position,  with  directions  to  Gen- 
eral Hays  to  keep  his  men  under  cover  until  the  artillery 
opened,  and  then  to  advance  to  the  assault  across  the 
field  and  up  the  hill  to  the  enemy's  works,  as  soon  as  he 
should  discover  that  the  force  occupying  them  was 
demoralized  by  the  artillery  fire.  The  artillery  under 
Jones  had  been  posted,  with  twelve  pieces  on  the  right 
of  the  woods,  near  Folk's  old  house,  and  right  on  the 
left  in  rear  of  the  cornfield  the  57th  North  Carolina 
Regiment  of  Hoke's  brigade  was  posted  so  as  to  pro- 
tect the  pieces  on  the  left  from  an  attack  in  the  direction 
of  the  Pughtown  road.  The  rest  of  Hoke's  brigade, 
except  the  54th  North  Carolina  Regiment,  still  on  picket 
on  the  Romney  road,  and  the  whole  of  Smith's,  were 
placed  in  line  in  the  woods  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in 
rear  of  Hays',  so  as  to  be  ready  to  support  him. 

About  an  hour  before  sunset,  everything  being  ready, 
Jones  caused  his  pieces  to  be  run  by  hand  to  the  front, 
and  opened  almost  simultaneously  with  the  whole  twenty 
pieces  upon  the  enemy,  who  thus  received  the  first  in- 
dication of  our  presence  in  that  quarter.  Of  course  he 
was  taken  by  surprise  and  thrown  into  confusion.  Our 
fire  continued  for  about  three-fourths  of  an  hour  very 
rapidly,  being  replied  to,  after  the  first  consternation 
was  over,  by  the  enemy's  guns,  but  in  a  very  wild  man- 
ner. Hays  then  advanced  to  the  assault  as  directed, 
crossing  the  field  in  his  front,  ascending  the  hill — the 
slope  of  which  was  covered  with  abattis  made  by  cutting 

247 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  .TUBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  brush  wood  growing  on  it, — and  carrying  the  main 
work  on  the  crest  in  handsome  style,  capturing  some 
prisoners  and  six  pieces  of  artillery,  including  those  in 
the  small  redoubt,  two  of  which  were  immediately  turned 
on  a  body  of  the  enemy's  infantry  seen  approaching 
from  the  main  fort  to  the  assistance  of  these  outer 
works. 

The  greater  portion  of  the  force  occupying  the  cap- 
tured works  was  enabled  to  make  its  escape  towards 
the 'town,  as  it  proved  that  this  main  work  was  open  in 
the  rear  with  wings  thrown  back  from  the  two  flanks 
of  the  bastion  front  presented  to  us.  As  soon  as  I  saw 
Hays'  men  entering  the  works,  I  ordered  Smith's  brigade 
forward  to  their  support,  and  directed  Colonel  Jones, 
whose  guns  had  ceased  firing  when  Hays  advanced,  to 
move  the  pieces  on  the  left  to  the  captured  hill,  those  on 
the  right  being  left  under  the  protection  of  three  regi- 
ments of  Hoke's  brigade.  Riding  on  myself  in  advance 
of  the  supports  ordered  to  Hays  I  discovered  him  in 
secure  possession  of  the  captured  works,  and  ascertained 
that  the  attempt  to  advance  against  him  had  been  aban- 
doned, the  force  that  commenced  advancing  having  been 
repulsed  by  the  fire  from  the  captured  guns  which  had 
been  turned  on  it. 

The  force  which  had  been  advancing  upon  Gordon 
in  the  direction  of  Bower's  Hill  had  retired  precipitately, 
and  the  enemy's  whole  force  seemed  to  be  in  great  com- 
motion. He  had  turned  all  his  guns  from  the  main  fort, 
and  from  a  square  redoubt  on  a  ridge  north  of  it,  upon 
the  position  now  occupied  by  us,  and  as  soon  as  Jones' 
guns  arrived  they  replied  to  the  enemy's,  firing  into 
both  forts,  which  were  completely  commanded  by  the 
one  in  our  possession,  and  upon  the  masses  of  infantry 
near  them.  The  enemy's  force  occupying  the  works, 
and  around  them,  was  quite  large,  and  deep  and  rugged 
ravines  interposed  between  us  and  the  two  occupied 
works,  which  rendered  an  assault  upon  them  from  that 
direction  very  difficult. 

248 


CAPTURE  OF  WINCHESTER 

By  the  time  Smith's  brigade  and  the  artillery  arrived, 
it  was  too  late  to  accomplish  anything  further  before 
night,  and  the  capture  of  the  other  works  by  assault 
would  evidently  require  the  co-operation  of  the  other 
troops  around  Winchester.  The  artillery  fire  upon  the 
enemy's  position  and  his  masses  of  infantry  was  con- 
tinued until  a  stop  was  put  to  it  by  the  approach  of 
darkness.  Hays'  brigade  was  formed  in  line  on  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  behind  the  captured  works,  with  Smith's  in 
rear.  The  57th  North  Carolina,  Colonel  Godwin,  was 
sent  for,  to  occupy  a  portion  of  the  works  on  the  north 
of  the  Pughtown  road,  Colonel  Avery  being  left  with 
two  regiments,  to  protect  the  artillery  which  had  not  been 
brought  forward  and  guard  against  a  surprise  in  our 
rear,  the  54th  North  Carolina  Regiment  being  still  left 
on  picket  on  the  Romney  road,  and  the  front  and  flanks 
of  our  main  position  being  watched  by  pickets  thrown 
out.  The  men  then  lay  down  on  their  arms  to  rest 
from  the  fatigues  of  the  day. 

During  my  operations  on  the  northwest,  Johnson's 
division  had  demonstrated  and  skirmished  heavily  with 
the  enemy  on  the  east  of  the  town,  while  Gordon  demon- 
strated and  skirmished  with  him  from  the  direction  of 
Bower's  Hill,  his  attention  being  thus  diverted  entirely 
from  the  point  of  real  attack,  which  enabled  us  to  effect 
a  surprise  with  artillery  in  open  day  upon  a  fortified 
position.  It  was  very  apparent  that  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion was  now  untenable,  and  that  he  must  either  submit 
to  a  surrender  of  his  whole  force  or  attempt  to  escape 
during  the  night. 

I  was  of  opinion  that  he  would  attempt  an  evacuation 
during  the  night,  and  I  sent  a  courier  to  General  Ewell 
with  information  of  what  I  had  accomplished,  stating 
my  opinion  of  the  probability  of  the  attempt  to  escape, 
but  also  informing  him  that  I  would  renew  the  attack  at 
light  if  the  enemy  was  not  gone.  I  had  been  given  to 
understand  that  Johnson's  division  would  be  so  moved 
as  to  cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat  in  the  event  I  succeeded 

249 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

in  capturing  the  position  commanding  his  works,  and  I 
took  it  for  granted  this  would  be  done. 

In  order  to  prepare  for  any  emergency  that  might 
exist,  I  sent  my  aide,  Lieutenant  Callaway,  with  orders 
to  General  Gordon,  to  move  direct  from  Bower's  Hill 
against  the  main  force  at  light  next  morning,  and  I  set 
my  pioneer  party  at  work  during  the  night  to  turn  the 
captured  works  for  my  artillery,  so  that  it  might  have 
some  protection  from  the  enemy's  guns,  if  it  should  be 
necessary  to  open  fire  in  the  morning.  As  soon  as  it 
was  light  enough  to  see  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy 
had  evacuated  his  works  and  the  town  of  Winchester 
during  the  night,  taking  the  Martinsburg  road,  and  some 
artillery  was  heard  on  the  road  which  proved  to  be 
Johnson's  guns  near  Stephenson's  depot  firing  on  the 
retiring  enemy,  whose  retreat  had  been  cut  off  by  his 
division. 

The  brigades  with  me,  including  the  detached  regi- 
ments of  Hoke's,  were  immediately  ordered  forward  to 
the  Martinsburg  road  for  the  purpose  of  taking  up  the 
pursuit.  Gordon  had  advanced  at  light,  as  ordered,  and 
finding  the  main  fort  unoccupied  had  pulled  down  the 
large  garrison  flag  still  left  floating  over  that  work.  The 
13th  Virginia  Regiment  under  Colonel  Terrill  was  im- 
mediately detailed  by  me  as  a  guard  for  a  large  number 
of  loaded  wagons  found  standing  outside  of  the  town, 
and  a  considerable  amount  of  stores  left  in  the  town 
by  the  enemy,  and  the  rest  of  my  command,  as  soon  as 
Avery  came  up  with  Hoke's  brigade,  advanced  in  pur- 
suit along  the  Martinsburg  road,  Gordon's  brigade  hav- 
ing preceded  the  others.  On  getting  near  Stephenson's 
depot,  five  or  six  miles  from  Winchester,  I  found  that 
General  Johnson's  division  had  captured  the  greater 
part  of  Milroy's  force,  Milroy  himself  having  made  his 
escape  with  a  small  fraction  of  his  command,  prin- 
cipally mounted  on  the  mules  and  horses  taken  from  the 
wagons  and  artillery  that  had  been  left  behind,  and  I 
therefore  desisted  from  further  pursuit. 

250 


CAPTURE  OF  WINCHESTER 

An  enemy  flying  for  safety  cannot  be  overtaken  by 
a  force  on  foot  moving  with  arms  in  their  hands,  and 
as  we  had  but  a  very  small  battalion  of  cavalry  (that 
belonging  to  Herbert's  command,  which  did  capture 
some  prisoners),  nothing  was  accomplished  by  the  at- 
tempts made  at  further  pursuit  of  Milroy,  and  he  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  in  safety  to  Harper's  Ferry. 

During  the  operations  against  Winchester,  Rodes  had 
moved  to  Berryville,  but  the  enemy  fled  from  that  place 
before  him;  he  then  moved  on  to  Martinsburg  in  con- 
junction with  Jenkins'  brigade  of  cavalry,  and  there 
captured  several  hundred  prisoners,  several  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  some  stores.  My  division  bivouacked  near 
Stephenson's  depot,  and  I  was  ordered  by  General  Ewell 
into  Winchester  to  make  arrangements  for  securing  the 
stores  and  sending  off  the  prisoners. 

The  enemy  had  abandoned  the  whole  of  his  artillery, 
wagon  trains,  camp  equipage,  baggage,  and  stores,  and 
twenty-five  pieces  of  artillery  with  all  their  equipments 
complete,  including  those  captured  by  Hays'  brigade  at 
the  storming  of  the  outer  work,  a  very  large  number  of 
horses  and  mules,  and  a  quantity  of  ammunition,  though 
in  a  damaged  state,  which  fell  into  our  hands.  In  the 
hurry  of  the  movement  after  Milroy  was  found  to  have 
evacuated,  I  made  such  arrangements  as  I  could  to  secure 
the  abandoned  property  by  detailing  a  regiment  to  guard 
it,  but  as  usual  on  such  occasions  the  contents  of  the 
wagons  and  the  stores  in  town  were  considerably  plun- 
dered by  stragglers  and  followers  of  our  trains,  before 
they  could  be  secured,  and  even  after  our  quartermasters 
and  commissaries  got  possession  of  them,  there  was  great 
waste,  and  perhaps  misappropriation  of  much  of  them, 
as  always  seemed  unavoidable  on  such  occasions. 

On  getting  into  town  I  endeavored  to  rectify  the 
abuses  as  well  as  I  could,  but  much  was  lost  to  the  army 
of  what  was  of  real  value,  because  there  was  no  means 
of  holding  such  agents  to  a  strict  responsibility.  I  sent 
off  to  Richmond,  under  guard,  by  the  way  of  Staunton, 

251 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

108  commissioned  officers  and  3,250  enlisted  men  as  pris- 
oners, much  the  larger  portion  of  which  had  been  cap- 
tured by  Johnson's  division.  Besides  these  there  were 
left  in  Winchester  several  hundred  sick  and  wounded 
prisoners. 

My  loss  in  the  operations  around  Winchester  was 
slight,  consisting  of  30  killed  and  144  wounded,  total  174, 
all  but  one  killed  and  six  wounded  being  from  Hays' 
and  Gordon's  brigades. 


CHAPTEE  XXIII. 

At  York  and  Wrightsville. 

I  remained  in  Winchester  until  the  afternoon  of  the 
18th,  General  Ewell  having  moved  in  the  meantime  to 
Shepherdstown  on  the  Potomac,  to  which  place  Johnson's 
division,  and  Gordon's  brigade,  Hays'  brigade  and  three 
regiments  of  Smith's  brigade  of  my  own  division  had 
also  moved.  The  54th  North  Carolina  Regiment  of 
Hoke's  brigade,  and  the  58th  Virginia  of  Smith's  brigade 
had  been  sent  to  Staunton  in  charge  of  the  prisoners, 
and  leaving  the  13th  Virginia  Regiment  in  "Winchester, 
I  proceeded  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  with  the  residue 
of  Hoke's  brigade,  and  Jones'  battalion  of  artillery,  to 
Shepherdstown,  which  place  I  reached  on  the  19th. 

By  this  time  Longstreet's  corps  had  begun  to  arrive 
in  the  valley,  and  Hill's  was  following.  The  crossing 
of  the  river  at  Fredericksburg  by  a  portion  of  Hooker's 
army  had  been  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether 
our  army  had  left  the  vicinity  of  that  place,  and  when 
ascertained  that  we  were  concentrating  near  Culpeper 
Court-House,  he  withdrew  his  force  from  across  the 
river  and  moved  his  army  north  to  defend  Washington. 

I  remained  at  Shepherdstown  until  the  22nd.  The 
field  return  of  my  division  at  this  place  on  the  20th 
showed  487  officers  and  5,124  men  present  for  duty, 
making  a  total  of  5,611,  and  the  brigade  inspection  re- 
ports for  the  same  day  showed  the  number  of  efficient 
present  to  be  about  the  same  number,  the  reduction 
since  the  last  reports  being  caused  by  the  absence  of  the 
three  regiments  before  mentioned  and  which  did  not 
rejoin  until  the  campaign  was  over,  the  permanent  de- 
taching of  Wharton's  battalion  of  Hoke's  brigade  as  a 
provost  guard  for  the  corps,  the  loss  sustained  at  Win- 
chester, and  the  sick  and  exhausted  men  left  behind. 

It  is  as  well  to  state  here  that  we  had  no  hired  men 

253 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

for  teamsters,  or  in  any  other  capacity,  but  all  the 
duties  usually  assigned  to  such  men  with  an  army  had 
to  be  performed  by  men  detailed  from  the  ranks,  as  were 
all  our  pioneer  and  engineer  parties. 

On  the  22nd  of  June  I  crossed  the  Potomac  with  my 
division  and  Jones'  battalion  of  artillery  at  Boteler's 
Ford  below  Shepherdstown  and  marched  through 
Sharpsburg  and  Boonsboro,  camping  three  miles  beyond 
Boonsboro  on  the  pike  to  Hagerstown.  The  17th  Vir- 
ginia Regiment  of  cavalry,  under  Colonel  French,  from 
Jenkins'  brigade,  joined  me  on  the  march  this  day  to 
accompany  my  division  by  orders  of  General  Ewell. 
Rodes  had  moved  through  Hagerstown  towards  Cham- 
bersburg,  and  Johnson's  division,  which  had  crossed  the 
Potomac  ahead  of  me,  moved  in  the  same  direction.  I 
was  ordered  to  proceed  along  the  western  base  of  the 
South  Mountain.  Maryland  Heights  and  Harper's  Ferry 
were  both  strongly  fortified,  and  were  occupied  by  a 
heavy  force  of  the  enemy,  which  we  left  behind  us,  with- 
out making  any  effort  to  dislodge  it,  as  it  would  have 
been  attended  with  a  loss  disproportionate  to  any  good 
to  be  obtained.  Our  movements  through  and  from 
Sharpsburg  were  in  full  view  of  the  enemy  from  the 
heights. 

On  the  23rd,  I  moved  through  Cavetown,  Smithtown, 
and  Ringgold  (or  Ridgeville  as  it  is  now  usually  called) 
to  Waynesboro  in  Pennsylvania.  On  the  24th  I  moved 
through  Quincy  and  Altodale  to  Greenwood,  at  the  west- 
ern base  of  the  South  Mountain,  on  the  pike  from  Cham- 
bersburg  to  Gettysburg.  There  were  no  indications  of 
any  enemy  near  us  and  the  march  was  entirely  without 
molestation.  We  were  now  in  the  enemy's  country,  and 
were  getting  our  supplies  entirely  from  the  country 
people.  These  supplies  were  taken  from  mills,  store- 
houses, and  the  farmers,  under  a  regular  system  ordered 
by  General  Lee,  and  with  a  due  regard  to  the  wants  of 
the  inhabitants  themselves,  certificates  being  given  in  all 
cases.    There  was  no  marauding,  or  indiscriminate  plun- 

254 


AT  YORK  AND  WRIGHTSVILLE 

dering,  but  all  such  acts  were  expressly  forbidden  and 
prohibited  effectually.  On  the  25th  my  command  re- 
mained stationary  at  Greenwood,  and  I  visited  General 
Ewell,  by  his  request,  at  Chambersburg,  where  Rodes' 
and  Johnson's  divisions  had  concentrated. 

In  accordance  with  instructions  received  from  Gen- 
eral Lee,  General  Ewell  ordered  me  to  move  with  my  com- 
mand across  the  South  Mountain,  and  through  Gettys- 
burg to  York,  for  the  purpose  of  cutting  the  Northern 
Central  Railroad  (running  from  Baltimore  to  Harris- 
burg),  and  destroying  the  bridge  across  the  Susquehanna 
at  Wrightsville  and  Columbia  on  the  branch  railroad 
from  York  to  Philadelphia.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Elijah 
White's  battalion  of  cavalry  was  ordered  to  report  to 
me  for  the  expedition  in  addition  to  French's  regiment, 
and  I  was  ordered  to  leave  the  greater  portion  of  my 
trains  behind  to  accompany  the  reserve  ordnance  and 
subsistence  trains  of  the  camps.  I  was  also  ordered  to 
rejoin  the  other  divisions  at  Carlisle  by  the  way  of 
Dillstown  from  York,  after  I  had  accomplished  the  task 
assigned  me. 

I  returned  to  Greenwood  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
25th,  and  directed  all  my  trains — except  the  ambulances, 
one  medical  wagon,  one  ordnance  wagon,  and  one  wagon 
with  cooking  utensils,  for  each  regiment,  and  fifteen 
empty  wagons  for  getting  supplies, — to  be  sent  to 
Chambersburg.  No  baggage  whatever  was  allowed  for 
officers,  except  what  they  could  carry  on  their  backs  or 
horses,  not  excepting  division  headquarters,  and  with 
my  command  and  the  trains  thus  reduced,  I  moved  across 
South  Mountain  on  the  morning  of  the  26th,  and  we 
saw  no  more  of  our  trains  until  we  crossed  the  Potomac 
three  weeks  later. 

As  we  were  leaving,  I  caused  the  iron  works  of  Mr. 
Thaddeus  Stevens  near  Greenwood,  consisting  of  a 
furnace,  a  forge,  a  rolling  mill — with  a  saw  mill  and 
storehouse  attached, — to  be  burnt  by  my  pioneer  party. 
The  enemy  had  destroyed  a  number  of  similar  works, 

255 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

as  well  as  manufacturing  establishments  of  different 
kinds,  in  those  parts  of  the  Southern  States  to  which 
he  had  been  able  to  penetrate,  upon  the  plea  that  they 
furnished  us  the  means  of  carrying  on  the  war,  besides 
burning  many  private  houses  and  destroying  a  vast  deal 
of  private  property  which  could  be  employed  in  no  way 
in  supporting  the  war  on  our  part;  and  finding  in  my 
way  these  works  of  Mr.  Stevens,  who — as  a  member  of 
the  Federal  Congress — had  been  advocating  the  most 
vindictive  measures  of  confiscation  and  devastation,  I 
determined  to  destroy  them.  This  I  did  on  my  own  re- 
sponsibility, as  neither  General  Lee  nor  General  Ewell 
knew  I  would  encounter  these  works.  A  quantity  of 
provisions  found  in  store  at  the  furnace  was  appropri- 
ated to  the  use  of  my  command,  but  the  houses  and 
private  property  of  the  employees  were  not  molested. 

On  getting  to  the  eastern  slope  of  the  South  Moun- 
tain, where  the  road  forks  about  one  and  a  half  miles 
from  Cashtown,  I  heard  that  there  was  probably  a  force 
in  Gettysburg,  and  the  pike  leading  through  Cashtown 
was  found  to  be  slightly  obstructed  by  trees  felled  across 
the  road.  I  determined,  therefore,  to  move  a  portion 
of  my  force  along  the  pike,  which  was  the  direct  road 
to  Gettysburg,  in  order  to  skirmish  with  and  amuse 
the  enemy  in  front,  while  I  moved  with  the  rest  on  the 
road  to  the  left,  by  the  way  of  Hilltown  and  Mum- 
masburg,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  such  force  as 
might  be  at  Gettysburg.  Accordingly,  Gordon  was  sent 
on  the  pike  directly  towards  the  town  with  his  brigade 
and  White's  battalion  of  cavalry,  and  I  moved  with  the 
rest  of  the  command  on  the  other  road.  There  had  been 
a  heavy  rain  the  night  before,  and  it  was  now  raining 
slightly  but  constantly,  in  consequence  of  which  the 
dirt  road,  over  which  the  left  column  moved,  was  very 
muddy. 

Gordon  moving  along  the  pike,  with  about  forty  men 
of  White's  cavalry  in  front,  as  an  advance  guard,  en- 

256 


AT  YORK  AND  WRIGHTSVILLE 

countered  a  militia  regiment  a  mile  or  two  from  Gettys- 
burg, which  fled  across  the  fields  at  the  first  sight  of 
White's  advance  party  without  waiting  to  see  what  was 
in  the  rear,  and  Gordon  moved  on  without  resistance 
into  the  town. 

On  reaching  Mummasburg  with  French's  cavalry  in 
advance  of  the  infantry,  I  was  informed  that  there  was 
but  a  comparatively  small  force  at  Gettysburg,  and  I 
halted  to  wait  for  the  infantry,  whose  march  was  im- 
peded by  the  mud,  sending  out  one  of  French's  com- 
panies towards  the  latter  place  to  reconnoitre.  In  a 
short  time  this  company  encountered  some  of  the  fleeing 
militia  and  captured  a  few  prisoners,  and  being  in- 
formed of  this  fact  and  that  the  command  to  which  they 
belonged  was  retreating  through  the  fields  between 
Mummasburg  and  Gettysburg,  I  sent  the  rest  of 
French's  cavalry  in  pursuit.  Hays'  brigade,  arriving 
soon  after,  was  ordered  to  move  towards  Gettysburg, 
while  the  rest  of  this  column  was  ordered  into  the  camp 
near  Mummasburg. 

I  then  rode  to  Gettysburg,  and  finding  Gordon  in 
possession  of  the  town,  Hays  was  halted  and  encamped 
within  a  mile  of  it,  and  two  of  his  regiments  were  sent 
to  help  French  in  catching  the  frightened  militia,  but 
could  not  get  up  with  it.  French  caught  about  two 
hundred,  but  the  rest  succeeded  in  getting  off  through 
enclosed  fields  and  the  woods.  The  regiment  proved  to 
be  the  26th  Pennsylvania  Militia,  eight  or  nine  hundred 
strong.  It  was  newly  clad  with  the  regular  United  States 
uniform,  and  was  well  armed  and  equipped.  It  had 
arrived  in  Gettysburg  the  night  before  and  moved  out 
that  morning  on  the  Cashtown  road.  This  was  a  part 
of  Governor  Curtin's  contingent  for  the  defence  of  the 
State,  and  seemed  to  belong  to  that  class  of  men  who 
regard  " discretion  as  the  better  part  of  valor."  It  was 
well  that  the  regiment  took  to  its  heels  so  quickly,  or 
some   of  its  members  might  have   been  hurt,   and   all 

17  257 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

would  have  been  captured.  The  men  and  officers  taken 
were  paroled  next  day  and  sent  about  their  business, 
rejoicing  at  this  termination  of  their  campaign. 

On  entering  Gettysburg  myself  I  called  for  the  town 
authorities  in  order  to  make  a  requisition  on  them  for  a 
sum  of  money  and  some  supplies.  The  principal 
municipal  officer  was  absent,  but  I  saw  one  of  the  au- 
thorities, who  informed  me  that  the  town  could  furnish 
no  supplies,  as  they  were  not  there,  and  the  people  were 
too  poor  to  afford  them.  I  caused  the  stores  in  town  to 
be  searched  and  succeeded  in  finding  only  a  small  quan- 
tity of  articles  suited  for  commissary  supplies,  which 
were  taken.  It  was  then  late  and  I  had  to  move  early 
in  the  morning  towards  York,  so  that  I  did  not  have 
time  to  enforce  my  demands.  Two  thousand  rations 
were  found  in  a  train  of  cars  which  had  been  brought 
with  the  militia,  and  these  were  taken  and  issued  to 
Gordon's  brigade.  The  cars,  ten  or  twelve  in  number, 
and  also  a  railroad  bridge  near  the  place  were  burnt, 
there  being  no  railroad  buildings  of  any  consequence.  I 
then  ordered  Colonel  White  to  proceed  with  his  bat- 
talion early  the  next  morning  along  the  railroad  from 
Gettysburg  to  Hanover  Junction  on  the  Northern  Central 
road,  and  to  burn  all  the  bridges  on  the  former  road, 
also  the  railroad  buildings  at  the  Junction  and  a  bridge 
or  two  south  of  it  on  the  Northern  Central,  and  then 
move  along  that  road  to  York,  burning  all  the  bridges. 
Gordon  was  ordered  to  move  at  the  same  time  along  the 
macadamized  road  to  York,  and  during  the  night  I  sent 
him  a  company  of  French's  cavalry  and  Tanner's  bat- 
tery of  artillery  to  accompany  him. 

With  the  rest  of  the  command  I  moved  at  light  next 
day  (the  27th)  from  Mummasburg  towards  York  by  the 
way  of  Hunterstown,  New  Chester,  Hampton,  and  East 
Berlin,  halting  and  bivouacking  for  the  night  after  pass- 
ing the  latter  place  a  few  miles.  I  then  rode  across  to 
the  York  pike  to  Gordon's  camp  to  arrange  with  him 
the  means  of  moving  against  the  town  next  day  in  the 

258 


AT  YORK  AND  WRIGHTSVILLE 

event  that  it  should  be  defended.  The  information  which 
Gordon  had  received  was  that  there  were  no  troops  in 
York,  and  I  directed  him,  in  the  event  the  town  should 
be  unoccupied,  to  move  on  through  to  the  Wrightsville 
and  Columbia  bridge  and  get  possession  of  it  at  both 
ends  and  hold  it  until  I  came  up. 

On  the  next  day  (the  28th)  both  columns  moved  at 
daylight,  and  a  deputation  consisting  of  the  Mayor  and 
other  citizens  of  York  came  out  to  meet  Gordon  and 
surrender  the  town,  which  he  entered  early  in  the  day 
without  opposition.  Moving  by  the  way  of  Weiglestown 
into  the  Harrisburg  and  York  road  with  the  other 
column,  I  entered  the  town  shortly  afterwards,  and  re- 
peated my  instructions  to  Gordon  about  the  bridge  over 
the  Susquehanna,  cautioning  him  to  prevent  the  bridge 
from  being  burned  if  possible.  At  Weiglestown  French 
had  been  sent  with  the  greater  part  of  his  cavalry  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Conewago  to  burn  two  railroad  bridges  at 
that  point  and  all  others  between  there  and  York.  Be- 
fore reaching  town  Hays'  and  Smith's  brigades  were 
ordered  into  camp  about  two  miles  on  the  north  of  it 
at  some  mills  near  the  railroad.  Hoke's  brigade  under 
Colonel  Avery  was  moved  into  town  to  occupy  it,  and 
preserve  order,  being  quartered  in  some  extensive  hos- 
pital buildings  erected  by  the  United  States  Government. 
I  then  levied  a  contribution  on  the  town  for  100,000  dol- 
lars in  money,  2,000  pairs  of  shoes,  1,000  hats,  1,000 
pairs  of  socks,  and  three  days'  rations  of  all  kinds  for 
my  troops,  for  which  a  requisition  was  made  on  the 
authorities. 

Gordon  moved  promptly  towards  Wrightsville,  and 
on  reaching  the  vicinity  of  that  place  found  the  western 
end  of  the  bridge  defended  by  a  force,  which  proved  to 
be  twelve  or  fifteen  hundred  Pennsylvania  militia,  en- 
trenched around  Wrightsville.  He  immediately  took 
measures  to  dislodge  the  enemy,  and,  finding  it  imprac- 
ticable to  turn  the  works  so  as  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of 
the  enemy,  opened  with  his  artillery  and  advanced  in 

259 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JTJBAL  A.  EARLY 

front,  the  militia  taking  to  its  heels  after  a  few  shots 
from  the  artillery  and  outrunning  Gordon's  men,  who 
had  then  marched  a  little  over  twenty  miles.  Gordon 
pursued  as  rapidly  as  possible,  but,  on  getting  half  way 
across  the  bridge,  he  found  it  on  fire,  inflammable  ma- 
terials having  previously  been  prepared  for  the  pur- 
pose. He  endeavored  to  extinguish  the  flames,  but  his 
men  had  nothing  but  their  muskets,  and  before  buckets, 
which  were  sent  for,  could  be  procured,  the  fire  had 
progressed  so  far  as  to  render  the  effort  hopeless,  as 
the  superstructure  of  the  bridge  was  of  wood,  it  being 
a  covered  one  of  more  than  a  mile  in  length  with  a  track 
for  the  railroad,  another  for  wagons,  and  a  third  as  a 
tow-path  for  the  canal  which  here  crossed  the  river.  He 
had  therefore  to  desist,  and  retire  to  Wrightsville  with 
his  men. 

The  bridge  was  entirely  consmned,  and  as  one  or  two 
houses  were  adjoining  it,  at  the  "Wrightsville  end,  they 
were  also  consumed.  When  these  houses  caught  fire 
Gordon  formed  his  brigade  around  them  and  by  the  ex- 
ertions of  his  men,  then  much  exhausted,  arrested  the 
flames  and  saved  the  town  of  Wrightsville  from  a  con- 
flagration, though  the  houses  immediately  adjoining  the 
bridge  could  not  be  saved.  The  brigade  which  did  this, 
and  thus  saved  from  a  disastrous  fire,  kindled  by  their 
own  defenders,  one  of  the  enemy's  towns,  was  composed 
of  Georgians,  in  whose  State,  just  a  short  time  before, 
the  town  of  Darien  had  been  fired  and  entirely  destroyed 
by  a  regular  expedition  of  Federal  troops. 

As  soon  as  I  had  made  the  necessary  arrangements 
for  establishing  order  in  the  town  of  York,  and  pre- 
venting any  molestation  of  the  citizens,  and  had  made 
the  requisitions  on  the  authorities  for  what  I  had 
determined  to  levy  on  the  town,  I  rode  in  the 
direction  of  Wrightsville.  By  the  time  I  got  outside  of 
the  town  I  saw  the  smoke  arising  from  the  burning 
bridge,  and  when  I  reached  Wrightsville  I  found  the 
bridge  entirely  destroyed.     I  regretted  this  very  much, 

260 


AT  YORK  AND  WRIGHTSVILLE 

as,  notwithstanding  my  orders  to  destroy  the  bridge,  I 
had  found  the  country  so  defenceless,  and  the  militia 
which  Curtin  had  called  into  service  so  utterly  inefficient, 
that  I  determined  to  cross  the  Susquehanna,  levy  a  con- 
tribution on  the  rich  town  of  Lancaster,  cut  the  Central 
Railroad,  and  then  move  up  in  rear  of  Harrisburg  while 
General  Ewell  was  advancing  against  that  city  from  the 
other  side,  relying  upon  being  able,  in  any  event  that 
might  happen,  to  mount  my  division  on  the  horses  which 
had  been  accumulated  in  large  numbers  on  the  east  side 
of  the  river,  by  the  farmers  who  had  fled  before  us,  and 
make  my  escape  by  moving  to  the  west  of  the  army, 
after  damaging  the  railroads  and  canals  on  my  route 
as  much  as  possible. 

This  scheme,  in  which  I  think  I  could  have  been  suc- 
cessful, was,  however,  thwarted  by  the  destruction  of 
the  bridge,  as  there  was  no  other  means  of  crossing  the 
river.  Gordon  was  therefore  ordered  to  return  to  York 
early  the  next  day,  and  I  rode  back  that  night.  The 
affair  at  Wrightsville  had  been  almost  bloodless ;  Gordon 
had  one  man  wounded,  and  he  found  one  dead  militiaman, 
and  captured  twenty  prisoners. 

Colonel  White  succeeded  in  reaching  Hanover  Junc- 
tion and  destroying  the  depot  at  that  place  and  one  or 
two  bridges  in  the  vicinity,  but  he  did  not  destroy  all  the 
bridges  between  there  and  York,  as  one  or  two  of  them, 
as  reported  by  him,  were  defended  by  a  force  of  in- 
fantry. Colonel  French  succeeded  in  destroying  the 
bridges  over  the  Conewago  at  its  mouth,  and  all  be- 
tween there  and  York,  and  on  the  29th  he  was  sent  to 
complete  the  destruction  of  the  bridges  south  of  the 
town,  over  the  Codorus,  which  he  succeeded  in  doing, 
as  the  force  defending  them  had  retired. 

In  compliance  with  my  requisition  some  twelve  or 
fifteen  hundred  pairs  of  shoes,  all  the  hats,  socks,  and 
rations  called  for,  and  $28,600  in  money  were  furnished 
by  the  town  authorities.  The  number  of  shoes  required 
could  not  be  found  in  the  place,  and  the  Mayor  assured 

261 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

me  that  the  money  paid  over  was  all  that  could  be  raised, 
as  the  banks  and  moneyed  men  had  run  off  their  funds  to 
Philadelphia.  I  believed  that  he  had  made  an  honest 
effort  to  raise  the  money,  and  I  did  not,  therefore,  take 
any  stringent  measures  to  enforce  the  demand,  but  left 
the  town  indebted  to  me  for  the  remainder.  The  shoes, 
hats,  and  socks  were  issued  to  the  men,  who  stood  very 
much  in  need  of  them.  A  portion  of  the  money  was 
subsequently  used  in  buying  beef  cattle,  which  could  be 
found  much  more  readily  when  they  were  to  be  paid  for 
than  when  certificates  were  to  be  given,  and  the  residue 
was  paid  into  the  hands  of  the  quartermaster  of  the  army, 
to  be  used  for  public  purposes.  No  public  stores  were 
found. 

A  few  prisoners  taken  in  the  hospitals  and  those  cap- 
tured at  Wrightsville  by  Gordon  were  paroled.  Some 
cars  found  in  the  town  were  burned.  There  were  two 
large  car  factories,  and  two  depots  and  other  railroad 
buildings  which  I  would  have  destroyed  but  for  the  fact 
that  the  burning  of  them  would  set  fire  to  some  private 
dwellings  and  perhaps  consume  a  large  part  of  the  town, 
and  I  therefore  determined  not  to  run  the  risk  of  entail- 
ing so  much  mischief  on  non-combatants,  notwithstand- 
ing the  barbarous  policy  that  had  been  pursued  by  the 
enemy  in  numerous  similar  cases.  Neither  were  the 
hospitals  burned  or  injured  in  any  way.  I  think  the 
people  of  York  were  very  well  satisfied  and  much  sur- 
prised to  get  out  of  my  hands  as  well  as  they  did.*  Cer- 
tainly any  Southern  town  into  which  the  enemy  went 
would  have  considered  itself  exceedingly  fortunate  to 

*  To  the  Citizens  of  York  : 

I  have  abstained  from  burning  the  railroad  buildings  and  car 
shops  in  your  town,  because,  after  examination,  I.  am  satisfied  the 
safety  of  the  town  would  be  endangered;  and,  acting  in  the  spirit  of 
humanity  which  has  ever  characterized  my  government  and  its  military 
authorities,  I  do  not  desire  to  involve  the  innocent  in  the  same  punish- 
ment with  the  guilty.  Had  I  applied  the  torch  without  regard  to 
consequences,  I  would  have  pursued  a  course  that  would  have  been 

262 


AT  YORK  AND  WRIGHTSVILLE 

have  got  off  so  well.  Our  forbearance,  however,  was 
not  at  all  appreciated  by  the  enemy  generally,  for  not 
only  did  they  not  follow  the  example  set  them,  but  some 
of  the  presses  actually  charged  Gordon's  brigade  with 
firing  the  town  of  Wrightsville. 

During  my  movement  to  York,  General  Ewell  had 
moved  towards  Harrisburg  and  reached  Carlisle  with 
Rodes'  division  and  Jenkins'  cavalry,  Johnson's  division 
going  to  Shippensburg; — Longstreet's  and  Hill's  corps 
had  also  moved  into  Pennsylvania  and  reached  the 
vicinity  of  Chambersburg,  while  the  Federal  Army  had 
moved  north  on  the  East  side  of  South  Mountain,  in- 
terposing between  ours  and  Washington. 

Late  on  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  Captain  Elliot 
Johnson,  aide  to  General  Ewell,  came  to  me  with  a  copy 
of  a  note  from  General  Lee  to  General  Ewell  stating  the 
enemy's  army  was  moving  north  and  directing  a  con- 
centration of  the  corps  on  the  west  side  of  the  South 
Mountain;  and  also  verbal  instructions  from  General 
Ewell  to  move  back  so  as  to  rejoin  the  rest  of  the  corps, 
and  information  of  his  purpose  to  move  back  to  unite 
with  Johnson. 

In  accordance  with  these  instructions,  I  put  my  whole 
command  in  motion  at  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the 
30th,  taking  the  route  by  the  way  of  Weiglestown  and 
East  Berlin  towards  Heidlersburg,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
move  from  that  point  to  Shippensburg  or  Greenwood  by 
the  way  of  Aaronsburg,  as  circumstances  might  require, 
Colonel  White  being  directed  to  move  his  battalion  of 

fully  vindicated  as  an  act  of  just  retaliation  for  the  many  authorized 
acts  of  barbarity  perpetrated  by  your  own  army  upon  our  soil.  But 
we  do  not  war  upon  women  and  children,  and  I  trust  the  treatment 
you  have  met  with  at  the  hands  of  my  soldiers  will  open  your  eyes  to 
the  monstrous  iniquity  of  the  war  waged  by  your  government  upon 
the  people  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  that  you  will  make  an 
effort  to  shake  off  the  revolting  tyranny  under  which  it  is  apparent 
to  all  you  are  yourselves  groaning. 

J.  A.  Early,  Major  General,  C.  S.  A. 
263 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

cavalry  on  the  pike  from  York  towards  Gettysburg,  to 
ascertain  if  any  force  of  the  enemy  was  on  that  road. 
At  East  Berlin,  a  small  squad  of  the  enemy's  cavalry 
was  seen  and  pursued  by  my  cavalry  advance,  and  I 
received  at  that  place  information,  by  a  courier  from 
Colonel  White,  that  a  cavalry  and  infantry  force  had 
been  at  Abbotstown  on  the  York  and  Gettysburg  road, 
but  had  moved  south  towards  Hanover  Junction.  A 
courier  also  reached  me  here  with  a  dispatch  from  Gen- 
eral Ewell,  informing  me  that  he  was  moving  with  Rodes' 
division  by  the  way  of  Petersburg  to  Heidlersburg,  and 
directing  me  to  march  for  the  same  place. 

I  marched  to  within  three  miles  of  Heidlersburg  and 
bivouacked  my  command,  and  then  rode  to  see  General 
Ewell  at  Heidlersburg,  where  I  found  him  with  Rodes' 
division.  I  was  informed  by  him  that  the  object  was  to 
concentrate  the  corps  at  or  near  Cashtown  at  the  eastern 
base  of  the  mountain,  and  I  was  directed  to  move  to 
that  point  the  next  day  by  the  way  of  Hunterstown  and 
Mummasburg,  while  Rodes  would  take  the  -route  by 
Middletown  and  Arendtsville. 

My  march  so  far,  to  the  bank  of  the  Susquehanna  and 
back,  had  been  without  resistance,  the  performances  of 
the  militia  force  at  Gettysburg  and  Wrightsville  amount- 
ing in  fact  to  no  resistance  at  all,  but  being  merely  a 
source  of  amusement  to  my  troops.  The  country  maps 
were  so  thorough  and  accurate  that  I  had  no  necessity 
for  a  guide  in  any  direction.  There  had  been  no  dep- 
redations upon  the  people,  except  the  taking  of  such 
supplies  as  were  needed  in  an  orderly  and  regular  man- 
ner as  allowed  by  the  most  liberal  and  intelligent  rules 
of  war.  No  houses  had  been  burned  or  pillaged,  no 
indignities  offered  to  the  inhabitants,  who  were  them- 
selves amazed  at  the  forbearance  of  our  troops ;  not 
even  a  rail  had  been  taken  from  the  fences  for  firewood. 
I  had  returned  over  a  large  portion  of  the  route  taken 
in  going  to  York,  and  I  was  myself  surprised  to  see  so 
little  evidence  of  the  march  of  an  invading  army.     It 

264 


AT  YORK  AND  WRIGHTSVILLE 

furnished  a  most  striking  contrast  to  the  track  of  the 
Federal  army,  as  I  had  witnessed  the  latter  on  many 
occasions  in  my  own  state. 

What  was  the  case  with  my  command,  was  the  case 
with  all  the  rest  of  our  army,  and  I  venture  to  say  that 
the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  by  General  Lee 's  army,  for 
the  forbearance  shown  to  the  invaded  country,  is  with- 
out a  parallel  in  the  history  of  war  in  any  age.  Yet  this 
invasion  was  made  by  an  army  composed  of  men  many 
of  whose  own  houses  had  been  destroyed  by  a  most  ruth- 
less enemy,  into  the  country  of  that  very  enemy,  and 
many  of  the  houses  thus  spared  were  those  of  the  very 
men  who  had  applied  the  torch  to  and  ransacked  the 
houses  of  the  men  now  so  forbearing:  yet  those  who 
have  left  their  mark  indelibly  all  over  the  South  charge 
the  invaders  of  Pennsylvania  and  their  countrymen  with 
being  barbarous,  and  with  maltreating  prisoners. 

As  we  moved  through  the  country,  a  number  of  people 
made  mysterious  signs  to  us,  and  on  inquiring  we  ascer- 
tained that  some  enterprising  Yankees  had  passed  along 
a  short  time  before,  initiating  the  people  into  certain 
signs,  for  a  consideration,  which  they  were  told  would 
prevent  the  "rebels"  from  molesting  them  or  their 
property,  when  they  appeared.  These  things  were  all 
new  to  us,  and  the  purchasers  of  the  mysteries  had  been 
badly  sold* 

*  The  "  mysterious  signs  "  referred  to  were  supposed  by  the  Con- 
federates to  be  made  by  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle,  a  secret 
organization  said  to  sympathize  with  the  South,  but  of  which  our 
soldiers  knew  nothing. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

Battle  of  Gettysburg. 

Having  ascertained,  after  I  left  General  Ewell  on 
the  night  of  the  30th,  that  the  road  from  my  camp  to 
Hunterstown  was  a  very  circuitous  and  rough  one,  on 
the  morning  of  the  1st  of  July  I  moved  to  Heidlersburg, 
for  the  purpose  of  following  the  road  from  that  point 
to  Gettysburg  until  I  reached  the  Mummasburg  road. 
After  moving  a  short  distance  for  Heidlersburg  on  the 
Gettysburg  road,  I  received  a  dispatch  from  General 
Ewell,  informing  me  that  Hill,  who  had  crossed  the 
mountain,  was  moving  towards  Gettysburg  against  a 
force  of  the  enemy,  which  had  arrived  at  that  place  and 
pushed  out  on  the  Cashtown  road,  and  that  Rodes'  divi- 
sion had  turned  off  from  Middletown  towards  Gettys- 
burg by  the  way  of  Mummasburg,  and  ordering  me  to 
move  on  the  direct  road  from  Heidlersburg  to  the  same 
place.  I  therefore  moved  on  until  I  came  in  sight  of 
Gettysburg. 

Hooker  had  been  supplanted  in  the  command  of  the 
Federal  Army  by  Major  General  Meade,  and  the  advance 
of  that  army,  consisting  of  the  1st  corps  under  Reynolds, 
the  11th  corps  under  Howard,  and  Buford's  division  of 
cavalry,  had  reached  Gettysburg;  the  cavalry  on  the 
30th  of  June,  and  the  infantry  early  on  the  morning  of 
the  1st  of  July.  The  cavalry  had  moved,  on  the  morning 
of  the  1st,  out  on  the  Cashtown  road  and  was  there  en- 
countered by  Hill 's  troops,  two  of  his  divisions  only  hav- 
ing as  yet  crossed  the  mountain.  The  enemy's  infantry 
then  moved  out  to  support  his  cavalry,  and  a  heavy  en- 
gagement ensued  between  it  and  Hill's  two  divisions. 
"While  this  was  progressing  Rodes'  division  came  up  on 
the  left  of  Hill,  on  the  Mummasburg  road,  and  imme- 
diately engaged  the  enemy. 

When  I  arrived  in  sight  of  Gettysburg  I  found  the 

266 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

engagement  in  progress  on  the  Cashtown  and  Mumnias- 
burg  roads,  the  enemy's  troops  being  advanced  out  from 
that  town  on  both  roads  for  about  a  mile.  Bodes  had 
opposed  to  him  a  very  large  force  which  overlapped 
his  left,  and  seemed  to  be  pressing  back  that  flank.  On 
the  hill  in  rear  of  Gettysburg,  known  as  Cemetery  Hill, 
was  posted  some  artillery  so  as  to  sweep  all  the  ground 
on  the  enemy's  right  flank,  including  the  Heidlersburg 
or  Harrisburg  road,  and  the  York  pike.  I  could  not 
discover  whether  there  was  any  infantry  supporting  this 
artillery,  as  the  hill  was  much  higher  than  the  ground 
on  which  I  then  was. 

Moving  on  the  Heidlersburg  road  and  on  Bodes'  left, 
I  came  up  on  the  enemy's  right  flank.  I  immediately 
ordered  the  artillery  forward  and  the  brigades  into  line. 
Gordon's  brigade  being  in  front  formed  first  in  line  on 
the  right  of  the  road,  then  Hays',  with  Smith's  in  rear 
of  Hoke's,  and  thrown  back  so  as  to  present  a  line 
towards  the  York  pike.  Jones'  battalion  was  posted  in 
a  field  immediately  in  front  of  Hoke's  brigade,  so  as  to 
open  on  the  enemy's  flank,  which  it  did  at  once  with 
effect,  attracting  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  on 
Cemetery  Hill  and  that  in  front  of  the  town  on  the 
enemy's  right  flank.  Between  us  and  the  enemy  on  the 
northeast  of  the  town  ran  a  small  stream,  called  Bock 
Creek,  with  abrupt  and  rugged  banks. 

On  the  opposite  bank  of  this  creek  in  front  of  Gordon 
was  a  heavy  force  of  the  enemy,  on  a  low  ridge  par- 
tially wooded,  with  a  part  of  it  in  line  moving  against 
the  left  of  Bodes'  division  held  by  Doles'  brigade,  so 
as  to  compel  it  to  fall  back,  while  the  right  flank  of  this 
advancing  line  was  protected  and  supported  by  another 
in  position  along  the  crest  of  the  ridge.  "While  the 
brigades  of  Hays  and  Hoke  were  being  formed:,  as 
Doles '  brigade  was  getting  in  a  critical  condition,  Gordon 
charged  rapidly  to  the  front,  passing  over  the  fences 
and  Bock  Creek  and  up  the  side  of  the  hill,  and  engaged 
the  enemy's  line  on  the  crest,  which,  after  a  short  but 

267 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

obstinate  and  bloody  conflict,  was  broken  and  routed. 
The  right  flank  of  the  force  advancing  against  Doles 
became  thus  exposed  to  Gordon's  fire,  and  that  force 
endeavored  to  change  front,  but  Gordon  immediately 
attacked  it  and  drove  it  from  the  field  with  heavy 
slaughter,  pursuing  towards  the  town  and  capturing  a 
number  of  prisoners,  among  them  being  General  Barlow, 
commanding  a  division  of  the  11th  corps,  severely 
wounded. 

While  Gordon  was  engaged,  Hays'  and  Hoke's 
brigades  were  advanced  in  line  to  Rock  Creek,  Smith's 
brigade  being  ordered  to  follow,  supporting  the  artil- 
lery as  it  advanced  in  rear  of  the  other  brigades.  By 
the  time  Hays  and  Avery  had  reached  Rock  Creek,  Gor- 
don had  encountered  a  second  line  just  outside  of  the 
town  in  a  strong  position  behind  some  houses,  and 
halted  his  brigade  behind  the  crest  of  a  low  ridge  in 
the  open  field.  I  then  rode  to  Gordon's  position  and, 
finding  that  the  line  confronting  him  extended  beyond 
his  left  across  the  Heidlersburg  road,  I  ordered  him  to 
remain  stationary  while  Hays  and  Avery  advanced  on 
his  left.  The  latter  were  then  ordered  forward,  and 
advancing  while  exposed  to  a  heavy  artillery  fire  of 
shell  and  canister,  encountered  the  second  line  and  drove 
it  back  in  great  confusion  into  the  town,  capturing  two 
pieces  of  artillery  and  a  large  number  of  prisoners. 

Hays  encountered  a  portion  of  the  force  falling  back 
on  his  right,  on  which  he  turned  some  of  his  regiments 
and  entered  the  town  fighting  his  way,  along  the  left 
end  of  a  street  running  through  the  middle  of  the  town. 
Avery,  after  reaching  the  outskirts  of  the  town,  moved 
to  the  left,  and  crossed  the  railroad  into  the  open  fields, 
on  the  left  of  the  town,  while  exposed  to  a  heavy  fire 
from  the  batteries  on  Cemetery  Hill,  and  took  a  position 
confronting  the  rugged  ascent  to  the  hill,  his  men  being 
placed  in  a  depression  under  cover  of  a  low  ridge,  so  as 
to  protect  them  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery. 
A  very  large  number  of  prisoners  were  taken  in  the 

268 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

town,  where  they  were  crowded  in  confusion,  the  number 
being  so  great  as  really  to  embarrass  us  and  stop  all 
further  movement  for  the  present. 

While  Hays  and  Avery  were  driving  the  enemy  so 
handsomely,  I  saw  a  large  force  to  the  right  of  Gordon, 
falling  back  in  comparatively  good  order,  before  Rodes' 
advancing  brigades,  around  the  right  of  the  town, 
towards  the  hills  in  the  rear,  and  I  sent  for  a  battery  of 
artillery  to  be  brought  up  so  as  to  open  on  this  force, 
and  on  the  town  from  which  a  fire  was  being  poured  on 
Hays'  and  Avery's  then  advancing  brigades,  but  before 
the  battery  reached  me,  Hays  had  entered  the  town  and 
the  enemy's  retreating  columns  had  got  out  of  reach, 
their  speed  being  very  much  accelerated  and  their  order 
considerably  disturbed  by  Rodes'  rapid  advance.  At 
the  same  time  I  had  sent  for  the  battery,  an  order  had 
been  sent  for  the  advance  of  Smith's  brigade  to  the  sup- 
port of  Hays  and  Avery,  but,  a  report  having  been 
brought  to  General  Smith  that  a  large  force  of  the 
enemy  was  advancing  on  the  York  road  on  our  then  rear, 
he  thought  proper  to  detain  his  brigade  to  watch  that 
road. 

As  soon  as  I  saw  my  men  entering  the  town,  I  rode 
forward  into  it  myself,  having  sent  to  repeat  the  order 
to  Smith  to  advance,  and  when  I  had  ascertained  the 
condition  of  things,  I  rode  to  the  right  of  it  to  find  either 
General  Ewell,  General  Rodes,  or  General  Hill,  for  the 
purpose  of  urging  an  immediate  advance  upon  the  enemy, 
before  he  could  recover  from  his  evident  dismay  and 
confusion.  Rodes'  troops  were  then  entering  the  town 
on  the  right  and  all  plains  on  that  flank  had  been  cleared 
of  the  enemy.  The  enemy,  however,  held  the  houses 
in  the  edge  of  the  town  on  the  slope  of  Cemetery  Hill 
with  sharpshooters,  from  which  they  were  pointing  an 
annoying  fire  into  Hays'  left,  and  along  the  streets 
running  towards  the  hill. 

The  ascent  to  the  hill  in  front  of  Avery  was  very 
rugged,  and  was  much  obstructed  by  plank  and  stone 

269 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

fences  on  the  side  of  it,  while  an  advance  through  the 
town  would  have  had  to  be  made  along  the  streets  by 
flank  or  in  columns  so  narrow  as  to  have  been  subjected 
to  a  destructive  fire  from  the  batteries  on  the  crest  of  the 
hill,  which  enfiladed  the  streets.  I,  therefore,  could  not 
make  an  advance  from  my  front  with  advantage,  and 
thought  it  ought  to  be  made  on  the  right. 

General  Hill's  troops  had  not  advanced  to  the  town, 
but  remained  on  or  beyond  Seminary  ridge,  more  than 
a  mile  distant,  and  before  I  could  find  either  General 
Ewell  or  General  Rodes,  General  Smith's  aide  came  to 
me  with  a  message  from  the  General  that  the  enemy 
was  advancing  a  large  force  of  infantry,  artillery,  and 
cavalry  on  the  York  road,  menacing  our  left  flank  and 
rear.  Though  I  believed  this  an  unfounded  report,  as 
it  proved  to  be,  yet  I  thought  it  best  to  send  General 
Gordon  with  his  brigade  out  on  that  road,  to  take  com- 
mand of  both  brigades,  and  to  stop  all  further  alarms 
from  that  direction. 

Meeting  with  a  staff  officer  of  General  Pender's  I 
requested  him  to  go  and  inform  General  Hill  that  if  he 
would  send  a  division  forward  we  could  take  the  hill 
to  which  the  enemy  had  retreated.  Finding  General 
Ewell  shortly  afterwards  in  the  town,  I  communicated 
to  him  my  views,  and  he  informed  me  that  Johnson's 
division,  which  had  m  ed  from  Shippensburg,  by  the 
way  of  Greenwood  Gap,  was  coming  up,  and  he  de- 
termined to  move  it  to  a  wooded  hill  on  the  left  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  which  seemed  to  command  the  latter 
hill  and  to  be  the  key  to  the  position  on  that  flank.  This 
hill  was  on  the  right  or  southwestern  side  of  Rock  Creek, 
and  seemed  to  be  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

Johnson's  division  was  late  in  arriving  and  when  it 
came,  it  was  further  delayed  by  a  false  report  that  the 
enemy  was  advancing  on  the  York  road,  so  that  it  be- 
came dark  in  the  meantime,  and  the  effort  to  get  pos- 
session of  the  wooded  hill  was  postponed  until  morn- 
ing, by  which  time  it  had  been  occupied  and  fortified 

270 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

by  the  enemy.  My  division  went  into  this  action  about 
three  o'clock  p.m.  and  at  the  close  of  the  day  a  brilliant 
victory  had  been  achieved,  between  six  and  seven  thou- 
sand prisoners  and  two  pieces  of  artillery  failing  into 
our  hands,  a  considerable  portion  of  which  had  been 
captured  by  Eodes'  division. 

Perhaps  that  victory  might  have  been  made  decisive, 
so  far  as  Gettysburg  was  concerned,  by  a  prompt  ad- 
vance of  all  the  troops  that  had  been  engaged  on  our 
side  against  the  hill  upon  and  behind  which  the  enemy 
had  taken  refuge,  but  a  common  superior  did  not  hap- 
pen to  be  present,  and  the  opportunity  was  lost.  The 
only  troops  engaged  on  our  side  were  Hill's  two  divi- 
sions and  Ewell's  two  divisions,  the  rest  of  the  army 
not  being  up. 

Late  in  the  evening,  when  it  had  become  too  dark  to 
do  anything  further,  General  Lee  came  to  General 
Ewell's  headquarters,  and  after  conferring  with  Gen- 
eral Ewell,  General  Eodes  and  myself,  we  were  given 
to  understand  that,  if  the  rest  of  the  troops  could  be  got 
up,  there  would  be  an  attack  very  early  in  the  morning 
on  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  also  on  the  right,  at  the 
wooded  hill  before  named. 

During  the  night,  Hays'  brigade  was  moved  to  the 
left  into  the  open  ground  on  that  side,  and  placed  in 
front  of  the  left  end  of  the  to$m,  under  cover  from  the 
artillery  and  in  a  position  to  advance  upon  Cemetery 
Hill  when  a  favorable  opportunity  should  offer,  his  line 
connecting  with  Avery's  right.  In  this  position  the  two 
brigades  were  behind  a  low  ridge  close  to  the  base  of 
Cemetery  Hill. 

Gordon  was  still  retained  on  the  York  road  with  his 
own  and  Smith's  brigades,  as  constant  rumors  were 
reaching  us  that  the  enemy  was  advancing  on  that  road. 
Johnson's  division  had  been  moved  to  the  left  and 
posted  in  the  valley  of  Bock  Creek,  confronting  the 
wooded  hill. 

During  the  night  a  large  portion  of  Meade's  army 

271 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

came  up  and  the  rest  arrived  in  the  course  of  the  next 
day  before  the  battle  opened. 

The  general  attack  was  not  made  in  the  morning  of 
the  2nd  because  there  was  great  delay  in  the  arrival  of 
Longstreet's  corps,  and  on  the  left  Rodes'  and  my  divi- 
sions remained  in  position  until  late  in  the  afternoon, 
waiting  for  the  preparations  on  the  right.  Johnson, 
however,  had  some  heavy  skirmishing  during  the  day. 

During  the  morning  General  Ewell  and  myself  rode 
to  a  ridge  in  rear  of  Johnson's  position  for  the  pur- 
pose of  posting  some  artillery  and  several  batteries 
were  placed  in  position  there  to  fire  upon  Cemetery 
Hill  and  the  wooded  hill. 

I  made  an  attempt  to  get  possession  of  the  wooded 
hill  in  the  morning,  but  found  it  occupied  by  the  enemy 
in  force  behind  breastworks  of  felled  trees. 

The  enemy's  position  consisted  of  a  low  range  of 
hills  extending  off  to  the  southwest  from  Cemetery  Hill 
to  what  was  called  Round  Top  Mountain,  and  on  the 
right  of  it,  confronting  Johnson's  division  and  my  two 
brigades,  was  an  elbow  almost  at  right  angles  with  the 
other  part  of  the  line,  and  terminating  with  the  wooded 
hill  or  range  of  hills  in  Johnson's  front,  which  extended 
beyond  his  left,  the  town  of  Gettysburg  being  located 
just  in  front  of  the  salient  angle  at  the  elbow. 

For  some  distance  on  the  right  of  Gettysburg  the 
ground  in  front  of  the  line  was  open  and  ascended  to 
the  crest  of  the  ridge  by  a  gradual  slope.  On  the  left 
of  the  town,  the  ascent  was  very  steep  and  rough,  and 
this  was  much  the  strongest  part  of  the  line  and  the  most 
difficult  of  approach. 

The  enemy  had  during  the  previous  night  and  the 
fore  part  of  this  day  strengthened  their  position  by 
entrenchments. 

Having  been  informed  that  the  attack  would  begin 
on  the  enemy's  left  at  four  o'clock  p.m.,  I  directed  Gen- 
eral Gordon  to  move  his  brigade  to  the  railroad  on  the 
left  of  the  town,  and  take  position  on  it  in  rear  of  Hays 

272 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

and  Avery,  Smith's  brigade  being  left  with  General 
Stuart's  cavalry  to  guard  the  York  road.  At  or  a 
little  after  four  o  'clock  p.m.  our  guns  on  the  right  opened 
on  the  enemy's  left,  and  those  on  the  ridge  in  rear  of 
Johnson's  division  opened  on  that  part  of  the  line  con- 
fronting them,  and  a  very  heavy  cannonading  ensued. 
After  this  cannonading  had  continued  for  some  time  the 
attack  was  begun  by  Longstreet  on  the  right,  two  of  whose 
divisions  had  only  arrived,  and  during  its  progress 
I  was  ordered  by  General  Ewell,  a  little  before  sunset, 
to  advance  to  the  assault  of  the  hills  in  front  of  me  as 
soon  as  Johnson  should  become  engaged  on  my  left, 
being  informed  at  the  same  time  that  the  attack  would 
be  general,  Rodes  advancing  on  my  right  and  Hill's  divi- 
sion on  his  right. 

I  ordered  Hays  and  Avery  to  advance,  as  soon  as 
Johnson  was  heard  engaged,  immediately  up  the  hill  in 
their  front,  and  Gordon  to  advance  to  the  position 
then  occupied  by  them  in  order  to  support  them. 
Before  Johnson  was  heard  fairly  engaged  it  was  after 
sunset,  and  Hays  and  Avery  then  moved  forward  on  the 
low  ridge  in  their  front  and  across  a  hollow  beyond  to 
the  base  of  the  hill,  while  exposed  to  a  severe  fire  from 
the  enemy's  batteries.  They  then  commenced  ascending 
the  steep  side  of  the  hill  in  gallant  style,  going  over 
fences  and  encountering  bodies  of  infantry  posted  in 
front  of  the  main  line  on  the  slope  of  the  hill  behind 
stone  fences  which  they  dislodged,  and  continuing  their 
advance  to  the  crest  of  the  hill,  when  by  a  dash  upon 
the  enemy's  works  Hays'  brigade  and  a  portion  of 
Hoke's  succeeded  in  entering  them  and  compelling  the 
enemy  to  abandon  his  batteries. 

In  the  meantime  Johnson  was  heavily  engaged  on  the 
left,  but  no  fire  was  heard  on  the  right,  Rodes'  division 
had  not  advanced  nor  had  the  left  division  of  Hill. 
Colonel  Avery,  commanding  Hoke's  brigade,  had  fallen 
mortally  wounded  near  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and  the 
portion  of  the  force  that  had  engaged  the  enemy's  works 

18  273 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

found  itself  unsupported,  and  paused  for  a  moment,  it 
being  now  nearly  dark. 

During  the  attack  on  the  left  of  the  enemy's  line,  a 
portion  of  his  troops  had  been  withdrawn  from  this  part 
of  the  line,  but  that  attack  had  now  ceased  and  in  a  few 
minutes  a  heavy  force  in  several  lines  was  concentrated 
on  Hays'  brigade,  and  that  part  of  Hoke's  which  had 
entered  the  enemy's  works,  and  finding  themselves  un- 
supported and  about  to  be  overwhelmed  by  numbers, 
they  were  compelled  to  retire,  which  they  did  with  com- 
paratively slight  loss,  considering  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  and  the  difficulties  by  which  they  were  sur- 
rounded. Hoke's  brigade  fell  back  to  the  position  from 
which  it  had  advanced  to  bring  off  its  wounded  com- 
mander, and  was  then  re-formed  by  Colonel  Godwin  of 
the  57th  North  Carolina.  Hays'  brigade  fell  back  to  a 
position  on  the  slope  of  the  hill,  where  it  remained  for 
some  time  awaiting  a  further  advance,  and  was  then 
drawn  back,  bringing  off  four  battle  flags  captured  on 
Cemetery  Hill.  Gordon's  brigade  had  advanced  to  the 
position  from  which  the  two  brigades  had  moved,  for 
the  purpose  of  following  up  their  attack  when  the  divi- 
sions on  the  right  moved,  but  finding  that  they  did  not 
advance,  it  was  not  ordered  forward,  as  it  would  have 
been  a  useless  sacrifice,  but  was  retained  as  a  support 
for  the  other  brigades  to  fall  back  upon. 

During  the  advance  of  my  two  brigades  I  had  ascer- 
tained that  Rodes  was  not  advancing,  and  I  rode  to 
urge  him  forward.  I  found  him  getting  his  brigades 
into  position  so  as  to  be  ready  to  advance,  but  he  in- 
formed me  that  there  was  no  preparation  to  move  on 
his  right,  and  that  General  Lane,  in  command  of  Pender's 
division,  on  his  immediate  right,  had  sent  him  word  that 
he  had  no  orders  to  advance,  which  had  delayed  his  own 
movement.  He,  however,  expressed  a  readiness  to  go 
forward  if  I  thought  it  proper,  but  by  this  time  I  had  been 
informed  that  my  two  brigades  were  retiring,  and  I  told 
him  it  was  then  too  late.    He  did  not  advance,  and  the 

274 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

fighting  for  the  day  closed — Johnson's  attack  on  the 
left  having  been  ended  by  the  darkness,  leaving  him 
possession  of  part  of  the  enemy's  works  in  the  woods. 

Before  light  next  morning  Hays  and  Godwin,  who 
had  taken  position  on  Gordon's  left  and  right,  respec- 
tively, were  withdrawn  to  the  rear  and  subsequently 
formed  in  line  on  the  street  first  occupied  by  Hays, 
Gordon  being  left  to  hold  the  position  in  front.  During 
the  night,  by  directions  of  General  Ewell,  Smith  was 
ordered  to  report  by  daylight  next  day  to  General  John- 
son on  the  left  and  did  so.  Longstreet,  supported  by  a 
part  of  the  right  of  Hill's  corps,  had  been  very  heavily 
engaged  with  the  enemy's  left,  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
2nd,  gaining  some  advantages,  and  driving  a  part  of 
the  enemy's  force  from  an  advanced  line,  but  at  the  close 
of  the  fight  the  enemy  retained  his  main  positions. 

On  the  morning  of  the  3rd,  the  enemy  made  an  attack 
on  Johnson  to  dislodge  him  from  that  part  of  the  works 
which  he  had  gained  the  morning  before,  and  very  heavy 
fighting  ensued,  continuing  at  intervals  throughout  the 
day,  in  which  Smith's  three  regiments  were  engaged 
under  General  Johnson's  orders,  the  enemy  finally  re- 
gaining his  works.  The  rest  of  my  command  did  not 
become  at  all  engaged  on  this  day. 

On  the  right,  Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet 's  corps 
having  arrived,  the  attack  on  the  enemy  was  renewed 
in  the  afternoon  after  a  very  heavy  cannonading  of  all 
parts  of  his  line,  and  a  very  sanguinary  fight  ensued 
during  which  the  enemy's  line  was  penetrated  by  Pick- 
ett's division,  but  it  was  finally  repulsed,  as  were  the 
supporting  forces,  with  very  heavy  loss  on  both  sides. 

This  closed  the  fighting  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 
Meade  retained  his  position  on  the  heights,  and  our  army 
held  the  position  it  had  assumed  for  the  attack,  while 
both  armies  had  sustained  very  heavy  losses  in  killed 
and  wounded,  as  well  as  prisoners. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

Retreat  to  Virginia. 

During  the  night  of  July  3rd,  EwelFs  corps  was 
withdrawn  from  its  position  in  and  to  the  left  of 
Gettysburg,  and  moved  to  the  right,  to  the  Cashtown 
road,  where  it  took  position  on  Seminary  Hill,  the  other 
corps  retaining  their  positions.  My  brigades  were  with- 
drawn from  Gettysburg  to  the  new  position  at  two 
o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  4th  and  were  formed  in 
line  in  rear  of  Seminary  Hill,  Rodes'  and  Johnson's 
divisions  occupying  the  front  line  on  the  crest  of  the 
hill  across  the  road. 

During  the  battle  our  line  had  encircled  that  of  the 
enemy,  thus  extending  our  army,  which  was  much 
smaller  than  his  own,  over  a  very  long  line. 

We  remained  in  position  confronting  the  enemy  dur- 
ing the  whole  of  the  4th,  being  subjected  in  the  after- 
noon to  a  very  heavy  shower  of  rain.  The  enemy  showed 
no  disposition  to  come  out,  but  hugged  his  defences  on 
the  hills  very  closely. 

General  Lee  sent  a  flag  of  truce  on  the  morning  of 
this  day  to  General  Meade  proposing  an  exchange  of 
prisoners,  but  he  declined  to  accede  to  the  proposition. 

Before  day  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  our  army  com- 
menced retiring  from  before  Gettysburg. 

The  loss  in  my  division  in  the  battle,  beginning  with 
the  first  and  ending  with  the  last  day,  was  in  killed  154, 
wounded  799,  and  missing  227,  total  1,180,  of  which  Hays' 
and  Hoke's  brigades  lost  in  the  assault  at  the  close  of 
the  day  of  the  2nd,  in  killed  39,  wounded  246,  and  miss- 
ing 149,  total  434.  194  of  my  command  were  left  in  hos- 
pitals near  Gettysburg,  the  rest  being  carried  off.  The 
loss  of  our  army  was  heavy,  as  was  that  of  the  enemy. 

I  have  before  stated  the  size  of  General  Lee's  army 
when  this  campaign  was  commenced.     The  army  had 

276 


RETREAT  TO  VIRGINIA 

received  no  accessions,  but  had  been  diminished  by  the 
march,  from  straggling,  exhaustion,  and  sickness.  My 
own  division  had  been  reduced  from  7,226,  its  strength 
when  it  left  Culpeper,  to  5,611  when  I  crossed  the 
Potomac,  those  numbers  representing  the  strength  in 
officers  and  men,  and  not  muskets.  A  similar  loss  ex- 
tended to  the  whole  army,  and  I  can  venture  to  affirm 
that  it  was  as  small  in  my  division  as  in  any  other.  Be- 
sides this  we  were  in  the  enemy's  country,  and  our  large 
trains  had  necessarily  to  be  guarded.  I  think  it  may 
be  assumed,  therefore,  that  General  Lee's  infantry  at 
this  battle  did  not  exceed  55,000  officers  and  men,  and 
that  his  whole  force  engaged,  and  in  support  of  that  part 
engaged,  was  smartly  under  60,000,  the  cavalry  not  being 
employed  at  all  except  in  watching  the  flanks  and  rear. 
His  artillery  numbered  less  than  150  guns. 

Meade,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Congressional 
Committee,  states  that  his  strength,  in  all  arms,  was,  a 
little  under  100,000,  about  95,000,  making  a  greater  re- 
duction from  Hooker's  force  than  I  have  allowed  for 
General  Lee's  for  similar  cause,  and  that  he  had  but 
little  under  three  hundred  guns.  The  odds,  therefore, 
were  not  very  far  from  two  to  one.  Hooker  had  conceded 
the  fact  that  he  outnumbered  our  army,  yet  Meade,  who 
succeeded  Hooker,  taking  up  the  old  idea  of  superior 
numbers,  thinks  General  Lee  now  outnumbered  him  by 
some  10,000  or  15,000  men.  The  figures  which  I  give  I 
think  fully  cover  our  force,  and  the  probability  is  that 
it  was  less. 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  what  difficulties  we  had 
to  encounter  in  attacking  the  enemy  in  his  strong  posi- 
tion. That  position  fought  the  battle  for  him.  It  is 
exceedingly  probable  that,  if  we  had  moved  promptly 
upon  Cemetery  Hill  after  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  on 
the  1st,  we  would  have  gained  the  position,  and 
thereby  avoided  the  battle  at  that  point.  What  might 
have  been  the  result  afterwards  it  is  impossible  to 
conjecture.     The  battle  would  have  had  to  be  fought 

277 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

somewhere  else,  and  it  may  or  may  not  have  resulted 
differently. 

The  fight  on  the  1st  had  not  been  contemplated  by 
General  Lee,  and  he  was  not,  therefore,  on  the  ground 
until  it  was  over,  and  the  time  had  passed  for  accom- 
plishing anything  further  when  he  arrived.  This  fight 
had  been  brought  on  by  the  movement  of  Buford's 
cavalry  in  the  direction  of  Cashtown  and  the  attack  on 
it  by  Hill's  two  divisions,  which  brought  up  the  two  corps 
of  the  enemy.  General  Ewell  had  moved  to  the  support 
of  Hill,  but  there  was  no  communication  between  them 
during  the  engagement,  as  they  were  on  separate  roads, 
and  each  force  went  into  action  under  its  own  commander, 
without  there  being  a  common  superior  to  direct  the 
whole.  This  want  of  concert  existed  after  the  defeat  of 
the  enemy,  and  the  consequence  was  that  the  opportunity 
was  not  improved. 

This  battle  of  Gettysburg  has  been  much  criticised, 
and  will  continue  to  be  criticised.  Errors  were  undoubt- 
edly committed,  but  these  errors  were  not  attributable 
to  General  Lee.  I  know  that  he  was  exceedingly  anxious 
to  attack  the  enemy  at  a  very  early  hour  on  the  morning 
of  the  2nd,  for  I  heard  him  earnestly  express  that  wish 
on  the  evening  previous,  but  his  troops  did  not  arrive 
in  time  to  make  the  attack.  Why  it  was  so  I  cannot  tell. 
In  the  assaults  which  were  made  on  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion, there  was  not  concert  of  action,  but  that  was  not 
General  Lee's  fault. 

Without  commenting  on  the  assault  from  right  of 
our  line,  which  I  did  not  witness,  for  that  part  of  the 
battle  was  entirely  excluded  from  my  view,  I  will  say 
that  I  believe  that  if  the  attack  which  was  made  by 
Johnson  on  the  extreme  left,  and  my  two  brigades  on 
his  right,  at  the  close  of  the  second  day,  had  been  sup- 
ported by  an  attack  by  the  divisions  to  the  right  of  us, 
Johnson  would  have  gained  all  of  the  enemy's  works  in 
front  of  him,  Cemetery  Hill  would  have  been  carried, 
and  the  victory  would  have  been  ours. 

278 


RETREAT  TO  VIRGINIA 

So  far  as  the  fighting  itself  was  concerned,  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg  was  a  drawn  battle,  but  under  the  circum- 
stances a  drawn  battle  was  a  failure  on  our  part  and 
a  success  for  the  enemy.  We  were  far  away  from  our 
supplies  of  ammunition,  and  he  was  in  his  own  country 
and  in  easy  communication  with  his  depots  of  supplies 
of  all  kinds.  We  were  then  in  a  part  of  the  country  by 
no  means  abounding  in  provisions  and  there  was  a  moun- 
tain at  our  back,  which  limited  the  area  from  which  we 
could  draw  food  for  our  men,  a  most  difficult  task  always, 
under  the  most  favorable  circumstances,  in  a  hostile 
country,  and  rendered  doubly  so  by  the  immediate  pres- 
ence of  a  large  army  in  our  front,  with  its  numerous 
cavalry  to  aid  the  citizens  in  resisting  the  demands  of 
our  foraging  parties. 

We  were,  therefore,  under  the  necessity  of  retreat- 
ing, not  because  our  army  had  been  demoralized  by  a 
defeat,  but  because  our  supply  of  ammunition  had  be- 
come short,  and  it  was  difficult  to  subsist  our  troops. 
That  retreat  was  made  deliberately  and  in  perfect  order, 
and  the  enemy  did  not  venture  to  attack  us,  but  was 
content  to  follow  us  with  a  corps  of  observation  at  a 
respectable  distance.  We  carried  off  a  very  large  pro- 
portion of  our  wounded,  but  many  were  left  because 
their  condition  would  not  admit  of  their  transportation. 
We  carried  off  some  captured  guns,  and  a  large  number 
of  prisoners,  after  having  paroled  some  three  or  four 
thousand.  The  enemy  had  none  of  our  guns  and  he 
had  in  his  hands  fewer  prisoners  than  we  had  taken. 

My  division  with  the  rest  of  EwelPs  corps  was  moved 
from  its  position  on  the  Cashtown  road  at  two  o'clock  on 
the  morning  of  the  5th,  arriving  at  the  Fairfield  road 
after  sunrise.  The  withdrawal  of  the  other  corps  was 
then  progressing,  and  EwelPs  corps,  being  ordered  to 
bring  up  the  rear,  was  here  halted  for  several  hours, 
waiting  for  the  others  to  clear  the  road,  and  confront- 
ing the  enemy's  position,  which  was  still  in  our  view, 
by  a  line  of  battle. 

279 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

The  enemy  seemed  to  be  very  cautious  about  com- 
ing out,  but  finally  ran  out  a  few  pieces  of  artillery  and 
opened  at  long  range,  without  doing  any  damage.  My 
division  was  ordered  to  constitute  the  rear  guard  of 
the  army,  and  White's  battalion  of  cavalry  was  ordered 
to  accompany  me.  I  waited  on  the  Fairfield  road  until 
it  had  been  cleared  by  the  rest  of  the  army,  including 
the  other  two  divisions  of  Ewell's  corps,  and  then  in 
the  afternoon  moved  off  slowly  in  rear  of  the  army  and 
all  the  trains,  Gordon,  followed  by  White's  battalion, 
bringing  up  my  rear. 

On  arriving  in  sight  of  Fairfield,  which  is  situated 
near  the  eastern  base  of  South  Mountain  on  a  wide  low 
plain  or  valley  surrounded  by  commanding  hills,  I  found 
the  wagon  trains  blocked  up  at  the  village.  While  wait- 
ing for  the  road  to  be  cleared  of  the  wagons  in  front, 
Colonel  White  sent  me  information  that  a  force  of  the 
enemy  was  advancing  in  my  rear,  and  being  on  the 
plain  where  I  would  be  exposed  to  a  fire  of  artillery 
from  the  surrounding  hills,  I  sent  to  hasten  forward  the 
trains,  but  as  they  did  not  move  off  I  was  preparing  to 
fire  a  blank  cartridge  or  two  for  the  purpose  of  quick- 
ening their  speed,  when  the  advance  of  the  pursuing 
column  of  the  enemy  appeared  on  a  hill  in  my  rear  with 
a  battery  of  artillery  supported  by  infantry,  and  I 
opened  with  shell  on  it.  The  enemy's  battery  replied  to 
mine,  and  Fairfield  was  soon  cleared  of  wagons,  as  the 
teamsters  and  wagon  masters  found  it  more  convenient 
to  comply  with  this  inducement  to  travel  than  my  orders 
and  solicitations. 

Gordon  deployed  his  brigade  and  sent  out  the  26th 
Georgia  Regiment  as  skirmishers  to  dislodge  the  enemy's 
advance,  which  it  did  after  a  sharp  skirmish,  and  a  loss 
of  seven  wounded.  This  regiment  was  then  ordered  to 
be  withdrawn,  and  I  moved  the  division  in  line  gradu- 
ally through  Fairfield  to  a  favorable  position  for  mak- 
ing a  defence,  and  here  waited  the  enemy's  advance,  but 
he  moved  very  cautiously,  sending  forward  only  a  party 
of  skirmishers,  which  kept  at  a  respectful  distance. 

280 


RETREAT  TO  VIRGINIA 

It  was  now  night,  and  my  division  was  formed  in 
line,  a  little  nearer  the  base  of  the  mountain,  so  as  to 
cover  our  trains  that  were  packed  on  its  side  and  at  its 
base.  In  this  position  my  men  lay  on  their  arms  all 
night  without  molestation  from  the  enemy. 

At  light  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  the  trains  moved 
forward,  and  General  Bodes,  whose  division  was  to  con- 
stitute the  rear  guard  that  day,  relieved  my  skirmishers 
in  front,  his  division  being  formed  in  line  just  at  the 
base  of  the  mountain,  and  I  moved  past  him  to  take  the 
front  of  the  corps ;  when,  pursuing  the  road  over  South 
Mountain  past  Monterey  Springs,  I  descended  to  the 
western  base  near  Waynesboro,  and  bivouacked  a  little 
beyond  the  town,  covering  it  on  the  north  and  west  with 
my  brigades.  The  other  corps  were  found  already  on 
this  side  near  the  base  of  the  mountain,  and  the  rest  of 
Ewell's  corps  reached  the  same  vicinity  with  mine.  The 
force  following  us  proved  to  be  the  6th  corps  under 
Sedgwick,  acting  as  a  corps  of  observation.  It  gave 
Bodes  no  trouble  and  did  not  come  beyond  Fairfield. 

A  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  previously  come 
upon  that  part  of  our  trains  that  had  preceded  the  army 
in  the  retreat,  but  was  repulsed  by  a  few  guards  accom- 
panying the  trains  without  being  able  to  accomplish  any 
damage  of  consequence.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the 
7th  we  moved  towards  Hagerstown  by  the  way  of  Leit- 
ersburg,  my  division  following  Bodes'  and  Johnson's 
bringing  up  the  rear.  The  corps  was  established  on 
the  north  and  northeast  of  Hagerstown,  and  my  division 
took  position  on  the  Chambersburg  pike  about  a  mile 
north  of  Hagerstown.  In  this  position  we  remained 
until  the  10th,  when  the  corps  was  moved  to  the  south 
of  Hagerstown,  the  other  corps  being  already  there. 

The  enemy's  troops  had  now  commenced  arriving  on 
the  western  side  of  the  mountain,  and  we  took  position 
on  the  south  and  southeast  of  Hagerstown  to  await  his 
attack — Longstreet's  corps  being  on  the  right,  Ewell's 
on  the  left  and  Hill  in  the  centre,  and  our  line  covering 
the  road  to  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport  and  Falling 

281 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Waters,  a  few  miles  below,  where  a  pontoon  bridge  was 
being  constructed  in  the  place  of  one  previously  de- 
stroyed by  the  enemy's  cavalry.  The  advance  of  the 
enemy  resulted  in  a  sharp  engagement  between  a  portion 
of  our  cavalry  and  a  part  of  his  troops  on  the  Boonsboro 
road. 

In  the  position  near  Hagerstown,  my  division  was 
posted  across  the  Cumberland  road  on  the  southwest 
of  the  town,  but  on  the  next  day  it  was  moved  further 
to  the  right  so  as  to  rest  its  right  on  the  Hagerstown  and 
Williamsport  road,  where  it  remained  until  just  before 
dark  on  the  12th.  In  the  meantime  Meade's  army,  now 
reinforced  by  some  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand  fresh 
troops,  according  to  his  own  statement,  had  moved  up 
and  taken  position  in  our  front,  but  did  not  attack. 

Two  of  my  absent  regiments,  the  54th  North  Caro- 
lina and  58th  Virginia,  had  returned  by  this  time,  after 
having  been  engaged  in  repelling  an  attack,  made  by 
the  enemy's  cavalry  at  Williamsport  on  the  6th,  on  an 
ordnance  train  coming  up  with  a  supply  of  ammunition. 
Besides  these,  General  Lee  received  no  other  reinforce- 
ments, but  our  army  was  not  at  all  demoralized,  and 
calmly  awaited  the  attack  of  the  enemy.  My  own  divi- 
sion was  buoyant  and  defiant,  for  it  felt  that  it  had  sus- 
tained no  defeat,  and  though  diminished  in  numbers  it 
was  as  ready  to  fight  the  enemy  as  at  Gettysburg. 

As  night  was  setting  in,  on  the  12th,  my  division  was 
taken  out  of  the  line  and  moved  to  the  right,  to  the  rear 
of  Hill's  position,  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  his 
corps,  in  front  of  which  a  very  large  force  of  the  enemy 
had  accumulated.  In  this  position  it  remained  during 
the  13th,  but  no  attack  was  made.  The  Potomac  had 
been  very  much  swollen  by  the  previous  rains,  and  after 
subsiding  a  little  was  again  threatened  with  another  rise 
from  a  rain  that  commenced  on  the  13th,  and  it  .was 
therefore  determined  to  recross  that  river  so  as  not  to 
have  an  impassable  stream  at  our  back,  when  we  had  but 
one  bridge  and  that  not  yet  fully  completed,  and  which, 

282 


RETREAT  TO  VIRGINIA 

being  laid  on  pontoons,  hastily  constructed  by  our  pioneer 
and  engineer  parties,  was  liable  to  be  washed  away. 
Accordingly  our  army  commenced  retiring  after  dusk 
on  the  night  of  the  13th,  Longstreet's  and  Hill's  corps 
going  to  Falling  Waters  and  Swell's  to  Williamsport  to 
ford  the  river. 

My  division  brought  up  the  rear  of  Ewell's  corps, 
and  the  river  being  found  too  high  for  the  passage  of 
artillery,  Jones'  battalion,  under  the  escort  of  Hays' 
brigade,  was  moved  down  the  river  to  Falling  Waters, 
where  ijfc  crossed  during  the  morning  of  the  14th.  The 
rest  of  the  division  forded  the  river,  in  rear  of  the  other 
two  divisions,  after  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  the  14th 
to  a  little  above  Williamsport,  with  the  water  nearly  up 
to  the  armpits  of  the  men,  who  had  to  hold  their  guns 
and  cartridge  boxes  above  their  heads  to  keep  them  out 
of  the  water.  The  regular  ford  was  too  swift  to  allow 
of  a  crossing  there,  and  we  had  therefore  to  cross  in  the 
deeper  water  above. 

The  crossing  at  Williamsport  was  effected  without 
any  molestation  whatever,  but  at  Falling  Waters  there 
was  considerable  delay  because  of  the  greater  number  of 
troops  crossing  there  and  the  passage  of  the  artillery 
at  that  point,  where  there  was  but  one  bridge.  The 
enemy's  cavalry  came  by  surprise  upon  a  portion  of 
Hill's  corps  covering  the  bridge,  and  succeeded  in  cap- 
turing some  prisoners  and  in  getting  two  pieces  of  artil- 
lery which  were  stuck  in  the  mud,  the  surprise  being 
caused  by  a  mistaken  opinion  that  the  front  was  watched 
by  some  of  our  cavalry. 

Our  army  remained  in  the  neighborhood  of  Haynes- 
ville  that  night,  near  which  place  my  division  camped, 
and  now  for  the  first  time  since  I  moved  from  Green- 
wood, on  the  26th  of  June,  we  had  the  benefit  of  our 
baggage  wagons.  On  the  next  day  we  moved  through 
Martinsburg,  and  on  the  16th  my  division  reached  Dark- 
ville,  where  it  went  into  camp  and  remained  until  the 
20th,  in  which  neighborhood  the  whole  of  Ewell's  corps 

283 


LIEUTENANT  GENERALJJUBAL  A.  EARLY 

was  concentrated,  the  other  corps  taking  positions 
further  up  towards  and  covering  Winchester.  In  the 
meantime,  Meade  made  preparations  for  crossing  the 
Potomac  below  Harper's  Ferry,  and  threw  his  army 
into  Loudoun,  while  General  Lee  prepared  to  intercept 
his  march  by  crossing  his  army  over  the  Blue  Ridge  into 
Culpeper. 

It  having  been  ascertained  that  a  force  had  moved 
from  Cumberland  in  Maryland  to  the  mouth  of  Back 
Creek  west  of  Martinsburg,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  20th, 
my  division  was  ordered  to  move  across  North  Moun- 
tain and  then  down  Back  Creek  for  the  purpose  of  inter- 
cepting that  force,  while  another  division  should  hold 
it  in  front.  We  moved  that  night  to  the  foot  of  the 
mountain  at  Guardstown,  and  crossing  early  next  morn- 
ing (the  21st)  through  Mills'  Gap,  marched  down  Back 
Creek  to  the  rear  of  Hedgesville,  where  we  found  that  the 
force  had  made  its  escape  by  retiring  the  night  before. 
The  division  was  then  moved  across  the  mountain 
through  Hedgesville  and  camped.  During  the  night  I 
received  orders  to  move  up  the  valley  for  the  purpose 
of  crossing  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  next  day  (the  22nd)  I 
marched  to  Bunker  Hill. 

On  the  23rd  I  passed  through  Winchester  to  the 
Opequon  on  the  Front  Royal  road,  being  joined  that 
day  by  the  13th  Virginia  Regiment.  General  Ewell, 
who  had  preceded  me  with  Rodes'  and  Johnson's  divi- 
sions, had  that  day  been  engaged  with  a  heavy  force 
which  came  through  Manassas  Gap,  which  he  moved 
out  to  meet,  near  the  Gap,  as  he  was  moving  past  Front 
Royal,  and  he  sent  at  night  to  inform  me  that  he  would 
retire  up  the  Luray  Valley  for  the  purpose  of  crossing 
at  Thornton's  Gap,  and  to  order  me  to  cross  to  the  Valley 
pike  so  as  to  move  up  by  the  way  of  New  Market,  and 
across  from  there  to  Madison  Court-House,  as  the  enemy 
was  in  very  heavy  force  in  Manassas  Gap.  The  Shenan- 
doah was  then  high  and  a  pontoon  bridge  had  been  laid 
near  Front  Royal  below  the  forks,  which  he  ordered 

284 


RETREAT  TO  VIRGINIA 

to  be  taken  up  during  the  night,  and  to  be  transported 
up  the  Valley  pike  under  my  protection. 

Accordingly  I  moved  by  the  way  of  Cedarville  next 
day  to  get  the  pontoon  train,  and  then  crossed  to  the 
Valley  pike,  following  the  route  taken  by  General  Jack- 
son's corps  the  fall  before  and  arriving  at  Madison 
Court-House  on  the  28th,  in  the  neighborhood  of  which 
I  found  the  other  divisions  which  had  come  through 
Thornton's  Gap  and  by  the  way  of  Sperryville.  I  had 
to  use  the  pontoon  train  for  crossing  the  Shenandoah,  as 
that  river  was  up,  and  I  then  sent  it  up  the  Valley  to 
Staunton. 

After  remaining  near  Madison  Court-House  until  the 
31st  I  moved  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Robinson  River,  near 
the  road  from  Liberty  Mills  to  Culpeper  Court-House, 
and  the  next  day  I  crossed  the  Robinson  just  above  its 
mouth  into  Culpeper  and  then  the  Rapidan  at  the  rail- 
road station,  and  encamped  near  Pisgah  Church  about 
four  miles  from  the  station,  the  other  divisions  moving 
to  the  same  neighborhood. 

Longstreet's  and  Hill's  corps  had  preceded  Ewell's 
corps  across  the  Blue  Ridge  through  Chester  Gap,  and 
while  Meade  was  moving  his  army  up  into  Manassas  Gap 
to  attack  Ewell,  they  moved  into  Culpeper  and  waited 
until  Meade's  army  had  moved  to  the  vicinity  of  War- 
renton  and  the  Rappahannock  and  halted  without  in- 
dicating any  purpose  to  advance  further;  when,  after  a 
body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  been  driven  back,  these 
two  corps  moved  to  the  south  of  the  Rapidan  and  took 
position  near  Orange  Court-House,  leaving  Stuart's 
cavalry  to  occupy  the  county  of  Culpeper. 

This  was  the  close  of  all  the  operations  resulting 
from  the  campaign  into  Pennsylvania. 

There  have  been  various  opinions  as  to  the  utility  of 
this  campaign  into  Pennsylvania.  Undoubtedly  we  did 
not  accomplish  all  that  we  desired,  but  still  I  cannot  re- 
gard the  campaign  in  the  light  of  a  failure.  If  we  had 
remained  on  the  Rappahannock  confronting  Hooker's 

285 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

army,  we  would  have  been  compelled  to  fight  one  or 
more  battles,  and  perhaps  a  series  of  them,  during  the 
summer,  which  would  probably  have  resulted  in  a  much 
heavier  loss  to  us  than  we  sustained  at  Gettysburg, 
though  the  enemy  might  have  been  repulsed.  Situated 
as  we  were,  it  was  simply  a  matter  of  impossibility  for 
us  to  have  attacked  the  opposing  army  in  its  then  posi- 
tion, for  we  did  not  have  the  means  of  forcing  a  passage 
of  the  river — the  advantage  in  that  respect  being  all 
on  the  other  side.  We  should,  therefore,  have  been 
compelled  to  await  the  enemy's  attack,  which  could  only 
have  resulted  in  his  repulse,  in  the  most  favorable  aspect 
for  us. 

We  were  in  a  country  entirely  devoid  of  supplies 
and  of  forage,  for  Fredericksburg  had  been  occupied  the 
previous  summer  by  a  Federal  army,  and  no  crops  of 
any  consequence  had  been  made  in  all  that  region.  By 
moving  into  Pennsylvania,  we  transferred  the  theatre 
of  the  war  for  a  time  into  the  enemy's  country.  Our 
army  was  supplied  from  that  country  and  from  stores 
captured  from  the  enemy  for  more  than  a  month  and 
this  gave  a  breathing  spell  to  our  commissary  depart- 
ment, which  had  been  put  to  great  straits.  We  had 
been  living  the  previous  winter  on  very  limited  rations 
of  meat,  only  14  of  a  pound  of  bacon  to  the  ration,  with 
few  or  no  vegetables,  and  a  change  of  diet  was  actually 
necessary  for  our  men. 

When  we  came  back,  though  we  had  lost  many  valu- 
able lives,  our  army  was  reinvigorated  in  health,  and 
the  transfer  of  the  two  armies  to  the  upper  waters  of 
the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan  was  a  decided  ad- 
vantage to  us.  The  campaign  into  Pennsylvania  cer- 
tainly defeated  any  further  attempt  to  move  against 
Richmond  that  summer  and  postponed  the  war  over  into 
the  next  year.  Could  the  most  brilliant  victories  which 
it  was  in  our  power  to  gain  in  Virginia  have  accomplished 
more?    I  think  not. 


CHAPTEE  XXVI. 

Treatment  of  Prisoners,  Wounded  and  Dead. 

It  was  from  the  close  of  this  campaign  that  the  diffi- 
culties in  regard  to  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  and  the 
consequent  complaints  about  the  maltreatment  of  those 
in  our  hands,  dated. 

The  fall  of  Vicksburg  simultaneously  with  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg,  gave  to  the  enemy  the  excess  of  prisoners, 
which  had  hitherto  been  on  our  side,  and  he  now  began 
to  discover  that  we  would  be  more  damaged  by  a  cessa- 
tion in  the  exchange  than  he  would : — our  men  when  they 
came  back  would  go  into  our  army  for  the  war,  and  we 
had  no  means  of  supplying  their  places  while  they  re- 
mained prisoners.  Many  of  his  prisoners  in  our  hands 
had  but  limited  terms  to  serve  out,  and  the  places  of 
those  whose  terms  were  longer  could  be  readily  supplied 
by  new  drafts,  while  his  high  bounties,  national,  state 
and  local,  opened  to  him  the  whole  civilized  world  as  a 
recruiting  ground.  He  had  no  inducement,  therefore, 
to  continue  the  exchange  as  a  matter  of  policy  affecting 
the  strength  of  his  army,  while  a  failure  to  do  so  would 
very  much  cripple  us,  by  detaining  from  our  army  the 
men  held  as  prisoners,  by  imposing  on  our  already  over- 
taxed resources  the  support  of  the  prisoners  themselves, 
as  well  as  the  diminution  of  the  strength  of  our  army 
by  the  detail  of  a  force  to  guard  them. 

While  we  were  in  Pennsylvania,  President  Lincoln 
had  issued  an  order,  declaring  that  no  paroles  given, 
unless  at  some  of  the  places  specified  for  the  exchange  of 
prisoners  in  the  cartel  which  had  been  adopted,  or  in 
cases  of  stipulation  to  that  effect  by  a  commanding 
officer  in  surrendering  his  forces,  would  be  recognized. 
I  think,  the  date  of  that  order  was  the  1st  of  July,  and 
it  was  evidently  intended  to  embarrass  us  while  in  Penn- 
sylvania, with  the  guarding  and  sustenance  of  such  pris- 

287 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

oners  as  should  fall  into  our  hands.  This  order  found 
us  in  possession  of  more  than  6,000  prisoners  taken  on 
the  1st  at  Gettysburg. 

About  3,000  of  them  were  paroled,  but  their  paroles 
were  not  recognized  and  they  subsequently  returned  to 
the  army  without  being  exchanged,  including  some  offi- 
cers who  solemnly  pledged  their  honor  to  surrender 
themselves  as  prisoners  in  the  event  their  paroles  were 
not  recognized  by  their  government.  The  rest  declined 
to  give  paroles  because  of  the  order  before  mentioned, 
and  they  were  carried  to  Virginia  and  held  in  custody. 
In  addition  to  our  willingness  to  parole  these  men,  Gen- 
eral Lee  proposed  to  make  an  exchange  of  prisoners  after 
the  battle,  but  it  was  declined.  Now  if  the  prisoners 
brought  off  by  us  from  Gettysburg  subsequently  suffered 
in  prison,  who  was  responsible  for  that  suffering? 

The  order  in  regard  to  the  recognition  of  paroles  was 
in  violation  of  the  well  recognized  principles  of  modern 
warfare.  In  the  most  ancient  times,  a  captive  taken  in 
battle  was  held  to  have  forfeited  his  life  to  his  captors 
and  it  was  always  taken.  After  a  time  this  was  changed, 
and  from  motives  of  humanity  the  prisoner's  life  was 
spared  and  he  became  by  the  laws  of  war,  even  among 
the  most  civilized  nations,  the  slave  of  his  captor — his 
enslavement  being  justified  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a 
boon  to  him  to  spare  his  life  at  the  expense  of  his  liberty. 
The  justice  of  this  rule  is  recognized  in  Holy  Writ 
itself,  and  the  rule  continued  to  prevail  long  after  the 
commencement  of  the  Christian  era. 

In  the  age  of  chivalry  a  modification  of  the  rule  pre- 
vailed, and  a  prisoner  was  allowed  to  ransom  himself, 
when  he  could  raise  the  means  of  doing  so.  In  more 
modern  times  the  system  of  paroles  was  adopted,  and 
the  prisoner  was  allowed  to  go  at  large  upon  pledging 
his  honor  not  to  take  up  arms  against  his  captors  until 
regularly  exchanged,  the  penalty  of  a  forfeiture  of  his 
parole  being  death  if  again  captured.  This  is  a  contract 
between  the  prisoner  and  his  captors,  which  his  govern- 

288 


TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS 

ment  is  bound  to  respect  in  the  interests  of  humanity, 
by  the  recognition  of  all  civilized  nations.  It  is  not 
necessary  for  him  to  receive  the  permission  of  his  gov- 
ernment or  his  leader  to  give  his  parole.  When  he  is 
a  captive,  he  is  beyond  the  power  and  protection  of 
either  and  has  a  right  to  stipulate  for  his  individual 
safety  against  the  penalties  of  death,  slavery,  or  im- 
prisonment by  neutralizing  his  services  for  the  time 
being.  If  his  contract  is  not  respected  by  his  govern- 
ment, what  must  be  the  consequence? 

When  two  nations  or  parties  are  at  war,  the  object 
of  each  is  to  destroy  the  physical  power  of  the  other, 
in  order  to  obtain  peace,  or  accomplish  the  object  for 
which  the  war  is  undertaken.  If  one  party  is  so  situated 
that  it  cannot  hold,  or  cannot  support  its  prisoners,  and 
the  other  will  neither  exchange  nor  recognize  the  validity 
of  paroles,  is  it  to  be  expected  that  the  prisoners  shall 
be  turned  loose  to  return  again  to  augment  the  force  of 
the  antagonistic  party,  and  thus  perhaps  insure  the 
destruction  of  that  party  liberating  them? 

The  very  principle  which  justifies  killing  in  battle, 
that  is  the  universal  principle  of  self-preservation,  will 
justify  the  taking  of  no  prisoners  or  the  destruction  of 
all  those  that  may  be  taken,  if  they  can  be  neutralized 
in  no  other  way.  It  was  on  this  principle  that  the  great 
Napoleon,  in  his  Egyptian  campaign,  killed  a  number  of 
prisoners  whom  he  did  not  have  the  means  of  feeding, 
and  who  would  not  recognize  the  validity  of  a  parole. 
If  he  turned  them  loose  they  would  have  gone  imme- 
diately into  the  ranks  of  his  opponents,  if  he  kept  them 
he  would  have  had  to  take  the  food  from  the  mouths  of 
his  own  soldiers  to  feed  them,  and  the  only  way  of  getting 
rid  of  them  was  by  killing  them.  It  is  true  a  clamor 
was  raised  by  his  enemies,  whose  interest  it  was  to  make 
him  appear  as  a  barbarian  devoid  of  humanity,  but  now 
that  the  feelings  of  that  day  have  subsided,  impartial 
men  do  not  doubt  the  conformity  of  the  act  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  war. 

19  289 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JTJBAL  A.  EARLY 

So  when  Mr.  Lincoln's  order  appeared,  if  the  safety 
of  General  Lee's  army,  or  the  success  of  his  campaign 
had  been  jeopardized  by  the  necessity  of  feeding  and 
guarding  the  prisoners  in  our  hands,  he  would  have  been 
justified  in  putting  them  to  death,  and  the  responsibility 
for  the  act  would  have  rested  on  the  shoulders  of  the  man 
who  issued  the  inhuman  order.  So  too  the  latter  was 
responsible  for  all  the  sufferings  to  which  those  pris- 
oners who  were  carried  off  were  afterwards  subjected, 
if  they  suffered. 

The  alleged  reason  for  stopping  the  exchange  was 
the  fact  that  the  Confederate  Government  would  not 
parole  or  exchange  negro  slaves  belonging  to  Southern 
citizens  who  were  captured  in  the  Federal  ranks.  But 
it  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  was  the  mere  pretext  and 
not  the  real  reason.  That  is  to  be  found  in  the  belief 
existing  on  the  part  of  the  Federal  authorities  that  the 
failure  to  exchange  would  cripple  us.  The  constitution 
of  the  United  States,  then  unchanged  in  any  respect, 
recognized  the  right  of  property  in  slaves,  and  guaran- 
teed the  return  of  such  as  should  flee  from  service. 

The  constitution  of  the  Confederate  States  contained 
the  same  guaranty,  and  the  institution  of  slavery  was 
recognized  by  the  laws  and  constitutions  of  all  the  States 
composing  the  Confederacy,  from  which  States  alone 
the  Confederate  Government  derived  its  delegated 
powers.  That  government  was  bound  to  respect  the  laws 
of  the  States  and  the  rights  of  the  citizens  under  those 
laws,  and  to  protect  them.  Granting,  for  the  sake  of  the 
argument,  that  the  United  States  may  have  had  the  right 
to  employ  as  soldiers  the  captured  or  fugitive  slaves, 
as  it  had  to  take  into  its  armies  deserters  from  ours, 
still  it  took  them  subject  to  all  the  rights  of  the  owners 
and  of  the  Confederate  Government,  in  the  event  of  their 
recapture,  just  as  deserters  taken  in  arms  in  the  op- 
posite camp  were  liable  to  all  the  penalties  for  their 
crime  without  any  infraction  of  the  rules  of  war. 

Many  of  the  slaves  put  into  the  ranks  of  the  Federal 

290 


TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS 

Army  were  put  there  by  force,  but  whether  their  service 
was  enforced  or  voluntary,  the  Confederate  Govern- 
ment would  have  been  recreant  to  its  trust,  and  grossly 
neglectful  of  its  rights  and  interests,  to  have  allowed  so 
large  a  proportion  of  its  own  population  to  be  used  by 
its  enemy  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  his  armies, 
by  recognizing  the  claim  set  up  on  the  part  of  these 
slaves  to  the  benefit  of  the  rules  of  war.  Most  nations 
have  denied  the  right  of  its  citizens  even  to  expatriate 
themselves,  so  as  to  be  competent  to  serve  in  the  ranks 
of  its  enemies.  None  permit  that  expatriation  to  take 
place  after  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  and  it  would 
be  the  blindest  folly  to  do  so.  In  the  case  of  the  re- 
captured slaves,  our  government  did  not  propose  to 
punish  the  slaves  themselves,  though  those  that  had 
voluntarily  entered  the  enemy's  service  had  justly  for- 
feited their  lives,  but  merely  returned  them  to  their 
owners,  to  the  great  gratification  of  the  negroes  them- 
selves in  most  cases. 

It  was  a  case  in  which  the  Federal  Government  had 
no  rights  whatever,  any  more  than  it  could  have  had  in 
the  case  of  deserters.  The  claim  therefore  set  up  to 
have  these  slaves  treated  as  other  soldiers  taken  in  battle 
was  without  the  slightest  foundation  in  the  principles 
of  international  law,  or  the  rules  of  civilized  war;  and 
the  cessation  of  the  exchange  on  that  pretence  was  a 
most  atrocious  act  of  cruelty  to  its  own  prisoners  by  the 
Federal  Government. 

A  great  clamor  was  raised  on  this  specious  pretext  in 
order  to  reconcile  the  soldiers  and  the  people  of  the 
North  to  the  discontinuance  of  the  exchange,  and  blind 
their  eyes  as  to  the  real  reason.  Not  denying  the  right 
of  the  Federal  Government  to  refuse  to  exchange  pris- 
oners, if  it  was  its  interest  to  do  so,  and  the  war  could 
not  be  terminated  favorably  to  itself  in  any  other  way, 
still  it  had  no  right  to  violate  the  faith  pledged  to  the 
exchange  by  the  cartel;  and  least  of  all  did  it  have  the 
right  to  deprive  its  own  soldiers  in  our  hands  of  the 

291 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

right  to  release  themselves  from  prison  by  giving  their 
paroles.  If  it  thought  proper  not  only  to  adopt  the  ex- 
treme harsh  measure  of  non-exchange  from  motives  of 
policy,  but  to  go  further  and  adopt  a  new  rule  upon  the 
subject  of  paroles,  then  it  had  no  right  whatever  to  com- 
plain of  any  measures  of  harshness  towards  its  pris- 
oners which  the  necessities  or  the  interests  of  our  gov- 
ernment and  our  army  rendered  necessary. 

S'o  much  for  the  question  of  rights ;  and  now  for  the 
facts  as  to  the  actual  treatment  which  the  prisoners  in 
our  hands  received.  I  think  I  can  safely  deny  that  they 
were  ever  subjected  to  any  maltreatment,  suffering,  or 
neglect,  which  it  was  in  our  power  to  avoid.  "We  did 
not  resort  to  the  extreme  measures  which  perhaps  the 
laws  of  war  and  our  own  necessities  would  have  justified, 
but  the  prisoners  were  treated  with  all  the  humanity 
possible  under  the  circumstances  in  which  we  were 
placed.  Doubtless  there  may  have  been  rare  individual 
acts  of  maltreatment,  but  until  human  nature  is  a  very 
different  thing  from  what  it  is,  there  can  be  no  body  of 
men  in  which  there  are  not  some  who  act  unjustly  and 
oppressively. 

Such  is  the  case  everywhere  over  the  world,  in  the 
church,  in  government,  in  society,  and  in  all  the  relations 
which  men  bear  to  each  other,  it  has  been  the  case,  and 
will  continue  to  be  the  case  until  the  end  of  all  things 
that  some  will  do  wrong,  and  we  of  the  South  cannot 
claim  an  exemption  from  the  common  lot.  What  I  main- 
tain is  that  no  harsh  treatment  to  the  prisoners  was 
authorized  or  tolerated,  and  if  there  were  individual 
cases  of  the  kind  they  were  exceedingly  rare. 

The  condition  of  a  prisoner  is  by  no  means  a  desirable 
one  under  any  circumstances,  and  he  who  is  captured 
in  war  must  expect  to  suffer  inconveniences.  The  sol- 
diers of  the  Federal  Army  were  supplied  with  an  abund- 
ance of  everything  necessary  for  their  comfort  and  even 
luxury,  to  which  many  of  them,  including  some  officers, 
had  never  been  accustomed  before,  and  to  which  but  few 

292 


TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS 

of  them  perhaps,  except  those  who  enriched  themselves 
by  the  plunder  of  our  people,  returned  again  after  the 
war.  No  army  that  ever  took  the  field  was  so  well  sup- 
plied in  all  that  was  necessary,  and  much  that  was 
superfluous. 

The  easy  communication  always  kept  up  with  the 
positions  of  that  army  by  railway  and  steamboat  sup- 
plied it  abundantly  not  only  with  ample  and  comfortable 
clothing  of  every  kind  and  the  government  ration  of 
everything,  but  with  most  of  the  delicacies  incident  to 
city  life.  They  had  not  only  bread,  meat,  vegetables, 
coffee  and  sugar  in  abundance,  but  the  enormous  horde 
of  sutlers  following  the  army  supplied  it  with  wines, 
liquors,  fruits,  oysters,  canned  meats  and  in  fact  every- 
thing that  could  be  desired;  and  which  high  pay  and 
high  bounties  enabled  both  officers  and  men  to  purchase. 
When  such  men,  therefore,  fell  into  our  hands  and  were 
subjected  to  the  scanty  fare  to  which  Confederate  soldiers 
were  reduced,  it  was  very  natural  for  them  to  complain 
of  their  treatment. 

Our  ports  were  blockaded  and  we  were  cut  off  from 
the  commerce  of  the  world.  The  enemy  made  not  only 
provisions,  but  medicines,  contraband  of  war.  He  had 
devastated  the  portions  of  our  country  to  which  he  had 
penetrated,  destroying  crops  and  farming  utensils,  and 
burning  barns,  mills,  factories  of  cloth  and  stuffs  of 
all  kinds,  and  tanneries,  and  in  fact  committing  every 
possible  waste  and  devastation  which  could  cripple  our 
army  or  pinch  the  non-combatants  who  remained  at 
home.  Coffee,  tea  and  sugar  had  disappeared  early  in 
1862  as  a  part  of  the  ration  to  our  men,  and  if  there 
was  any  at  all,  it  was  to  be  found  in  rare  quantities  and 
at  the  most  enormous  prices.  The  scanty  supplies  of 
provisions  to  which  our  own  men  were  reduced  can 
hardly  be  conceived  of  by  one  who  was  not  present  to 
know  the  actual  state  of  the  case. 

On  the  night  after  the  second  victory  at  Manassas, 
thousands  of  our  men  lay  down  to  rest  without  having 

293 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

had  a  mouthful  to  eat  all  day.  I  was  then  in  command 
of  a  brigade,  and  I  was  very  well  content,  after  the  fight 
at  Ox  Hill  or  Chantilly,  to  make  my  supper  on  two  very 
small  ears  of  green  corn,  which  I  roasted  in  the  ashes. 
On  the  next  day  and  for  a  day  or  two  afterwards,  all  that 
I  had  to  eat  was  a  piece  of  cold  boiled  fresh  beef  with- 
out either  salt  or  bread,  which  I  carried  in  a  haversack. 
This  was  the  strait  to  which  a  Brigadier  General  was 
reduced  in  our  army. 

I  have  many  a  time  on  the  march,  while  a  division  and 
corps  commander,  been  glad  to  get  a  hard  cracker  and 
a  very  small  piece  of  uncooked  bacon  for  my  dinner,  and 
I  have  been  often  thankful  on  the  road  to  a  soldier  for 
a  biscuit  from  his  haversack  which  he  himself  had  baked, 
after  mixing  up  the  flour  on  an  India  rubber  cloth,  which 
he  had  secured  on  some  battlefield.  When  our  money 
became  so  depreciated  as  to  be  worth  only  from  five  to 
ten  cents  on  the  dollar,  many  of  the  company  officers  were 
compelled  from  necessity  to  eat  with  their  men  of  the 
scanty  food  furnished  them. 

I  have  seen  commissioned  officers  often,  marching  on 
foot  with  their  pantaloons  out  behind,  their  coats  out 
at  the  elbow  and  their  toes  sticking  out  of  their  shoes, 
with  but  a  pretence  for  a  sole,  while  they  had  but  the 
shirt  that  was  on  their  backs  as  their  whole  supply  of 
linen.  I  have  seen  this  the  case  with  gentlemen  of  refine- 
ment, whose  means  before  the  war  had  enabled  them  to 
live  with  every  desirable  comfort,  yet  they  submitted 
cheerfully  not  only  to  this,  but  to  actual  hunger;  and  I 
have  seen  them  go  into  battle  with  the  proud  tread  of 
heroes,  encouraging  their  men,  cheering  over  the  vic- 
tory, or  bravely  meeting  death  in  defence  of  a  country 
which  could  treat  them  no  better. 

What  these  men  were  content  with,  the  prisoners 
taken  by  their  valor,  and  who  had  been  so  well  pampered 
in  their  own  country,  thought  proper  to  regard,  when 
furnished  them,  as  evidence  of  a  disposition  to  starve 
them.     Not  only  was  our  army  so  meagrely  supplied  with 

294 


TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS 

what  was  necessary  not  only  to  its  comfort,  but  to  its 
very  existence,  but  our  people  everywhere  were  pinched 
for  the  necessaries  of  life.  Gentlemen,  ladies,  and  chil- 
dren, who  had  been  accustomed  to  every  indulgence  and 
luxury,  were  very  often  put  to  the  utmost  straits  for 
clothes  to  wear  and  meat  and  bread  to  eat,  and  while  this 
was  the  case  with  them  there  was  a  long,  long  list  of 
the  wives  and  the  children  of  the  privates  in  the  ranks 
fighting  for  their  homes  and  their  altars,  who  were  on 
the  very  brink  of  actual  starvation. 

Now,  I  ask,  in  the  name  of  all  that  is  sacred,  did 
they  expect  that  the  men  who  had  come  down  to  make 
war  upon  a  people  so  reduced  by  their  barbarous  acts 
to  the  very  verge  of  starvation  and  nakedness  should, 
when  taken  in  battle,  be  fed  and  clothed  better  than  the 
men  who,  sacrificing  all  mere  personal  considerations, 
were  so  bravely  meeting  their  foes  in  deadly  strife,  while 
their  wives,  children,  mothers  and  sisters  were  starving! 

There  is  talk  about  the  food  furnished  the  sick  and 
wounded  as  being  unsuited  for  their  condition.  I  will 
mention  an  incident  that  occurred  under  my  own  ob- 
servation. While  we  were  at  Spottsylvania  Court-House 
in  May,  1864,  battling  with  such  immense  odds,  I  was 
in  command  of  a  corps,  and  I  received  a  message  to  come 
to  General  Lee's  headquarters  at  night  on  one  occasion 
for  the  purpose  of  receiving  some  instructions  from  him. 
General  Lee  was  then  himself  suffering  with  a  dysentery 
which  had  reduced  him  very  much,  and  rendered  all  of 
us  who  were  aware  of  his  condition  exceedingly  uneasy, 
for  we  knew  that  if  he  failed  all  was  gone. 

When  I  arrived  his  dinner  and  supper,  both  in  one, 
were  just  ready  and  I  was  invited  in  to  partake  of  the 
meal,  and  I  found  it  to  consist  of,  what  to  me  was  most 
acceptable,  a  scant  supply  of  hard  crackers,  fried  fat 
bacon,  and  a  beverage  made  as  a  substitute  for  coffee 
out  of  parched  wheat,  without  sugar,  and  this  was  all. 
This  was  what  the  foremost  commander  of  the  age  was 
reduced  to  in  the  then  critical  condition  of  his  health. 

295 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Such  fare,  if  furnished  to  a  sick  or  wounded  Federal 
soldier,  would  have  been  regarded  as  evidence  of  a  bar- 
barous purpose  to  cause  his  death.  To  inflame  the  minds 
of  the  Northern  people  and  prejudice  the  civilized  world 
against  us,  an  investigation  was  had  before  a  committee 
of  the  Federal  Congress  who  made  a  report  upon  "rebel 
atrocities,"  founded  on  the  testimony  of  men  who  swore 
to  some  things  they  had  seen,  many  that  they  had  heard, 
and  a  great  many  more  that  they  had  neither  seen  nor 
heard. 

The  press  was  flooded  with  stories  of  cruel  treat- 
ment, illustrated  by  pictures,  and  during  the  war  every 
device  was  resorted  to,  to  fix  upon  us  the  stigma  of  bar- 
barous treatment  of  the  prisoners  in  our  hands.  After 
the  close  of  the  war  a  poor  feeble  foreigner,  Captain 
Wirz,  who  had  been  in  our  service,  and  was  then  on  the 
very  verge  of  the  grave  from  wounds  received  in  battle, 
was  selected  as  a  victim  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  demands 
of  the  North  for  more  blood,  and,  after  a  farce  of  a  trial, 
was  hung  for  alleged  cruelty  to  prisoners.  As  a  speci- 
men of  the  evidence  given  on  his  trial,  it  is  only  necessary 
to  mention  that  of  Boston  Corbet,  the  man  who  killed 
Booth,  while  the  latter,  with  a  fractured  leg,  was  in  a 
house  in  flames  and  surrounded  by  a  large  party  of 
Federal  cavalry,  by  slipping  up  to  the  side  of  the  house 
and  firing  his  revolver  through  a  crack. 

Boston  Corbet  testified  on  the  trial  of  Wirz,  stating 
that  he  was  a  prisoner  at  Andersonville,  and  among 
other  atrocities  testified  to,  by  him,  he  mentioned  the 
fact  that  bloodhounds  were  kept  to  pursue  escaped  pris- 
oners, and  he  said  that  he  himself  with  some  others 
made  an  escape,  and  the  bloodhounds  were  put  on  the 
track;  that  while  he  was  concealed  in  the  bushes,  one  of 
the  bloodhounds  came  up  and  rubbed  its  nose  against 
his.  When  asked  why  the  hound  did  not  do  any  mischief 
to  him,  he  said  that  he  served  the  same  Lord  that  Daniel 
served  when  in  the  lions '  den. 

There  were  many  other  witnesses  in  whose  stories 

296 


TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS 

there  was  as  little  truth  as  in  that  of  Boston  Corbet,  and 
" rebel"  witnesses  were  denounced  as  unworthy  of  credit 
unless  they  would  prove  renegades  and  endeavor  to 
propitiate  their  masters  by  turning  against  their  com- 
rades. Even  poor  Wirz  himself  was  offered  his  life  if 
he  would  testify  against  the  high  officials  of  the  Con- 
federate Government,  but  he  was  too  true  a  man  and 
Christian  to  attempt  to  save  himself  from  his  unjust 
sentence  by  perjuring  his  soul;  and  he,  therefore, 
suffered  on  the  gallows. 

To  appreciate  at  its  proper  worth  the  evidence  of 
the  witnesses  who  have  tried  to  fix  upon  the  Confederate 
authorities  this  iniquitous  charge  of  maltreatment  of 
prisoners,  it  is  only  necessary  to  refer  to  the  evidence 
of  the  general  officers  of  the  Federal  Army  before  the 
Congressional  Committee  on  the  War.  Let  any  candid 
man  read,  for  instance,  the  evidence  contained  in  that 
part  of  the  report  which  refers  to  the  battle  of  Gettys- 
burg and  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
under  Meade,  where  there  is  such  palpable  conflict,  not 
as  to  opinions  merely,  but  as  to  facts ;  and  when  he  has 
determined  in  his  mind  which  of  those  general  officers 
tell  the  truth  and  which  do  not,  let  him  say  how  much 
credence  is  to  be  given  to  the  stories  of  those  men  who 
testified  as  to  the  horrors  of  Andersonville,  and  other 
Confederate  prisons.  When  the  general  officers  of  the 
army  were  so  loose  in  their  testimony  as  to  important 
facts  affecting  each  other,  what  was  to  be  expected  of 
the  subordinates  and  the  privates,  when  testifying 
against  their  enemies  ? 

It  is  very  easy  to  raise  the  cry  of  " rebel"  when  any 
statement  is  put  forth  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate 
authorities ;  and  that  is  conceded  a  sufficient  answer.  The 
same  cry  would  invalidate  the  testimony  of  General  Lee 
or  "Stonewall"  Jackson.  If  such  atrocities  were  com- 
mitted as  those  alleged,  why  is  it  that  poor  Wirz  is  the 
solitary  victim  offered  up  in  expiation  of  the  thousands 
of  victims  who,  it  is  said,  died  from  the  effects  of  the 

297 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

atrocities?  The  popular  heart  at  the  time  of  his  sacrifice 
thirsted  for  blood,  notwithstanding  the  oceans  that 
flowed  during  the  war,  but  when  the  first  frenzy  was 
over  the  more  cautious  panderers  to  the  tastes  of  their 
countrymen  felt  that  there  was  danger  of  shocking  the 
minds  of  the  civilized  world,  and  desisted. 

If  poor  Wirz  was  guilty,  he  was  the  least  guilty  of 
all  those  charged  with  the  same  crime,  and  was  but  a 
mere  instrument  in  the  hands  of  others.  His  executioners 
owed  it  to  themselves  and  to  the  cause  of  truth  and 
justice  to  bring  the  others  to  trial  in  order  to  vindicate 
their  action  in  his  case,  and  failing  in  this,  they  must 
stand  before  the  world  as  his  murderers.  Sufferings 
there  were  doubtless  at  Andersonville  and  other  prisons, 
but  how  could  they  be  avoided? 

Our  men  in  the  army  were  suffering,  and  our  women 
at  home  were  suffering.  Could  the  men  who  came  down 
to  kill  and  plunder  us  expect  a  better  fate  than  that 
which  befell  our  own  soldiers  and  people?  Many  per- 
haps died  from  the  want  of  proper  medicines,  but  thou- 
sands upon  thousands  of  our  own  wounded  and  sick  died 
from  the  same  cause.  Who  deprived  us  of  the  means 
of  getting  medicines?  When  we  could  not  feed,  clothe, 
and  provide  for  these  prisoners  in  such  a  manner  as 
would  satisfy  them,  whose  fault  was  it  that  they,  were 
not  released  to  be  cared  for  by  their  own  friends  ?  Who 
issued  the  order  forbidding  their  being  paroled?  Who 
put  a  stop  to  the  exchange?  Was  it  to  be  expected  that 
we  would  turn  those  men  loose  to  come  back  again  to 
kill  and  plunder  our  people? 

Kindred  to  this  is  another  charge  of  plundering  and 
disfiguring  the  dead.  Now  as  to  the  question  of  plunder- 
ing, I  cannot  but  think  that  it  is  more  cruel  to  plunder 
the  living  than  the  dead,  especially  if  the  living  be  help- 
less women  and  children.  I  presume  it  is  not  necessary 
to  state  the  reasons  why  I  entertain  this  opinion. 

It  is  to  me  a  little  strange  that  the  men  who  applauded 


TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS 

Butler,  Banks,  Milroy,  Sherman,  and  Sheridan,  for 
plundering  and  rendering  utterly  desolate  the  houses 
of  thousands  of  woman  and  children,  should  complain 
that  our  barefooted  soldiers  took  the  shoes  from  the  feet 
of  some  of  the  men  who  had  been  engaged  in  this  plunder 
and  were  killed,  in  order  that  they  might  not  be  able  to 
follow  and  fight  the  rest. 

I  have  myself  but  too  often  seen  in  the  track  of  the 
Federal  armies  the  evidence  of  how  they  plundered  and 
destroyed  the  property  of  our  people.  Not  content  with 
taking  provisions,  cattle,  horses,  sheep  and  other  things 
which  they  might  use,  they  often  took  what  was  of  no 
earthly  use  to  them  as  soldiers,  and  destroyed  what 
they  could  not  carry  away.  I  have  seen  where  they  had 
torn  up  the  clothes  of  the  women  and  children,  hacked 
to  pieces  furniture,  pianos,  and  other  articles,  destroy- 
ing valuable  papers  and  books,  burned  besides  houses, 
plows,  carts  and  a  variety  of  such  things.  This  I  have 
seen  in  not  a  few  instances,  but  I  have  seen  whole  com- 
munities rendered  destitute  in  this  way. 

They  also  burned  all  our  factories  and  tanneries 
which  they  could  reach,  taking  the  hides  out  of  the  vats 
in  the  latter  and  cutting  them  to  pieces.  "When  a  man 
is  naked  and  barefooted,  is  he  to  be  blamed  for  taking 
such  articles  as  he  needs  from  the  dead  body  of  his  enemy 
who  has  thus  treated  him  or  his  comrades,  in  order  that 
he  may  still  continue  to  fight  the  despoilers  of  his  home 
and  his  country?  Let  the  man  who  is  disposed  to  con- 
demn him  put  the  case  to  himself.  He  is  plundered  and 
robbed,  and  perhaps  some  of  his  family  or  friends  killed, 
he  pursues  his  plunderers  and  succeeds  in  killing  one  of 
them,  but  he  finds  himself  faint  and  sorefooted  from 
the  want  of  shoes,  and  is  therefore  unable  to  continue 
the  pursuit.  Will  he  hesitate  to  strip  the  shoes  from 
the  feet  of  his  fallen  enemy  to  enable  him  to  resume 
the  task  of  recovering  his  own  and  chastising  his  other 
enemies? 

299 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

On  one  occasion,  a  very  worthy  chaplain  in  our  army 
on  riding  over  a  battlefield  found  a  soldier  pulling  the 
shoes  from  the  feet  of  a  dead  Federal  soldier,  and  this 
being  new  to  him,  his  feelings  were  rather  shocked. 
Speaking  to  the  soldier  he  said:  "  My  friend,  if  I  were 
in  your  place,  I  would  have  more  respect  for  the  dead, 
and  not  do  that."  The  soldier,  looking  at  the  comfort- 
able iDair  of  boots  which  the  chaplain  by  good  luck  was 
able  to  sport,  said:  "Sir,  I  have  as  much  respect  for 
the  dead  as  you  or  any  other  man,  but  if  you  had  marched 
as  long  as  I  have  without  any  shoes,  and  your  feet  were 
as  sore  as  mine,  you  would  not  think  it  so  wrong  to  take 
these  shoes  which  can't  do  this  man  any  good  now,  and 
will  do  me  a  great  deal."  The  chaplain  was  silenced, 
and  that  was  the  whole  question  in  a  few  words. 

As  to  the  other  part  of  the  charge,  about  disfiguring 
the  bodies,  I  do  not  presume  our  enemies  themselves 
believe  it,  though  it  was  their  policy  to  show  that  we 
were  barbarous,  and  this  was  set  forth  in  the  report  of 
a  Congressional  Committee.  I  was  on  many  battlefields 
beginning  with  first  Manassas,  both  during  and  after 
the  battles,  and  I  slept  on  some,  with  the  enemy's  dead 
lying  all  around  me.  I  never  in  a  solitary  case  saw  any 
evidence  of  any  such  treatment,  and  I  never  heard  of 
any  except  from  the  reports  put  in  circulation. 

As  I  have  passed  along  over  the  ground  when  we 
were  fighting  I  have  had  some  of  the  wounded  appeal 
to  me,  saying  they  were  informed  by  their  officers  that 
we  killed  all  the  wounded,  and  I  have  ordered  them  to 
be  carried  off  and  cared  for.  It  was  the  policy  to  circu- 
late such  reports  in  regard  to  the  treatment  of  pris- 
oners, the  wounded,  and  the  dead,  not  only  to  inflame 
the  minds  of  the  Northern  people  in  order  to  induce  them 
to  give  a  hearty  support  to  the  war,  but  to  make  the 
soldiers  in  the  army  fight  more  obstinately;  and  there 
were  not  wanting  witnesses  to  aid  the  authorities  by 
their  testimony. 

300 


TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS 

The  appeal  may  be  safely  made  to  the  world  to  decide 
these  charges  against  the  comrades  of  General  Robert 
E.  Lee  and  " Stonewall"  Jackson,  and  now  that  the  war 
is  over,  it  would  seem  that  we  might  even  "  appeal  from 
Philip  drunk  to  Philip  sober,"  but  it  will  seem  as  if 
such  critics  had  not  allowed  those  passions  to  subside,  by 
which  they  were  intoxicated  during  the  existence  of 
active  hostilities. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 
On  the  Rapidan. 

We  remained  in  camp  during  the  month  of  August, 
and  the  forepart  of  September,  resting  our  men  from 
their  late  fatigues,  and  recruiting  our  strength  by  the 
return  of  the  sick  and  wounded  who  had  recovered. 
General  Hoke  having  recovered  from  his  wound,  now  re- 
turned to  his  brigade,  but  was  soon  sent  off  with  one  of 
his  regiments  to  North  Carolina  on  special  duty.  In  the 
last  of  August,  or  first  part  of  September,  Longstreet's 
corps  was  detached  from  our  army,  leaving  only  Ewell's 
and  Hill's. 

The  enemy's  cavalry  had  been  constantly  increasing 
in  amount,  and  he  had  now  a  much  larger  force  of  that 
arm  than  we  had.  He  was  able  to  keep  his  cavalry  well 
mounted,  while  horses  were  becoming  very  scarce  with  us. 
On  the  13th  of  September,  a  large  force  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  supported  by  infantry,  advanced  into  Culpeper, 
and  Stuart's  cavalry  was  compelled  to  retire.  My  divis- 
ion, followed  by  Rodes',  was  advanced  to  the  Rapidan 
to  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing,  and  we  had  some 
sharp  skirmishing  with  the  enemy's  cavalry  which  came 
up  to  Somerville  and  Raccoon  Fords,  and  we  had  some 
brisk  artillery  firing  also. 

My  division  took  position  covering  the  two  fords 
named,  and  Rodes'  went  to  Morton's  Ford  on  my  right 
and  took  position  covering  that;  some  of  Hill's  troops 
covering  the  fords  above.  The  demonstrations  by  the 
enemy's  cavalry  and  the  skirmishing  continued  a  day  or 
two  on  the  river,  and  a  portion  of  Meade's  infantry,  all 
of  which  had  moved  into  Culpeper,  came  up  and  relieved 
the  cavalry,  when  the  pickets  were  again  established  in 
sight  of  each  other.  We  then  proceeded  to  strengthen 
our  position  by  rifle  pits  and  epaulments  for  artillery, 
and  continued  in  position  until  the  8th  of  October,  there 

302 


ON  THE  RAPID  AN 

being  occasional  reconnaissances  to  the  right  and  left 
by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  demonstrations  with  his 
infantry  by  manoeuvring  in  our  view,  his  camps  being 
distinctly  visible  to  us  from  a  signal  station  on  Clark's 
Mountain,  at  the  base  of  which,  on  the  north,  the  Rapidan 
runs. 

Meade  had  now  sent  off  two  of  his  corps,  the  11th  and 
12th,  to  reinforce  Rosecrans  at  Chattanooga,  Longstreet 
having  reinforced  Bragg  with  two  of  his  divisions;  and 
General  Lee  determined  to  move  around  Meade's  right 
and  attack  him,  this  movement  commencing  on  the  night 
of  the  8th.  One  of  Rodes '  brigades,  and  Fitz.  Lee 's  brigade 
of  cavalry,  were  left  to  hold  the  line  of  the  river  on  the 
right  of  Rapidan  Station  until  the  enemy  had  disappeared 
from  the  front,  and  my  pickets  having  been  relieved,  my 
division  was  concentrated  that  night  in  rear  of  my  posi- 
tion, for  the  purpose  of  moving  early  next  morning.  The 
movement  was  to  be  made  by  the  way  of  Madison  Court- 
House  so  as  to  avoid  the  observation  of  the  enemy,  Hill 
taking  the  lead,  Ewell  following. 

I  moved  early  on  the  morning  of  the  9th,  taking  the 
road  by  Orange  Court-House  and  crossing  the  Rapidan 
at  a  ford  a  little  above  the  mouth  of  the  Robinson  River, 
camping  a  mile  or  two  beyond.  On  the  morning  of  the 
10th  I  moved  by  the  way  of  Madison  Court-House,  follow- 
ing the  rest  of  the  army,  and  crossing  Robinson  River, 
camped  again  three  or  four  miles  from  it.  Just  before 
night  there  was  a  sharp  fight  in  the  advance  with  a  por- 
tion of  the  enemy's  cavalry.  On  the  11th  we  continued  to 
move  to  the  left  and  then  in  direction  of  Culpeper  Court- 
House  to  Stone-House  Mountain,  when  it  was  found  that 
the  enemy  had  fallen  back  across  the  Rappahannock  with 
his  infantry,  but  there  was  fighting  with  the  cavalry 
in  the  direction  of  the  Court-House. 

On  the  12th  we  turned  off  in  the  direction  of  Fauquier 
Springs,  and  our  advance  drove  a  body  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  from  the  river  and  crossed  over,  a  portion  of  the 
troops,  including  my  division,  remaining  on  the  south 

303 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JIIBAL  A.  EARLY 

side.  On  the  13th  we  crossed  and  proceeded  to  Warren- 
ton,  and  Meade's  army,  which  was  on  the  Rappahannock 
below,  commenced  its  retreat  on  both  sides  of  the  railroad 
towards  Manassas.  We  took  position  that  night  around 
Warrenton,  Hill's  corps  being  advanced  out  on  the  road 
towards  Centreville. 

Stuart,  with  a  part  of  his  cavalry,  had  crossed  the 
river  and  got  in  between  two  of  the  enemy's  columns, 
where  he  spent  the  night  of  the  13th  in  imminent  danger 
of  capture.  We  moved  before  daybreak  on  the  morning 
of  the  14th,  as  well  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  Stuart 
as  for  attacking  the  enemy,  Ewell's  corps  taking  the  road 
by  Auburn  towards  Greenwich  and  Bristow  Station,  and 
Hill's,  a  route  further  to  the  left.  About  light,  a  con- 
siderable force  of  the  enemy,  composed  of  both  infantry 
and  cavalry,  was  found  at  Auburn,  on  Cedar  Creek, 
occupying  the  opposite  banks  of  the  stream,  where  a 
mill  pond  rendered  the  advance  against  him  very  difficult. 
Rodes'  division  formed  line  in  front,  and  some  skirmish- 
ing and  cannonading  ensued,  while  I  moved  with  my 
division  and  Jones'  battalion  of  artillery  to  the  left 
across  the  creek  above  the  mill,  and  around  to  get  in  the 
enemy's  rear. 

After  I  had  started  Rodes,  having  been  replaced  by 
Johnson,  moved  to  the  right  to  cross  the  stream  below. 
The  enemy's  infantry  in  the  meantime  had  moved  off, 
leaving  only  a  cavalry  force  and  some  horse  artillery  to 
dispute  the  passage,  and  as  I  was  moving  up  to  attack 
this  force  in  the  rear  and  Rodes  was  coming  up  from 
the  right,  it  rapidly  made  its  escape  towards  the  railroad, 
passing  between  us. 

We  then  moved  towards  Greenwich,  and  near  that 
place  Ewell's  corps  turned  off  through  some  farms  in 
the  direction  of  the  bridge  over  Kettle  Run,  while  Hill's 
corps  preceded  us  on  the  direct  road  to  Bristow.  At  this 
latter  place,  the  2nd  corps  of  Meade 's  army,  under  War- 
ren, was  found,  and  two  of  Hill's  brigades  which  were 

304 


ON  THE  RAPID  AN 

in  the  advance  moved  against  it  while  behind  the  railroad 
embankment,  and  were  repulsed  with  some  loss,  a  battery 
of  artillery,  which  was  advanced  to  the  front  at  the  same 
time,  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  About  this 
time  my  division,  in  the  lead  of  Ewell's  corps,  came  up 
on  the  right  near  Kettle  Run  Bridge,  and  was  ordered  to 
move  forward  against  some  troops  and  wagon  trains  said 
to  be  moving  on  the  road  across  the  run  in  the  direction 
of  Bristow.  Gordon's  brigade  being  in  front  was  formed 
in  line  facing  the  run  and  he  was  directed  to  wait  until 
the  other  brigades  came  up  and  were  formed. 

While  I  was  hurrying  these  brigades  up,  Gordon  see- 
ing some  cavalry  on  the  opposite  hills  made  a  rapid 
advance  across  the  run  and  up  the  hills  on  the  other  side, 
driving  the  cavalry  from  the  road  to  Bristow  and  pursu- 
ing it  towards  Brentsville.  When  the  other  brigades 
were  brought  up,  I  found  Gordon  unexpectedly  gone,  and 
I  moved  to  the  run,  expecting  to  find  him  there,  but  he 
was  nowhere  to  be  seen.  Warren's  corps  constituted  the 
rear  of  Meade's  army,  and  the  troops  and  trains  seen 
across  Kettle  Run  proved  only  a  rear  guard  of  cavalry 
with  some  ambulances,  the  main  wagon  trains  moving 
on  the  east  of  the  railroad  by  Brentsville.  When  I  found 
there  was  no  enemy  to  attack  in  the  direction  I  had  been 
ordered  to  move,  I  then  formed  my  brigades  in  line  across 
the  railroad  facing  towards  Bristow  Station,  and  sent 
to  find  Gordon,  for  the  purpose  of  moving  against  the 
force  behind  the  railroad  at  the  station,  according  to 
instructions  I  had  received  from  General  Lee. 

After  a  time  one  of  Gordon's  staff  officers  came  up 
with  the  information  that  he  was  facing  a  heavy  cavalry 
force  immediately  in  his  front  from  which  he  could  not 
retire  easily,  and  that  there  was  a  very  large  train  of 
wagons  about  Brentsville.  Gordon's  brigade  was  more 
than  one-third  of  my  division,  and  with  the  other  brigades 
I  was  not  strong  enough  to  advance  against  the  enemy's 
position,  especially  as  there  was  a  very  dense  thicket  of 

20  305 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

young  pines  intervening  between  my  position  and  that  of 
the  enemy  which  rendered  an  advance  in  line  almost 
impossible. 

It  was  now  getting  late,  it  being  very  nearly  dark,  and 
though  Johnson's  division  was  ordered  up  to  my  assist- 
ance, before  it  could  reach  me  it  became  entirely  dark, 
so  as  to  put  a  stop  to  all  further  operations  that  night. 
Very  early  next  morning  I  advanced  towards  the  station, 
but  the  enemy  was  found  to  have  made  good  his  retreat 
during  the  night.  I  then  halted  my  division,  and  moved 
on  to  Manassas  Junction  with  a  regiment,  in  order  to 
reconnoitre,  picking  up  some  stragglers  on  the  way.  The 
enemy  was  found  to  have  crossed  Bull  Run  and  taken 
position  behind  it.  Our  cavalry  advanced  up  to  the  Run 
and  had  some  skirmishing  with  the  enemy,  but  our  army 
did  not  make  any  further  movement  forward. 

We  then  proceeded  to  destroy  the  bridge  over  Broad 
Run  and  Kettle  Run  and  to  tear  up  the  railroad,  burning 
the  cross-ties  and  bending  the  rails  by  heating  them. 

On  the  march  from  Rapidan,  Brigadier  General 
Pegram,  who  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of 
Smith's  brigade,  joined  us,  General  Smith,  who  had  been 
elected  Governor  of  Virginia,  having  resigned  at  the  close 
of  the  Pennsylvania  campaign. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

Devastation  op  the  Country. 

We  remained  near  Bristow  two  or  three  days,  but 
were  unable  to  supply  our  army  in  this  position,  and  as 
the  enemy  had  destroyed  the  bridge  over  the  Rappahan- 
nock on  his  retreat,  we  crossed  the  river  on  a  pontoon 
bridge.  Our  army  then  occupied  the  line  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock, and  remained  there  until  the  7th  of  November, 
my  division  after  several  moves  finally  going  into  camp 
in  rear  of  Brandy  Station,  Rodes  covering  Kelly's  Ford 
on  the  right,  with  Johnson  between  us,  while  Hill  was 
on  the  left.  We  still  held  the  crossing  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock at  the  railroad  bridge  with  a  pontoon  bridge  across 
the  river  and  a  tete  du  pont  covering  it. 

Meade  in  the  meantime  had  gradually  moved  his  army 
up  to  the  vicinity  of  Warrenton  and  Warrenton  Junction, 
and  we  had  sent  forward,  on  several  occasions,  wagons 
strongly  guarded  by  infantry  to  bring  back  the  rails  that 
had  been  torn  up  from  the  railroad  between  Bealton  and 
the  river.  On  the  last  of  these  expeditions,  which  was 
protected  by  my  division,  a  considerable  force  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  was  encountered  at  Bealton  and  driven 
off. 

The  tete  du  pont  in  front  of  the  Rappahannock  was 
occupied  by  a  brigade  detailed  alternately  from  my  divis- 
ion and  Johnson's  with  a  battery  of  artillery  detailed 
from  the  artillery  of  the  corps. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  November,  his  position 
was  occupied  by  Hays'  brigade  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  Penn  of  the  7th  Louisiana  Regiment,  and  Green's 
battery  of  artillery  of  four  guns,  while  some  works  on 
the  south  bank,  immediately  in  rear  of  the  tete  du  pont, 
were  occupied  by  Graham's  and  Dance's  batteries  of 
artillery. 

The  tete  du  pont  itself  consisted  of  a  line  of  rifle 

307 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

trenches  encircling  the  bridge  and  resting  on  the  river 
above  and  below,  near  the  right  of  which  were  two  small 
redoubts  embraced  in  the  circle  of  works,  one  of  which 
had  been  constructed  in  the  spring  of  1862  when  our 
troops  fell  back  from  Manassas  to  face  to  the  north,  and 
the  other  had  been  constructed  by  the  enemy  subsequently 
to  face  to  the  north,  both  being  remodelled  for  the  use  of 
artillery.  The  rifle  pits  were  slight,  affording  in  them- 
selves no  obstacle  to  the  passage  of  a  force  over  them 
unless  held  by  an  opposing  force,  and  the  redoubts  were 
imperfectly  remodelled — while  there  was  no  obstruction 
in  front,  in  the  way  of  ditches,  abattis  or  otherwise. 

The  work  was  completely  commanded  by  higher  posi- 
tions in  front,  on  ridges  behind  which  a  cover  for  the 
advance  of  troops  from  that  direction  was  afforded,  while, 
on  the  immediate  right  of  the  point  at  which  the  rifle 
pits  touched  the  river,  on  that  flank,  the  railroad 
approached  to  the  bank  of  the  stream  by  a  high  embank- 
ment of  earth,  with  a  walled  opening  in  it  for  the  passage 
of  a  road  just  in  front  of  that  part  of  the  work.  In  rear 
of  the  tete  du  pont  the  river  was  rendered  impassable 
except  over  the  bridge,  which  was  near  the  right,  by  a 
mill  dam  which  backed  up  the  water,  making  a  pond 
extending  along  the  entire  rear  of  the  work,  the  bridge 
being  across  this  pond. 

The  works  in  rear  of  the  bridge  occupied  by  Graham's 
and  Dance's  batteries  consisted  of  a  redoubt  that  had 
been  constructed  by  the  enemy  on  that  side  and  which 
had  been  turned,  and  some  sunken  pits  for  guns  on  the 
left  of  it,  the  ground  occupied  by  these  works  being  lower 
than  the  tete  du  pont  in  front.  Some  sunken  pits  for 
artillery  had  been  made  on  the  south  side  of  the  river  on 
the  right  of  the  railroad  in  low,  flat  ground  so  as  to  sweep 
the  east  side  of  the  railroad  embankment  that  was  on 
the  north,  but  was  unoccupied;  there  were  also  rifle 
trenches  connected  with  this  epaulment,  and  lower  down 
to  cover  a  point  at  which  the  enemy  had  had  a  bridge. 
The  works  which  were  occupied  on  the  south  bank  really 

308 


DEVASTATION  OF  THE  COUNTRY 

afforded  no  protection  to  those  on  the  north,  but  merely- 
served  to  command  the  bridge  itself  in  the  event  of  the 
tete  du  pont  being  carried,  as  the  fire  from  the  guns 
posted  in  them  would  be  over  the  latter,  in  order  to  reach 
an  advancing  enemy. 

Early  in  the  day  of  the  7th,  a  small  force  of  infantry 
appeared  in  front  of  the  tete  du  pont,  beyond  the  range  of 
the  artillery  there  posted,  passing  down  the  river,  and  a 
little  before  noon  a  heavy  force  of  infantry  was  developed 
in  front  of  the  works,  forming  a  line  of  battle  encircling 
them,  but  still  out  of  range  of  our  artillery ;  and  still  later 
a  large  force  was  seen  passing  down  the  river,  that  in 
front  still  remaining  in  line  of  battle. 

The  enemy  confronting  this  position,  subsequently 
ascertained  to  be  two  corps,  the  5th  and  6th,  under  Sedg- 
wick, then  commenced  advancing  by  gradual  steps,  com- 
ing up  a  little  nearer  each  time  and  forming  a  new  line  of 
battle;  and  Colonel  Penn,  who  had  three  of  his  regiments 
advanced  to  the  front  and  on  the  flanks,  so  as  to  cover 
the  main  position  with  a  line  of  pickets  while  one  was 
in  reserve  in  the  trenches,  and  the  other  was  on  picket 
on  the  river  on  the  south  bank,  was  compelled  to  retire  his 
advanced  regiments  gradually,  until  they  were  with- 
drawn into  the  woods,  leaving  only  a  line  of  skirmishers 
in  front  as  far  as  their  safety  would  permit.  On  the 
first  appearance  of  the  enemy  in  force,  Colonel  Penn  had 
sent  me  a  dispatch  informing  me  of  the  fact,  but  as  my 
camp  was  fully  five  miles  off  it  did  not  reach  me  until  a 
little  before  2  p.m. 

I  immediately  signalled  the  information  to  General 
Lee  and  General  Ewell,  and  ordered  my  other  brigades, 
then  engaged  in  constructing  huts  for  quarters,  to  be 
moved  to  the  front  as  soon  as  they  could  be  got  together. 
As  this  required  some  time,  I  rode  in  advance  towards 
the  position  occupied  by  my  brigade  on  picket,  and  at 
Brandy  Station  received  another  dispatch  from  Colonel 
Penn  informing  me  that  the  enemy  still  remained  in  his 
front  in  line  of  battle  with  a  very  heavy  force.    For  fear 

309 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

that  the  information  by  signal  had  not  reached  General 
Ewell,  as  I  understood  he  was  coming  up  towards  Brandy 
Station,  I  sent  my  Adjutant  General,  Major  John  W. 
Daniel,  to  meet  him  and  communicate  the  contents  of  the 
two  dispatches  to  him. 

Before  reaching  the  river  I  encountered  General  Lee, 
who  had  not  received  my  dispatch,  and  together  we  pro- 
ceeded to  the  river,  where  we  arrived  a  little  after  three 
o'clock.  I  immediately  crossed  over  to  Penn's  position 
and  going  out  in  front  of  the  skirmish  line,  then  con- 
siderably advanced,  I  discovered  a  very  heavy  force 
which  was  gradually  but  very  slowly  and  cautiously  mov- 
ing up,  encircling  the  whole  position.  Penn's  regiments 
had  been  drawn  in,  including  the  one  on  picket  below, 
except  one  company  still  left  on  picket  at  that  point,  and 
now  occupied  the  trenches,  which  they  could  not  fully 
man,  while  the  guns  of  Green's  battery  were  posted  in 
the  works  on  the  right. 

After  fully  reconnoitring  in  front  I  rode  back  across 
the  river  and  communicated  the  state  of  the  case  to 
General  Lee.  Shortly  after  I  recrossed  the  river,  the 
enemy  commenced  forcing  back  our  skirmishers,  who 
were  compelled  to  retire  towards  the  works,  and  having 
got  possession  of  the  hills  in  front  he  opened  with  a  bat- 
tery of  artillery,  his  guns  being  replied  to  by  Graham's 
and  Dance's  with  little  or  no  effect,  as  the  distance  was 
too  great.  The  enemy's  skirmishers  in  very  heavy  line 
continued  to  advance,  forcing  ours  back  to  the  protection 
of  the  line  of  works,  and  a  portion  of  his  getting  to  the 
river  bank  about  half  a  mile  below  the  right  of  the  tete  du 
pont.  An  attempt  was  then  made  to  send  one  of  Dance's 
guns  to  the  pits  on  the  right  of  the  railroad,  but  the 
advance  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers  up  the  opposite  bank 
of  the  river  caused  it  to  be  abandoned,  for  fear  of  losing 
the  horses. 

At  four  o'clock,  General  Hays,  who  had  been  detained 
from  his  brigade  by  his  duties  as  a  member  of  a  court 
martial,  arrived  and  assumed  command  of  the  tete  du 

310 


DEVASTATION  OF  THE  COUNTRY 

pont.  In  a  short  time  afterwards  the  three  regiments  of 
Hoke's  brigade,  forming  the  advance  of  the  rest  of  the 
division,  came  up,  and  I  sent  them  across  the  river,  under 
command  of  Colonel  Godwin,  to  the  support  of  Hays. 
General  Lee  directed  me  to  send  no  more  troops  across 
the  river,  but  retain  the  others  on  the  south  side,  and 
Gordon  was  moved  to  the  right  to  occupy  a  hill  further 
down  the  river,  while  Pegram's  brigade  was  formed  in 
line  in  rear  of  the  hill  occupied  by  Graham's  and  Dance's 
batteries,  the  31st  Virginia  being  sent  to  occupy  the  rifle 
trenches  at  the  gun  pits  on  the  right  of  the  railroad. 

The  enemy  now  opened  from  a  battery  on  our  left  and 
soon  from  another  on  our  right,  and  the  fire  of  these  bat- 
teries, which  crossed  in  rear  of  our  works,  and  that  from 
the  front  rendered  the  bridge  very  unsafe.  The  fire  from 
Graham's  and  Dance's  guns  seemed  to  be  doing  no  good, 
as  they  could  not  be  used  to  advantage  by  reason  of 
having  to  fire  over  the  works  in  front,  and  it  was  there- 
fore stopped  by  General  Lee's  orders.  Green's  battery, 
however,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  Moore,  con- 
tinued the  fire  in  front,  but  was  greatly  overmatched. 

On  crossing  the  river,  which  was  under  the  enemy's 
artillery  fire,  Godwin's  three  brigades  were  put  in  the 
trenches  covering  the  river  above  the  bridge — three  regi- 
ments of  Hays'  brigade,  the  6th,  9th  and  8th,  being  on 
the  right  and  the  5th  and  7th  on  the  extreme  left.  The 
portion  of  the  trenches  occupied  by  the  6th,  9th  and  8th 
regiments  of  Hays'  brigade  covered  the  bridge  and  to 
the  right  of  it  and  on  this  part  of  the  works  were  the 
four  guns  of  Green's  battery. 

The  enemy  continued  his  artillery  fire  vigorously  and 
rapidly  until  dark,  his  skirmishers  in  the  meantime  ad- 
vancing in  such  heavy  force  as  to  drive  ours  into  the 
works,  and  themselves  coming  up  to  within  easy  rifle 
range  of  the  trenches.  Just  at  dark  the  enemy's  force 
advanced  in  heavy  columns  immediately  in  front  of  the 
position  occupied  by  Hays '  three  regiments  and  our  artil- 
lery, one  of  the  columns  moving  up  to  within  a  short 

311 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

distance  under  cover  of  the  railroad  embankment  and 
then  suddenly  debouching  through  the  opening  made  for 
the  passage  of  the  road,  before  mentioned. 

This  assault  was  resolutely  met  by  Hays'  men  and 
Green's  guns,  who  poured  a  destructive  fire  into  the 
advancing  masses  of  the  enemy,  breaking  the  heavy  line 
of  skirmishers  preceding  the  columns,  but  these  columns 
came  on  in  such  strong  force  and  such  rapid  succession 
that  after  a  brief  but  obstinate  resistance,  Hays'  men 
were  literally  overpowered  by  numbers  in  the  trenches, 
which  they  held  to  the  last,  without  attempting  to  leave 
them.  The  enemy  also  rushed  upon  the  guns  at  the  same 
time  and,  meeting  with  little  or  no  obstacle  from  the 
works  themselves,  overpowered  the  gunners  at  their 
posts. 

When  the  guns  were  taken  General  Hays  made  an 
attempt  to  recapture  them,  but  the  enemy  coming  up 
in  still  further  force  in  front  rendered  the  attempt  abor- 
tive. The  part  of  the  line  now  taken  was  within  a  hun- 
dred yards  of  the  northern  end  of  the  bridge  and  com- 
pletely commanded  it,  so  that  all  the  force  on  the  left  was 
completely  cut  off  from  retreat. 

An  attack  made  on  Godwin's  front  simultaneously 
with  that  on  Hays'  right,  but  not  in  as  strong  force,  had 
been  repulsed  by  the  54th  North  Carolina  Regiment,  and 
when  Godwin  learned  that  Hays'  line  was  broken,  he 
endeavored  to  move  to  his  assistance,  but  the  enemy  had 
now  got  between  the  trenches  and  the  river  and  com- 
menced moving  up  a  strong  force  against  Godwin's  right, 
at  the  same  time  that  another  advanced  against  him  in 
front.  He  was  therefore  compelled  to  abandon  a  part  of 
the  trenches  on  his  right  and  present  front,  as  well  as  he 
could  in  the  darkness,  to  the  two  forces,  thus  assailing 
him  in  different  directions,  so  as  to  try  to  cut  his  way 
to  the  bridge. 

He  made  a  resolute  struggle,  but  the  enemy  threw 
such  a  force  between  him  and  the  bridge  that  the  attempt 
to  reach  it  was  hopeless,  and  the  rest  of  his  men  were 

312 


DEVASTATION  OF  THE  COUNTRY 

forced  to  abandon  the  trenches  on  the  left.  His  three 
regiments  and  the  two  Louisiana  regiments  on  his  left 
were  now  completely  surrounded,  the  enemy  encircling 
them  in  front  and  on  the  flanks,  while  an  impassable  river 
was  in  their  rear.  Nevertheless,  Colonel  Godwin  con- 
tinued to  struggle,  rallying  and  encouraging  his  men  as 
he  retired  from  point  to  point  towards  the  river,  until  he 
himself,  with  only  about  seventy  men  still  remaining  to 
him,  was  overpowered  and  taken  by  an  irresistible  force, 
without  surrendering  himself  or  his  command.  A  like 
fate  befell  the  5th  and  7th  Louisiana  Regiments. 

I  had  remained  with  General  Lee,  by  his  direction,  on 
the  hill  in  rear  near  Dance's  guns,  where  he  had  taken 
his  position,  observing  the  enemy's  movements  as  well 
as  we  could,  until  very  nearly  or  about  dark.  When  the 
enemy's  artillery  fire  ceased,  we  had  discovered  some 
movement  of  his  infantry,  but  we  could  see  so  indis- 
tinctly that  we  could  not  tell  what  it  meant.  We  saw 
the  flashes  of  the  rifles  from  our  trenches  and  from  the 
guns  on  the  side  of  the  river,  but  a  very  heavy  wind  was 
blowing,  so  that  we  could  hear  no  sounds,  not  even  that 
of  our  guns,  which  were  not  more  than  three  or  four 
hundred  yards  from  us. 

After  this  firing  had  continued  some  minutes,  perhaps 
twenty  or  thirty,  it  slackened,  and  not  hearing  from  it, 
we  were  of  the  opinion  that  it  was  at  the  enemy's  skir- 
mishers. General  Lee  then,  expressing  the  opinion  that 
the  movement  of  the  enemy  in  our  front  at  this  point  was 
probably  intended  merely  as  a  reconnoissance  or  feint, 
and  that  it  was  too  late  for  him  to  attempt  anything 
serious  that  night,  concluded  to  retire,  leaving  with  me 
two  dispatches  for  General  Ewell. 

A  short  time  before  we  saw  the  last  firing,  I  had  sent 
my  Inspector  General,  Major  Hale,  on  foot  across  the 
bridge  to  direct  General  Hays  and  Colonel  Godwin  to 
send  and  have  rations  brought  up  for  their  men,  and 
just  as  I  was  preparing  to  send  off  the  two  dispatches 
left  with  me  for  General  Ewell,  Major  Hale  returned 

313 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

and  informed  me  that  when  he  saw  General  Hays  the 
enemy  was  advancing  against  him,  but  he  and  his  men 
were  all  right  and  in  good  spirits  and  that  he  then  went 
to  Colonel  Godwin,  whom  he  found  all  right,  but  as  he 
was  returning  across  the  bridge  he  saw  one  or  two  of 
Hays'  men  coming  off,  who  said  the  enemy  had  just 
broken  through  the  line,  the  Major  himself  expressing 
the  opinion  that  the  statement  was  entirely  false.  It  was 
now  very  dark  and  objects  could  not  be  seen  at  a  very 
short  distance.  General  Lee  could  not  have  then  gone 
more  than  a  few  hundred  yards  since  he  left  me. 

Though  I  did  not  think  the  information  brought  could 
be  true,  as  what  I  had  witnessed  did  not  indicate  such 
a  result,  yet  I  sent  Major  Daniel  to  ascertain  the  truth, 
and  ordered  Pegram  to  move  his  brigade  to  the  bridge 
immediately  and  Graham  and  Dance  to  man  their  guns. 
I  then  started  to  the  bridge  and  soon  met  Major  Daniel, 
who  informed  me  he  had  just  seen  General  Hays,  who 
had  made  his  escape,  and  that  the  greater  part  of  his 
brigade  was  captured,  the  enemy  in  possession  of  the 
works,  and  Godwin  cut  off  from  the  bridge. 

Pegram 's  brigade  was  then  hurried  up  to  the  bridge 
to  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing  and  Gordon's  was 
sent  for,  information  of  the  disaster  being  sent  to  General 
Lee  at  once.  Godwin's  regiments  had  not  yet  been  cap- 
tured, and  I  had  the  mortification  of  seeing  the  flashes  of 
their  rifles,  and  hearing  their  capture  without  being  able 
to  render  them  the  slightest  assistance,  as  it  would  have 
been  folly  to  attempt  to  cross  the  bridge,  and  I  could  not 
open  with  the  guns  on  the  south  side,  as  it  was  so  very 
dark  that  nothing  was  visible,  and  we  would  have  been 
as  apt  to  fire  into  our  own  men  as  into  the  enemy. 

A  number  of  Hays'  officers  and  men  had  been  able  to 
effect  their  escape  by  slipping  off  in  the  dark,  after  the 
works  were  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  many  swimming 
the  river  and  others  getting  over  the  bridge.  Some  of 
Godwin's  officers  and  men  also  effected  their  escape  by 
swimming  the  river,  and  others  by  slipping  down  the 

314 


DEVASTATION  OF  THE  COUNTRY 

banks  of  it  to  the  bridge,  while  the  enemy  was  engaged 
in  securing  the  rest.  General  Hays  had  effected  his 
escape  after  he  was  entirely  surrounded  by  the  enemy, 
and  was  in  their  power,  by  his  horse's  taking  fright  at  a 
musket  fired  near  him  and  dashing  off,  when  a  number  of 
shots  were  fired  at  him,  and  finding  that  he  had  to  run 
the  gauntlet  anyhow,  he  made  for  the  bridge  and  escaped 
unhurt. 

A  regiment  from  Pegram's  brigade  had  been  sent  to 
the  end  of  the  bridge  and  the  rest  of  the  brigade  formed 
in  line  in  rear  of  it.  To  have  attempted  to  cross  the  rest 
of  my  command  over  the  bridge  would  have  but  added 
to  the  disaster,  and  therefore,  after  waiting  for  some  time 
to  give  an  opportunity  to  all  the  men  to  escape  who  could, 
and  ascertaining  definitely  the  capture  of  the  regiments 
on  the  left,  and  that  the  enemy  had  a  guard  at  the  further 
end,  the  bridge  was  fired  at  the  end  next  us,  and  so 
destroyed  that  it  could  not  be  used  by  the  enemy. 

Receiving  orders  from  General  Lee  to  move  back  to 
my  camp,  I  did  so  at  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  after 
having  sent  off  Graham's  and  Dance's  batteries. 

The  loss  in  my  division  in  this  affair  was  5  killed, 
35  wounded,  and  1593  missing,  making  a  total  of  1630. 
The  loss  in  Green's  battery  was  1  killed  and  41  missing, 
total  42,  making  the  loss  altogether  1672,  besides  the  four 
guns  and  the  small  arms.  The  killed  are  those  who  were 
known  to  be  killed,  and  the  wounded  were  those  who  got 
off.  Doubtless  there  were  a  number  killed  and  wounded 
who  were  put  down  in  the  missing,  but  the  enemy  came  up 
to  the  works  firing  but  very  little,  and  therefore  the  loss 
in  that  respect  was  comparatively  slight. 

Nearly  three  hundred  of  Hays'  officers  and  men,  be- 
tween one  hundred  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  from  the 
three  regiments  under  Godwin,  and  twenty  men  of 
Green's  battery  made  their  escape.  A  considerable  num- 
ber of  the  men  in  both  brigades  were  engaged  in  getting 
timber  for  building  huts  at  the  time  and  were  not  present 
with  their  brigades,  thus  escaping  capture. 

315 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

The  total  force  occupying  the  works  was  a  little  over 
two  thousand,  and  the  force  which  attacked  them  con- 
sisted of  two  corps,  numbering  probably  over  thirty 
thousand  men.  The  result  of  the  attack  was  unavoidable, 
and  I  fully  exempted  my  officers  and  men  from  all  blame. 
If  the  enemy  chose  to  make  the  attack  his  success  was 
inevitable.  The  works  were  of  too  slight  a  character  to 
enable  a  body  of  troops  to  hold  them  against  such  over- 
whelming numbers.  When  the  enemy  reached  the  works 
he  had  no  trouble  in  walking  over  them,  as  there  were  no 
ditches  or  obstructions  in  front. 

In  constructing  these  works  too  great  reliance  had 
been  placed  in  the  want  of  enterprise  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy,  and  there  was  but  one  mode  of  approach  to  or 
retreat  from  them,  so  that  when  the  works  were  carried 
in  front  of  the  only  bridge  there  was,  the  fate  of  the  rest 
of  the  command  was  sealed.  The  enemy  on  this  occasion 
had  more  enterprise  than  had  been  presumed  on,  and 
hence  the  disaster. 

This  was  the  first  serious  disaster  that  had  befallen 
any  of  my  immediate  commands,  either  as  a  brigade  or 
division  commander,  since  the  commencement  of  the  war, 
and  I  felt  that  I  was  not  responsible  for  it,  though  I 
bitterly  regretted  it. 

The  same  afternoon  three  corps  of  the  enemy  had 
attacked  Rodes  at  Kelly's  and  forced  a  passage  there, 
inflicting  on  his  division  some  loss  in  killed,  wounded, 
aud  prisoners. 

On  the  next  morning,  the  8th,  we  formed  a  line  of 
battle,  a  mile  or  two  in  rear  of  Brandy  Station,  Ewell's 
corps  occupying  the  right,  with  its  left,  my  division,  rest- 
ing on  the  road  to  Culpeper  Court-House,  and  Hill's  corps 
occupying  the  left,  with  his  right  connecting  with  my  left. 
In  this  position  we  awaited  the  advance  of  the  enemy  all 
day,  but  he  made  no  attack  on  us,  though  there  was  some 
fighting  on  Hill's  left  with  the  enemy's  cavalry.  Being 
now  in  a  very  unfavorable  position,  and  having  no  good 
line  to  occupy  in  Culpeper,  we  fell  back  that  night  to  the 

316 


DEVASTATION  OF  THE  COUNTRY 

Rapidan,  and  next  morning  crossed  over  and  occupied 
our  old  positions.  Meade's  army  also  occupied  very 
much  the  same  positions  it  had  previously  occupied,  and 
the  line  of  pickets  on  the  Rapidan  was  re-established. 

While  we  were  in  Culpeper  on  this  occasion  we  dis- 
covered that  Meade's  army  had  almost  entirely  devas- 
tated that  county.  Many  beautiful  residences  of  gentle- 
men had  been  pulled  down,  and  some  within  sight  of 
Meade's  own  headquarters,  for  the  purpose  of  making 
huts  for  the  soldiers  and  chimneys  to  the  officers'  tents. 
It  was  a  scene  of  desolation,  and  the  population  was 
almost  gone.  I  had  been  on  the  track  of  this  army  under 
all  the  other  commanders,  but  I  think  it  committed  more 
depredations  under  Meade  than  under  any  of  the  rest, 
not  excepting  Pope  himself. 

After  resuming  our  positions  on  the  Rapidan,  the 
condition  of  things  was  pretty  much  as  it  had  been  before, 
the  enemy  making  some  demonstrations  but  no  serious 
movement  until  the  last  of  the  month. 

A  little  after  the  middle  of  the  month,  General  Ewell's 
health  had  been  impaired,  and  I  succeeded  temporarily 
to  the  command  of  the  corps. 

There  had  been  some  demonstrations  with  the  enemy's 
cavalry  force,  and  General  Lee,  apprehending  that  the 
enemy  might  attempt  to  turn  our  right  by  moving  across 
some  of  the  lower  fords,  directed  me  to  examine  all  the 
country  on  our  right  as  far  as  Mine  Run,  and  ascertain  if 
a  line  could  be  formed  there,  extending  towards  Verdier- 
ville  on  the  Plank  road,  which  we  could  occupy  in  the 
event  of  an  advance  in  that  quarter ;  and  to  make  myself 
familiar  with  all  the  roads.  Our  right,  then  held  by 
Rodes'  division,  covered  Morton's  Ford  and  extended 
around  to  the  river  above  the  mouth  of  Mountain  Run — 
the  extreme  right  flank  being  unfavorably  located,  and 
liable  to  be  turned,  not  only  by  a  movement  across  at 
Germana  Ford,  but  also  at  Jacob's  Ford  higher  up,  and 
from  our  right,  as  well  as  at  some  other  points  in  the 
neighborhood. 

317 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

After  a  careful  examination  of  the  country,  I  selected 
a  line  to  be  connected  with  Rodes'  right,  by  throwing 
the  latter  back  from  the  river  and  then  running  the  new 
line  in  its  prolongation  across  Mountain  Run,  and  a  road 
leading  past  Rodes'  rear  to  Bartlett's  Mill,  to  Locust 
Grove,  to  Black  Walnut  Run  above  Bartlett's  Mill,  from 
which  point  the  line  could  be  still  further  prolonged  past 
Zoar  Church  to  Verdierville,  if  necessary,  on  a  dividing 
ridge  between  the  waters  of  Black  Walnut  and  Mine 
Runs,  which  streams  united  just  above  Bartlett's  Mill. 
Johnson's  division  which  had  been  camped  in  the  rear 
was  then  moved  up  to  construct  and  occupy  the  right  of 
the  line  extending  from  Mountain  Run  to  Black  Walnut. 

While  we  were  engaged  in  constructing  this  new  line, 
with  a  view  to  its  further  prolongation  if  necessary,  so 
as  to  cover  all  the  roads  coming  in  from  the  right  between 
the  Plank  road  and  the  river,  on  the  26th  of  November, 
Meade's  army  was  discovered  to  be  in  motion  towards  the 
fords  below  on  our  right,  and  preparations  were  at  once 
made  to  meet  it. 

Fitz.  Lee 's  cavalry  was  ordered  to  relieve  our  pickets, 
and  late  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day  Rodes'  division  was 
moved  across  Black  Walnut  to  the  right  of  Johnson  on 
the  ridge  extending  towards  Zoar  Church,  and  my  own 
division  under  the  command  of  General  Hays  was  with- 
drawn from  its  position  and  concentrated  with  a  view  of 
moving  next  morning  on  the  old  stone  pike  leading  from 
Orange  Court-House  to  Fredericksburg  by  the  way  of 
Locust  Grove  or  Robertson's  Tavern,  and  the  old  Wilder- 
ness Tavern  so  as  to  get  on  Rodes'  right  in  prolongation 
of  the  line. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

Skirmishing  at  Mine  Run. 

General  Lee  had  discovered  that  the  enemy  was  cross- 
ing some  of  his  troops  as  low  down  as  Germana  Ford,  and 
to  prevent  him  from  getting  too  far  to  his  rear,  he  deter- 
mined to  move  forward,  and  not  await  the  advance 
against  this  new  line ;  and  during  the  night  I  was  ordered 
to  advance  at  daylight  next  morning  as  far  as  Locust 
Grove  on  the  three  roads  leading  to  that  point,  to  wit: 
the  stone  pike,  the  road  by  Zoar  Church,  and  the  one  by 
Bartlett's  Mill. 

In  accordance  with  General  Lee's  instructions,  the 
three  divisions  of  the  corps  were  advanced  at  light  on  the 
morning  of  the  27th,  as  follows :  my  own  division  under 
Hays  on  the  stone  pike  on  the  right,  Rodes'  on  the  road 
by  Zoar  Church,  and  Johnson's  on  the  road  by  Bartlett's 
Mill ;  and  while  the  troops  were  moving  forward  I  rode  to 
meet  General  Lee  at  Verdierville,  in  accordance  with  a 
request  from  him  to  that  effect. 

Rodes'  was  a  little  in  advance  of  the  other  divisions, 
and  as  the  advance  of  his  column  came  in  view  of  the 
open  ground  around  Locust  Grove  (Robertson's  Tavern) 
a  very  large  force  of  the  enemy  was  discovered  moving 
up  and  occupying  the  high  ground  at  that  point.  General 
Rodes  then  formed  his  division  in  line  across  the  road 
on  which  he  was  advancing,  in  a  body  of  woods,  and  the 
point  at  which  that  road  united  with  the  one  by  Bartlett's 
Mill  on  which  Johnson  was.  In  a  short  time  Hays  came 
up  from  Bartlett's  Mill  and  finding  Rodes  in  position  in 
possession  of  Locust  Grove,  formed  his  line  across  that 
road  confronting  him — Johnson  in  the  meantime  coming 
up  from  Bartlett's  Mill  and  finding  Rodes  in  positon  in 
front  of  him,  halted  his  division  along  the  road  with  his 
advance  a  short  distance  in  rear  of  Rodes'  line,  and  his 
division  extending  back  towards  Bartlett's  Mill,  so  as  to 

319 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

make  his  position  nearly  at  right  angles  with  the  line 
occupied  by  Rodes.  The  enemy  opened  with  artillery  on 
both  Rodes  and  Hays,  and  some  skirmishing  ensued. 

While  I  was  in  consultation  with  General  Lee  at 
Verdierville,  the  information  that  the  enemy  had  been 
encountered  at  Locust  Grove  reached  me  in  the  afternoon, 
and  I  rode  to  the  front  to  Hays'  position.  I  found  the 
enemy  occupied  commanding  ground  in  front  and  around 
Locust  Grove,  while  the  position  Hays  had  been  com- 
pelled to  assume  was  low  and  very  unfavorable.  The 
enemy's  guns  raked  the  road  as  far  as  they  could  reach, 
and  each  side  of  it  the  ground,  ascending  towards  the 
enemy,  was  very  rough  and  so  obstructed  with  young 
pines  and  underbrush  as  to  make  an  advance  very  difficult. 
Causing  Hays  to  connect  his  left  with  Rodes'  right  and 
so  post  his  troops  as  to  render  them  as  secure  as  possible, 
I  rode  to  Rodes'  position,  which  I  found  equally  disad- 
vantageous for  defence  or  attack.  General  Rodes  in- 
formed me  that  the  force  seen  entering  the  plains  around 
Locust  Grove  was  very  heavy  and  that  it  was  evident 
other  troops  were  moving  up  to  that  position. 

After  reconnoitring  I  was  fully  satisfied  that  I  could 
not  make  an  attack  upon  the  enemy  with  advantage,  and 
that  he  had  decidedly  the  advantage  of  the  ground  for 
attacking  me.  An  examination  of  the  ground  on  Hays' 
right  had  caused  me  to  suppose  that  an  attack  might  be 
made  on  the  enemy's  left  by  a  force  coming  up  on  that 
flank  from  the  Plank  road,  and  information  of  that  fact 
had  been  sent  to  General  Lee. 

While  we  were  endeavoring  to  find  out  all  we  could 
about  the  enemy's  position  and  strength,  a  little  before 
sunset,  General  Johnson  sent  me  word  (to  the  point  of 
intersection  of  the  Bartlett's  Mill  and  Zoar  Church  roads 
where  I  then  was,  just  in  Rodes'  rear)  that  a  party  of  the 
enemy  had  fired  on  his  ambulances,  on  the  road  from 
Bartlett's  Mill.  I  had  received  information  that  a  body 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  crossed  in  front  of  Fitz.  Lee 
at  Morton's  Ford,  and  had  been  cautioned  by  General 

320 


SKIRMISHING  AT  MINE  RUN 

Fitz.  Lee  to  look  out  for  my  left  flank  against  molestation 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  supposing  the  party  firing  on 
Johnson's  train  might  be  a  body  of  cavalry  that  had 
crossed  at  some  of  the  fords  below  Morton's,  I  sent  word 
to  General  Johnson  that  such  was  my  opinion  and 
directed  him  to  attack  and  drive  off  the  cavalry.  He  at 
once  formed  his  division  and  moved  forward  to  the  attack, 
soon  encountering,  instead  of  a  cavalry  force,  a  very 
heavy  force  of  infantry  advancing  towards  the  Bartlett's 
Mill  road. 

A  very  heavy  engagement  with  both  artillery  and  in- 
fantry ensued,  in  which  Johnson's  division  encountered 
the  enemy's  3rd  corps  under  French,  supported  by  the 
6th  corps  under  Sedgwick,  and,  after  a  very  obstinate 
fight  lasting  until  after  dark,  Johnson  effectually  checked 
the  enemy's  advance,  driving  his  troops  back,  and  main- 
taining full  occupation  of  the  road.  His  brigades  behaved 
with  great  gallantry,  encountering  many  times  their  own 
numbers,  and  by  the  check  thus  given  to  the  enemy  in  this 
quarter  saved  the  whole  corps  from  a  very  serious  dis- 
aster, for  if  the  enemy  had  got  possession  of  this  road, 
he  would  have  been  able  to  come  up  in  rear  of  the  other 
division,  while  they  were  confronting  the  large  force  at 
Locust  Grove. 

During  the  engagement  one  of  Rodes'  brigades  was 
taken  from  his  left  and  sent  to  Johnson's  assistance,  but 
before  it  arrived  the  action  had  closed.  Johnson's  divis- 
ion did  not  then  exceed  4,000  men,  if  it  reached  that  num- 
ber. The  two  corps  moving  against  it  numbered  not  less 
than  30,000  men,  though  French's  corps,  the  3rd,  was  the 
only  one  which  became  actually  engaged. 

This  affair  satisfied  me  that  the  enemy's  whole  army 
was  in  the  immediate  neighborhood,  and  as  Ewell's  corps, 
under  my  command,  was  then  in  a  most  unfavorable  posi- 
tion, I  determined  to  fall  back  across  Mine  Run  about 
two  miles  in  our  rear,  where  I  had  observed  a  good  posi- 
tion as  I  passed  on.  Accordingly  after  Johnson's  fight 
was  over,  and  all  his  wounded  and  dead  had  been  collected 

21  321 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

as  far  as  practicable,  in  the  darkness,  the  divisions  were 
withdrawn  across  Mine  Run,  my  own  and  Rodes'  on  the 
stone  pike,  and  Johnson's  on  the  road  to  Zoar  Church. 
'Division  commanders  were  directed  to  place  their  divis- 
ions in  position  at  light  next  morning,  on  the  west  side  of 
the  run,  Hays'  left  and  Rodes'  right  resting  on  the  stone 
pike,  and  Johnson's  division  across  the  Zoar  Church  road 
so  as  to  connect  with  Rodes'  left.  Anderson's  division 
of  Hill's  corps  had  been  sent  from  the  Plank  road  to  my 
assistance,  by  General  Lee,  arriving  about  dark  in  rear  of 
Hays'  right,  and  before  withdrawing  my  own  troops  I 
communicated  to  General  Anderson  my  purpose,  and  he 
also  withdrew  across  the  run,  so  as  to  take  position  on 
Hays'  right  next  morning.  A  strong  line  of  pickets  hav- 
ing been  posted  in  front,  the  troops  lay  down  on  their 
arms  a  short  time  before  day  to  rest  from  their  fatigue. 

In  the  affair  between  Johnson's  division  and  the 
enemy's  3rd  corps,  there  was  some  loss  of  valuable  offi- 
cers and  men  in  killed  and  wounded,  among  the  former 
being  Randolph  of  the  Stonewall  Brigade,  and  among 
the  latter  Brigadier  General  J.  M.  Jones;  but  a  much 
heavier  loss  was  inflicted  on  the  enemy. 

After  light  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  I  rode  to  see 
General  Lee  at  Verdierville  for  the  purpose  of  advising 
him  fully  of  the  condition  of  things  and  receiving  his 
further  instructions.  After  being  there  a  short  time,  in- 
formation was  sent  me  that  the  enemy  was  advancing 
on  the  stone  pike  from  Locust  Grove,  and  on  riding  to 
the  front  I  found  his  skirmishers  on  the  hills  beyond  Mine 
Run.  The  line  on  the  west  bank  was  now  taken  and  the 
men  commenced  strengthening  it  with  rifle  trenches. 
Previous  to  this  time  not  a  spade  of  earth  had  been 
thrown  up  on  the  whole  line.  In  the  course  of  the  day 
the  enemy  moved  up  his  whole  force  in  our  front;  Hill's 
corps,  which  had  come  up,  having  taken  position  on  my 
right  extending  across  to  the  Plank  road,  and  covering 
that  also. 

Some  skirmish  firing  ensued  between  the  advance  line 

322 


SKIRMISHING  AT  MINE  RUN 

of  skirmishers,  but  no  serious  move  was  made  by  the 
enemy. 

Our  position  was  a  very  good  one  and  it  was  rapidly 
strengthened  with  the  ordinary  rifle  trenches  and  some 
epaulments  for  artillery.  The  enemy's  position  on  the 
opposite  banks  of  Mine  Run  was  also  a  strong  one  for 
defence,  the  ground  there  being  a  little  higher  than  that 
occupied  by  us;  and  he  proceeded  to  throw  up  strong 
epaulments  for  his  artillery  in  numerous  favorable  posi- 
tions. A  direct  attack  from  either  side  would  have  been 
attended  with  great  difficulties,  on  account  of  the  neces- 
sity of  having  to  descend  the  slopes  to  Mine  Run  and 
then  after  crossing  that  stream  to  ascend  the  opposite 
slopes  under  the  fire  of  artillery  as  well  as  infantry. 

As  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  river  to  attack  us,  we 
calmly  awaited  his  assault  for  several  days,  with  full 
confidence  that  we  would  be  able  to  punish  him  severely 
for  disturbance  of  us  at  this  inclement  season. 

The  weakest  part  of  the  line  occupied  by  me  was  on 
the  left,  where  Mine  Run  made  a  turn  somewhat  around 
that  flank,  so  as  to  afford  the  enemy  an  opportunity  of 
placing  guns  in  position  to  partially  enfilade  the  line. 
He  was  slow,  however,  to  take  advantage  of  this,  and 
our  lines  at  the  exposed  parts  were  protected  in  some 
measure  by  traverses  hastily  made.  On  the  30th,  he  was 
observed  moving  troops  to  his  right  beyond  our  left,  and 
dispositions  were  made  to  meet  him  by  extending 
Johnson's  line  to  the  rear  around  towards  Zoar  Church. 
There  had  been  occasional  artillery  firing  by  the  enemy, 
and  on  this  day  he  opened  quite  heavily  for  a  time,  our 
fire  being  generally  reserved  for  the  attack  when  it  should 
be  made.  Andrews'  battalion  of  artillery,  however,  near 
Johnson's  left,  supported  by  some  guns  from  the  reserve 
artillery,  replied  to  the  enemy's  for  a  time. 

A  force  of  infantry  crossing  Mine  Run  in  front  of  my 
division,  under  cover  of  some  woods  on  the  bank  of  the 
stream,  came  up  to  an  imperfect  line  of  trenches  in  front, 
which  had  been  abandoned  for  a  better  and  shorter  line 

323 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

in  their  rear  and  were  then  only  held  by  a  line  of  skir- 
mishers, but  was  soon  compelled  to  retire. 

The  enemy  had  possession  of  Bartlett's  Mill  road 
which  ran  on  our  left  towards  the  fords  above,  and  con- 
nected with  a  road  from  Bartlett's  Mill  to  Zoar  Church  in 
our  rear ;  and  as  there  was  great  danger  of  our  left  being- 
turned  in  this  direction,  a  watch  was  kept  by  videttes  and 
pickets  on  that  flank,  so  as  to  advise  us  of  any  movement, 
and  enable  us  to  move  the  line  in  prolongation  until  it 
connected  with  the  one  on  the  river. 

The  enemy  made  no  such  movement,  however,  and 
though  on  the  30th  there  were  indications  as  if  he  were 
going  to  attack  our  left,  yet  he  did  not  do  so. 

At  the  same  time  there  had  been  indications  of  a 
purpose  to  attack  our  right  beyond  the  Plank  road,  and 
corresponding  movements  were  made  to  meet  an  attack 
there. 

We  remained  in  position  awaiting  the  enemy's  move- 
ments until  December,  when,  all  purpose  to  attack  on  his 
part  being  apparently  abandoned,  General  Lee  deter- 
mined to  attack  him  on  his  left  flank,  and  for  that  purpose 
drew  out  two  of  Hill's  divisions  on  the  right  to  make  the 
attack  early  next  morning,  the  other  division  being  moved 
to  occupy  their  positions  and  my  divisions  being  extended 
out  to  the  right  to  occupy  the  part  of  the  line  evacuated 
by  Hill's  left  division  (Anderson's).  During  the  night, 
however,  the  enemy  withdrew  from  our  front,  and  next 
morning  he  was  found  gone. 

As  soon  as  this  was  discovered  I  moved  forward  with 
the  whole  corps  on  the  stone  pike  and  then  towards  Ger- 
mana  Ford,  capturing  some  two  or  three  hundred  pris- 
oners, but  the  enemy's  main  force  had  crossed  the  river 
early  in  the  morning.*    After  going  to  within  a  short  dis- 

*  Though  Meade's  performance  on  this  occasion  was  somewhat 
like  that  of  a  King  of  France  on  a  certain  occasion,  yet  he  had  not 
failed  to  accomplish  something  towards  the  "  suppression  of  the  re- 
bellion." There  was  a  little  tanyard  near  Locust  Grove,  in  sight  of 
his  headquarters,  which  belonged  to  and  was  operated  by  a  poor  man 

324 


SKIRMISHING  AT  MINE  RUN 

tance  of  Germana  Ford,  and  finding  that  there  was  no 
prospect  of  accomplishing  anything  further,  I  returned 
that  night  across  Mine  Run  and  encamped.  The  next 
day  we  returned  to  our  former  positions  and  the  old  state 
of  things  was  resumed. 

During  our  absence  a  division  of  the  enemy's  cavalry 
had  crossed  at  Morton's  Ford,  and  after  some  fighting, 
had  been  compelled  by  Fitz.  Lee's  cavalry  to  retire. 

The  loss  in  the  corps  during  this  affair  was  slight, 
nearly  the  whole  of  it  being  sustained  by  Johnson's 
division  in  the  fight  of  the  27th. 

who  took  in  hides  to  tan  on  shares  for  the  neighbors,  but  who  was  in  no 
wise  engaged  in  tanning  for  the  government  or  the  soldiers.  The 
community  around  it  was  very  poor,  and  this  was  the  sole  dependence 
for  shoes  for  the  women  and  children  of  that  neighborhood.  The 
tannery  building  and  the  house  of  the  owner  were  burned,  the  leather 
all  destroyed,  and  the  hides  in  the  vats  taken  out  and  cut  to  pieces  so 
as  to  be  worthless.  In  addition  to  this,  all  the  plows  and  farming 
utensils,  and  wheeled  vehicles,  including  old  ox-carts  and  dilapidated 
buggies,  in  the  neighborhood  and  on  the  road  to  Germana  Ford  were 
burned,  and  the  houses  of  a  number  of  citizens  ransacked  and  the 
furniture  destroyed.  In  the  very  few  cases  where  there  were  pianos  or 
libraries,  the  former  were  hacked  to  pieces  with  axes,  and  the  books  in 
the  latter  torn  up  and  scattered  over  the  ground,  private  papers  shar- 
ing the  same  fate.  I  saw  the  evidences  of  these  things  myself.  The 
women  and  children  around  Locust  Grove  had  no  new  shoes  that  winter, 
and  the  people  in  all  that  country  were  deprived  of  the  means  of 
properly  cultivating  their  crops  next  season,  to  say  nothing  of  those 
who  lost  what  little  source  of  amusement,  recreation  or  mental  employ- 
ment there  was  left  to  them. 

Can  it  be  doubted  that  this  was  calculated  to  break  the  spirit  of 
the  "rebellion"?  Meade's  expedition  to  Mine  Run  accomplished  this 
much  if  no  more. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

Averill 's  Raid  and  the  Winter  Campaign. 

A  few  days  after  our  return  from  Mine  Run,  General 
Ewell  came  back  to  the  command  of  the  corps,  and  I  re- 
turned to  my  division,  all  remaining  quiet  on  the  Rapidan. 

About  the  middle  of  December  a  force  of  cavalry  and 
infantry  moved  from  New  Creek  on  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Railroad  up  the  south  branch  of  the  Potomac,  under 
General  Averill  of  the  Federal  Army,  apparently  threat- 
ening Staunton  in  the  Valley,  while  at  the  same  time 
another  force  under  Colonel  Wells  moved  up  the  Valley 
from  Martinsburg  to  Strasburg.  General  Imboden  com- 
manding in  the  Valley,  having  only  a  small  brigade  of 
cavalry  and  a  battery  of  artillery,  applied  to  General  Lee 
for  reinforcements,  and  two  brigades  of  Hill's  corps, 
Thomas'  and  H.  H.  Walker's,  were  sent  to  Staunton  over 
the  railroad,  Fitz.  Lee 's  brigade  of  cavalry  being  ordered 
to  move  to  the  Valley  also.  General  Lee  then  ordered 
me  to  proceed  to  the  Valley  and  take  command  of  all  the 
troops  there. 

I  started  at  once,  leaving  Orange  Court-House  by  rail 
and,  reaching  Staunton,  by  reason  of  some  delay  on  the 
railroad,  after  the  middle  of  the  night.  I  found  Thomas' 
brigade  in  Staunton,  it  having  arrived  the  evening  before, 
ahead  of  me,  and.  Walker's  had  moved  out  to  Buffalo 
Gap,  ten  miles  beyond  Staunton  on  the  road  to  McDowell, 
at  or  near  which  place  the  enemy  under  Averill  was 
reported  to  be. 

Very  early  next  morning  General  Imboden  came  into 
town,  and  I  rode  with  him  to  his  camp  across  the  moun- 
tain from  Buffalo  Gap  near  the  Calf  Pasture  River.  He 
reported  that  the  enemy's  force  was  about  five  thousand 
strong  and  still  confronted  him  behind  Bull  Pasture 
River,  on  the  other  side  of  the  intervening  mountains, 
where  it  was  watched  b3^  a  detachment  of  his  cavalry,  and 

326 


AVERILL'S  RAID  AND  THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN 

such  was  the  report  we  found  at  his  camp.  After  I  had 
been  at  his  camp  but  a  very  short  time,  a  courier  came 
to  me  with  a  telegraphic  dispatch  from  General  Lee,  who 
was  then  in  Richmond,  stating  that  Averill  had  left  the. 
Sweet  Springs  on  the  morning  of  the  day  before  on  the 
road  towards  Salem.  I  then  started  back  to  Buffalo  Gap, 
and  on  the  way  I  received  another  telegraphic  dispatch 
from  General  Lee,  informing  me  that  Averill  had  entered 
Salem  on  the  Virginia  &  Tennessee  Railroad  the  morning 
of  that  day,  and  directing  me  to  make  arrangements  to 
capture  him. 

It  turned  out  that  Averill  with  his  cavalry  had  left 
the  front  of  General  Imboden  at  least  two  days  before 
I  started  from  Orange,  leaving  the  small  infantry  force 
with  him,  under  Colonel  Thoburn,  to  amuse  Imboden 's 
pickets,  and  that  Thoburn  had  also  started  back  to  the 
valley  of  the  South  Branch  before  I  arrived.  Imboden 
was  ordered  to  bring  his  brigade  back  to  Buffalo  Gap, 
that  night,  for  the  purpose  of  being  sent  after  Averill. 

The  question  was  how  to  cut  off  Averill's  retreat,  as 
he  had  several  ways  of  getting  back  to  a  safe  position. 
He  might  return  the  way  he  went — go  up  the  railroad  and 
then  by  the  way  of  Blacksburg  in  Montgomery — come  back 
by  the  way  of  Fincastle  to  Covington — or  by  the  way  of 
Buchanan  and  Lexington  through  the  Valley,  there  being 
numerous  intervening  roads  between  these  main  routes 
which  afforded  him  ample  facilities  for  escape  if  he  had 
good  guides.  After  consultation  with  General  Imboden, 
who  was  very  familiar  with  the  country,  I  determined  to 
send  his  brigade  to  Covington  next  day,  where  it  would  be 
in  a  position  to  intercept  Averill's  retreat  on  the  road  by 
that  place  or  move  to  the  right  and  intercept  him  at 
Callahan's  if  he  returned  the  same  way  he  went. 

During  the  night  it  rained  in  perfect  torrents — such 
a  rain  as  I  have  rarely  seen — and  by  the  next  morning 
all  the  streams  were  very  high.  The  direct  route  to 
Covington  was  down  the  valley  of  the  Little  Calf  Pasture 
crossing  that  stream  many  times,  across  Big  Calf  Pasture 

327 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

and  Cow  Pasture  Rivers.  Little  Calf  Pasture  itself,  it 
was  evident  from  the  condition  of  the  very  small  streams 
at  Buffalo,  would  be  impassable  where  there  were  no 
bridges,  and  there  was  no  bridge  over  the  Cow  Pasture, 
quite  a  large  river,  on  this  route.  It  was,  therefore,  im- 
possible for  him  to  go  the  direct  road,  but  being  informed 
by  him  that  there  was  a  bridge  over  the  Cow  Pasture  not 
far  above  its  junction  with  Jackson's  River,  which  could 
be  neached  by  going  through  Rockbridge,  and  avoiding 
the  other  streams,  I  ordered  him  to  take  that  route,  which 
was  by  the  way  of  Brownsburg. 

The  infantry  brigades  I  determined  to  move  back  to 
Staunton,  to  be  used  for  the  defence  of  that  place  in  the 
event  of  Averill's  moving  that  way,  as  it  was  useless  to 
be  sending  them  after  cavalry  over  such  a  track  of  coun- 
try. Colonel  Wm.  L.  Jackson  was  at  Jackson's  River 
Depot  at  the  termination  of  the  Central  Railroad,  with 
about  five  hundred  men  of  his  brigade  dismounted,  and 
that  covered  a  route  by  Clifton  Forge  from  Fincastle  up 
the  river  to  Covington.  Railroad  communication  with 
him  was  cut  by  the  previous  destruction  of  the  bridge 
over  Cow  Pasture,  but  there  was  telegraphic  communi- 
cation with  him,  and  he  was  ordered  to  keep  a  lookout 
and  make  disposition  to  stop  Averill  if  he  came  that  way. 
I  expected  to  find  Fitz.  Lee  in  the  valley  by  this  time, 
either  at  Staunton  or  farther  down,  and  I  rode  to  that 
place  to  order  him  to  such  point  as  might  be  advisable 
after  I  heard  what  route  Averill  had  taken. 

On  arriving  at  Staunton,  I  found  General  Fitz.  Lee 
himself,  who  had  come  in  advance  of  his  brigade,  which 
had  crossed  the  mountain  at  Swift  Run  Gap.  I  was  now 
in  telegraphic  communication  with  General  Nichols  at 
Lynchburg,  and  from  him  I  received  information  that 
Averill  had  started  back  on  the  same  route  he  came,  but 
was  stopped  by  high  water  at  Craig's  Creek  some  twelve 
or  fifteen  miles  from  Salem.  I,  therefore,  determined  to 
order  Fitz.  Lee  to  Covington  by  the  way  of  Lexington  and 
Colliertown,  at  which  latter  place  Imboden  was  ordered 

328 


AVERILL'S  RAID  AND  THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN 

to  unite  with  him.  His  brigade  passed  through  Staunton 
late  that  afternoon,  and  General  Lee  followed  very  early 
next  morning,  with  instructions  to  make  all  necessary 
arrangements  to  capture  the  raiding  force,  and  with 
directions  to  move  to  any  point  that  might  be  necessary 
according  to  the  information  which  he  might  receive 
either  at  Lexington  or  elsewhere. 

About  the  middle  of  the  day  I  received  a  telegraphic 
dispatch  from  General  Nichols  covering  one  from  an 
operator,  stating  that  he  had  gone  on  the  railroad  that 
morning  to  within  a  mile  of  Salem,  and  that  Averill  was 
returning  to  that  place,  having  been  unable  to  cross 
Craig's  Creek.  If  this  was  true,  Averill  must  then 
attempt  to  make  his  escape  by  the  way  of  the  western 
route  by  Blacksburg,  or  the  northern  route  by  the  way 
of  Buchanan,  and  taking  it  for  granted  that  it  was  true, 
I  at  once  sent  a  copy  by  a  courier  to  General  Lee  for  his 
information,  stating  to  him  at  the  same  time  that  as  he 
was  much  nearer  to  Averill  than  I  was,  he  might  have 
other  information  on  which  to  act,  and  leaving  it  to  his 
discretion  to  move  to  Buchanan  or  to  Covington  as  his 
information  might  justify. 

When  my  dispatch  reached  General  Lee  he  had  united 
with  Imboden  at  Colliertown,  and  after  consultation  with 
the  latter  he  determined  to  move  to  Buchanan,  as  he  had 
no  information  which  warranted  him  in  supposing  that 
the  dispatch  from  Lynchburg  was  not  true. 

During  the  night  after  I  had  received  the  dispatch 
informing  me  of  Averill 's  return  to  Salem,  I  received 
another  from  General  Nichols  informing  me  that  the  in- 
formation sent  was  not  true  and  that  Averill  had  suc- 
ceeded after  some  delay  in  crossing  Craig's  Creek  and 
moving  on.  It  was  now  too  late  to  reach  Fitz.  Lee  by 
courier  and  I  hoped  that  he  might  have  had  some  accurate 
information. 

I  now  determined  to  try  to  reach  Jackson's  position 
with  one  of  the  brigades  of  infantry,  and  Thomas'  was 
sent  next  morning  on  the  railroad,  to  endeavor  to  get 

329 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

across  Cow  Pasture  in  boats  and  so  reach  Jackson.  The 
running  stock  of  the  railroad  was  in  such  bad  condition, 
and  the  grades  beyond  Millboro  were  so  heavy,  having  a 
temporary  track  with  inclined  planes  at  an  unfinished 
part  of  the  road  beyond  that  point,  that  Thomas '  brigade 
could  not  get  any  further.  I  ran  down  on  the  road  myself 
to  see  if  the  brigade  could  not  be  thrown  to  some  point  to 
intercept  the  enemy.  Arriving  just  at  night  I  found 
General  Thomas  in  telegraphic  communication  with  Jack- 
son, and  the  information  was  soon  received  that  Averill's 
advance  had  made  its  appearance  on  an  obscure  road 
across  the  mountains  into  the  Jackson's  River  Valley, 
and  that  a  small  part  of  Jackson's  men  were  skirmishing 
with  the  enemy.  This  road  came  in  above  Jackson's 
main  position,  and  the  party  watching  it  was  soon  forced 
back,  and  Averill's  force  got  into  the  road  between 
Jackson  and  the  bridge  above  him,  which  bridge  was 
guarded  by  a  party  of  some  eight  or  ten  reserves,  who 
abandoned  their  post. 

The  enemy  thus  got  possession  of  the  bridge  and  com- 
menced crossing  rapidly.  Jackson,  in  the  meantime, 
moved  up  and  attacked  the  enemy's  rear,  which  he  threw 
into  great  confusion,  capturing  over  two  hundred  pris- 
oners. In  his  alarm  the  enemy  set  fire  to  the  bridge, 
thus  cutting  off  all  of  his  wagons,  and  some  two  or  three 
hundred  of  his  men.  The  wagons  were  burned  and  the 
men  left  behind  subsequently  moved  up  the  river  and 
forded  by  swimming. 

All  this  information  was  communicated  to  me  that 
night  and  next  morning  by  telegram,  and  I  knew  that 
it  was  useless  to  make  any  further  attempt  to  cut  the 
enemy  off  with  my  infantry,  as  he  was  beyond  pursuit  of 
any  kind. 

When  Fitz.  Lee  reached  Buchanan  and  found  Averill 
was  not  coming  that  way,  he  moved  by  the  way  of  Fin- 
castle  in  pursuit,  and  ascertaining  what  route  Averill  had 
taken,  he  then  went  to  Covington  and  from  there  followed 
to  Callahan's,  but  the  greater  part  of  the  raiding  party 

330 


AVERILL'S  RAID  AND  THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN 

had  made  its  escape,  so  lie  desisted  from  what  was  then 
a  useless  effort.  The  facts  were  that  on  going  back  on 
the  route  he  had  come,  from  the  Sweet  Springs,  Averill 
found  his  retreat  cut  off  that  way  by  Echol's  brigade  of 
General  Sam  Jones'  force  from  Southwestern  Virginia, 
which  was  posted  on  what  is  called  Potts'  or  Middle 
Mountain,  and  he  then  turned  across  toward  Covington 
over  Rich  Patch  Mountain,  being  compelled  to  come  into 
the  valley  of  Jackson's  River  at  the  point  he  did  to 
reach  the  bridge  on  the  road  from  Clifton  Forge  to 
Covington,  as  there  was  no  bridge  on  the  direct  road  to 
that  place.  He  thus  succeeded  in  making  his  escape  by 
the  stupidity  or  treachery  of  a  telegraph  operator,  but  the 
amount  of  damage  he  had  been  able  to  do  did  not  com- 
pensate for  the  loss  of  men  and  horses  which  he  sustained, 
and  the  sufferings  the  others  endured.  He  had  been  able 
to  burn  a  small  depot  at  Salem  with  a  few  supplies  in  it 
and  one  or  two  small  bridges  in  the  neighborhood,  which 
were  rebuilt  in  a  few  days.  His  raid  really  amounted  to 
very  little  except  the  name  of  it. 

The  same  night  that  Averill  made  his  escape  by 
Jackson,  I  received  a  dispatch  from  General  Walker  at 
Staunton  informing  me  that  the  force  that  had  been  at 
Strasburg  was  moving  up  the  valley,  and  had  passed 
New  Market.  I  telegraphed  to  him  to  move  to  the  North 
River  at  Mount  Crawford  at  once,  which  he  did  early 
next  day.  Thomas'  brigade  was  moved  back  to  Staunton, 
starting  early  in  the  morning,  but  on  account  of  the  con- 
dition of  the  road,  did  not  reach  there  until  nearly  night. 
On  arriving  at  Staunton  myself,  I  rode  out  to  Walker's 
position  eighteen  miles  beyond,  leaving  orders  for 
Thomas  to  march,  up  during  the  night.  On  reaching 
Walker  I  found  that  the  enemy  was  in  Harrisonburg,  and 
I  ordered  an  advance  early  next  morning. 

At  light  next  day,  Thomas  came  up,  both  brigades 
moving  forward.  The  enemy  was  found  to  have  retired 
during  the  night,  leaving  a  small  cavalry  rear  guard, 
which  retreated  as  we  came  up.    I  had  no  cavalry  except 

331 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

a  few  stragglers  from  different  cavalry  commands,  which 
I  could  employ  only  as  scouts  to  observe  the  movements 
of  the  enemy,  but  I  pushed  on  in  pursuit.  After  passing 
Harrisonburg,  a  battalion  of  mounted  men  exempt  from 
regular  service  by  age  or  otherwise,  called  the  Augusta 
Raid  Guards,  came  up,  and  were  ordered  forward  in  pur- 
suit, but  accomplished  nothing.  According  to  the  organ- 
ization of  the  command,  the  men  were  not  bound  to  go 
beyond  the  limits  of  any  adjoining  county,  and  when  they 
reached  the  Shenandoah  line  they  halted,  standing  upon 
their  legal  rights,  though  it  may  be  doubted  if  they 
would  have  stood  upon  them  if  the  enemy  had  turned 
back. 

This  force  of  the  enemy  had  now  got  beyond  reach, 
and  Thomas'  brigade  was  halted  at  Lacy's  Springs  after 
having  marched  thirty-six  miles  since  after  nightfall  the 
evening  before.  Walker's  moved  on  to  New  Market  and 
halted  there,  having  then  marched  twenty-eight  miles. 

The  movement  in  this  direction  had  been  made  to 
divert  some  of  the  troops  from  the  pursuit  of  Averill, 
so  as  to  aid  his  escape ;  and  the  force  making  it  now  re- 
treated rapidly  to  Martinsburg.  Thomas  being  moved 
up  to  New  Market,  I  rested  the  men  a  few  days,  and  1 
then  received  directions  from  General  Lee  to  send  a 
cavalry  expedition  into  the  counties  of  Hardy  and  Hamp- 
shire to  get  some  cattle  and  meat  for  his  men.  Our  army 
was  now  very  much  straitened  for  provisions,  espe- 
cially for  meat,  of  which  they  were  sometimes  devoid 
for  days  at  a  time.  As  soon  as  Fitz.  Lee  had  returned 
from  the  pursuit  of  Averill  I  ordered  him  up  to  the 
vicinity  of  New  Market,  and  when  his  men  and  horses 
had  rested  a  few  days  he  was  ordered  to  cross  the  Great 
North  Mountain  into  Hardy,  try  and  dislodge  an  infantry 
force  at  Petersburg,  cut  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad 
at  the  mouth  of  the  South  Branch  of  the  Potomac,  and  of 
Patterson's  Creek,  gather  all  the  beef  cattle  he  could, 
and  likewise  get  what  of  value  was  to  be  had. 

By  the  last  of  December  he  was  ready  to  move,  and 

332 


AVERILL'S  RAID  AND  THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN 

started,  accompanied  by  McNeil's  company  of  partisan 
rangers  and  Gilmor's  Maryland  battalion,  crossing  the 
mountain  over  a  rugged  road  near  Orkney  Springs.  I 
started  McClanahan's  battery  of  artillery  of  Imboden's 
command  with  him  and  some  wagons,  but  it  was  now  the 
1st  of  January  and  the  weather  had  become  excessively 
cold,  the  thermometer  being  near  zero,  and  when  the 
artillery  got  to  the  top  of  the  mountain,  it  was  found 
that  the  roads  on  the  other  side,  which  were  very  steep, 
were  sheeted  with  ice,  rendering  it  impracticable  to  get 
the  artillery  down  in  safety.  The  cavalry  succeeded  in 
getting  down,  by  the  men  being  dismounted  to  lead  their 
horses,  but  the  artillery  and  wagons  had  to  be  sent  back. 

To  attract  attention  from  this  expedition  I  moved  at 
the  same  time  down  the  Valley  pike  to  Fisher's  Hill  with 
Thomas'  brigade,  preceded  by  Imboden's  cavalry  under 
Colonel  Smith,  and  remained  there  until  Fitz.  Lee's  re- 
turn, Smith  being  sent  beyond  Strasburg  to  demonstrate 
towards  Winchester.  Walker's  brigade  had  been  left  at 
Mount  Jackson.  While  we  were  at  Fisher's  Hill,  there 
were  two  heavy  snows,  and  there  was  very  hard  freezing 
weather  all  the  time.  The  men  had  no  tents  and  their 
only  shelter  consisted  of  rude  open  sheds  made  of  split 
wood,  yet,  though  Thomas'  was  a  Georgia  brigade,  they 
stood  the  weather  remarkably  well  and  seemed  to  take 
a  pleasure  in  the  expedition,  regretting  when  the  time 
came  to  fall  back. 

In  the  meantime  Fitz.  Lee  had  reached  Hardy, 
attacked  a  guarded  train  moving  from  New  Creek  to 
Petersburg  for  the  supply  of  that  post,  captured  more 
than  twenty  wagons  and  some  prisoners,  invested  the 
post  at  Petersburg,  which  he  found  strongly  fortified,  but 
having  no  artillery  he  abandoned  the  attempt  to  dislodge 
the  enemy  without  making  an  attack.  He  then  moved 
down  to  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  destroyed  the 
bridge  over  Patterson's  Creek  and  that  over  the  South 
Branch  partially,  collected  a  large  number  of  cattle,  and 
came  off  with  the  captured  wagons,  and  prisoners,  and 

333 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

some  eight  hundred  or  one  thousand  head  of  beef  cattle. 
His  men  had  been  exposed  to  the  same  severe  weather 
to  which  those  at  Fisher's  Hill  had  been,  and  the  feet  of  a 
few  of  them  had  been  frosted.  As  soon  as  I  heard  of 
his  safe  return,  I  moved  back  up  the  valley,  and  the  cattle 
brought  off  were  sent  to  the  army. 

Not  long  afterwards,  Fitz.  Lee's  cavalry  returned  to 
the  eastern  side  of  the  ridge,  but  its  place  was  taken  by 
Rosser's  brigade,  which  had  come  into  the  valley. 

About  the  last  of  January  I  undertook  another  expe- 
dition into  the  Hardy  Valley  for  the  same  objects  for 
which  the  first  had  been  made.  This  I  determined  to 
make  with  Rosser's  brigade  of  cavalry  and  one  of  the 
brigades  of  infantry,  accompanied  by  McClanahan's  bat- 
tery, that  being  the  only  artillery  there  was  in  the  valley. 

Rosser  with  his  brigade,  McNeil's  company,  a  part 
of  Gilmor's  battalion,  the  battery  and  some  wagons 
passed  through  Brock's  Gap  into  the  valley  of  Lost  River, 
while  Thomas '  brigade  moved  over  the  mountains,  at  the 
Orkney  Springs  pass,  to  the  same  valley.  Imboden  was 
left  with  Walker's  brigade  of  infantry  at  Mount  Jackson, 
and  his  own  brigade  of  cavalry  advanced  down  the  Valley 
pike  towards  Winchester,  to  demonstrate  in  that  direc- 
tion. Passing  over  the  mountain  to  Matthews'  on  Lost 
River  in  advance  of  Thomas'  brigade  I  found  Rosser  at 
that  place,  where  we  spent  the  night.  From  this  point 
the  road  to  Moorefield  ascends  to  the  summit  of  Branch 
Mountain  and  then  along  that  for  several  miles,  through 
a  wild,  mountainous  and  desolate  looking  region,  until 
it  comes  to  the  point  of  descent  into  the  Moorefield  Val- 
ley, which  latter,  a  most  beautiful  and  fertile  valley  sur- 
rounded by  high  mountains,  is  reached  at  the  western 
base  of  the  mountain  on  the  South  Fork  of  the  South 
Branch. 

Starting  early  in  the  morning  we  reached  the  South 
Fork  with  the  cavalry  and  artillery  early  in  the  day,  and 
leaving  the  main  force  there,  behind  the  mountain  inter- 
vening between  the  two  forks,  McNeil's  company  was 

334 


AVERILL'S  RAID  AND  THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN 

thrown  forward  to  Moorefield  and  the  North  Fork,  to 
cover  our  front  and  prevent  the  enemy,  who  occupied  the 
fortified  fort  at  Petersburg  eight  or  ten  miles  above 
Moorefield  on  the  North  Fork,  from  discovering  our  pres- 
ence in  force;  McNeil's  company  being  composed  mainly 
of  men  from  that  section,  and  being  in  the  habit  of  mak- 
ing frequent  raids  into  the  valley. 

We  had  ascertained  that  a  large  loaded  wagon  train 
was  on  the  point  of  starting  from  New  Creek  for  Peters- 
burg, and  some  very  trusty  scouts  perfectly  familiar  with 
the  country  were  watching  it.  During  the  night,  we  were 
informed  by  the  scouts  that  the  train  of  about  one  hun- 
dred wagons  had  started,  guarded  by  a  force  of  infantry, 
and  that  it  would  be  on  the  Patterson  Creek  road  across 
Patterson  Mountain  from  Moorefield  at  an  early  hour 
next  day.  Rosser  immediately  made  preparations  to 
move  with  his  brigade  and  the  battery  of  artillery  before 
light  in  the  morning.  Crossing  over  Patterson  Moun- 
tain, he  found  the  road  obstructed  with  trees  felled  across 
it,  extending  some  distance  on  each  side,  and  the  obstruc- 
tions defended  by  a  force  of  infantry.  Dismounting  a 
part  of  his  men,  he  attacked  and  drove  the  enemy  from 
the  obstructions,  and  clearing  the  road,  he  passed  through 
and  soon  encountered  the  train. 

The  infantry  guard  was  very  strong,  and  McClana- 
han  's  guns  were  brought  into  action,  when  by  a  vigorous 
charge  the  guard  was  dispersed,  taking  refuge  in  the 
mountains,  and  over  ninety  loaded  wagons  with  their 
teams,  and  more  than  one  hundred  prisoners  were  cap- 
tured. Fifty  of  the  wagons  were  sent  back  with  their 
teams  and  loads,  but  the  rest  were  so  badly  smashed  in  the 
confusion  resulting  from  the  attack,  that  they  could  not 
be  moved;  and  securing  the  teams  and  such  of  the  con- 
tents as  could  be  brought  off,  the  injured  wagons  were 
burned. 

Rosser  had  been  ordered  to  move  around  and  take 
position  on  the  road  north  and  west  of  Petersburg,  so 
as  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  from  that  place, 

335 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

against  which  I  proposed  moving  at  light  next  day,  as  the 
infantry  would  be  up  at  night,  and  he  proceeded  to  obey 
the  orders. 

Thomas'  Georgians,  moving  along  the  summit  of 
Branch  Mountain  with  nothing  but  wild  inaccessible 
mountains  and  deep  ravines  on  each  side  as  far  as  the  eye 
could  reach,  could  not  understand  why  they  were  carried 
over  such  a  route  at  this  season  and  inquired  of  each 
other:  "  What  can  General  Early  mean  by  bringing  u^ 
into  such  a  country  as  this  in  the  midst  of  winter?  "  But 
when  they  came  suddenly  in  view  of  the  beautiful  valley 
of  Moorefield  and  saw  spread  out  before  them  what  John- 
son might  have  taken  as  the  original  of  his  ideas  of  the 
"  Happy  Valley  "  in  Rasselas,  they  burst  into  wild 
enthusiasm  at  the  unexpected  scene,  so  beautiful  and 
inviting  even  in  the  midst  of  winter  and  with  the  tread 
of  an  invading  enemy  upon  it. 

They  were  no  longer  disposed  to  murmur,  and  reach- 
ing the  vicinity  of  Moorefield  late  in  the  afternoon,  their 
spirits  were  still  further  cheered  by  the  sight  of  a  large 
number  of  beautiful  girls  rushing  out  to  see  and  welcome 
"  our  "  infantry,  as  they  fondly  called  it,  a  sight  that 
had  not  met  the  eyes  of  those  warm-hearted  beings  since 
a  portion  of  the  force  constituting  Garnett's  ill-starred 
expedition  had  retreated  that  way  early  in  the  war.  The 
Georgians  were  ready  then  to  go  anywhere.  Not  dis- 
continuing their  march  they  were  thrown  across  the  North 
Fork  just  at  dark  on  the  road  to  Petersburg,  by  felling- 
trees  from  each  side  so  as  to  interlap,  and  enable  them 
to  crawl  over. 

The  road  to  Petersburg  passed  through  a  narrow  de- 
file above,  just  wide  enough  for  a  wagon  way,  with  the 
river  on  one  side  and  a  very  high  vertical  precipice  of 
rock  on  the  other  side,  so  as  to  make  it  impracticable  to 
pass  through  the  file  if  held  by  any  force  at  all,  and  it  was 
then  strongly  picketed  by  the  enemy,  whose  main  force 
was  in  reach.  The  men  bivouacked  and  kept  as  quiet  as 
possible  during  the  night  so  as  not  to  alarm  the  enemy, 

336 


AVERILL'S  RAID  AND  THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN 

and  at  light  next  morning  I  moved  with  them  over  the 
mountain,  on  a  mere  pathway  lately  unused  and  nearly 
grown  up  with  underbrush,  so  as  to  avoid  the  defile 
spoken  of  and  get  in  its  rear,  being  guided  by  Captain 
McNeil  with  his  company. 

A  thick  fog  overspread  the  mountains  and  the  valley, 
as  it  was  moist,  mild  weather,  and  when  we  reached  the 
open  ground  on  the  other  side  where  we  were  within  easy 
artillery  range  of  the  enemy's  works,  nothing  could  be 
seen  of  them  or  the  town  of  Petersburg.  We  heard  some 
drums  beating  and  an  occasional  cheer,  and  having  sent 
a  small  force  to  get  in  rear  of  the  defile  while  I  made 
disposition  to  advance  upon  the  point  where  I  was  told 
the  enemy's  works  were,  information  reached  me  that 
Rosser  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy's  works,  the  force 
of  the  latter  consisting  of  two  regiments  and  some  artil- 
lery, having  evacuated  during  the  night  and  taken  a 
rough  obscure  road  to  the  west  through  the  mountains 
of  which  Rosser  had  not  known. 

Some  provisions  and  forage  were  found  in  the  works 
which  were  appropriated,  and  Rosser  was  ordered  to 
move  at  once  down  Patterson  Creek,  cut  the  railroad,  and 
gather  all  the  cattle  and  sheep  he  could  by  sending  detach- 
ments through  the  country.  After  demolishing  the  works, 
which  contained  several  bomb-proof  shelters  for  men  and 
magazines  for  ammunition  and  other  stores,  Thomas' 
brigade  was  moved  back  towards  Moorefield,  and  next 
day  posted  so  as  to  cover  the  approaches  from  the  direc- 
tion of  Winchester. 

The  men  now  had  an  abundance  of  provisions,  and 
the  luxury  of  a  little  coffee  taken  from  the  enemy;  and 
the  kind  hospitality  of  the  good  people  of  Moorefield  and 
the  vicinity  rendered  this  winter  campaign  into  the 
mountains  a  most  pleasant  episode  in  their  army 
experiences. 

Rosser  succeeded  in  cutting  the  railroad  at  the  mouths 
of  Patterson  Creek  and  the  South  Branch  where  it  had 
been  previously  cut  by  Fitz.  Lee,  dislodging  a  guard  from 

22  337 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  latter  place,  and  also  in  collecting  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  cattle  and  sheep,  with  which  he  returned  to  Moore- 
field  in  two  or  three  days.  The  enemy,  however,  had 
moved  from  Cumberland  with  a  large  force  of  infantry 
and  cavalry,  and  also  a  brigade  of  cavalry  from  Martins- 
burg  to  intercept,  but  he  succeeded  in  passing  in  safety 
between  the  columns  sent  against  him.  McNeil's  com- 
pany and  part  of  Grilmor's  battalion  had  been  sent  west 
to  the  Allegheny  Mountains  to  collect  cattle  and  were  now 
returning  by  the  way  of  Petersburg  with  a  good  lot  of 
them. 

The  morning  after  Rosser's  return  I  made  prepara- 
tions to  retire  with  the  prisoners,  plunder,  cattle,  and 
sheep  in  our  possession,  and  as  we  were  moving  out  of 
Moorefield,  the  enemy's  force  consisting  of  Kelly's  com- 
mand from  Cumberland  and  Averill's  brigade  of  cavalry 
came  in  view  on  the  opposite  banks  of  the  river,  and 
opened  with  artillery.  Thomas'  brigade,  which  had 
moved  across  to  the  valley  of  the  South  Fork,  and  com- 
menced retiring,  was  brought  back  a  short  distance  and 
formed  in  line  across  the  valley  with  the  artillery  in  posi- 
tion, while  Rosser's  cavalry  retiring  through  Moorefield 
took  position  below  Thomas,  sending  out  some  skir- 
mishers to  encounter    those  of  the  enemy. 

The  object  of  this  was  to  enable  Captain  McNeil  to 
get  in  rear  with  his  cattle,  with  which  he  was  coming  up 
on  a  road  around  our  left  flank,  as  we  were  then  faced, 
and  give  time  to  the  wagons  and  cattle  and  sheep  to  get 
well  up  the  sides  of  the  mountain,  so  that  they  might  be 
protected  against  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  this  was  done, 
and  we  could  see  the  wagons,  cattle  and  sheep  slowly  mov- 
ing up  the  road  on  the  side  of  the  mountain,  extending 
over  a  distance  of  some  two  or  three  miles,  we  withdrew 
gradually,  but  a  small  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  fol- 
lowed at  a  most  respectful  distance,  to  the  base  of  the 
mountains,  where  it  halted. 

Rosser's  brigade  took  an  obscure  road  to  the  left 

338 


AVERILL'S  RAID  AND  THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN 

across  the  mountain,  so  as  to  come  into  the  valley  of  Lost 
River  below  Matthews',  and  Thomas  followed  the  trains. 
The  enemy  did  not  attempt  to  molest  us  further,  and  he 
had  the  mortification  of  seeing  all  the  plunder  we  had 
obtained  marched  off  in  a  long  winding  train,  visible  to 
him  for  several  miles,  without  being  able  to  interfere  with 
us.  It  was  not  in  accordance  with  the  object  of  my  expe- 
dition to  give  him  battle  at  this  time,  and  I  therefore 
contented  myself  with  securing  what  I  had. 

Everything  reached  the  valley  in  safety,  Rosser  taking 
the  route  through  Brock's  Gap  with  the  wagons,  etc.,  and 
Thomas  moving  across  the  mountain  the  same  way  we  had 
gone.  Riding  ahead  of  the  infantry  the  day  after  we  left 
Moorefield,  I  understood,  on  the  road,  there  was  a  report 
at  Mount  Jackson  that  the  enemy  was  moving  up  from 
below  in  strong  force,  and  quickening  my  force  I  reached 
Mount  Jackson  just  after  the  report  had  been  ascertained 
to  be  false,  and  the  commotion  had  been  allayed.  The 
whole  report  had  originated  in  the  foolish  fright  of  a 
small  cavalry  picket  at  Columbia  Furnace,  below,  where 
a  road  comes  in  across  the  mountain  from  the  valley  of 
Lost  River,  which  was  caused  by  the  approach  on  that 
road  of  a  company  of  Rosser 's  men  whose  homes  were 
in  that  immediate  neighborhood,  they  having  been  allowed 
to  go  to  them  for  a  day  or  two. 

"When  discharged,  after  crossing  the  mountain,  with- 
out knowing  that  a  picket  was  near,  the  men,  who  had 
been  out  in  a  rain,  commenced  discharging  their  arms, 
and  the  picket  made  off,  not  stopping  to  hear  the  calls  of 
the  men  at  whose  appearance  it  had  become  frightened, 
but  continuing  to  retreat  the  faster,  magnifying  the  force, 
in  imagination,  at  every  step,  until,  when  the  commander 
of  the  picket  reached  General  Imboden,  with  his  horse 
panting  and  foaming,  it  had  swelled  to  two  or  three 
thousand  men. 

Those  things  will  happen  sometimes  to  the  bravest  of 
men.    We  were  again  able  to  send  General  Lee's  army 

339 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

about  a  thousand  beef  cattle,  and  some  few  other  supplies, 
which  served  to  keep  up  the  spirits  of  our  much  enduring 
men. 

The  weather  we  had  had  for  this  expedition  was 
unusually  mild  and  favorable  for  that  season  when,  in  the 
section  into  which  we  went,  the  climate  is  usually  as  harsh 
among  the  mountains  as  it  is  in  that  part  of  Canada 
bordering  on  the  Lakes. 

Shortly  after  our  return,  the  troops  were  moved  fur- 
ther up  the  valley,  the  two  infantry  brigades  going  into 
camp  near  Harrisonburg,  and  the  cavalry  going  to  Rock- 
bridge and  the  railroad  west  of  Staunton  where  forage 
could  be  obtained,  a  small  force  being  left  to  picket  down 
the  valley. 

Major  Gilmor  subsequently  made  a  raid  down  the 
valley,  and  captured  a  train  on  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Railroad. 

After  the  troops  had  been  located,  in  company  with 
Captain  Hotchkiss,  topographical  engineer  for  Ewell's 
corps,  I  made  a  reconnoissance  of  the  country  and  moun- 
tain passes  west  of  Staunton  and  extending  across 
Jackson's  River  to  the  mountains  beyond,  and  selected  a 
line  to  be  fortified  so  as  to  prevent  raids.  Captain  Hotch- 
kiss made  a  sketch  of  this  line  and  the  country,  which 
being  sent  to  General  Lee,  he  ordered  the  necessary  works 
to  be  constructed,  which  I  believe  was  subsequently  done. 

About  the  last  of  February,  my  services  being  no 
longer  necessary  in  the  valley,  I  left  for  the  purpose  of 
returning  to  my  division,  after  a  leave  of  absence  of  two 
weeks  granted  me.  In  reaching  Gordonsville  by  the  rail- 
road, I  ascertained  that  some  movement  was  being  made 
by  the  enemy,  and  I  therefore  ran  down  to  Orange  Court- 
House  to  be  present  with  my  command  if  anything  serious 
was  going  on. 

It  turned  out  that  the  enemy's  movement  was  for  the 
purpose  of  a  cavalry  raid  against  Richmond.  A  force 
being  moved  towards  Charlottesville  on  our  left,  while 
the  main  raiding  party,  under  Kilpatrick,  went  towards 

340 


AVERILL'S  RAID  AND  THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN 

Richmond  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  and  burning  the 
city,  releasing  the  Federal  prisoners,  and  bringing  off  or 
killing  the  Confederate  authorities.  This  raid  proved  a 
ridiculous  failure,  its  approach  to  Richmond  being  pre- 
vented by  some  home  guards  and  local  troops  composed 
of  employees  in  the  departments,  while  Hampton  dis- 
persed a  part  of  it  with  a  few  of  his  cavalry  hastily  gotten 
up.  The  force  moving  on  Charlottesville  retired  from 
before  a  few  pieces  of  artillery  which  had  no  support. 

After  this  affair  was  settled  I  took  the  benefit  of  my 
short  leave — the  only  indulgence  of  the  kind  asked  for 
or  received  by  me  during  the  whole  war. 

I  returned  to  my  division  about  the  middle  of  March, 
and  assumed  command,  finding  it  in  its  old  position, 
nothing  serious  having  occurred  during  the  winter. 

What  was  left  of  Hoke's  brigade  had  been  detached 
and  sent  under  General  Hoke  to  North  Carolina,  where 
it  participated  in  some  movements,  including  the  capture 
of  the  town  of  Plymouth,  with  its  garrison,  by  Hoke.  It 
did  not  return  to  the  division  until  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  subsequent  campaign,  though  it  took  part  in 
the  defence  of  Petersburg  and  the  attack  on  Butler  by 
General  Beauregard. 

We  remained  in  position  in  our  old  place  until  the 
opening  of  the  spring  campaign.  In  the  meantime  Major 
General  U.  S.  Grant  had  been  assigned  to  the  command 
of  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  with  the  rank  of 
Lieutenant  General,  and  had  come  to  take  immediate  com- 
mand of  the  army  confronting  us,  which  army  was  being 
very  greatly  strengthened  by  recruits,  drafted  men,  and 
other  troops. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  Meade  had  been  con- 
solidated into  three  corps  instead  of  five,  to-wit :  the  2nd, 
and  6th,  and  9th  corps  under  Burnside,  which  had  been 
very  greatly  increased,  was  added  to  the  force  in  our 
front.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  9th  corps, 
with  the  artillery  and  cavalry,  the  latter  having  been 
largely  increased,  constituted  Grant's  immediate   com- 

341 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

mand,  though  he  had  a  general  control  of  all  the  forces. 
By  the  last  of  May  it  was  very  evident  that  the  enemy 
was  making  very  formidable  preparations  for  a  campaign 
against  us,  and  to  meet  them  we  had  but  what  remained 
of  the  army  with  which  we  had  fought  the  year  before, 
recruited  since  the  close  of  active  operations,  only  by 
such  men  as  had  recovered  from  wounds  and  sickness, 
and  a  few  young  men  who  had  just  arrived  at  the  age  of 
military  service.  Longstreet  had  returned  from  his  ex- 
pedition into  Tennessee  with  two  of  his  divisions, 
McLaws'  and  Field's  (formerly  Hood's),  Pickett's  being 
absent  and  south  of  James  River. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

From  the  Rapidan  to  the  James. 

On  the  3rd  of  May,  1864,  the  positions  of  the  Con- 
federate Army  under  General  Lee,  and  the  Federal  Army 
under  Lieutenant  General  Grant  in  Virginia,  were  as 
follows :  General  Lee  held  the  southern  bank  of  the  Rapi- 
dan  River,  in  Orange  County,  with  his  right  resting  near 
the  mouth  of  Mine  Run,  and  his  left  extending  to  Liberty 
Mills  on  the  road  from  Gordonsville  (via  Madison  Court- 
House)  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley;  while  the  crossings  of 
the  river  on  the  right,  and  the  roads  on  the  left,  were 
watched  by  cavalry:  Ewell's  corps  was  on  the  right,  Hill's 
on  the  left,  and  two  divisions  of  Longstreet's  corps  were 
encamped  in  the  rear,  near  Gordonsville.  Grant's  army 
(composed  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  Meade, 
and  the  9th  corps  under  Burnside)  occupied  the  north 
banks  of  the  Rapidan  and  Robinson  rivers ;  the  main  body 
being  encamped  in  Culpeper  County  and  on  the  Rappa- 
hannock River. 

I  am  satisfied  that  General  Lee's  army  did  not  exceed 
50,000  effective  men  of  all  arms.  The  report  of  the  Fed- 
eral Secretary  of  War,  Stanton,  shows  that  the  "  avail- 
able force  present  for  duty,  May  1st,  1864,"  in  Grant's 
army,  was  141,166,  to-wit:  In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
120,386,  and  in  the  9th  corps  20,780.  The  draft  in  the 
United  States  was  being  energetically  enforced,  and  vol- 
unteering had  been  greatly  stimulated  by  high  bounties. 
The  Northwestern  States  had  tendered  large  bodies  of 
troops  to  serve  one  hundred  days,  in  order  to  relieve 
other  troops  on  garrison  and  local  duty,  and  this  enabled 
Grant  to  put  in  the  field  a  large  number  of  troops  which 
had  been  employed  on  that  kind  of  duty.  It  was  known 
that  he  was  receiving  heavy  reinforcements  up  to  the  very 
time  of  his  movement  on  the  4th  of  May,  and  afterwards ; 
so  that  the  statement  of  his  force  on  the  1st  of  May,  by 

343 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Stanton,  does  not  cover  the  whole  force  with  which  he 
commenced  the  campaign.  Moreover,  Secretary  Stan- 
ton's report  shows  that  there  were  in  the  Department  of 
Washington  and  the  Middle  Department,  47,751  available 
men  for  duty,  the  chief  part  of  which,  he  says,  was  called 
to  the  front,  after  the  campaign  began,  ' '  in  order  to  re- 
pair the  losses  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  "  and  Grant 
says  that,  at  Spottsylvania  Court-House,  "the  13th,  14th, 
15th,  16th,  17th  and  18th  (of  May)  were  consumed  in 
manoeuvring  and  awaiting  the  arrival  of  reinforcements 
from  Washington."  His  army,  therefore,  must  have 
numbered  very  nearly,  if  not  quite,  200,000  men,  before  a 
junction  was  effected  with  Butler. 

On  the  4th  of  May,  it  was  discovered  that  Grant's 
army  was  moving  towards  Germana  Ford  on  the  Rapi- 
dan,  which  was  ten  or  twelve  miles  from  our  right.  This 
movement  had  begun  on  the  night  of  the  3rd,  and  the 
enemy  succeeded  in  seizing  the  ford  and  effecting  a 
crossing,  as  the  river  was  guarded  at  that  point  by  only 
a  small  cavalry  picket.  The  direct  road  from  Germana 
Ford  to  Richmond  passes  by  Spottsylvania  Court-House 
and  when  Grant  had  effected  his  crossing,  he  was  nearer 
to  Richmond  than  General  Lee  was.  From  Orange  Court- 
House,  near  which  were  General  Lee's  headquarters, 
there  are  two  nearly  parallel  roads  running  eastwardly  to 
Fredericksburg — the  one  which  is  nearest  to  the  river 
being  called  ' '  The  old  Stone  Pike, ' '  and  the  other  ' '  The 
Plank  Road. ' '  The  road  from  Germana  Ford  to  Spottsyl- 
vania Court-House  crosses  the  old  Stone  Pike  at  the  "Old 
Wilderness  Tavern,"  and  two  or  three  miles  farther  on 
it  crosses  the  Plank  road. 

As  soon  as  it  was  ascertained  that  Grant's  movement 
was  a  serious  one,  preparations  were  made  to  meet  him, 
and  the  troops  of  General  Lee's  army  were  put  in  motion 
— Ewell's  corps  moving  on  the  old  Stone  Pike,  and  Hill's 
corps  on  the  Plank  Road;  into  which  latter  road  Long- 
street's  force  also  came,  from  his  camp  near  Gordonsville. 

Ewell's  corps,  to  which  my  division  belonged,  crossed 

344 


FROM  THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES 

Mine  Run,  and  encamped  at  Locust  Grove,  four  miles 
beyond,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  4th.  When  the  rest  of  the 
corps  moved,  my  division  and  Ramseur's  brigade  of 
Rodes'  division  were  left  to  watch  the  fords  of  the  Rapi- 
dan,  until  relieved  by  cavalry.  As  soon  as  this  was  done, 
I  moved  to  the  position  occupied  by  the  rest  of  the  corps, 
carrying  Ramseur  with  me. 

Ewell's  corps  contained  three  divisions  of  infantry, 
to  wit:  Johnson's,  Rodes'  and  my  own  (Early's).  At  this 
time  one  of  my  brigades  (Hoke's)  was  absent,  having 
been  with  Hoke  in  North  Carolina ;  and  I  had  only  three 
present,  to  wit:  Hays',  Pegram's  and  Gordon's.  One  of 
Rodes'  brigades  (R.  D.  Johnston's)  was  at  Hanover  Junc- 
tion. I  had  about  4,000  muskets  for  duty ;  Johnson  about 
the  same  number;  and  Rodes  (including  Johnston's  bri- 
gade) about  6,000. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

Battles  of  the  Wilderness. 

On  the  morning-  of  the  5th,  Ewell's  corps  was  put  in 
motion,  my  division  bringing  up  the  rear.  A  short  dis- 
tance from  the  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  and  just  in  ad- 
vance of  the  place  where  a  road  diverges  to  the  left  from 
the  old  Stone  Pike  to  the  Germana  Ford  road,  the  enemy, 
in  heavy  force,  was  encountered,  and  Jones'  brigade,  of 
Johnson's  division,  and  Battle's  brigade,  of  Rodes'  divis- 
ion, were  driven  back  in  some  confusion.  My  division  was 
ordered  up,  and  formed  across  the  pike,  Gordon's  bri- 
gade being  on  the  right  of  the  road.  This  brigade,  as  soon 
as  it  was  brought  into  line,  was  ordered  forward,  and 
advanced  through  a  dense  pine  thicket  in  gallant  style. 
In  conjunction  with  Daniel's,  Doles'  and  Ramseur's  bri- 
gades, of  Rodes'  division,  it  drove  the  enemy  back  with 
heavy  loss,  capturing  several  hundred  prisoners,  and 
gaining  a  commanding  position  on  the  right.  Johnson, 
at  the  same  time,  was  heavily  engaged  in  his  front,  his 
division  being  on  the  left  of  the  pike  and  extending  across 
the  road  to  the  Germana  Ford  road,  which  has  been  men- 
tioned. After  the  enemy  had  been  repulsed,  Hays'  bri- 
gade was  sent  to  Johnson's  left,  in  order  to  participate  in 
a  forward  movement ;  and  it  did  move  forward  some  half 
a  mile  or  so,  encountering  the  enemy  in  force ;  but  from 
some  mistake,  not  meeting  with  the  expected  co-operation, 
except  from  one  regiment  of  Jones'  brigade  (the  25th 
Virginia),  the  most  of  which  was  captured,  it  was  drawn 
back  to  Johnson's  line,  and  took  position  on  his  left. 

Pegram's  brigade  was  subsequently  sent  to  take  posi- 
tion on  Hays'  left;  and,  just  before  night,  a  very  heavy 
attack  was  made  on  its  front,  which  was  repulsed  with 
severe  ioss  to  the  enemy.  In  this  affair,  General  Pegram 
received  a  severe  wound  in  the  leg,  which  disabled  him 
for  the  field  for  some  months. 

346 


BATTLES  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

During  the  afternoon  there  was  heavy  skirmishing 
along  the  whole  line,  several  attempts  having  been  made 
by  the  enemy,  without  success,  to  regain  the  position 
from  which  he  had  been  driven ;  and  the  fighting  extended 
to  General  Lee's  right  on  the  Plank  road.  Gordon  occu- 
pied the  position  which  he  had  gained,  on  the  right,  until 
after  dark,  when  he  was  withdrawn  to  the  extreme  left, 
and  his  place  occupied  by  part  of  Rodes'  division. 

The  troops  encountered,  in  the  beginning  of  the  fight, 
consisted  of  the  5th  corps,  under  Warren;  but  other 
troops  were  brought  to  his  assistance.  At  the  close  of  the 
day,  Ewell's  corps  had  captured  over  a  thousand  pris- 
oneis,  besides  inflicting  on  the  enemy  very  heavy  losses 
in  killed  and  wounded.  Two  pieces  of  artillery  had  been 
abandoned  by  the  enemy,  just  in  front  of  the  point  at 
which  Johnson's  right  and  Rodes'  left  joined,  and  were 
subsequently  secured  by  our  troops. 

After  the  withdrawal  of  Gordon's  brigade  from  the 
right,  the  whole  of  my  division  was  on  the  left  of  the 
road  diverging  from  the  pike,  in  extension  of  Johnson's 
line.  All  of  my  brigades  had  behaved  handsomely;  and 
Gordon's  advance,  at  the  time  of  the  confusion  in  the 
beginning  of  the  fight,  was  made  with  great  energy  and 
dispatch,  and  was  just  in  time  to  prevent  a  serious 
disaster. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  the  fighting  was  re- 
sumed, and  a  very  heavy  attack  was  made  on  the  front 
occupied  by  Pegram's  brigade  (now  under  the  command 
of  Colonel  Hoffman  of  the  31st  Virginia  Regiment) ;  but 
it  was  handsomely  repulsed,  as  were  several  subsequent 
attacks  on  the  same  point. 

These  attacks  were  so  persistent,  that  two  regiments 
of  Johnson's  division  were  moved  to  the  rear  of  Pegram's 
brigade,  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  it;  and  when  an 
offer  was  made  to  relieve  it,  under  the  apprehension  that 
its  ammunition  might  be  exhausted,  the  men  of  that  gal- 
lant brigade  begged  that  they  might  be  allowed  to  retain 

347 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

their  position,  stating  that  they  were  getting  along  very 
well  indeed  and  wanted  no  help. 

During  the  morning,  the  fact  was  communicated  to 
General  Ewell,  by  our  cavalry  scouts,  that  a  column  of 
the  enemy's  infantry  was  moving  between  our  left  and  the 
river,  with  the  apparent  purpose  of  turning  our  left 
flank;  and  information  was  also  received  that  Burnside's 
corps  had  crossed  the  river,  and  was  in  rear  of  the 
enemy 's  right.  I  received  directions  to  watch  this  column, 
and  take  steps  to  prevent  its  getting  to  our  rear;  and 
Johnston's  brigade,  of  Rodes'  division,  which  had  just 
arrived  from  Hanover  Junction,  was  sent  to  me  for  that 
purpose.  This  brigade,  with  some  artillery,  was  put  in 
position,  some  distance  to  my  left,  so  as  to  command  some 
by-roads  coming  in  from  the  river.  In  the  meantime 
General  Gordon  had  sent  out  a  scouting  party  on  foot, 
which  discovered  what  was  supposed  to  be  the  enemy's 
right  flank  resting  in  the  woods,  in  front  of  my  division ; 
and,  during  my  absence  while  posting  Johnston's  brigade, 
he  reported  the  fact  to  General  Ewell,  and  suggested  the 
propriety  of  attacking  this  flank  of  the  enemy  with  his 
brigade,  which  was  not  engaged.  On  my  return,  the  sub- 
ject was  mentioned  to  me  by  General  Ewell,  and  I  stated 
to  him  the  danger  and  risk  of  making  the  attack  under  the 
circumstances,  as  a  column  was  threatening  our  left  flank 
and  Burnside's  corps  was  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  flank, 
on  which  the  attack  was  suggested.  General  Ewell  con- 
curred with  me  in  this  opinion,  and  the  impolicy  of  the 
attempt  at  that  time  was  obvious,  as  we  had  no  reserves, 
and,  if  it  failed,  and  the  enemy  showed  any  enterprise,  a 
serious  disaster  would  befall,  not  only  our  corps,  but 
General  Lee's  whole  army.  In  the  afternoon,  when  the 
column  threatening  our  left  had  been  withdrawn,  and  it 
had  been  ascertained  that  Burnside  had  gone  to  Grant's 
left,  on  account  of  the  heavy  fighting  on  that  flank,  at  my 
suggestion,  General  Ewell  ordered  the  movement  which 
Gordon  had  proposed.  I  determined  to  make  it  with  Gor- 
don's brigade  supported  by  Johnston's  and  to  follow 

348 


BATTLES  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

it  up,  if  successful,  with  the  rest  of  my  division.  Gordon's 
brigade  was  accordingly  formed  in  line  near  the  edge  of 
the  woods  in  which  the  enemy's  right  rested,  and  John- 
ston's in  the  rear,  with  orders  to  follow  Gordon  and  obey 
his  orders. 

I  posted  my  adjutant  general,  Major  John  W.  Daniel, 
with  a  courier,  in  a  position  to  be  communicated  with  by 
Gordon,  so  as  to  inform  me  of  the  success  attending  the 
movement,  and  enable  me  to  put  in  the  other  brigades  at 
the  right  time.  As  soon  as  Gordon  started,  which  was 
a  very  short  time  before  sunset,  I  rode  to  my  line  and 
threw  forward  Pegram's  brigade  in  a  position  to  move 
when  required.  In  the  meantime  Gordon  had  become  en- 
gaged, and,  while  Pegram's  brigade  was  being  formed 
in  line,  I  saw  some  of  Gordon's  men  coming  back  in  con- 
fusion, and  Colonel  Evans,  of  the  31st  Georgia  Regiment, 
endeavoring  to  rally  them.  Colonel  Evans  informed  me 
that  his  regiment  which  was  on  Gordon's  right  had  struck 
the  enemy's  breastworks  and  had  given  way.  I  immedi- 
ately ordered  Pegram's  brigade  forward  and  directed 
Colonel  Evans  to  guide  it.  Its  advance  was  through  a 
dense  thicket  of  underbrush,  but  it  crossed  the  road 
running  through  Johnson's  line,  and  struck  the  enemy's 
works,  and  one  of  the  regiments,  the  13th  Virginia,  under 
Colonel  Terrill,  got  possession  of  part  of  the  line,  when 
Colonel  Hoffman  ordered  the  brigade  to  retire,  as  it  was 
getting  dark,  and  there  was  much  confusion  produced  by 
the  difficulties  of  advance.  Gordon  had  struck  the 
enemy's  right  flank  behind  breastworks,  and  a  part  of  his 
brigade  was  thrown  into  disorder.  In  going  through 
the  woods,  Johnston  had  obliqued  too  much  and  passed 
to  Gordon 's  left,  getting  in  rear  of  the  enemy. 

Major  Daniel,  not  hearing  from  Gordon,  had  endeav- 
ored to  get  to  him,  when,  finding  the  condition  of  things, 
he  attempted  to  lead  one  of  Pegram's  regiments  to  his 
assistance,  and  was  shot  down  while  behaving  with  great 
gallantry,  receiving  a  wound  in  the  leg  which  has  per- 
manently disabled  him.    Notwithstanding  the  confusion 

349 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

in  part  of  his  brigade,  Gordon  succeeded  in  throwing  the 
enemy's  right  flank  into  great  confusion,  capturing  two 
brigadier  generals  (Seymour  and  Shaler),  and  several 
hundred  prisoners,  all  of  the  6th  corps,  under  Sedgwick. 
The  advance  of  Pegram's  brigade,  and  the  demonstration 
of  Johnston's  brigade  in  the  rear,  where  it  encountered 
a  part  of  the  enemy's  force  and  captured  some  prisoners, 
contributed  materially  to  the  result.  It  was  fortunate, 
however,  that  darkness  came  to  close  this  affair,  as  the 
enemy,  if  he  had  been  able  to  discover  the  disorder  on  our 
side,  might  have  brought  up  fresh  troops  and  availed  him- 
self of  our  condition.  As  it  was,  doubtless,  the  lateness 
of  the  hour  caused  him  to  be  surprised,  and  the  approach- 
ing darkness  increased  the  confusion  in  his  ranks,  as  he 
could  not  see  the  strength  of  the  attacking  force,  and 
probably  imagined  it  to  be  much  more  formidable  than  it 
really  was.  All  of  the  brigades  engaged  in  the  attack 
were  drawn  back,  and  formed  on  a  new  line  in  front  of 
the  old  one,  and  obliquely  to  it. 

At  light  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  an  advance  was 
made,  which  disclosed  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  given 
up  his  line  of  works  in  front  of  my  whole  line  and  a  good 
portion  of  Johnston's.  Between  the  lines  a  large  number 
of  his  dead  had  been  left,  and  at  his  breastworks,  a  large 
number  of  muskets  and  knapsacks  had  been  abandoned, 
and  there  was  every  indication  of  great  confusion.  It  was 
not  till  then  that  we  ascertained  the  full  extent  of  the 
success  attending  the  movement  of  the  evening  before. 
The  enemy  had  entirely  abandoned  the  left  side  of  the 
road,  across  which  Johnston's  line  extended,  and  my  divi- 
sion and  a  part  of  his  were  thrown  forward,  occupying  a 
part  of  the  abandoned  works  on  the  right  of  the  road, 
and  leaving  all  those  on  the  left  in  our  rear.  This  ren- 
dered our  line  straight,  the  left  having  been  previously 
thrown  back,  making  a  curve. 

During  the  day  there  was  some  skirmishing,  but  no 
serious  lighting  in  my  front.  The  loss  in  my  division 
during  the  fighting  in  the  Wilderness  was  comparatively 
light. 

350 


BATTLES  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th,  it  was  discovered  that  the 
enemy  was  leaving  our  front  and  moving  towards 
Spottsylvania  Court-House.  General  Lee's  army  was 
also  put  in  motion,  Ewell's  corps  moving  along  the  line 
occupied  by  our  troops  on  the  day  before,  until  it  reached 
the  Plank  road,  where  it  struck  across  to  Shady  Grove, 
which  is  on  the  road  from  Orange  Court-House  to 
Spottsylvania  Court-House. 

On  reaching  the  Plank  road,  I  received  through 
General  A.  P.  Hill,  who  was  sick  and  unable  to  remain  on 
duty,  an  order  from  General  Lee,  transferring  Hays '  bri- 
gade from  my  division  to  Johnson's,  in  order  that  it 
might  be  consolidated  with  another  Louisiana  brigade 
in  that  division,  whose  brigadier  general  had  been  killed 
in  the  Wilderness,  and  Johnston's  brigade  from  Rodes' 
division  to  mine ;  and  assigning  me  to  the  temporary  com- 
mand of  Hill's  corps,  which  was  still  in  position  across 
the  Plank  road,  and  was  to  bring  up  the  rear.  I  accord- 
ingly turned  over  the  command  of  my  division  to  Gordon, 
the  senior  brigadier  left  with  it,  and  assumed  command 
of  Hill's  corps.* 

*  Grant  says  General  Lee  had  the  advantage  of  position.  As  the 
latter  had  to  move  from  his  lines  on  the  Rapidan  and  attack  Grant  in 
the  Wilderness,  how  happened  it  that  he  was  enabled  to  get  the  ad- 
vantage of  position,  after  the  two  days'  fighting?  He  also  says  that 
General  Lee  was  enabled  to  reach  Spottsylvania  Court-House  first, 
because  he  had  the  shorter  line.  The  fact  is,  that,  as  the  two  armies 
lay  in  their  positions  at  the  Wilderness,  their  lines  were  parallel  to 
the  road  to  Spottsylvania  Court-House.  Grant  had  the  possession  of 
the  direct  road  to  that  place,  and  he  had  the  start.  General  Lee  had 
to  move  on  the  circuitous  route  by  Shady  Grove,  and  he  was  enabled 
to  arrive  there  first  with  part  of  his  infantry,  because  his  cavalry  held 
Grant's  advance  in  check  for  nearly  an  entire  day. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

Battles  around  Spottsylvania. 

Hill's  Corps  was  composed  of  Heth's,  Wilcox's  and 
Mahone 's  (formerly  Anderson's)  division  of  infantry  and 
three  battalions  of  artillery  under  Colonel  Walker. 
When  I  took  command  of  it,  the  infantry  numbered  about 
13,000  muskets  for  duty. 

General  Lee's  orders  to  me  were  to  move  by  Todd's 
Tavern  along  the  Brock  road  to  Spottsylvania  Court- 
House  as  soon  as  our  front  was  clear  of  the  enemy.  In 
order  to  get  into  that  road,  it  was  necessary  to  reopen 
an  old  one  leading  from  Hill's  right,  by  which  I  was  en- 
abled to  take  a  cross-road  leading  into  the  road  from 
Shady  Grove  to  Todd's  Tavern.  The  wagon  trains  and  all 
the  artillery,  except  one  battalion,  were  sent  around  by 
Shady  Grove.  About  a  mile  from  the  road  from  Shady 
Grove  to  Todd's  Tavern,  the  enemy's  cavalry  videttes 
were  encountered,  and  Mahone  's  division  was  thrown  for- 
ward to  develop  the  enemy's  force  and  position.  Mahone 
encountered  a  force  of  infantry  which  had  moved  up  from 
Todd's  Tavern  toward  Shady  Grove  and  had  quite  a 
brisk  engagement  with  it,  causing  it  to  fall  back  rapidly 
towards  the  former  place.  At  the  same  time  General 
Hampton,  who  had  communicated  with  me,  after  I  left  the 
Plank  Road,  moved  with  his  cavalry  on  my  right  and 
struck  the  enemy  on  the  flank  and  rear;  but  on  account 
of  want  of  knowledge  of  the  country  on  our  part,  and 
the  approach  of  darkness,  the  enemy  was  enabled  to 
make  his  escape.  This  affair  developed  the  fact  that  the 
enemy  was  in  possession  of  Todd's  Tavern  and  the  Brock 
road,  and  a  continuation  of  my  march  would  have  led 
through  his  entire  army.  We  bivouacked  for  the  night, 
at  the  place  from  which  Mahone  had  driven  the  enemy, 
and  a  force  was  thrown  out  towards  Todd's  Tavern,  which 
was  about  a  mile  distant. 

352 


BATTLES  AROUND  SPOTTSYLVANIA 

Very  early  next  morning  (the  9th),  I  received  an  order 
from  General  Lee,  through  Hampton,  to  move  on  the 
Shady  Grove  road  towards  Spottsylvania  Court-House, 
which  I  did,  crossing  a  small  river  called  the  Po  twice. 
After  reaching  the  rear  of  the  position  occupied  by  the 
other  two  corps,  I  was  ordered  to  Spottsylvania  Court- 
House,  to  take  position  on  the  right,  and  cover  the  road 
from  that  place  to  Fredericksburg.  No  enemy  appeared 
in  my  front  on  this  day,  except  at  a  distance  on  the  Fred- 
ericksburg road. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  10th  I  was  ordered  to 
move  one  of  my  divisions  back,  to  cover  the  crossing  of 
the  Po  on  the  Shady  Grove  road;  and  to  move  with 
another  division  to  the  rear  and  left,  by  the  way  of 
Spottsylvania  Old  Court-House,  and  drive  back  a  column 
of  the  enemy  which  had  crossed  the  Po  and  taken  pos- 
session of  the  Shady  Grove  road,  thus  threatening  our 
rear  and  endangering  our  trains  which  were  on  the  road 
leading  by  the  Old  Court-House  to  Louisa  Court-House. 

Our  line  was  then  north  of  the  Po,  with  its  left,  Fields ' 
division  of  Longstreet's  corps,  resting  on  that  stream, 
just  above  the  crossing  of  the  Shady  Grove  road.  The 
whole  of  the  enemy's  force  was  also  north  of  the  Po, 
prior  to  this  movement  of  his.  Mahone's  division  was 
sent  to  occupy  the  banks  of  the  Po  on  Fields'  left,  while 
with  Heth's  division  and  a  battalion  of  artillery  I  moved 
to  the  rear,  crossing  the  Po  on  the  Louisa  Court-House 
road,  and  then  following  that  road  until  we  reached  one 
coming  in  from  Waite  's  Shop  on  the  Shady  Grove  road. 
After  moving  about  a  mile  on  this  road,  we  met  Hampton 
gradually  falling  back  before  the  enemy,  who  had  pushed 
out  a  column  of  infantry  considerably  to  the  rear  of  our 
line.  This  column  was  in  turn  forced  back  to  the  posi- 
tion on  Shady  Grove  road  which  was  occupied  by  what 
was  reported  to  be  Hancock's  corps.  Following  up  and 
crossing  a  small  stream  just  below  a  mill  pond,  we  suc- 
ceeded in  reaching  Waite 's  Shop,  from  whence  an  attack 
was  made  on  the  enemy,  and  the  entire  force,  which  had 

23  353 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

crossed  the  Po,  was  driven  back  with  a  loss  of  one  piece 
of  artillery,  which  fell  into  our  hands,  and  a  consider- 
able number  in  killed  and  wounded.  This  relieved  us  from 
a  very  threatening  danger,  as  the  position  the  enemy 
had  attained  would  have  enabled  him  to  completely  enfi- 
lade Fields'  position  and  get  possession  of  the  line  of  our 
communications  to  the  rear,  within  a  very  short  distance 
of  which  he  was,  when  met  by  the  force  which  drove  him 
back.  In  this  affair  Heth's  division  behaved  very  hand- 
somely, all  of  the  brigades  (Cook's,  Davis',  Kirkland's 
and  Walker's)  being  engaged  in  the  attack.  General 
H.  H.  Walker  had  the  misfortune  to  receive  a  severe 
wound  in  the  foot,  which  rendered  amputation  necessary, 
but  otherwise  our  loss  was  slight.  As  soon  as  the  road 
was  cleared,  Mahone's  division  crossed  the  Po,  but  it  was 
not  practicable  to  pursue  the  affair  further,  as  the  north 
bank  of  the  stream  at  this  point  was  covered  by  a  heavily 
entrenched  line,  with  a  number  of  batteries,  and  night 
was  approaching. 

On  the  morning  of  the  11th,  Heth  was  moved  back  to 
Spottsylvania  Court-House  and  Mahone  was  left  to 
occupy  the  position  on  the  Shady  Grove  road  from 
which  the  enemy  had  been  driven.* 

My  line  on  the  right  had  been  connected  with  Ewell's 
right,  and  covered  the  Fredericksburg  road,  as  also  the 
road  leading  from  Spottsylvania  Court-House  across 
the  Ny  into  the  road  from  Fredericksburg  to  Hanover 
Junction.  Wilcox  was  on  my  left,  uniting  with  Ewell,  and 
Heth  joined  him.  The  enemy  had  extended  his  lines 
across  the  Fredericksburg  road,  but  there  was  no  fighting 
on  this  front  on  the  10th  or  11th,  except  some  artillery 
firing. 

*  It  will  be  seen  that  after  this  affair  I  held,  for  a.  time,  both  of 
General  Lee's  flanks,  which  was  rather  an  anomaly,  but  it  could  not 
be  avoided,  as  we  had  no  reserves  and  the  two  other  corps  being  imme- 
diately in  front  of  the  enemy  in  line  of  battle,  and  almost  constantly 
engaged,  could  not  be  moved  without  great  risk.  It  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  occupy  the  position,  held  on  the  left  by  Mahone,  to  avoid 
a  renewal  of  the  danger  from  which  we  had  escaped. 

354 


BATTLES  AROUND  SPOTTSYLVANIA 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  11th,  the  enemy  was  demon- 
strating to  our  left,  np  the  Po,  as  if  to  get  possession 
of  Shady  Grove  and  the  road  from  thence  to  Louisa 
Court-House.  General  Hampton  reported  a  column  of 
infantry  moving  up  the  Po,  and  I  was  ordered  by  General 
Lee  to  take  possession  of  Shady  Grove,  by  light  next 
morning,  and  hold  it  against  the  enemy.  To  aid  in  that 
purpose,  two  brigades  of  Wilcox's  division  (Thomas'  and 
Scales')  were  moved  from  the  right,  and  Mahone  was 
ordered  to  move  before  light  to  Shady  Grove ;  but  during 
the  night  it  was  discovered  that  the  movement  to  our 
left  was  a  feint  and  that  there  was  a  real  movement  of 
the  enemy  towards  our  right. 

Before  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  the  12th,  Wilcox's 
brigades  were  returned  to  him,  and  at  dawn  Mahone 's 
division  was  moved  to  the  right,  leaving  Wright's  brigade 
of  that  division  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  Po  on  Field's 
left.  On  this  morning,  the  enemy  made  a  very  heavy 
attack  on  Ewell  's  front,  and  the  line  where  it  was  occupied 
by  Johnson's  division.  A  portion  of  the  attacking  force 
swept  along  Johnson's  line  to  Wilcox's  left,  and  was 
checked  by  a  prompt  movement  on  the  part  of  Brigadier 
General  Lane,  who  was  on  that  flank.  As  soon  as  the 
firing  was  heard,  General  Wilcox  sent  Thomas'  and 
Scales'  brigades  to  Lane's  assistance  and  they  arrived 
just  as  Lane's  brigade  had  repulsed  this  body  of  the 
enemy,  and  they  pursued  it  for  a  short  distance.  As  soon 
as  Mahone 's  division  arrived  from  the  left,  Perrin's  and 
Harris'  brigades  of  that  division  and,  subsequently,  Mc- 
Gowan's  brigade  of  Wilcox's  division  were  sent  to 
General  Swell's  assistance,  and  were  carried  into  action 
under  his  orders.  Brigadier  General  Perrin  was  killed 
and  Brigadier  General  McGowan  severely  wounded, 
while  gallantly  leading  their  respective  brigades  into 
action;  and  all  the  brigades  sent  to  Ewell 's  assistance 
suffered  severely. 

Subsequently,  on  the  same  day,  under  orders  from 
General  Lee,  Lane's  brigade  of  Wilcox's  division  and 

355 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Mahone's  own  brigade  (under  Colonel  Weisiger)  were 
thrown  to  the  front,  for  the  purpose  of  moving  to  the 
left,  and  attacking  the  flank  of  the  column  of  the  enemy 
which  had  broken  Ewell's  line,  to  relieve  the  pressure  on 
him,  and,  if  possible,  recover  the  part  of  the  line  which 
had  been  lost.  Lane's  brigade  commenced  the  movement 
and  had  not  proceeded  far,  when  it  encountered  and 
attacked,  in  a  piece  of  woods  in  front  of  my  line,  the 
9th  corps,  under  Burnside,  moving  up  to  attack  a  salient 
on  my  front.  Lane  captured  over  three  hundred  pris- 
oners and  three  battle  flags,  and  his  attack  on  the  enemy's 
flank  taking  him  by  surprise,  no  doubt  contributed  mate- 
rially to  his  repulse.  Mahone's  brigade  did  not  become 
seriously  engaged.  The  attacking  column  which  Lane 
encountered  got  up  to  within  a  very  short  distance  of  a 
salient  defended  by  Walker's  brigade  of  Heth's  division, 
under  Colonel  Mayo,  before  it  was  discovered,  as  there 
was  a  pine  thicket  in  front,  under  cover  of  which  the 
advance  was  made. 

A  heavy  fire  of  musketry  from  Walker's  brigade  and 
Thomas'  which  was  on  his  left,  and  a  fire  of  artillery  from 
a  considerable  number  of  guns  on  Heth's  line,  were 
opened  with  tremendous  effect  upon  the  attacking  column, 
and  it  was  driven  back  with  heavy  loss,  leaving  its  dead 
in  front  of  our  works.  This  affair  took  place  under  the 
eye  of  General  Lee  himself.  In  the  afternoon  another 
attempt  was  made  to  carry  out  the  contemplated  flank 
movement  with  Mahone's  brigade,  and  Cook's  brigade 
of  Heth's  division,  to  be  followed  up  by  the  other  troops 
under  my  command ;  but  it  was  discovered  that  the  enenry 
had  one  or  more  entrenched  lines  in  our  front,  to  the  fire 
from  which  our  flanking  column  would  have  been  exposed. 
Moreover  the  ground  between  the  lines  was  very  rough, 
being  full  of  ragged  ravines  and  covered  with  thick  pines 
and  other  growth ;  and  it  was  thought  advisable  to  desist 
from  the  attempt.  The  two  brigades  which  were  to  have 
commenced  the  movement  were  then  thrown  to  the  front 

356 


BATTLES  AROUND  SPOTTSYLVANIA 

on  both  sides  of  the  Fredericksburg  road,  and  passing 
over  two  lines  of  breastworks,  defended  by  a  strong  force 
of  skirmishers,  developed  the  existence  of  a  third  and 
much  stronger  line  in  rear,  which  would  have  afforded  an 
almost  insuperable  obstacle  to  the  proposed  flank  move- 
ment. This  closed  the  operations  of  the  corps  under 
my  command  on  the  memorable  12th  of  May. 

Between  that  day  and  the  19th,  there  was  no  serious 
attack  on  my  front,  but  much  manoeuvring  by  the  enemy. 
General  Mahone  made  two  or  three  reconnaissances  to 
the  front,  which  disclosed  the  fact  that  the  enemy  was 
gradually  moving  to  our  right.  In  making  one  of  them, 
he  encountered  a  body  of  the  enemy  which  had  got  pos- 
session of  Gayle's  house,  on  the  left  of  the  road  leading 
from  our  right  towards  the  Fredericksburg  and  Hanover 
Junction  road,  at  which  a  portion  of  our  cavalry,  under 
Brigadier  General  Chambliss,  had  been  previously 
posted,  and  drove  it  back  across  the  Ny.* 

Another  reconnaissance,  handsomely  made  by  Briga- 
dier General  Wright,  who  had  been  brought  from  the 
left,  ascertained  that  a  heavy  force  of  the  enemy  was  be- 
tween the  Ny  and  the  Po,  in  front  of  my  right,  which  was 
held  by  Mahone,  and  was  along  the  road  towards  Hanover 
Junction.  To  meet  this  movement  of  the  enemy  Field's 
division  was  brought  from  the  left  and  placed  on  my 
right. 

On  the  19th,  General  Ewell  made  a  movement  against 
the  enemy's  right,  and  to  create  a  diversion  in  his  favor, 
Thomas'  brigade  was  thrown  forward,  and  drove  the 
enemy  into  his  works  in  front  of  the  salient,  against  which 

*  The  Matapony  River,  which,  by  its  juncture  with  the  Pamunkey 
forms  York  River,  is  formed  by  the  confluence  of  four  streams,  called 
respectively,  the  "Mat,"  "  Ta,"  "  Po,"  and  "Ny."  The  Ny  is  north 
and  east  of  Spottsylvania  Court-House,  and  behind  it  the  enemy  did 
most  of  his  manoeuvring  in  my  front.  It  unites  with  the  Po,  a  few 
miles  to  the  east  and  south  of  Spottsylvania  Court-House,  and  both 
streams  are  difficult  to  cross  except  where  there  are  bridges. 

357 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Burnside's  attack  had  been  made  on  the  12th,  while  the 
whole  corps  was  held  in  readiness  to  co-operate  with 
Ewell,  should  his  attack  prove  successful ;  but  as  he  was 
compelled  to  retire,  Thomas  was  withdrawn. 

Subsequently,  the  enemy  retired  from  Heth's  and 
Wilcox's  fronts;  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  21st  Wilcox 
was  sent  out  on  the  road  leading  from  Mahone's  front 
across  the  Ny  with  two  of  his  brigades  to  feel  the  enemy, 
and  found  him  still  in  force  behind  entrenched  lines,  and 
had  a  brisk  engagement  with  that  force.  While  Wilcox 
was  absent,  an  order  was  received  by  me,  from  General 
Lee,  to  turn  over  to  General  Hill  the  command  of  his 
corps,  as  he  had  reported  for  duty.  I  did  so  at  once  and 
thus  terminated  my  connection  with  this  corps,  which  I 
had  commanded  during  all  the  trying  scenes  around 
Spottsylvania  Court-House.  The  officers  and  men  of  the 
corps  had  all  behaved  well,  and  contributed  in  no  small 
degree  to  the  result  by  which  Grant  was  compelled  to 
wait  six  days  for  reinforcements  from  Washington,  be- 
fore he  could  resume  the  offensive  or  make  another  of  his 
flank  movements  to  get  between  General  Lee's  army  and 
Richmond. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

Operations  near  Hanover  Junction. 

The  movement  of  the  enemy  to  get  between  our  army 
and  Richmond  had  been  discovered,  and  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  21st  Ewell's  corps  was  put  in  motion  towards 
Hanover  Junction.*  After  turning  over  to  General  Hill 
the  command  of  his  corps,  I  rode  in  the  direction  taken 
by  Ewell's  corps,  and  overtook  it,  a  short  time  before  day 
on  the  morning  of  the  22nd.  Hoke 's  brigade,  under  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Lewis,  this  day  joined  us  from  Petersburg, 
and  an  order  was  issued,  transferring  Gordon's  brigade, 
now  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General  Evans,  to 
Johnson's  division,  which  was  placed  under  the  command 
of  General  Gordon,  who  had  been  made  a  major  general. 
This  left  me  in  command  of  three  brigades,  to  wit: 
Pegram's,  Hoke's  and  Johnston's,  all  of  which  were  very 
much  reduced  in  strength.  My  Adjutant  General,  Major 
Daniel,  had  been  disabled  for  life  by  a  wound  received 
at  the  Wilderness,  and  my  Inspector  General,  Major 
Samuel  Hale,  had  been  mortally  wounded  at  Spottsyl- 
vania  Court-House  on  the  12th  while  serving  with  the 
division  and  acting  with  great  gallantry  during  the  dis- 
order which  ensued  after  Ewell's  line  was  broken.  Both 
were  serious  losses  to  me. 

On  this  day  (the  22nd)  we  moved  to  Hanover  Junc- 
tion, and,  next  day,  my  division  was  posted  on  the  ex- 
treme right,  covering  a  ferry  two  or  three  miles  below 
the  railroad  bridge  across  the  North  Anna.     While  at 

*  Hanover  Junction  is  about  22  miles  from  Richmond  and  is  at 
the  intersection  of  the  Richmond,  Fredericksburg  and  Potomac  Rail- 
road with  the  Central  Railroad  from  Richmond  west,  via  Gordonsville 
and  Staunton.  It  is  on  the  direct  road,  both  from  Spottsylvania 
Court-House  and  Fredericksburg,  to  Richmond.  The  North  Anna 
River  is  north  of  the  Junction  about  two  miles  and  the  South  Anna 
about  three  miles  south  of  it.  These  two  streams  unite  south  of  east, 
and  a  few  miles  from  the  Junction,  and  form  the  Pamunkey  River. 

359 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Hanover  Junction  my  division  was  not  engaged.  At  one 
time  it  was  moved  towards  our  left,  for  the  purpose  of 
supporting  a  part  of  the  line  on  which  an  attack  was 
expected,  and  moved  back  again  without  being  required. 
It  was  subsequently  placed  temporarily  on  the  left  of 
the  corps,  relieving  Rodes'  division  and  a  part  of  Field's 
while  the  line  was  being  remodelled,  and  then  took  posi- 
tion on  the  right  again.  During  the  night  of  the  26th, 
the  enemy  again  withdrew  from  our  front.* 

*  At  Hanover  Junction  General  Lee  was  joined  by  Pickett's  divi- 
sion of  Long-street's  corps,  and  Breekenridge  "with  two  small  brigades 
of  infantry,  and  a  battalion  of  artillery.  These,  with  Hoke's  brigade, 
were  the  first  and  only  reinforcements  received  by  General  Lee  since 
the  opening  of  the  campaign.  Yet  Grant's  immense  army,  notwith- 
standing the  advantage  gained  by  it  on  the  12th  of  May,  had  been 
so  crippled,  that  it  was  compelled  to  wait  six  days  at  Spottsylvania 
Court-House  for  reinforcements  from  Washington,  before  it  could 
resume  the  offensive.  Breckenridge's  infantry  numbered  less  than 
3,000  muskets.  Grant  puts  it  at  15,000  and  says,  "  The  army  sent  to 
operate  against  Richmond  having  hermetically  sealed  itself  up  at 
Bermuda  Hundreds,  the  enemy  was  enabled  to  bring  the  most,  if  not 
all  the  reinforcements  brought  from  the  South  by  Beauregard  against 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac."  He  therefore  determined  to  try  another 
flank  movement,  and  to  get  more  reinforcements  from  the  army  at 
Bermuda  Hundreds. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

Battles  of  Cold  Harbor. 

On  the  27th,  the  enemy  having  withdrawn  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  North  Anna,  and  commenced  another 
flank  movement  by  moving  down  the  north  bank  of  the 
Pamunkey,  Ewell's  corps,  now  under  my  command,  by 
reason  of  General  Ewell's  sickness,  was  moved  across  the 
South  Anna  over  the  bridge  of  the  Central  Railroad,  and 
by  a  place  called  ' '  Merry  Oaks, ' '  leaving  Ashland  on  the 
Richmond,  Fredericksburg  and  Potomac  Railroad  to  the 
right,  and  bivouacked  for  the  night  at  Hughes'  cross-road, 
the  intersection  of  the  road  from  Ashland  to  Atlee's  Sta- 
tion on  the  Central  Railroad  with  the  road  from  the 
Merry  Oaks  to  Richmond.  Next  morning  I  moved  by 
Atlee's  Station  to  Hundley's  Corner,  at  the  intersection 
of  the  road  from  Hanover  Town  (the  point  at  which  Grant 
crossed  the  Pamunkey),  by  Pole  Green  Church  to  Rich- 
mond, with  the  road  from  Atlee  's  Station,  by  Old  Church 
in  Hanover  County,  to  the  White  House  on  the  Pamunkey. 
This  is  the  point  from  which  General  Jackson  commenced 
his  famous  attack  on  McClellan's  flank  and  rear,  in  1862, 
and  it  was  very  important  that  it  should  be  occupied,  as  it 
intercepted  Grant's  direct  march  towards  Richmond.  All 
of  these  movements  were  made  under  orders  from 
General  Lee. 

My  troops  were  placed  in  position,  covering  the  road 
by  Pole  Green  Church,  and  also  the  road  to  Old  Church, 
with  my  right  resting  near  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  a  small 
stream  running  towards  Mechanicsville  and  into  the 
Chickahominy.  Brigadier  General  Ramseur  of  Rodes' 
division  was  this  day  assigned  to  the  command  of  my 
division.  Ewell's  corps,  the  2nd  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  now  numbered  less  than  9,000  muskets  for  duty, 
its  loss,  on  the  12th  of  May,  having  been  very  heavy. 

361 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

On  the  29th,  the  enemy  having  crossed  the  Tottopoto- 
moy  (a  creek  running  just  north  of  Pole  Green  Church, 
and  eastward  to  the  Pamunkey),  appeared  in  my  front  on 
both  roads,  and  there  was  some  skirmishing  but  no  heavy 
fighting. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  30th,  in  accordance  with 
orders  from  General  Lee,  I  moved  to  the  right  across 
Beaver  Dam,  to  the  road  from  Old  Church  to  Mechanics- 
ville,  and  thence  along  that  road  towards  Old  Church, 
until  we  reached  Bethesda  Church.  At  this  point  the 
enemy  was  encountered,  and  his  troops,  which  occupied 
the  road,  were  driven  by  Rodes'  division  towards  the 
road  from  Hundley's  Corner,  which  unites  with  the  road 
from  Mechanicsville,  east  of  Bethesda  Church.  Pegram's 
brigade,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Edward  Willis 
of  the  12th  Georgia  Regiment,  was  sent  forward  with 
one  of  Codes'  brigades  on  its  right,  to  feel  the  enemy,  and 
ascertain  his  strength;  but  meeting  with  a  heavy  force 
behind  breastworks,  it  was  compelled  to  retire,  with  the 
loss  of  some  valuable  officers  and  men,  and  among  them 
were  Colonel  Willis,  mortally  wounded,  and  Colonel 
Terrill  of  the  13th  Virginia  Regiment,  killed.  This  move- 
ment showed  that  the  enemy  was  moving  to  our  right 
flank,  and  at  night  I  withdrew  a  short  distance  on  the 
Mechanicsville  road,  covering  it  with  my  force.  When 
I  made  the  movement  from  Hundley's  Corner,  my  posi- 
tion at  that  place  was  occupied  by  a  part  of  Longstreet's 
corps,  under  Anderson. 

On  the  next  morning,  my  troops  were  placed  in  posi- 
tion on  the  east  side  of  Beaver  Dam  across  the  road  to 
Mechanicsville,  but  Rodes  was  subsequently  moved  to  the 
west  side  of  the  creek.  Grant's  movement  to  our  right, 
towards  Cold  Harbor,  was  continued  on  the  31st,  and 
the  1st  of  June,  and  corresponding  movements  were  made 
by  General  Lee  to  meet  him,  my  command  retaining  its 
position  with  a  heavy  force  in  its  front. 

362 


BATTLES  OF  COLD  HARBOR 

On  the  2nd,  all  the  troops  on  my  left,  except  Heth's 
division  of  Hill's  corps,  had  moved  to  the  right,  and  in 
the  afternoon  of  that  day,  Rodes'  division  moved  for- 
ward, along  the  road  from  Hundley's  Corner  towards  Old 
Church,  and  drove  the  enemy  from  his  entrenchments, 
now  occupied  with  heavy  skirmish  lines,  and  forced  back 
his  left  towards  Bethesda  Church,  where  there  was  a 
heavy  force.  Gordon  swung  round  so  as  to  keep  pace 
with  Rodes,  and  Heth  co-operated,  following  Rodes  and 
taking  position  on  his  left  flank.  In  this  movement  there 
was  some  heavy  fighting  and  several  hundred  prisoners 
were  taken  by  us.  Brigadier  General  Doles,  a  gallant  offi- 
cer of  Rodes'  division,  was  killed,  but  otherwise  our  loss 
was  not  severe. 

On  the  next  day  (the  3rd),  when  Grant  made  an  attack 
at  Cold  Harbor  in  which  he  suffered  very  heavily,  there 
were  repeated  attacks  on  Rodes'  and  Heth's  fronts,  those 
on  Cook's  brigade,  of  Heth's  division,  being  especially 
heavy,  but  all  of  them  were  repulsed.  There  was  also 
heavy  skirmishing  on  Gordon's  front.  During  the  day, 
Heth's  left  was  threatened  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  but 
it  was  kept  off  by  Walker's  brigade  under  Colonel  Fry, 
which  covered  that  flank,  and  also  repulsed  an  effort  of 
the  enemy's  infantry  to  get  to  our  rear.  As  it  was  neces- 
sary that  Heth's  division  should  join  its  corps  on  the 
right,  and  my  flank  in  this  position  was  very  much  ex- 
posed, I  withdrew,  at  the  close  of  the  day,  to  the  line 
previously  occupied,  and  next  morning  Heth  moved  to  the 
right. 

My  right  now  connected  with  the  left  of  Longstreet's 
corps  under  General  Anderson.  The  enemy  subsequently 
evacuated  his  position  at  Bethesda  Church  and  his  lines 
in  my  front,  and  having  no  opposing  force  to  keep  my 
troops  in  their  lines,  I  made  two  efforts  to  attack  the 
enemy  on  his  right  flank  and  rear.  The  first  was  made 
on  the  6th,  when  I  crossed  the  Matadaquean  (a  small 

363 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

stream,  running  through  wide  swamps  in  the  enemy's 
rear),  and  got  in  rear  of  his  right  flank,  driving  in  his 
skirmishers  until  we  came  to  a  swamp,  which  could  be 
crossed  only  on  a  narrow  causeway  defended  by  an  en- 
trenched line  with  artillery.  General  Anderson  was  to 
have  co-operated  with  me,  by  moving  down  the  other  side 
of  the  Matadaquean,  but  the  division  sent  for  that  pur- 
pose did  not  reach  the  position  from  which  I  started  until 
near  night,  and  I  was  therefore  compelled  to  retire,  as  my 
position  was  too  much  exposed. 

On  the  next  day  (the  7th),  a  reconnaissance  made  in 
front  of  Anderson's  line  showed  that  the  greater  part  of 
it  was  uncovered,  and,  in  accordance  with  instructions 
from  General  Lee,  I  moved  in  front  of,  and  between  it  and 
the  Matadaquean,  until  my  progress  was  arrested  by  a 
ravine  and  swamp  which  prevented  any  further  advance, 
but  a  number  of  pieces  of  artillery  were  opened  upon  the 
enemy's  position  in  flank  and  reverse,  so  as  to  favor  a 
movement  from  Anderson's  front,  which  had  been 
ordered  but  was  not  made;  and  at  night  I  retired  from 
this  position  to  the  rear  of  our  lines. 

Since  the  fighting  at  the  Wilderness,  Grant  had  made 
it  an  invariable  practice  to  cover  his  front,  flank,  and  rear 
with  a  perfect  network  of  entrenchments,  and  all  his 
movements  were  made  under  cover  of  such  works.  It 
was  therefore  very  difficult  to  get  at  him. 

On  the  11th,  my  command  was  moved  to  the  rear  of 
Hill's  line,  near  Gaines'  Mill;  and  on  the  12th,  I  received 
orders  to  move,  with  the  2nd  corps,  to  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  to  meet  Hunter.  This,  therefore,  closed  my  con- 
nection with  the  campaign  from  the  Rapidan  to  James 
River. 

When  I  moved  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  Grant  had 
already  put  his  army  in  motion  to  join  Butler,  on  James 
River,  a  position  which  he  could  have  reached,  from  his 
camp  on  the  north  of  the  Rapidan,  by  railroad  trans- 

364 


BATTLES  OF  COLD  HARBOR 

ports,  without  the  loss  of  a  man.  In  attempting  to  force 
his  way  by  land,  he  had  already  lost,  in  killed  and 
wounded,  more  men  than  were  in  General  Lee's  entire 
army;  and  he  was  compelled  to  give  up,  in  despair,  the 
attempt  to  reach  Richmond  in  that  way.* 

*  Grant,  in  describing  his  movement  from  Spottsylvania  Court- 
House  to  Hanover  Junction,  says :  "  But  the  enemy  again  having  the 
shorter  line,  and  being  in  possession  of  the  main  roads,  was  enabled 
to  reach  the  North  Anna  in  advance  of  us,  and  took  position  behind  it." 
And,  when  he  speaks  of  his  final  determination  to  join  Butler,  he 
says :  "  After  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness  it  was  evident  that  the 
enemy  deemed  it  of  the  first  importance  to  run  no  risk  with  the  army 
he  then  had.  He  acted  purely  on  the  defensive,  behind  breastworks, 
or,  feebly,  on  the  offensive,  immediately  in  front  of  them,  and  where, 
in  case  of  repulse,  he  could  retire  behind  them.  Without  a  greater 
sacrifice  of  life  than  I  was  willing  to  make  all  could  not  be  accom- 
plished that  I  designed  north  of  Richmond." 

He  has  made  some  observations,  in  his  report,  about  the  advantages 
of  interior  lines  of  communication,  supposed  to  be  possessed  by  the 
Confederate  commanders,  which  are  more  specious  than  sound.  The 
Mississippi  River  divided  the  Confederacy  into  two  parts,  and  the 
immense  naval  power  of  the  enemy  enabled  him  to  render  communica- 
tion across  that  river,  after  the  loss  of  New  Orleans  and  Memphis, 
always  difficult.  The  Ohio  River,  in  the  West,  and  the  Potomac,  in 
the  East,  with  the  mountains  of  Western  Virginia,  rendered  it  im- 
possible for  an  invading  army  to  march  into  the  enemy's  country, 
except  at  one  or  two  fords  of  the  Potomac,  just  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge, 
and  two  or  three  fords  above  Harper's  Ferry.  The  possession  of  the 
seas,  and  the  blockade  of  our  ports,  as  well  as  the  possession  of  the 
Mississippi,  the  Ohio,  and  Potomac  Rivers,  with  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad,  and  the  railroads  through  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Indiana, 
Illinois,  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  enabled  the  enemy  to  transport 
troops,  from  the  most  remote  points,  with  more  ease  and  rapidity  than 
they  could  be  transported  over  the  railroads  under  the  control  of  the 
Confederate  Government,  all  of  which  were  in  bad  condition.  The 
enemy,  therefore,  in  fact,  had  all  the  advantages  of  interior  lines; 
that  is,  rapidity  of  communication  and  concentration,  with  the  ad- 
vantage, also,  of  unrestricted  communication  with  all  the  world,  which 
his  naval  power  gave  him. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

Campaign  in  Maryland  and  Virginia. 

The  Valley  of  Virginia,  in  its  largest  sense,  embraces 
all  that  country  lying  between  the  Blue  Ridge  and  Alle- 
ghany Mountains,  which  unite  at  its  southwestern  end. 

The  Shenandoah  Valley,  which  is  a  part  of  the  Valley 
of  Virginia,  embraces  the  counties  of  Augusta,  Rocking- 
ham, Shenandoah,  Page,  Warren,  Clarke,  Frederick,  Jef- 
ferson and  Berkeley.  This  valley  is  bounded  on  the  north 
by  the  Potomac,  on  the  south  by  the  county  of  Rockbridge, 
on  the  east  by  the  Blue  Ridge  and  on  the  west  by  the 
Great  North  Mountain  and  its  ranges. 

The  Shenandoah  River  is  composed  of  two  branches, 
called,  respectively,  the  "  North  Fork  "  and  the  "  South 
Fork,"  which  unite  near  Front  Royal  in  Warren  County. 
The  North  Fork  rises  in  the  Great  North  Mountain,  and 
runs  eastwardly  to  within  a  short  distance  of  New  Market 
in  Shenandoah  County,  and  thence  northeast  by  Mount 
Jackson  and  Strasburg,  where  it  turns  east  to  Front 
Royal.  The  South  Fork  is  formed  by  the  union  of  North, 
Middle  and  South  Rivers.  North  River  and  Middle  River, 
running  from  the  west,  unite  near  Mount  Meridian  in 
Augusta  County.  South  River  rises  in  the  southeastern 
part  of  Augusta,  and  runs  by  Waynesboro,  along  the 
western  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  to  Port  Republic  in 
Rockingham,  where  it  unites  with  the  stream  formed  by 
the  junction  of  the  North  and  Middle  Rivers,  a  few  miles 
above.  From  Port  Republic,  the  South  Fork  of  the  Shen- 
andoah runs  northeast,  through  the  eastern  border  of 
Rockingham  and  the  county  of  Page,  to  Front  Royal  in 
Warren  County. 

The  North  Fork  and  South  Fork  are  separated  by  the 
Massanutten  Mountain,  which  is  connected  with  no  other 
mountain  but  terminates  abruptly  at  both  ends.  Its 
northern  end  is  washed  at  its  base,  just  below  Strasburg, 

366 


CAMPAIGN  IN  MARYLAND  AND  VIRGINIA 

by  the  North  Fork.  Its  southern  end  terminates  near 
the  road  between  Harrisonburg  and  Conrad's  Store  on 
the  South  Fork,  at  which  latter  place  the  road  through 
Swift  Run  Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge  crosses  that  stream. 
Two  valleys  are  thus  formed,  the  one  on  the  North  Fork 
being  called  "The  Main  Valley,"  and  the  other  on  the 
South  Fork,  and  embracing  the  county  of  Page  and  part 
of  the  county  of  Warren,  being  usually  known  by  the 
name  of  "The  Luray  Valley."  The  Luray  Valley  unites 
with  the  Main  Valley  at  both  ends  of  the  mountain.  There 
is  a  good  road  across  Massanutten  Mountain  from  one 
valley  to  the  other  through  a  gap  near  New  Market.  South 
of  this  gap,  there  is  no  road  across  the  mountain,  and 
north  of  it  the  roads  are  very  rugged  and  not  practicable 
for  the  march  of  a  large  army  with  its  trains.  At  the 
northern  or  lower  end  of  Massanutten  Mountain,  and 
between  two  branches  of  it,  is  a  valley  called  "  Powell's 
Fort  Valley,"  or  more  commonly  "The  Fort."  This 
valley  is  accessible  only  by  the  very  rugged  roads  over 
the  mountain  which  have  been  mentioned,  and  through  a 
ravine  at  its  lower  end.  From  its  isolated  position,  it 
was  not  the  theatre  of  military  operations  of  any  conse- 
quence, but  merely  furnished  a  refuge  for  deserters, 
stragglers  and  fugitives  from  the  battlefields. 

From  Front  Royal,  the  Shenandoah  River  runs  along 
the  western  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge  to  Harper's  Ferry, 
where  it  unites  with  the  Potomac,  which  here  bursts 
through  the  mountains.  The  mountain,  in  extension  of 
the  Blue  Ridge  from  this  point  through  Maryland  and 
Pennsylvania,  is  called  "South  Mountain." 

Strictly  speaking,  the  county  of  Berkeley  and  the 
greater  part  of  Frederick  are  not  in  the  Valley  of  the 
Shenandoah.  The  Opequon,  rising  southwest  of  Win- 
chester, and  crossing  the  Valley  Pike  four  or  five  miles 
south  of  that  place,  turns  to  the  north  and  empties  into 
the  Potomac  some  distance  above  its  junction  with  the 
Shenandoah ;  the  greater  part  of  Frederick  and  nearly  the 

367 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

whole  of  Berkeley  being  on  the  western  side  of  the 
Opequon. 

Little  North  Mountain,  called  in  the  lower  valley 
"North  Mountain,"  runs  northeast,  through  the  western 
portion  of  Shenandoah,  Frederick  and  Berkeley  Counties, 
to  the  Potomac.  At  its  northern  end,  where  it  is  called 
North  Mountain,  it  separates  the  waters  of  the  Opequon 
from  those  of  Back  Creek. 

Cedar  Creek  rises  in  Shenandoah  County,  west  of 
Little  North  Mountain,  and  running  northeast  along  its 
western  base,  passes  through  that  mountain,  four  or  five 
miles  from  Strasburg,  and,  then  making  a  circuit,  empties 
into  the  North  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  about  two  miles 
below  Strasburg. 

The  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  crosses  the  Potomac 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  passing  through  Martinsburg  in 
Berkeley  County,  crosses  Back  Creek  near  its  mouth,  runs 
up  the  Potomac,  crossing  the  South  Branch  of  that  river 
near  its  mouth,  and  then  the  North  Branch  to  Cumberland 
in  Maryland.  From  this  place  it  runs  into  Virginia  again 
and,  passing  through  Northwestern  Virginia,  strikes  the 
Ohio  River  by  two  stems,  terminating  at  Wheeling  and 
Parkersburg  respectively. 

There  is  a  railroad  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  Winches- 
ter, called  "Winchester  &  Potomac  Railroad,"  and  also 
one  from  Manassas  Junction  on  the  Orange  &  Alexan- 
dria Railroad,  through  Manassas  Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge, 
by  Front  Royal  and  Strasburg  to  Mount  Jackson,  called 
"The  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,"  but  both  of  these  roads 
were  torn  up  and  rendered  unserviceable  in  the  year  1862, 
under  the  orders  of  General  Jackson. 

From  Staunton,  in  Augusta  County,  there  is  a  fine 
macadamized  road  called  "The  Valley  Pike,"  running 
through  Mount  Sidney,  Mount  Crawford,  Harrisonburg, 
New  Market,  Mount  Jackson,  Edinburg,  Woodstock,  Stras- 
burg, Middletown,  Newtown,  Bartonsville  and  Kernstown 
to  Winchester  in  Frederick  County,  and  crossing  Middle 
River  seven  miles  from  Staunton ;  North  River  at  Mount 

368 


CAMPAIGN  IN  MARYLAND  AND  VIRGINIA 

Crawford,  eighteen  miles  from  Staunton ;  the  North  Fork 
of  the  Shenandoah  at  Mount  Jackson;  Cedar  Creek  be- 
tween Strasburg  and  Middletown;  and  the  Opequon  at 
Bartonsville,  four  or  five  miles  from  Winchester.  There 
is  also  another  road  west  of  the  Valley  Pike  connecting 
these  several  villages  called  the  ''Back  Road,"  and  in 
some  places,  another  road  between  the  Valley  Pike  and 
the  Back  Road,  which  is  called  the  " Middle  Road." 

From  Winchester  there  is  a  macadamized  road  via 
Martinsburg,  to  Williamsport  on  the  Potomac  in  Mary- 
land, and  another  via  Berryville  in  Clarke  County,  and 
Charlestown  in  Jefferson  County,  to  Harper's  Ferry. 
There  is  also  a  good  pike  from  Winchester  to  Front 
Royal,  which  crosses  both  forks  of  the  Shenandoah  just 
above  their  junction;  and  from  Front  Royal  there  are 
good  roads  up  the  Luray  Valley,  and  by  the  way  of  Con- 
rad's Store  and  Port  Republic,  to  Harrisonburg  and 
Staunton. 

From  Staunton,  south,  there  are  good  roads  passing 
through  Lexington,  in  Rockbridge  County,  and  Buchanan, 
in  Botetourt  County,  to  several  points  on  the  Virginia 
&  Tennessee  Railroad;  and  others  direct  from  Staunton 
and  Lexington  to  Lynchburg. 

The  Central  Railroad,  from  Richmond,  passes  through 
the  Blue  Ridge,  with  a  tunnel  at  Rockfish  Gap,  and  runs 
through  Waynesboro  and  Staunton,  westwardly,  to  Jack- 
son's River,  which  is  one  of  the  head  streams  of  James 
River. 

This  description  of  the  country  is  given  in  order  to 
render  the  following  narrative  intelligible,  without  too 
much  repetition.  In  the  spring  of  1864,  before  the  open- 
ing of  the  campaign,  the  lower  Shenandoah  Valley  was 
held  by  the  Federal  troops,  under  Major  General  Sigel, 
with  his  headquarters  at  Winchester,  while  the  upper 
Valley  was  held  by  Brigadier  General  Imboden,  of  the 
Confederate  Army,  with  one  brigade  of  cavalry,  or 
mounted  infantry,  and  a  battery  of  artillery.  When  the 
campaign  opened,  Sigel  moved  up  the  Valley  and  Major 

24  369 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

General  Breckenridge  moved  from  Southwestern  Vir- 
ginia, with  two  brigades  of  infantry  and  a  battalion  of 
artillery,  to  meet  him.  Breckenridge,  having  united  his 
forces  with  Imboden's,  met  and  defeated  Sigel  at  New 
Market  on  May  15th,  driving  him  back  toward  Winches- 
ter. Breckenridge  then  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge  and 
joined  General  Lee  at  Hanover  Junction,  with  his  two 
brigades  of  infantry  and  the  battalion  of  artillery.  Subse- 
quently, the  Federal  General  Hunter  organized  another 
and  larger  force  than  Sigel 's,  and  moved  up  the  Valley, 
and  on  the  5th  day  of  June  defeated  Brigadier  General 
William  E.  Jones,  at  Piedmont,  between  Port  Republic 
and  Staunton — Jones'  force  being  composed  of  a  very 
small  body  of  infantry,  and  a  cavalry  force  which  had 
been  brought  from  Southwestern  Virginia,  after  Breck- 
enridge 's  departure  from  the  Valley.  Jones  was  killed, 
and  the  remnant  of  his  force,  under  Brigadier  General 
Vaughan,  fell  back  to  Waynesboro.  Hunter's  force  then 
united  with  another  column  which  had  moved  from  Lewis- 
burg,  in  Western  Virginia,  under  the  Federal  General 
Crook.  As  soon  as  information  was  received  of  Jones' 
defeat  and  death,  Breckenridge  was  sent  back  to  the 
Valley,  with  the  force  he  had  brought  with  him. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

Pursuit  of  Hunter. 

On  the  12th  of  June,  while  the  2nd  corps  (Ewell's) 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  lying  near  Gaines' 
Mill,  in  rear  of  Hill's  line  at  Cold  Harbor,  I  received 
verbal  orders  from  General  Lee  to  hold  the  corps,  with 
two  of  the  battalions  of  artillery  attached  to  it,  in  readi- 
ness to  move  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Nelson's  and 
Braxton's  battalions  were  selected,  and  Brigadier 
General  Long  was  ordered  to  accompany  me  as  Chief  of 
Artillery.  After  dark,  on  the  same  day,  written  instruc- 
tions were  given  me  by  General  Lee,  by  which  I  was 
directed  to  move,  with  the  force  designated,  at  3  o'clock 
next  morning,  for  the  Valley,  by  the  way  of  Louisa  Court- 
House  and  Charlottesville,  and  through  Brown's  or  Swift 
Run  Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge,  as  I  might  find  most  advis- 
able; to  strike  Hunter's  force  in  the  rear,  and,  if  possible, 
destroy  it;  then  to  move  down  the  Valley,  cross  the 
Potomac  near  Leesburg  in  Loudoun  County,  or  at  or 
above  Harper's  Ferry,  as  I  might  find  most  practicable, 
and  threaten  Washington  City.  I  was  further  directed  to 
communicate  with  General  Breckenridge,  who  would 
co-operate  with  me  in  the  attack  on  Hunter  and  the  expe- 
dition into  Maryland. 

At  this  time  the  railroad  and  telegraph  lines  between 
Charlottesville  and  Lynchburg  had  been  cut  by  a  cavalry 
force  from  Hunter's  army;  and  those  between  Richmond 
and  Charlottesville  had  been  cut  by  Sheridan's  cavalry, 
from  Grant's  army;  so  that  there  was  no  communication 
with  Breckenridge.  Hunter  was  supposed  to  be  at  Staun- 
ton with  his  whole  force,  and  Breckenridge  was  supposed 
to  be  at  Waynesboro  or  Rock-fish  Gap.  If  such  had  been 
the  case,  the  route  designated  by  General  Lee  would  have 
carried  me  into  the  Valley  in  Hunter's  rear. 

The   2nd   corps  now  numbered  a  little   over  8,000 

371 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

muskets  for  duty.  It  had  been  on  active  and  arduous 
service  in  the  field  for  forty  days,  and  had  been  engaged 
in  all  the  great  battles  from  the  Wilderness  to  Cold 
Harbor,  sustaining  very  heavy  losses  at  Spottsylvania 
Court-House,  where  it  lost  nearly  an  entire  division,  in- 
cluding its  commander,  Major  General  Johnson,  who  was 
made  prisoner.  Of  the  brigadier  generals  with  it  at  the 
commencement  of  the  campaign,  only  one  remained  in 
command  of  his  brigade.  Two  (Gordon  and  Ramseur) 
had  been  made  Major  Generals;  one  (G.  H.  Stewart)  had 
been  captured;  four  (Pegram,  Hays,  J.  A.  Walker  and 
E.  D.  Johnston)  had  been  severely  wounded;  and  four 
(Stafford,  J.  M.  Jones,  Daniel,  and  Doles)  had  been  killed 
in  action.  Constant  exposure  to  the  weather,  a  limited 
supply  of  provisions,  and  two  weeks'  service  in  the 
swamps  north  of  the  Chickahominy  had  told  on  the  health 
of  the  men.  Divisions  were  not  stronger  than  brigades 
ought  to  have  been,  nor  brigades  than  regiments. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  at  two  o'clock,  we  com- 
menced the  march;  and  on  the  16th,  arrived  at  Rivanna 
River  near  Charlottesville,  having  marched  over  eighty 
miles  in  four  days.* 

From  Louisa  Court-House  I  had  sent  a  dispatch  to 
Gordonsville,  to  be  forwarded,  by  telegraph,  to  Brecken- 
ridge ;  and,  on  my  arrival  at  Charlottesville,  on  the  16th, 

*  On  the  15th  we  passed  over  the  ground,  near  Trevillian's  depot, 
on  which  Hampton  and  Sheridan  had  fought  on  the  11th  and  12th. 
Hampton  had  defeated  Sheridan  and  was  then  in  pursuit  of  him. 
Grant,  in  his  report,  says  that  on  the  11th  Sheridan  drove  our  cavalry 
"  from  the  field,  in  complete  rout,"  and,  when  he  advanced  towards 
Gordonsville,  on  the  12th,  "  he  found  the  enemy  reinforced  by  in- 
fantry, behind  well-constructed  rifle-pits,  about  five  miles  from  the  latter 
place,  and  too  strong  to  successfully  assault."  There  was  not  an  infantry 
soldier  in  arms  nearer  the  scene  of  action  than  with  General  Lee's 
army,  near  Cold  Harbor;  and  the  "well-constructed  rifle-pits"  were 
nothing  more  than  rails  put  up  in  the  manner  in  which  cavalry  were 
accustomed  to  arrange  them  to  prevent  a  charge.  Sheridan  mistook 
some  of  Hampton's  cavalry,  dismounted  and  fighting  on  foot,  for 
infantry. 

372 


PURSUIT  OF  HUNTER 

to  which  place  I  rode  in  advance  of  my  troops,  I  received 
a  telegram  from  him,  dated  at  Lynchburg,  informing  me 
that  Hunter  was  then  in  Bedford  County,  about  twenty 
miles  from  that  place,  and  moving  on  it. 

The  railroad  and  telegraph  between  Charlottesville 
and  Lynchburg  had  been,  fortunately,  but  slightly  injured 
by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  had  been  repaired.  The 
distance  between  the  two  places  was  sixty  miles,  and 
there  were  no  trains  at  Charlottesville  except  one  which 
belonged  to  the  Central  road,  and  was  about  starting  for 
Waynesboro.  I  ordered  this  to  be  detained,  and  immedi- 
ately directed,  by  telegram,  all  the  trains  of  the  two  roads 
to  be  sent  to  me  with  all  dispatch,  for  the  purpose  of 
transporting  my  troops  to  Lynchburg.  The  trains  were 
not  in  readiness  to  take  the  troops  on  board  until  sun- 
rise on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  and  then  only  enough 
were  furnished  to  transport  about  half  of  my  infantry. 
Ramseur's  division,  one  brigade  of  Gordon's  division  and 
part  of  another  were  put  on  the  trains,  as  soon  as  they 
were  ready,  and  started  for  Lynchburg.  Rodes '  division, 
and  the  residue  of  Gordon's,  were  ordered  to  move  along 
the  railroad,  to  meet  the  trains  on  their  return.  The 
artillery  and  wagon-trains  had  been  started  on  the 
ordinary  roads  at  daylight. 

I  accompanied  Ramseur's  division,  going  on  the  front 
train,  but  the  road  and  rolling  stock  were  in  such  bad  con- 
dition that  I  did  not  reach  Lynchburg  until  about  one 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  the  other  trains  were  much 
later.  I  found  General  Breckenridge  in  bed,  suffering 
from  an  injury  received  by  the  fall  of  a  horse  killed  under 
him  in  action  near  Cold  Harbor.  He  had  moved  from 
Rock-fish  Gap  to  Lynchburg  by  a  forced  march,  as  soon 
as  Hunter's  movement  towards  that  place  was  discov- 
ered. When  I  showed  him  my  instructions,  he  very  read- 
ily and  cordially  offered  to  co-operate  with  me,  and 
serve  under  my  command. 

Hunter's  advance  from  Staunton  had  been  impeded 
by  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  under  Brigadier  General  Mc- 

373 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Causland,  which  had  been  managed  with  great  skill,  and 
kept  in  his  front  all  the  way,  and  he  was  reported  to  be 
then  advancing  on  the  old  stone  turnpike  from  Liberty 
in  Bedford  County  by  New  London,  and  watched  by 
Imboden  with  a  small  force  of  cavalry. 

As  General  Breckenridge  was  unable  to  go  out,  at 
his  request,  General  D.  H.  Hill,  who  happened  to  be  in 
town,  had  made  arrangements  for  the  defence  of  the  city, 
with  such  troops  as  were  at  hand.  Brigadier  General 
Hays,  who  was  an  invalid  from  a  wound  received  at 
Spottsylvania  Court-House,  had  tendered  his  services 
and  also  aided  in  making  arrangements  for  the  defence. 
I  rode  out  with  General  Hill  to  examine  the  line  selected 
by  him,  and  make  a  reconnaissance  of  the  country  in 
front.  Slight  works  had  been  hastily  thrown  up  on 
College  Hill,  covering  the  turnpike  and  Forest  roads  from 
Liberty,  which  were  manned  by  Breckenridge 's  infantry 
and  the  dismounted  cavalry  of  the  command  which  had 
been  with  Jones  at  Piedmont.  The  reserves,  invalids 
from  the  hospitals,  and  the  cadets  from  the  Military  In- 
stitute at  Lexington,  occupied  other  parts  of  the  line. 
An  inspection  satisfied  me  that,  while  this  arrangement 
was  the  best  which  could  be  made  under  the  circumstances 
in  which  General  Hill  found  himself,  yet  it  would  leave 
the  town  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery, 
should  he  advance  to  the  attack,  and  I  therefore  deter- 
mined to  meet  the  enemy  with  my  troops  in  front. 

"We  found  Imboden  about  four  miles  out  on  the  turn- 
pike, near  an  old  Quaker  church,  to  which  position  he 
had  been  gradually  forced  back  by  the  enemy's  infantry. 
My  troops,  as  they  arrived,  had  been  ordered  in  front  of 
the  works  to  bivouac,  and  I  immediately  sent  orders 
for  them  to  move  out  on  this  road,  at  a  redoubt  about 
two  miles  from  the  city,  as  Imboden 's  command  was 
driven  back  by  vastly  superior  numbers.  These  bri- 
gades, with  two  pieces  of  artillery  in  the  redoubt,  arrested 
the  progress  of  the  enemy,  and  Ramseur's  other  brigade, 
and  the  part  of  Gordon 's  division  which  had  arrived,  took 

374 


PURSUIT  OF  HUNTER 

position  on  the  same  line.  The  enemy  opened  a  heavy 
fire  of  artillery  on  us,  but,  as  night  soon  came  on,  he 
went  into  camp  in  our  front.* 

Upon  my  arrival  at  Lynchburg,  orders  had  been  given 
for  the  immediate  return  of  the  train  for  the  rest  of  my 
infantry,  and  I  expected  it  to  arrive  by  the  morning  of 
the  18th,  but  it  did  not  get  to  Lynchburg  until  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  that  day.  Hunter's  force  was  considerably 
larger  than  mine  would  have  been,  had  it  all  been  up, 
and  as  it  was  of  the  utmost  consequence  to  the  army  at 
Richmond  that  he  should  not  get  into  Lynchburg,  I  did 
not  feel  justified  in  attacking  him  until  I  could  do  so  with 
a  fair  prospect  of  success.  I  contented  myself  therefore 
with  acting  on  the  defensive  on  the  18th,  throwing  Breck- 
enridge  's  infantry  and  a  part  of  his  artillery  on  the  front 
line,  while  that  adopted  by  General  Hill  was  occupied  by 
the  dismounted  cavalry  and  the  irregular  troops.  Dur- 
ing the  day,  there  was  artillery  firing  and  skirmishing 
along  the  line,  and,  in  the  afternoon,  an  attack  was  made 
on  our  line,  to  the  right  of  the  turnpike,  which  was  hand- 
somely repulsed  with  considerable  loss  to  the  enemy.  A 
demonstration  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the  Forest  road 
was  checked  by  part  of  Breckenridge's  infantry  under 
Wharton  and  McCausland's  cavalry. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  cars  from  Richmond  this  day, 
Major  Generals  Elzey  and  Ransom  reported  for  duty,  the 

*  Hunter's  delay  in  advancing  from  Staunton  had  been  most  re- 
markable. He  had  defeated  Jones'  small  force  at  Piedmont,  about 
ten  miles  from  Staunton,  on  the  5th,  and  united  with  Crook  on  the 
8th,  yet  he  did  not  arrive  in  front  of  Lynchburg  until  near  night  on 
the  17th.  The  route  from  Staunton  to  Lynchburg  by  which  he  moved, 
which  was  by  Lexington,  Buchanan,  the  Peaks  of  Otter  and  Liberty, 
is  about  one  hundred  miles  in  distance.  It  is  true  that  McCausland 
had  delayed  his  progress  by  keeping  constantly  in  his  front,  but  an 
energetic  advance  would  have  brushed  away  McCausland's  small  force, 
and  Lynchburg,  with  all  its  manufacturing  establishments  and  stores, 
would  have  fallen  before  assistance  arrived.  A  subsequent  passage 
over  the  greater  part  of  the  same  route  showed  how  Hunter  had  been 
employed. 

375 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

former  to  command  the  infantry  and  dismounted  cavalry 
of  Breckenridge's  command,  and  the  latter  to  command 
the  cavalry.  The  mounted  cavalry  consisted  of  the  rem- 
nants of  several  brigades  divided  into  two  commands,  one 
under  Imboden,  and  the  other  under  McCausland.  It  was 
badly  mounted  and  armed,  and  its  efficiency  much  im- 
paired by  the  defeat  at  Piedmont,  and  the  arduous  ser- 
vice it  had  recently  gone  through. 

As  soon  as  the  remainder  of  my  infantry  arrived  by 
the  railroad,  though  none  of  my  artillery  had  gotten  up, 
arrangements  were  made  for  attacking  Hunter  at  day- 
light on  the  19th,  but  some  time  after  midnight  it  was  dis- 
covered that  he  was  moving,  though  it  was  not  known 
whether  he  was  retreating  or  moving  so  as  to  attack 
Lynchburg  on  the  south  where  it  was  vulnerable,  or  to 
attempt  to  join  Grant  on  the  south  side  of  James  River. 
Pursuit  could  not,  therefore,  be  made  at  once,  as  a  mis- 
take, if  either  of  the  last  two  objects  had  been  contem- 
plated, would  have  been  fatal.  At  light,  however,  the  pur- 
suit commenced,  the  2nd  corps  moving  along  the  turn- 
pike, over  which  it  was  discovered  Hunter  was  retreating, 
and  Elzey's  command  on  the  right,  along  the  Forest 
road,  while  Ransom  was  ordered  to  move  on  the  right  of 
Elzey,  with  McCausland 's  cavalry,  and  endeavor  to  strike 
the  enemy  at  Liberty  or  Peaks  of  Otter.  Imboden,  who 
was  on  the  road  from  Lynchburg  to  Campbell  Court- 
House  to  watch  a  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  had 
moved  in  that  direction  the  day  before,  was  to  have 
moved  on  the  left  towards  Liberty,  but  orders  did  not 
reach  him  in  time.  The  enemy's  rear  was  overtaken  at 
Liberty,  twenty-five  miles  from  Lynchburg,  just  before 
night,  and  driven  through  that  place,  after  a  brisk  skir- 
mish, by  Ramseur's  division.  The  day's  march  on  the 
old  turnpike,  which  was  very  rough,  had  been  terrible. 
McCausland  had  taken  the  wrong  road  and  did  not  reach 
Liberty  until  after  the  enemy  had  been  driven  through 
the  town. 

It  was  here  ascertained  that  Hunter  had  not  retreated 

376 


PURSUIT  OF  HUNTER 

on  the  route  by  the  Peaks  of  Otter,  over  which  he  had 
advanced,  but  had  taken  the  road  to  Buford's  depot,  at 
the  foot  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  which  would  enable  him  to  go 
either  by  Salem,  Fincastle  or  Buchanan.  Ransom  was, 
therefore,  ordered  to  take  the  route,  next  day,  by  the 
Peaks  of  Otter,  and  endeavor  to  intercept  the  enemy 
should  he  move  by  Buchanan  or  Fincastle.  The  pursuit 
was  resumed  early  on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  and  upon 
our  arrival  in  sight  of  Buford's,  the  enemy's  rear  guard 
was  seen  going  into  the  mountain  on  the  road  towards 
Salem.  As  this  left  the  road  to  Buchanan  open,  my 
aide,  Lieutenant  Pitzer,  was  sent  across  the  mountain  to 
that  place,  with  orders  for  Ransom  to  move  for  Salem. 
Lieutenant  Pitzer  was  also  instructed  to  ride  all  night 
and  send  instructions,  by  courier  from  Fincastle,  and 
telegraph  from  Salem,  to  have  the  road  through  the 
mountains  to  Lewisburg  and  Southwestern  Virginia 
blockaded.  The  enemy  was  pursued  into  the  mountains 
at  Buford's  Gap,  but  he  had  taken  possession  of  the  crest 
of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  put  batteries  in  position  command- 
ing a  gorge,  through  which  the  road  passes,  where  it 
was  impossible  for  a  regiment  to  move  in  line.  I  had 
endeavored  to  ascertain  if  there  was  another  way  across 
the  mountain  by  which  I  could  get  around  the  enemy,  but 
all  men,  except  the  old  ones,  had  gotten  out  of  the  way, 
and  the  latter,  as  well  as  the  women  and  children,  were  in 
such  a  state  of  distress  and  alarm,  that  no  reliable  infor- 
mation could  be  obtained  from  them.  We  tried  to  throw 
forces  up  the  sides  of  the  mountains  to  get  at  the  enemy, 
but  they  were  so  rugged  that  night  came  on  before  any- 
thing could  be  accomplished,  and  we  had  to  desist,  though 
not  until  a  very  late  hour  in  the  night. 

By  a  mistake  of  the  messenger,  who  was  sent  with 
orders  to  General  Rodes,  who  was  to  be  in  the  lead  next 
morning,  there  was  some  delay  in  his  movement  on  the 
21st,  but  the  pursuit  was  resumed  very  shortly  after  sun- 
rise. At  the  Big  Lick,  it  was  ascertained  that  the  enemy 
had  turned  off  from  Salem  towards  Lewisburg,  on  a  road 

377 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

which  passes  through  the  mountains  at  a  narrow  pass 
called  the  "Hanging  Rock,"  and  my  column  was  immedi- 
ately turned  towards  that  point,  but  on  arriving  there  it 
was  ascertained  that  the  enemy's  rear  guard  had  passed 
through  the  gorge.  McCausland  had  struck  his  column 
at  this  point  and  captured  ten  pieces  of  artillery,  some 
wagons  and  a  number  of  prisoners ;  but,  the  enemy  hav- 
ing brought  up  a  heavy  force,  McCausland  was  compelled 
to  fall  back,  carrying  off,  however,  the  prisoners  and  a 
part  of  the  artillery,  and  disabling  the  rest  so  that  it  could 
not  be  removed.  As  the  enemy  had  got  into  the  moun- 
tains, where  nothing  useful  could  be  accomplished  by  pur- 
suit, I  did  not  deem  it  proper  to  continue  it  farther. 

A  great  part  of  my  command  had  had  nothing  to  eat 
for  the  last  few  days,  except  a  little  bacon  which  was 
obtained  at  Liberty.*  The  cooking  utensils  were  in  the 
trains,  and  the  effort  to  have  bread  baked  at  Lynchburg 
had  failed.  Neither  the  wagon  trains,  nor  the  artillery 
of  the  2nd  corps,  were  up  and  I  knew  that  the  country, 
through  which  Hunter's  route  led  for  forty  or  fifty 
miles,  was,  for  the  most  part,  a  desolate  mountain  region ; 
and  that  his  troops  were  taking  everything  in  the  way  of 
provisions  and  forage  which  they  could  lay  their  hands 
on.  My  field  officers,  except  those  of  Breckenridge's  com- 
mand, were  on  foot,  as  their  horses  could  not  be  trans- 
ported on  the  trains  from  Charlottesville.  I  had  seen 
our  soldiers  endure  a  great  deal,  but  there  was  a  limit  to 
the  endurance  even  of  Confederate  soldiers.  A  stern 
chase  with  infantry  is  a  very  difficult  one,  and  Hunter's 
men  were  marching  for  their  lives,  his  disabled  being  car- 
ried in  his  provision  train,  which  was  now  empty.  My 
cavalry  was  not  strong  enough  to  accomplish  anything 
of  importance,  and  a  further  pursuit  could  only  have 
resulted  in  disaster  to  my  command  from  want  of  pro- 
visions and  forage. 

I  was  glad  to  see  Hunter  take  the  route  to  Lewisburg, 

*  Now  Bedford  City. 

378 


PURSUIT  OF  HUNTER 

as  I  knew  he  could  not  stop  short  of  the  Kanawha  River, 
and  he  was,  therefore,  disposed  of  for  some  time.  Had 
he  moved  to  Southwestern  Virginia,  he  would  have  done 
us  incalculable  mischief,  as  there  were  no  troops  of  any 
consequence  in  that  quarter,  but  plenty  of  supplies  at  that 
time.  I  should,  therefore,  have  been  compelled  to  follow 
him.* 

My  command  had  marched  sixty  miles,  in  the  three 
days '  pursuit,  over  very  rough  roads,  and  that  part  of  it 
from  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  had  no  rest 
since  leaving  Gaines '  Mill.  I  determined  therefore  to  rest 
on  the  22nd,  so  as  to  enable  the  wagons  and  artillery  to 
get  up,  and  to  prepare  the  men  for  the  long  march  before 
them.  Imboden  had  come  up,  following  on  the  road 
through  Salem  after  the  enemy,  and  the  cavalry  was  sent 
through  Fincastle,  to  watch  the  enemy  and  to  annoy  him 
as  he  passed  through  the  mountains  towards  Lewisburg, 
and  also  ascertain  whether  he  would  endeavor  to  get  into 
the  valley  towards  Lexington  or  Staunton. 

*  In  his  report  Grant  says :  "  General  Hunter,  owing  to  a  want 
of  ammunition  to  give  battle,  retired  from  before  the  place  "  (Lynch- 
burg). Now  it  appears  that  this  expedition  had  been  long  contem- 
plated and  was  one  of  the  prominent  features  of  the  campaign  of 
1864.  Sheridan,  with  his  cavalry,  was  to  have  united  with  Hunter  at 
Lynchburg  and  the  two  together  were  to  have  destroyed  General  Lee's 
communications  and  depots  of  supplies  and  then  have  joined  Grant. 
Can  it  be  believed  that  Hunter  set  out  on  so  important  an  expedition 
with  an  insufficient  supply  of  ammunition?  He  had  only  fought  the 
battle  of  Piedmont  with  a  part  of  his  force,  and  not  a  very  severe 
one,  as  Jones'  force  was  a  small  one  and  composed  mostly  of  cavalry. 
Crook's  column,  not  being  there,  was  not  engaged.  Had  Sheridan 
defeated  Hampton  at  Trevillian's,  he  would  have  reached  Lynchburg 
after  destroying  the  railroad  on  the  way,  and  I  could  not  have  reached 
there  in  time  to  do  any  good.  But  Hampton  defeated  Sheridan  and 
the  latter  saw  "  infantry  too  strong  to  successfully  assault."  Had 
Hunter  moved  on  Lynchburg  with  energy,  that  place  would  have  fallen 
before  it  was  possible  for  me  to  get  there.  But  he  tarried  on  the  way, 
and  when  he  reached  there,  there  was  discovered  "  a  want  of  ammuni- 
tion to  give  battle." 


CHAPTEE  XXXVIII. 

Operations  in  Lower  Valley  and  Maryland. 

At  Lynchburg  I  had  received  a  telegram  from  G-eneral 
Lee  directing  me,  after  disposing  of  Hunter,  either  to 
return  to  his  army  or  to  carry  out  the  original  plan,  as 
I  might  deem  most  expedient  under  the  circumstances  in 
which  I  found  myself.  After  the  pursuit  had  ceased,  I 
received  another  dispatch  from  him,  submitting  it  to  my 
judgment  whether  the  condition  of  my  troops  would  per- 
mit the  expedition  across  the  Potomac  to  be  carried  out, 
and  I  determined  to  take  the  responsibility  of  continuing 
it.  On  the  23rd,  the  march  was  resumed  and  we  reached 
Buchanan  that  night,  where  we  struck  again  the  route 
over  which  Hunter  had  advanced.*  Eansom's  cavalry 
moved  by  Clifton  Forge,  through  the  western  part  of 

*  The  scenes  on  Hunter's  route  from  Lynchburg  had  been  truly 
heart-rending.  Houses  had  been  burned,  and  women  and  children  left 
without  shelter.  The  country  had  been  stripped  of  provisions  and 
many  families  left  without  a  morsel  to  eat.  Furniture  and  bedding 
had  been  cut  to  pieces,  and  old  men  and  women  and  children  robbed 
of  all  clothing  except  what  they  were  wearing.  Ladies'  trunks  had  been 
rifled  and  their  dresses  torn  to  pieces  in  mere  wantonness.  Even 
negro  girls  had  lost  their  little  finery.  We  now  had  renewed  evidences 
of  outrages  committed  by  the  commanding  general's  orders  in  burn- 
ing and  plundering  private  houses.  We  saw  the  ruins  of  a  number 
of  houses  so  destroyed.  At  Lexington  Hunter  had  burned  the  Military 
Institute,  with  all  its  contents,  including  its  library  and  scientific 
apparatus;  and  Washington  College  had  been  plundered  and  the  statue 
of  Washington  taken.  The  residence  of  Ex-Governor  Letcher,  at  that 
place,  had  been  burned,  and  but  a  few  minutes  given  Mrs.  Letcher  and 
her  family,  to  leave  the  house.  In  the  same  county  a  Christian  gentle- 
man, Mr.  Creigh,  had  been  hung  because  he  had  killed  a  straggling 
and  marauding  Federal  soldier  while  in  the  act  of  insulting  and 
outraging  the  ladies  of  his  family.  The  time  consumed  in  the  per- 
petration of  those  deeds  was  the  salvation  of  Lynchburg,  with  its 
stores,  foundries  and  factories,  which  were  so  necessary  to  our  army 
at  Richmond. 

380 


OPERATIONS  IN  LOWER  VALLEY  AND  MARYLAND 

Rockbridge,  to  keep  a  lookout  for  Hunter  and  ascertain 
if  he  should  attempt  to  get  into  the  Valley  again. 

On  the  26th,  I  reached  Staunton  in  advance  of  my 
troops,  and  the  latter  came  up  next  day,  which  was  spent 
in  reducing  transportation  and  getting  provisions  from 
Waynesboro,  to  which  point  they  had  been  sent  over  the 
railroad.  Some  of  the  guns  and  a  number  of  the  horses 
belonging  to  the  artillery  were  now  unfit  for  service,  and 
the  best  of  each  were  selected,  and  about  a  battalion  taken 
from  Breckenridge's  artillery,  under  Lieutenant  Colonel 
King,  to  accompany  us,  in  addition  to  the  two  battalions 
brought  with  the  2nd  corps.  The  rest  were  left  behind 
with  a  portion  of  the  officers  and  men  in  charge  of  them. 
The  dismounted  cavalry  had  been  permitted  to  send  for 
their  horses  which  had  been  recruiting,  and  Col.  Bradley 
T.  Johnson,  who  had  joined  me  at  this  place  with  a  battal- 
ion of  Maryland  cavalry,  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  Jones '  brigade,  with  the  temporary  rank  of  brigadier 
general,  that  brigade  having  been  reorganized  and  the 
two  Maryland  battalions  attached  to  it.  General  Breck- 
enridge  had  accompanied  us  from  Lynchburg,  and,  to 
give  him  a  command  commensurate  with  his  proper  one, 
and  at  the  same  time  enable  me  to  control  the  cavalry 
more  readily,  Gordon's  division  of  infantry  was  assigned 
to  his  command  in  addition  to  the  one  under  Elzey,  and 
Ransom,  in  charge  of  the  cavalry,  was  ordered  to  report 
to  me  directly.  Major  General  Elzey  was  relieved  from 
duty,  at  his  own  request,  and  the  division  under  him  was 
left  under  the  temporary  command  of  Brigadier  General 
Vaughan. 

The  official  reports  at  this  place  showed  about  two 
thousand  mounted  men  for  duty  in  the  cavalry,  which 
was  composed  of  four  small  brigades,  to  wit:  Imboden's, 
McCausland's,  Jackson's  and  Jones'  (now  Johnson's). 
Vaughan 's  had  not  been  mounted,  but  the  horses  had  been 
sent  for  from  Southwestern  Virginia.  The  official  re- 
ports of  the  infantry  showed  10,000  muskets  for  duty, 
including  Vaughan 's  dismounted  cavalry.    Nearly,  if  not 

381 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

quite,  half  of  the  company's  officers  and  men  were  bare- 
footed or  nearly  so,  and  a  dispatch  had  been  sent  from 
Salem  by  courier,  and  Lynchburg  by  telegraph,  to  Rich- 
mond, requesting  shoes  to  be  sent  to  Staunton,  but  they 
had  not  arrived. 

Another  telegram  was  received  here  from  General 
Lee  stating  that  the  circumstances  under  which  my  orig- 
inal orders  were  given  had  changed,  and  again  submit- 
ting it  to  my  judgment,  in  the  altered  state  of  things, 
whether  the  movement  down  the  Valley  and  across  the 
Potomac  should  be  made.  The  accession  to  my  command 
from  Breckenridge's  forces  had  not  been  as  great  as 
General  Lee  supposed  it  would  be,  on  account  of  the 
disorganization  consequent  on  Jones'  defeat  at  Piedmont, 
and  the  subsequent  rapid  movement  to  Lynchburg  from 
Rock-fish  Gap,  but  I  determined  to  carry  out  the  original 
design  at  all  hazards,  and  telegraphed  General  Lee  my 
purpose  to  continue  the  movement. 

The  march  was  resumed  on  the  28th  with  five  days' 
rations  in  the  wagons  and  two  days'  in  haversacks,  empty 
wagons  being  left  to  bring  the  shoes  when  they  arrived. 
Imboden  was  sent  through  Brock's  Gap  in  the  Great 
North  Mountain  to  the  Valley  of  the  south  branch  of  the 
Potomac,  with  his  brigade  of  cavalry  and  a  battery  of 
horse  artillery,  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge  over  that 
stream  and  all  the  bridges  on  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Rail- 
road from  that  point  to  Martinsburg.  The  telegraph  line 
was  repaired  to  New  Market  as  we  marched  down  the 
Valley,  and  communications  kept  up  with  that  point  by 
signal  stations.  On  the  2nd  of  July  we  reached 
Winchester  *  and  I  here  received  a  dispatch  from  General 


*  On  this  day  we  passed  through  Newtown,  where  several  houses, 
including  that  of  a  Methodist  minister,  had  been  burned  by  Hunter's 
orders,  because  a  part  of  Mosby's  command  had  attacked  a  train  of 
supplies  for  Sigel's  force,  at  this  place.  The  original  order  was  to 
burn  the  whole  town,  but  the  officer  sent  to  execute  it  had  revolted  at 
the  cruel  mandate  and  another  was  sent  who  but  partially  executed 
it,  after  forcing  the  people  to  take  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United 

382 


OPERATIONS  IN  LOWER  VALLEY  AND  MARYLAND 

Lee,  directing  me  to  remain  in  the  lower  Valley  until 
everything  was  in  readiness  to  cross  the  Potomac  and  to 
destroy  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  and  the  Chesa- 
peake &  Ohio  Canal  as  far  as  possible.  This  was  in 
accordance  with  my  previous  determination,  and  its  policy 
was  obvious.  My  provisions  were  nearly  exhausted,  and  if 
I  had  moved  through  Loudoun,  it  would  have  been  neces- 
sary for  me  to  halt  and  thresh  wheat  and  have  it  ground, 
as  neither  bread  nor  flour  could  otherwise  be  obtained, 
which  would  have  caused  much  greater  delay  than  was 
required  on  the  other  route,  where  we  could  take  provi- 
sions from  the  enemy.  Moreover,  unless  the  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  Railroad  was  torn  up,  the  enemy  would  have  been 
able  to  move  troops  from  the  West  over  that  road  to 
Washington. 

On  the  night  of  the  2nd,  McCausland  was  sent  across 
North  Mountain,  to  move  down  Back  Creek,  and  burn  the 
railroad  bridge  at  its  mouth,  and  then  to  move  by  North 
Mountain  depot  to  Haynesville  on  the  road  from  Martins- 
burg  to  Williamsport ;  and,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  3rd, 
Bradley  Johnson  was  sent  by  Smithfield  and  Leetown,  to 
cross  the  railroad  at  Kearneysville  east  of  Martinsburg, 
and  unite  with  McCausland  at  Haynesville,  so  as  to 
cut  off  the  retreat  of  Sigel,  who  was  at  Martinsburg  with 
a  considerable  force.  Breckenridge  moved,  on  the  same 
morning,  direct  from  Martinsburg,  with  his  command 
preceded  by  Grilmor's  battalion  of  cavalry,  while  I  moved 
with  Rodes'  and  Ramseur's  divisions,  over  the  route 
taken  by  Johnson,  to  Leetown.  On  the  approach  of 
Breckenridge,  Sigel,  after  very  slight  skirmishing,  evacu- 
ated Martinsburg,  leaving  behind  considerable  stores, 
which  fell  into  our  hands.    McCausland  burned  the  bridge 

States  to  save  their  houses.  Mosby's  battalion,  though  called  "  gueril- 
las "  by  the  enemy,  was  a  regular  organization  in  the  Confederate 
Army,  and  was  merely  serving  on  detached  duty  under  General  Lee's 
orders.  The  attack  on  the  train  was  an  act  of  legitimate  warfare,  and 
the  order  to  burn  Newtown  and  the  burning  of  houses  mentioned  were 
unjustifiable. 

383 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

over  Back  Creek,  captured  the  guard  at  North  Mountain 
depot,  and  succeeded  in  reaching  Haynesville ;  but  John- 
son encountered  a  force  at  Leetown,  under  Mulligan, 
which,  after  hard  fighting,  he  drove  across  the  railroad, 
when,  Sigel  having  united  with  Mulligan,  Johnson's  com- 
mand was  forced  back,  just  before  night,  on  Rodes'  and 
Ramseur's  divisions,  which  had  arrived  at  Leetown,  after 
a  march  of  twenty-four  miles.  It  was  too  late,  and  these 
divisions  were  too  much  exhausted,  to  go  after  the  enemy ; 
and  during  the  night,  Sigel  retreated  across  the  Potomac 
at  Shepherdstown,  to  Maryland  Heights. 

On  the  4th,  Shepherdstown  was  occupied  by  a  part  of 
Ransom's  cavalry.  Rodes'  and  Ramseur's  divisions 
moved  to  Harper's  Ferry  and  the  enemy  was  driven 
from  Bolivar  Heights  and  the  village  of  Bolivar,  to  an 
inner  line  of  works  under  the  cover  of  the  guns  from 
Maryland  Heights.  Breckenridge  after  burning  the  rail- 
road bridges  at  Martinsburg,  and  across  the  Opequon, 
moved  to  Duffield's  depot,  five  miles  from  Harper's  Ferry, 
destroying  the  road  as  he  moved.  During  the  night  of  the 
4th,  the  enemy  evacuated  Harper's  Ferry,  burning  the 
railroad  and  pontoon  bridges  across  the  Potomac. 

It  was  not  possible  to  occupy  the  town  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  except  with  skirmishers,  as  it  was  thoroughly 
commanded  by  the  heavy  guns  on  Maryland  Heights ;  and 
the  5th  was  spent  by  Rodes'  and  Ramseur's  divisions  in 
demonstrating  at  that  place.  In  the  afternoon  Brecken- 
ridge's  command  crossed  the  river  at  Shepherdstown, 
and  Gordon's  division  was  advanced  over  the  Antietam 
towards  Maryland  Heights.  At  night,  considerable 
stores,  which  had  been  abandoned  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
were  secured;  and  before  day,  Rodes'  and  Ramseur's 
divisions  moved  to  Shepherdstown,  and  crossed  the 
Potomac  early  on  the  6th,  Lewis'  brigade,  of  Ramseur's 
division,  being  left  to  occupy  Harper's  Ferry  with 
skirmishers. 

On  this  day  (the  6th)  Gordon's  division  advanced 
towards  Maryland  Heights,  and  drove  the  enemy  into 

384 


OPERATIONS  IN  LOWER  VALLEY  AND  MARYLAND 

his  works.  Working  parties  were  employed  in  destroying 
the  aqueduct  of  the  canal  over  the  Antietam,  and  the  locks 
and  canal-boats. 

On  the  7th  Rodes  moved  through  Rohrersville,  on  the 
road  to  Crampton's  Gap  in  South  Mountain,  and  skir- 
mished with  a  small  force  of  the  enemy,  while  Brecken- 
ridge  demonstrated  against  Maryland  Heights,  with 
Gordon's  division,  supported  by  his  other  division,  now 
under  Brigadier  General  Echols,  who  had  reported  for 
duty. 

While  these  operations  were  going  on,  McCausland 
had  occupied  Hagerstown,  and  levied  a  contribution  of 
$20,000,  and  Boonsboro  had  been  occupied  by  Johnson's 
cavalry.  On  the  6th  I  received  a  letter  from  General 
Lee,  by  special  courier,  informing  me  that,  on  the  12th, 
an  effort  would  be  made  to  release  the  prisoners  at  Point 
Lookout,  and  directing  me  to  take  steps  to  unite  them 
with  my  command,  if  the  attempt  was  successful;  but  I 
was  not  informed  of  the  manner  in  which  the  attempt 
would  be  made — General  Lee  stating  that  he  was  not, 
himself,  advised  of  the  particulars. 

My  desire  had  been  to  manoeuvre  the  enemy  out  of 
Maryland  Heights,  so  as  to  enable  me  to  move  directly 
from  Harper's  Ferry  for  Washington;  but  he  had  taken 
refuge  in  his  strongly  fortified  works,  and  as  they  could 
not  be  approached  without  great  difficulty,  and  an  attempt 
to  carry  them  by  assault  would  have  resulted  in  greater 
loss  than  the  advantage  to  be  gained  would  justify,  I 
determined  to  move  through  the  gaps  of  South  Mountain 
to  the  north  of  the  Heights.  On  the  7th,  the  greater  por- 
tion of  the  cavalry  was  sent  across  the  mountain,  in  the 
direction  of  Frederick ;  and  that  night,  the  expected  shoes 
having  arrived  and  been  distributed,  orders  were  given 
for  a  general  move  next  morning;  and  an  officer  (Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Goodwin  of  a  Louisiana  regiment)  was 
ordered  back  to  Winchester,  with  a  small  guard,  to  collect 
the  stragglers  at  that  place,  and  prevent  them  from 
following. 

25  385 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Imboden  had  reached  the  railroad,  at  the  South 
Branch  of  the  Potomac,  and  partially  destroyed  the 
bridge,  but  had  not  succeeded  in  dislodging  the  guard 
from  the  block-house  at  that  place.  He  had  been  taken 
sick  and  very  little  had  been  accomplished  by  the  expe- 
dition ;  and  his  brigade,  now  under  the  command  of  Col. 
George  H.  Smith,  had  returned. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  the  whole  force 
moved;  Rodes,  through  Crampton's  Gap,  to  Jefferson; 
Breckenridge,  through  Fox 's  Gap ;  and  Ramseur,  with  the 
trains,  through  Boonsboro  Gap,  followed  by  Lewis'  bri- 
gade, which  had  started  from  Harper's  Ferry  the  night 
before,  after  burning  the  trestle-work  on  the  railroad, 
and  the  stores  which  had  not  been  brought  off.  Brecken- 
ridge and  Ramseur  encamped  near  Middletown,  and 
Rodes  near  Jefferson.  Ransom  had  occupied  Catoctan 
Mountain,  between  Middletown  and  Frederick,  with  his 
cavalry,  and  had  skirmished  heavily  with  a  body  of  the 
enemy  at  the  latter  place.  McCausland  was  ordered  to 
move  to  the  right,  in  the  afternoon,  and  the  next  day  cut 
the  telegraph  and  railroad  between  Maryland  Heights 
and  Washington  and  Baltimore — cross  the  Monocacy, 
and,  if  possible,  occupy  the  railroad  bridge  over  that 
stream,  at  the  junction  near  Frederick. 

Early  on  the  9th,  Johnson,  with  his  brigade  of  cavalry, 
and  a  battery  of  horse  artillery,  moved  to  the  north  of 
Frederick,  with  orders  to  strike  the  railroads  from  Balti- 
more to  Harrisburg  and  Philadelphia,  burn  the  bridges 
over  the  Gunpowder,  also  to  cut  the  railroad  between 
Washington  and  Baltimore  and  threaten  the  latter  place ; 
and  then  to  move  towards  Point  Lookout,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  releasing  the  prisoners,  if  we  should  succeed  in 
getting  into  Washington.  The  other  troops  also  moved 
forward  towards  Monocacy  Junction,  and  Ramseur 's 
division  passed  through  Frederick,  driving  a  force  of 
skirmishers  before  it. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

Battle  of  Monocacy. 

The  enemy,  in  considerable  force  under  General  Lew 
"Wallace,  was  found  strongly  posted  on  the  eastern  bank 
of  the  Monocacy  near  the  Junction,  with  an  earthwork 
and  two  block-houses  commanding  both  the  railroad 
bridge  and  the  bridge  on  the  Georgetown  pike.  Ram- 
seur's  division  was  deployed  in  front  of  the  enemy,  after 
driving  his  skirmishers  across  the  river,  and  several  bat- 
teries were  put  in  position,  when  a  sharp  artillery  fire 
opened  from  both  sides.  Rodes'  division  had  come  up 
from  Jefferson  and  was  placed  on  Ramseur's  left,  cover- 
ing the  roads  from  Baltimore  and  the  crossings  of  the 
Monocacy  above  the  Junction.  Breckenridge  's  command, 
with  the  trains,  was  in  the  rear  between  Frederick  and  the 
Junction,  while  the  residue  of  the  cavalry  was  watching 
a  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  which  had  followed  from 
Maryland  Heights.  The  enemy's  position  was  too  strong, 
and  the  difficulties  of  crossing  the  Monocacy  under  fire  too 
great,  to  attack  in  front  without  greater  loss  than  I  was 
willing  to  incur.  I  therefore  made  an  examination  in  per- 
son to  find  a  point  at  which  the  river  could  be  crossed,  so 
as  to  take  the  enemy  in  flank. 

"While  I  was  engaged  in  making  this  examination  to 
my  right,  I  discovered  McCausland  in  the  act  of  crossing 
the  river  with  his  brigade.  As  soon  as  he  crossed,  he 
dismounted  his  men,  and  advanced  rapidly  against  the 
enemy's  left  flank,  which  he  threw  into  confusion,  and  he 
came  very  near  capturing  a  battery  of  artillery,  but  the 
enemy  concentrated  on  him,  and  he  was  gradually  forced 
back  obstinately  contesting  the  ground.  McCausland 's 
movement,  which  was  very  brilliantly  executed,  solved  the 
problem  for  me,  and,  as  soon  as  I  discovered  it,  orders 
were  sent  to  Breckenridge  to  move  up  rapidly  with 
Gordon's  division  to  McCausland 's  assistance,  and  to  fol- 
low up  his  attack.     This  division  crossed  at  the  same 

387 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

place,  and  Gordon  was  ordered  to  move  forward  and 
strike  the  enemy  on  his  left  flank,  and  drive  him  from 
the  position  commanding  the  crossings  in  Ramseur's 
front,  so  as  to  enable  the  latter  to  cross.  This  movement 
was  executed  under  the  personal  superintendence  of 
General  Breckenridge,  and,  while  Ramseur  skirmished 
with  the  enemy  in  front,  the  attack  was  made  by  Gordon 
in  gallant  style,  and,  with  the  aid  of  several  pieces  of 
King's  artillery  which  had  been  crossed  over,  and  Nel- 
son's artillery  from  the  opposite  side,  he  threw  the 
enemy  into  great  confusion  and  forced  him  from  his 
position.  Ramseur  immediately  crossed  on  the  railroad 
bridge  and  pursued  the  enemy's  flying  forces  and  Rodes 
crossed  on  the  left  and  joined  in  the  pursuit. 

Echols'  division,  which  had  been  left  to  guard  the 
trains,  was  ordered  up  during  the  engagement,  but  was 
not  needed.  The  pursuit  was  soon  discontinued,  as 
Wallace's  entire  force  had  taken  the  road  towards  Balti- 
more, and  I  did  not  desire  prisoners.  Wallace's  force  I 
estimated  at  8,000  or  10,000  men,  and  it  was  ascertained 
that  one  division  of  the  6th  corps  (Rickett's),  from 
Grant's  army,  was  in  the  fight.  Between  600  and  700 
unwounded  prisoners  fell  into  our  hands,  and  the  enemy's 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  very  heavy.  Our  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  was  about  700,  and  among  them 
were  Brigadier  General  Evans  wounded,  and  Colonel 
Lamar  of  the  61st  Georgia  Regiment,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Tavener  of  the  17th  Virginia  Cavalry  and  Lieutenant 
Hobson  of  Nelson's  artillery,  killed.  The  action  closed 
about  sunset,  and  we  had  marched  fourteen  miles  before 
it  commenced.  All  the  troops  and  trains  were  crossed 
over  the  Monocacy  that  night,  so  as  to  resume  the  march 
early  next  day.  Such  of  our  wounded  as  could  not  be 
moved  in  ambulances  or  otherwise  were  sent  to  the  hos- 
pitals at  Frederick  under  charge  of  competent  medical 
officers,  and  our  dead  were  buried.  During  the  operations 
at  Monocacy,  a  contribution  of  $200,000  in  money  was 
levied  on  the  city  of  Frederick,  and  some  needed  supplies 
were  obtained. 


CHAPTER  XL. 

In  Front  of  Washington. 

On  the  10  th,  the  march  was  resumed  at  daylight,  and 
we  bivouacked  four  miles  from  Rockville,  on  the  George- 
town pike,  having  marched  twenty  miles.  Ramseur's 
division,  which  had  remained  behind  for  a  short  time  to 
protect  a  working  party  engaged  in  destroying  the  rail- 
road bridge,  was  detained  for  a  time  in  driving  off  a  party 
of  cavalry  which  had  been  following  from  Maryland 
Heights,  and  did  not  get  up  until  one  o'clock  at  night. 
McCausland,  moving  in  front  on  this  day,  drove  a  body 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry  before  them  and  had  quite  a  brisk 
engagement  at  Rockville,  where  he  encamped  after  defeat- 
ing and  driving  off  the  enemy. 

"We  moved  at  daylight  on  the  11th ;  McCausland  mov- 
ing on  the  Georgetown  pike,  while  the  infantry,  preceded 
by  Imboden's  cavalry  under  Colonel  Smith,  turned  to  the 
left  at  Rockville,  so  as  to  reach  the  7th  Street  pike  which 
runs  by  Silver  Spring  into  Washington.  Jackson's 
cavalry  moved  on  the  left  flank.  The  previous  day  had 
been  very  warm,  and  the  roads  were  exceedingly  dusty, 
as  there  had  been  no  rain  for  several  weeks.  The  heat 
during  the  night  had  been  very  oppressive,  and  but  little 
rest  had  been  obtained.  This  day  was  an  exceedingly 
hot  one,  and  there  was  no  air  stirring.  While  marching, 
the  men  were  enveloped  in  a  suffocating  cloud  of  dust, 
and  many  of  them  fell  by  the  way  from  exhaustion. 
Our  progress  was  therefore  very  much  impeded,  but  I 
pushed  on  as  rapidly  as  possible,  hoping  to  get  into  the 
fortifications  around  Washington  before  they  could  be 
manned.  Smith  drove  a  small  body  of  cavalry  before  him 
into  the  woods  on  the  7th  Street  pike,  and  dismounted  his 
men  and  deployed  them  as  skirmishers.  I  rode  ahead 
of  the  infantry,  and  arrived  in  sight  of  Fort  Stevens  on 
the  road  a  short  time  after  noon,  when  I  discovered  that 
the  works  were  but  feebly  manned. 

389 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Rodes,  whose  division  was  in  front,  was  immediately 
ordered  to  bring  it  into  line  as  rapidly  as  possible,  throw 
out  skirmishers,  and  move  into  the  works  if  he  could.  My 
whole  column  was  then  moving  by  flank,  which  was  the 
only  practicable  mode  of  marching  upon  the  road  we  were 
on,  and  before  Rodes'  division  could  be  brought  up,  we 
saw  a  cloud  of  dust  in  the  rear  of  the  works  towards 
Washington,  and  soon  a  column  of  the  enemy  filed  into 
them  on  the  right  and  left  and  skirmishers  were  thrown 
out  in  front,  while  an  artillery  fire  was  opened  on  us 
from  a  number  of  batteries.  This  defeated  our  hopes 
of  getting  possession  of  the  works  by  surprise,  and  it 
became  necessary  to  reconnoitre. 

Rodes'  skirmishers  were  thrown  to  the  front,  driving 
those  of  the  enemy  to  the  cover  of  the  works,  and  we  pro- 
ceeded to  examine  the  fortifications  in  order  to  ascertain 
if  it  was  practicable  to  carry  them  by  assault.  They  were 
found  to  be  exceedingly  strong,  and  consisted  of  what 
appeared  to  be  enclosed  forts  of  heavy  artillery,  with  a 
tier  of  lower  works  in  front  of  each  pierced  for  an  im- 
mense number  of  guns,  the  whole  being  connected  by 
curtains  with  ditches  in  front,  and  strengthened  by  pali- 
sades and  abattis.  The  timber  had  been  felled  within 
cannon  range  all  around  and  left  on  the  ground,  making 
a  formidable  obstacle,  and  every  possible  approach  was 
raked  by  artillery.  On  the  right  was  Rock  Creek  run- 
ning through  a  deep  ravine  which  had  been  rendered 
impassable  by  the  felling  of  the  timber  on  each  side,  and 
beyond  were  the  works  on  the  Georgetown  pike  which  had 
been  reported  to  be  the  strongest  of  all.  On  the  left,  as 
far  as  the  eye  could  reach,  the  works  appeared  to  be  of 
the  same  impregnable  character.  The  position  was  natur- 
ally strong  for  defence,  and  the  examination  showed, 
what  might  have  been  expected,  that  every  appliance  of 
science  and  unlimited  means  had  been  used  to  render  the 
fortifications  around  Washington  as  strong  as  possible. 
This  reconnaissance  consumed  the  balance  of  the  day. 

The  rapid  marching  which  had  broken  down  a  number 

390 


IN  FRONT  OF  WASHINGTON 

of  the  men  who  were  barefooted  or  weakened  by  previous 
exposure,  and  had  been  left  in  the  Valley  and  directed  to 
be  collected  at  Winchester,  and  the  losses  in  killed  and 
wounded  at  Harper's  Ferry,  Maryland  Heights  and 
Monocacy,  had  reduced  my  infantry  to  about  8,000 
muskets.  Of  those  remaining,  a  very  large  number  were 
greatly  exhausted  by  the  last  two  days'  marching,  some 
having  fallen  by  sunstroke,  and  I  was  satisfied,  when  we 
arrived  in  front  of  the  fortifications,  that  not  more  than 
one-third  of  my  force  could  have  been  carried  into  action. 
I  had  about  forty  pieces  of  field  artillery,  of  which  the 
largest  were  12  pounder  Napoleons,  besides  a  few  pieces 
of  horse  artillery  with  the  cavalry.  McCausland  reported 
the  works  on  the  Georgetown  pike  too  strongly  manned 
for  him  to  assault.  We  could  not  move  to  the  right  or 
left  without  its  being  discovered  from  a  signal  station 
on  the  top  of  the  "Soldiers'  Home,"  which  overlooked 
the  country,  and  the  enemy  would  have  been  enabled  to 
move  in  his  works  to  meet  us.  Under  the  circumstances, 
to  have  rushed  my  men  blindly  against  the  fortifications, 
without  understanding  the  state  of  things,  would  have 
been  worse  than  folly.  If  we  had  any  friends  in  Washing- 
ton, none  of  them  came  out  to  give  us  information,  and 
this  satisfied  me  that  the  place  was  not  undefended.  I 
knew  that  troops  had  arrived  from  Grant's  army,  for 
prisoners  had  been  captured  from  Rickett's  division  of 
the  6th  corps  at  Monocacy. 

From  Sharpsburg  I  had  sent  a  message  to  Mosby,  by 
one  of  his  men,  requesting  him  to  cross  the  Potomac  below 
Harper's  Ferry,  cut  the  railroad  and  telegraph,  and 
endeavor  to  find  out  the  condition  of  things  in  Washing- 
ton, but  he  had  not  crossed  the  river,  and  I  had  received 
no  information  from  him.  A  Northern  paper,  which  was 
obtained,  gave  the  information  that  Hunter,  after  moving 
up  the  Ohio  River  in  steamboats,  was  passing  over  the 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  and  I  knew  that  he  would  be 
at  Harper's  Ferry  soon,  as  Imboden  had  done  very  little 
damage  to  the  road  west  of  Martinsburg.    After  dark  on 

391 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

the  11th  I  held  a  consultation  vwith  Major  Generals 
Breckenridge,  Bodes,  Gordon  and  Ramseur,  in  which  I 
stated  to  them  the  danger  of  remaining  where  we  were, 
and  the  necessity  of  doing  something  immediately,  as  the 
probability  was  that  the  passes  of  the  South  Mountain 
and  the  fords  of  the  upper  Potomac  would  soon  be  closed 
against  us.  After  interchanging  views  with  them,  being 
very  reluctant  to  abandon  the  project  of  capturing  Wash- 
ington I  determined  to  make  an  assault  on  the  enemy's 
works  at  daylight  next  morning,  unless  some  information 
should  be  received  before  that  time  showing  its  impracti- 
cability, and  so  informed  those  officers.  During  the  night 
a  dispatch  was  received  from  Gen.  Bradley  Johnson  from 
near  Baltimore  informing  me  that  he  had  received  infor- 
mation, from  a  reliable  source,  that  two  corps  had 
arrived  from  General  Grant's  army,  and  that  his  whole 
army  was  probably  in  motion.  This  caused  me  to  delay 
the  attack  until  I  could  examine  the  works  again,  and 
as  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see,  I  rode  to  the  front 
and  found  the  parapets  lined  with  troops.  I  had,  there- 
fore, reluctantly  to  give  up  all  hopes  of  capturing  Wash- 
ington, after  I  had  arrived  in  sight  of  the  dome  of  the 
Capitol,  and  given  the  Federal  authorities  a  terrible 
fright. 

In  his  report,  Grant  says,  in  regard  to  the  condition  of 
things  when  I  moved  towards  Washington,  "The  garri- 
sons of  Baltimore  and  Washington  were  at  this  time 
made  up  of  heavy  artillery  regiments,  hundred  days'  men, 
and  detachments  from  the  invalid  corps."  And,  in  re- 
gard to  the  force  of  Wallace  at  Monocacy,  he  says:  "His 
force  was  not  sufficient  to  ensure  success,  but  he  fought 
the  enemy  nevertheless,  and  although  it  resulted  in  a 
defeat  to  our  arms,  yet  it  detained  the  enemy  and  thereby 
served  to  enable  General  Wright  to  reach  Washington 
with  two  divisions  of  the  6th  corps,  and  the  advance  of 
the  19th ,  corps  before  him."  Stanton  says  in  his  re- 
port: "Here  (at  Washington)  they  (we)  were  met  by 
troops  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  consisting  of  the 

392 


IN  FRONT  OF  WASHINGTON 

6th  corps  under  General  Wright,  a  part  of  the  8th  corps 
under  General  Gilmore  and  a  part  of  the  19th  corps,  just 
arrived  from  New  Orleans  under  General  Emory." 

Taking  Grant's  statement  of  the  troops  which  had 
arrived  from  his  army,  they  were  sufficient  to  hold  the 
works  against  my  troops,  at  least  until  others  could 
arrive.  But  in  addition  to  those  which  had  already 
arrived,  there  were  the  detachments  from  the  invalid 
corps,  called,  I  believe,  the  "Veteran  Reserves"  (of  which 
I  was  informed  there  were  5,000),  the  heavy  artillery 
regiments,  the  hundred  days'  men,  and,  I  suppose,  the 
part  of  the  8th  corps  mentioned  by  Stanton.  To  all 
of  these  may  be  added  the  local  troops,  or  militia,  and  the 
Government  employees.  Some  of  the  Northern  papers 
stated  that,  between  Saturday  and  Monday,  I  could  have 
entered  the  city :  but  on  Saturday  I  was  fighting  at  Monoc- 
acy,  35  miles  from  Washington,  a  force  which  I  could  not 
leave  in  my  rear;  and  after  disposing  of  that  force  and 
moving  as  rapidly  as  it  was  possible  for  me  to  move,  I 
did  not  arrive  in  front  of  the  fortifications  until  after 
noon  on  Monday,  and  then  my  troops  were  exhausted  and 
it  required  time  to  bring  them  up  into  line.  I  had  then 
made  a  march,  over  the  circuitous  route  by  Charlottes- 
ville, Lynchburg  and  Salem,  down  the  Valley  and  through 
the  passes  of  the  South  Mountain,  which,  notwithstand- 
ing the  delays  in  dealing  with  Hunter's,  Sigel's,  and  Wal- 
lace's forces,  is,  for  its  length  and  rapidity,  I  believe, 
without  a  parallel  in  this  or  any  other  modern  war — the 
unopposed  excursion  of  Sherman  through  Georgia  not 
excepted.  My  small  force  had  been  thrown  up  to  the  very 
walls  of  the  Federal  Capital,  north  of  a  river  which  could 
not  be  forded  at  any  point  within  40  miles,  and  with  a 
heavy  force  and  the  South  Mountain  in  my  rear, — the 
passes  through  which  mountain  could  be  held  by  a  small 
number  of  troops.  A  glance  at  the  map,  when  it  is  recol- 
lected that  the  Potomac  is  a  wide  river,  and  navigable 
to  Washington  with  the  largest  vessels,  will  cause  the 
intelligent  reader  to  wonder,  not  why  I  failed  to  take 

393 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Washington,  but  why  I  had  the  audacity  to  approach  it 
as  I  did,  with  the  small  force  under  my  command. 

It  was  supposed  by  some,  who  were  not  informed  of 
the  facts,  that  I  delayed  in  the  lower  Valley  longer  than 
was  necessary;  but  an  examination  of  the  foregoing 
narrative  will  show  that  not  one  moment  was  spent  in 
idleness,  but  that  every  one  was  employed  in  making  some 
arrangement,  or  removing  some  difficulty  in  my  way, 
which  it  was  necessary  to  make  or  remove ;  so  as  to  enable 
me  to  advance  with  a  prospect  of  success.  I  could  not 
move  across  the  Potomac  and  through  the  passes  of  the 
South  Mountain,  with  any  safety,  until  Sigel  was  driven 
from,  or  safely  housed  in,  the  fortifications  at  Maryland 
Heights. 

After  abandoning  the  idea  of  capturing  Washington,  I 
determined  to  remain  in  front  of  the  fortifications  during 
the  12th,  and  retire  at  night,  as  I  was  satisfied  that  to 
remain  longer  would  cause  the  loss  of  my  entire  force. 

Johnson  had  burned  the  bridges  over  the  Gunpowder, 
on  the  Harrisburg  and  Philadelphia  roads,  threatened 
Baltimore,  and  started  for  Point  Lookout,  but  I  sent  an 
order  for  him  to  return.  The  attempt  to  release  the 
prisoners,  of  which  I  was  informed  by  General  Lee,  was 
not  made,  as  the  enemy  had  received  notice  of  it  in  some 
way.  Major  Harry  Gilmor,  who  burned  the  bridge  over 
the  Gunpowder  on  the  Philadelphia  road,  captured  Major 
General  Franklin  on  a  train  at  that  point,  but  he  was 
permitted  to  escape,  either  by  the  carelessness  or  exhaus- 
tion of  the  guard  placed  over  him,  before  I  was  informed 
of  the  capture. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  12th,  a  heavy  reconnoitring 
force  was  sent  out  by  the  enemy,  which,  after  severe  skir- 
mishing, was  driven  back  by  Rodes'  division  with  but 
slight  loss  to  us.  About  dark  we  commenced  retiring  and 
did  so  without  molestation. 

Passing  through  Rockville  and  Poolsville,  we  crossed 
the  Potomac  at  White's  Ford,  above  Leesburg  in  Loudoun 
County,  on  the  morning  of  the  14th,  bringing  off  the  pris- 

394 


IN  FRONT  OF  WASHINGTON 

oners  captured  at  Monocacy  and  everything  else  in  safety. 
There  was  some  skirmishing  in  the  rear,  between  our 
cavalry  and  that  of  the  enemy  which  was  following,  and 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  there  was  some  artillery  fir- 
ing by  the  enemy,  across  the  river,  at  our  cavalry  which 
was  watching  the  fords.  Besides  the  money  levied  in 
Hagerstown  and  Frederick,  which  was  subsequently  very 
useful  in  obtaining  supplies,  we  brought  off  quite  a  large 
number  of  beef  cattle,  and  the  cavalry  obtained  a  number 
of  horses,  some  being  also  procured  for  the  artillery.* 

*  On  the  night  of  the  13th  the  house  of  Postmaster  General  Blair 
near  Silver  Spring  was  burned,  and  it  was  assumed  by  the  enemy  that 
it  was  burned  by  my  orders.  I  had  nothing  to  do  with  it  and  do  not 
yet  know  how  the  burning  occurred.  Though  I  believed  that  retalia- 
tion was  justified  by  previous  acts  of  the  enemy,  yet  I#  did  not  wish 
to  incur  the  risk  of  any  license  on  the  part  of  my  troops  and  it  was 
obviously  impolitic  to  set  the  house  on  fire  when  we  were  retiring,  as 
it  amounted  to  notice  of  our  movement. 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

Return  to  Virginia. 

We  rested  on  the  14th  and  15th,  near  Leesburg;  and 
on  the  morning  of  the  16th,  resumed  the  march  to  the 
Valley,  through  Sincker's  Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge.  Hunter 
had  arived  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  united  with  Sigel,  and 
the  whole  force  had  moved  from  that  place,  under  Crook, 
to  Hillsboro,  in  Loudoun,  and  a  body  of  cavalry  from  it 
made  a  dash  on  our  train,  as  we  were  moving  towards  the 
Valley,  and  succeeded  in  setting  fire  to  a  few  wagons,  but 
was  soon  driven  off  by  troops  from  Rodes'  and  Ramseur 's 
divisions,  and  one  piece  of  artillery  was  captured  from 
the  enemy. 

On  the  morning  of  the  17th,  we  crossed  the  Shenan- 
doah, at  Snicker's  or  Castleman's  Ferry,  and  took  posses- 
sion near  Berryville — Breckenridge  covering  the  ford  at 
the  ferry  and  the  river  above  and  below,  and  Rodes '  and 
Ramseur 's  division  the  roads  from  Harper's  Ferry. 

On  the  18th  the  enemy,  having  moved  through 
Snicker 's  Gap,  appeared  on  the  banks  of  the  Shenandoah, 
and  there  was  some  skirmishing.  In  the  afternoon,  a 
heavy  column  of  his  infantry  made  a  dash  at  Parker's 
Ford,  one  mile  below  the  ferry,  and  crossed  over,  after 
driving  back  the  picket  of  100  men  at  that  point.  Brecken- 
ridge moved  Gordon's  and  Echols'  divisions  to  the  front, 
and  held  the  enemy  in  check,  while  Rodes'  division  was 
brought  up  from  the  left,  and  attacked  and  drove  him 
across  the  river,  with  heavy  loss,  and  in  great  confusion. 

The  enemy's  main  body  still  occupied  the  eastern  bank 
of  the  Shenandoah  on  the  19th,  and  smaller  columns 
moved  up  and  down  the  river,  to  effect  a  crossing.  Im- 
boden,  with  his  own  and  McCausland's  cavalry,  resisted 
and  repulsed  one  of  these  columns,  which  attempted  to 
cross  at  Berry's  Ferry,  with  considerable  loss  to  the 
enemy.     The  horses  of  Vaughan's  cavalry  having  been 

396 


RETURN  TO  VIRGINIA 

brought  from  Southwestern  Virginia,  his  small  force  had 
been  now  mounted.  On  this  day  I  received  information 
that  a  column  under  Averill  was  moving  from  Martins- 
burg  towards  Winchester,  and  as  the  position  I  held  near 
Berryville  left  my  trains  exposed  to  expeditions  in  the 
rear  from  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry,  I  deter- 
mined to  concentrate  my  force  near  Strasburg,  so  as  to 
enable  me  to  put  the  trains  in  safety  and  then  move  out 
and  attack  the  enemy.  This  movement  was  commenced 
on  the  night  of  the.  19th;  Ramseur's  division,  with  a  bat- 
tery of  artillery,  being  sent  to  Winchester,  to  cover  that 
place  against  Averill,  while  the  stores,  and  the  sick  and 
wounded  were  being  removed,  and  the  other  divisions 
moving  through  Millwood  and  White  Post  to  the  Valley 
Pike  at  Newtown  and  Middletown. 

Vaughan's  and  Jackson's  cavalry  had  been  watching 
Averill,  and,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  20th,  it  was  reported 
to  General  Ramseur,  by  General  Vaughan,  that  Averill 
was  at  Stephenson's  depot,  with  an  inferior  force,  which 
could  be  captured,  and  Ramseur  moved  out  from  Win- 
chester to  attack  him ;  but  relying  on  the  accuracy  of  the 
information  he  had  received,  General  Ramseur  did  not 
take  the  proper  precautions  in  advancing,  and  his  divis- 
ion, while  moving  by  the  flank,  was  suddenly  met  by  a 
larger  force,  under  Averill,  advancing  in  line  of  battle, 
and  the  result  was  that  Ramseur 's  force  was  thrown  into 
confusion,  and  compelled  to  retire,  with  the  loss  of  four 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  a  number  in  killed  and  wounded — 
Brigadier  Generals  Lewis  and  Lilly  being  among  the 
wounded,  and  Colonel  Board  of  the  58th  Virginia  Regi- 
ment among  the  killed.  Colonel  Jackson  made  a  vigorous 
charge  with  his  cavalry,  which  enabled  Ramseur  to  rally 
his  men,  restore  order,  and  arrest  the  progress  of  Averill 
before  he  reached  Winchester.  The  error  committed,  on 
this  occasion,  by  this  most  gallant  officer,  was  nobly  re- 
trieved in  the  subsequent  part  of  the  campaign.  I 
received  at  New  Market  the  news  of  Ramseur's  misfor- 
tune, and  immediately  moved  to  his   assistance  with 

397 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Rodes'  division;  but  on  arriving  at  Winchester,  I  found 
that  the  enemy,  after  being  checked,  had  fallen  back  a 
short  distance ;  and,  as  another  and  much  larger  column 
was  moving  through  Berryville,  I  did  not  go  after  Averill, 
but  moved  the  whole  command  to  Newtown — the  stores, 
and  such  of  the  wounded  and  sick  as  could  be  transported, 
having  been  gotten  off. 

On  the  21st  my  whole  infantry  force  was  concentrated 
near  Middletown ;  and,  on  the  22nd,  it  was  moved  across 
Cedar  Creek,  towards  Strasburg,  and  so  posted  as  to 
cover  all  the  roads  from  the  direction  of  Winchester. 

A  report  having  been  sent  to  me,  from  Mount  Jack- 
son, that  a  force  of  the  enemy  was  moving  from  the 
Valley  of  the  South  Branch  of  the  Potomac  to  that  place, 
Imboden  was  sent  to  ascertain  its  truth,  and  it  proved  to 
be  false.  We  rested  on  the  23rd,  while  waiting  to  ascer- 
tain the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  during  the  day  a 
report  was  received  from  the  cavalry  in  front  that  a  large 
portion  of  the  force  sent  after  us  from  Washington  was 
returning,  and  that  Crook  and  Averill  had  united  and 
were  at  Kernstown,  near  Winchester. 


CHAPTER  XLII. 

Battle  op  Kernstown. 

On  the  reception  of  the  foregoing  information,  I  deter- 
mined to  attack  the  enemy  at  once;  and,  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  24th,  my  whole  force  was  pnt  in  motion 
for  Winchester.  The  enemy,  under  Crook,  consisting  of 
the  "Army  of  West  Virginia,"  and  including  Hunter's 
and  Sigel's  forces,  and  Averill's  cavalry,  was  found  in 
position  at  Kernstown,  on  the  same  ground  occupied  by 
Shields,  at  the  time  of  General  Jackson's  fight  with  him, 
on  March  22nd,  1862.  Eamseur's  division  was  sent  to 
the  left,  at  Bartonsville,  to  get  around  the  enemy's  right 
flank,  while  the  other  divisions  moved  along  the  Valley 
Pike,  and  formed  on  each  side  of  it.  Ransom's  cavalry 
was  ordered  to  move  in  two  columns:  one,  on  the  right, 
along  the  road  from  Front  Royal  to  Winchester,  and  the 
other  on  the  left,  and  west  of  Winchester,  so  as  to  unite 
in  rear  of  the  latter  place,  and  cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat. 
After  the  enemy's  skirmishers  were  driven  in,  it  was  dis- 
covered that  his  left  flank,  extending  through  Kernstown, 
was  exposed,  and  General  Breckenridge  was  ordered  to 
move  Echols'  division,  now  under  Brigadier  General 
Wharton,  under  cover  of  some  ravines  on  our  right  and 
attack  that  flank.  This  movement,  which  was  made  under 
General  Breckenridge 's  personal  superintendence,  was 
handsomely  executed,  and  the  attacking  division  struck 
the  enemy's  left  flank  in  open  ground,  doubling  it  up  and 
throwing  his  whole  line  into  great  confusion.  The  other 
divisions  then  advanced,  and  the  rout  of  the  enemy  be- 
came complete.  He  was  pursued,  by  the  infantry  and 
artillery,  through  and  beyond  Winchester;  and  the  pur- 
suit was  continued  by  Rodes'  division  to  Stephenson's 
depot,  six  miles  from  Winchester— this  division  then  hav- 
ing marched  twenty-seven  miles  from  its  position  west 
of  Strasburg.    The  cavalry  had  not  been  moved  according 

399 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

to  my  orders ;  and  the  enemy,  having  the  advantage  of  an 
open  country  and  a  wide  macadamized  road,  was  enabled 
to  make  his  escape  with  his  artillery  and  most  of  his 
wagons.  General  Ransom  had  been  in  very  bad  health 
since  he  reported  to  me  in  Lynchburg,  and  unable  to  take 
the  active  command  in  the  field ;  and  all  of  my  operations 
had  been  impeded  for  the  want  of  an  efficient  and  ener- 
getic cavalry  commander.  I  think,  if  I  had  had  one  on 
this  occasion,  the  greater  part  of  the  enemy's  force  would 
have  been  captured  or  destroyed,  for  the  rout  was  thor- 
ough. Our  loss,  in  this  action,  was  very  light.  The 
enemy's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  severe,  and  two 
or  three  hundred  prisoners  fell  into  our  hands;  and 
among  them,  Colonel  Mulligan,  in  command  of  a  divis- 
ion, mortally  wounded.  The  infantry  was  too  much  ex- 
hausted to  continue  the  pursuit  on  the  25th,  and  only 
moved  to  Bunker  Hill,  twelve  miles  from  Winchester. 
The  pursuit  was  continued  by  our  cavalry,  and  the) 
enemy's  rear  guard  of  cavalry  was  encountered  at  Mar- 
tinsburg;  but  after  slight  skirmishing,  it  evacuated  the 
place.  The  whole  defeated  force  crossed  the  Potomac, 
and  took  refuge  at  Maryland  Heights  and  Harper's 
Ferry.  The  road  from  Winchester,  via  Martinsburg,  to 
Williamsport  was  strewed  with  debris  of  the  rapid  re- 
treat— twelve  caissons  and  seventy-two  wagons  having 
been  abandoned,  and  most  of  them  burned. 


CHAPTER  XLIII. 

The  Burning  of  Chambersburg. 

On  the  26th  we  moved  to  Martinsburg,  the  cavalry- 
going  to  the  Potomac.  The  27th  and  28th  were  employed 
in  destroying  the  railroad,  it  having  been  repaired  since 
we  passed  over  it  at  the  beginning  of  the  month.  While 
at  Martinsburg,  it  was  ascertained  that  while  we  were 
near  Washington,  after  Hunter's  return  to  the  Valley, 
by  his  orders,  a  number  of  private  residences  had  been 
burned, — among  them  the  homes  of  Mr.  Alex.  E.  Boteler, 
an  ex-member  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  of  Mr. 
Andrew  Hunter,  a  member  of  the  Virginia  Senate,  and  of 
Mr.  Edmund  I.  Lee,  a  distant  relative  of  General  Lee, — all 
in  Jefferson  County,  with  their  contents,  only  time 
enough  being  given  for  the  ladies  to  get  out  of  their 
houses.  A  number  of  towns  in  the  South,  as  well  as  pri- 
vate country  houses,  had  been  burned  by  the  Federal 
troops.  I  came  to  the  conclusion  it  was  time  to  open  the 
eyes  of  the  people  of  the  North  to  this  enormity,  by  an 
example  in  the  way  of  retaliation.  I  did  not  select  the 
cases  mentioned,  as  having  more  merit  or  greater  claims 
for  retaliation  than  others,  but  because  they  had  occurred 
within  the  limits  of  the  country  covered  by  my  command 
and  were  brought  more  immediately  to  my  attention. 

The  town  of  Chambersburg  in  Pennsylvania  was 
selected  as  the  one  on  which  retaliation  should  be  made, 
and  McCausland  was  ordered  to  proceed,  with  his  brigade 
and  that  of  Johnson  and  a  battery  of  artillery,  to  that 
place,  and  demand  of  the  municipal  authorities  the  sum 
of  $100,000  in  gold  or  $500,000  in  U.  S.  currency,  as  a 
compensation  for  the  destruction  of  the  houses  named 
and  their  contents;  and  in  default  of  payment,  to  lay 
the  town  in  ashes.  A  written  demand  to  that  effect  was 
sent  to  the  authorities,  and  they  were  informed  what 
would  be  the  result  of  a  failure  or  refusal  to  comply  with 

26  401 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

it :  for  I  desired  to  give  the  people  of  Chambersburg  an 
opportunity  of  saving  their  town,  by  making  compen- 
sation for  part  of  the  injury  done,  and  hoped  the  pay- 
ment of  such  a  sum  would  have  the  effect  of  causing  the 
adoption  of  a  different  policy.  McCausland  was  also 
directed  to  proceed  from  Chambersburg  towards  Cumber- 
laud,  Maryland,  and  levy  contributions  in  money  upon 
that  and  other  towns  able  to  bear  them,  and  if  possible 
destroy  the  machinery  of  the  coal  pits  near  Cumberland 
and  the  machine  shops,  depots  and  bridges  on  the  Balti- 
more &  Ohio  Railroad  as  far  as  practicable. 

On  the  29th,  McCausland  crossed  the  Potomac  near 
Clear  Spring  above  Williamsport,  and  I  moved  with 
Rodes'  and  Ramseur's  divisions  and  Vaughan's  cavalry 
to  the  latter  place,  while  Imboden  demonstrated  with  his 
and  Jackson's  cavalry  towards  Harper's  Ferry,  in  order 
to  draw  attention  from  McCausland.  Breckenridge  re- 
mained at  Martinsburg  and  continued  the  destruction  of 
the  railroad.  Vaughan  drove  a  force  of  cavalry  from 
Williamsport,  and  went  into  Hagerstown,  where  he  cap- 
tured and  destroyed  a  train  of  cars  loaded  with  supplies. 
One  of  Rodes'  brigades  was  crossed  over  at  Williamsport 
and  subsequently  withdrawn.  On  the  30th,  McCausland 
being  well  under  way  I  moved  back  to  Martinsburg,  and 
on  the  31st,  the  whole  infantry  force  was  moved  to 
Bunker  Hill,  where  we  remained  on  the  1st,  2nd,  and 
3rd  of  August. 

On  the  4th,  in  order  to  enable  McCausland  to  retire 
from  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland,  and  to  keep  Hunter, 
who  had  been  reinforced  by  the  6th  and  19th  corps,  and 
had  been  oscillating  between  Harper's  Ferry  and  Monoc- 
acy  Junction,  in  a  state  of  uncertainty,  I  again  moved  to 
the  Potomac  with  the  infantry  and  Vaughan's  and  Jack- 
son's cavalry,  while  Imboden  demonstrated  towards 
Harper's  Ferry.  On  the  5th,  Rodes'  and  Ramseur's 
divisions  crossed  at  Williamsport  and  took  position  near 
St.  James'  College  and  Vaughan's  cavalry  went  into 
Hagerstown.      Breckenridge,    with    his    command,    and 

402 


THE  BURNING  OF  CHAMBERSBURG 

Jackson's  cavalry,  crossed  at  Shepherdstown,  and  took 
position  at  Sharpsburg.  This  position  is  in  full  view 
from  Maryland  Heights,  and  a  cavalry  force  was  sent 
out  by  the  enemy  to  reconnoitre,  which,  after  skirmishing 
with  Jackson's  cavalry,  was  driven  off  by  the  sharp- 
shooters of  Gordon's  division.  On  the  6th,  the  whole 
force  recrossed  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport,  and  moved 
towards  Martinsburg,  and  on  the  7th  we  returned  to 
Bunker  Hill.* 

*  While  at  Sharpsburg  on  this  occasion,  I  .rode  over  the  ground 
on  which  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  or  Antietam,  as  it  is  called  by  the 
enemy,  was  fought,  and  I  was  surprised  to  see  how  few  traces  of  that 
great  battle  remained.  In  the  woods  at  the  famous  Dunkard  or  Tunker 
Church,  where,  from  personal  observation  at  the  battle,  I  expected  to 
find  the  trees  terribly  broken  and  battered,  a  stranger  would  find  diffi- 
culty in  identifying  the  marks  of  the  bullets  and  shells. 

I  will  take  occasion  here  to  say  that  the  public,  North  or  South, 
has  never  known  how  small  was  the  force  with  which  General  Lee 
fought  that  battle.  From  personal  observation  and  conversation  with 
other  officers  engaged,  including  General  Lee  himself,  I  am  satisfied 
that  the  latter  was  not  able  to  carry  30,000  men  into  action.  The 
exhaustion  of  our  men,  in  the  battles  around  Richmond,  the  subsequent 
battles  near  Manassas,  and  on  the  march  to  Maryland,  when  they 
were  for  days  without  anything  to  eat  except  green  corn,  was  so  great, 
that  the  straggling  was  frightful  before  we  crossed  the  Potomac.  .  As 
an  instance  of  our  weakness,  and  a  reminiscence  worthy  of  being 
recorded,  which  was  brought  forcibly  to  my  mind  while  riding  over 
the  ground,  I  state  the  following  facts;  in  the  early  part  of  the  day, 
all  of  General  Jackson's  troops  on  the  field  except  my  brigade  (A.  P. 
Hill  had  not  then  arrived  from  Harper's  Ferry)  were  driven  from  the 
field  in  great  disorder,  and  Hood  had  taken  their  place  with  his 
division. 

My  brigade,  which  was  on  the  extreme  left,  supporting  some 
artillery  with  which  Stuart  was  operating,  and  had  not  been  en- 
gaged, was  sent  for  by  General  Jackson  and  posted  in  the  left  of  the 
woods  at  the  Dunkard  Church.  Hood  was  also  forced  back,  and  then 
the  enemy  advanced  to  this  woods — Sumner's  corps,  which  was  fresh, 
advancing  on  our  left  flank.  My  brigade,  then  numbering  about  1000 
men  for  duty,  with  two  or  three  hundred  men  of  Jackson's  own 
division,  who  had  been  rallied  by  Colonels  Grigsby  and  Stafford,  and 
with  an  interval  of  at  least  one-half  a  mile  between  us  and  any 
other  part  of  our  line,  held  Sumner's  corps  in  check  for  some  time, 

403 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

On  the  30th  of  July  McCausland  reached  Chambers- 
burg  and  made  the  demand  as  directed,  reading  to  such 
of  the  authorities  as  presented  themselves  the  paper  sent 
by  me.  The  demand  was  not  complied  with,  the  people 
stating  that  they  were  not  afraid  of  having  their  town 
burned,  and  that  a  Federal  force  was  approaching.  The 
policy  pursued  by  our  army  on  former  occasions  had  been 
so  lenient  that  they  did  not  suppose  the  threat  was  in 
earnest  this  time,  and  they  hoped  for  speedy  relief.  Mc- 
Causland, however,  proceeded  to  carry  out  his  orders, 
and  the  greater  part  of  the  town  was  laid  in  ashes.* 

He  then  moved  in  the  direction  of  Cumberland,  but 
on  approaching  that  town,  he  found  it  defended  by  a  force 
under  Kelly  too  strong  for  him  to  attack,  and  he  with- 
drew towards  Hampshire  County  in  Virginia,  and  crossed 
the  Potomac  near  the  month  of  the  South  Branch,  captur- 
ing the  garrison  at  that  place  and  partially  destroying 

until  Green's  division,  of  Mansfield's  corps,  penetrated  into  the  in- 
terval in  the  woods  between  us  and  the  rest  of  our  line,  and  I  was 
compelled  to  move  by  the  flank  and  attack  it.  That  division  was  driven 
out  of  the  woods  by  my  brigade,  while  Grigsby  and  Stafford  skirmished 
with  Sumner's  advancing  force,  when  we  turned  on  it,  and  with  the 
aid  of  three  brigades — to  wit:  Anderson's,  Semmes'  and  Barksdale's — 
which  had  just  arrived  to  our  assistance,  drove  it  from  the  woods  in 
great  confusion  and  with  heavy  loss.  So  great  was  the  disparity  in 
the  forces  at  this  point  that  the  wounded  officers  who  were  captured 
were  greatly  mortified,  and  commenced  making  excuses  by  stating  that 
the  troops  in  their  front  were  raw  troops  who  stampeded  and  pro- 
duced confusion  in  their  ranks.  McClellan,  in  his  report,  states  that 
Sumner's  corps  and  Green's  division  encountered  in  this  woods  "  over- 
whelming numbers  behind  breastworks,"  and  he  assigns  the  heavy  losses 
and  consequent  demoralization  in  Sumner's  corps  as  one  of  the  reasons 
for  not  renewing  the  fight  on  the  18th.  We  had  no  breastworks  or 
anything  like  them  in  that  woods  on  the  17th,  and,  on  our  part,  it  was 
a  stand  up  fight  there  altogether.  The  slight  breastworks  subsequently 
seen  by  McClellan  were  made  on  the  18th,  when  we  were  expecting  a 
renewal  of  the  battle. 

*  For  this  act  I,  alone,  am  responsible,  as  the  officers  engaged  in 
it  were  simply  executing  my  orders,  and  had  no  discretion  left  them. 
Notwithstanding  the  lapse  of  time  which  has  occurred  and  the  result 
of  the  war,  I  see  no  reason  to  regret  my  conduct  on  this  occasion. 

404 


THE  BURNING  OF  CHAMBERSBT7RG 

the  railroad  bridge.  He  then  invested  the  post  on  the 
railroad  at  New  Creek,  but  finding  it  too  strongly  forti- 
fied to  take  by  assault,  he  moved  to  Moorefield  in  Hardy 
County,  near  which  he  halted  to  rest  and  recruit  his  men 
and  horses,  as  the  command  was  now  considered  safe 
from  pursuit.  Averill,  however,  had  been  pursuing 
from  Chambersburg  with  a  body  of  cavalry,  and  John- 
son's brigade  was  surprised  in  camp,  before  day,  on  the 
morning  of  the  7th  of  August,  and  routed  by  Averill 's 
force.  This  resulted  also  in  the  rout  of  McCausland's 
brigade,  and  the  loss  of  the  artillery  (4  pieces),  and  about 
300  prisoners  from  the  whole  command.  The  balance  of 
the  command  made  its  way  to  Mount  Jackson  in  great 
disorder,  and  much  weakened.  This  affair  had  a  very 
damaging  effect  upon  my  cavalry  for  the  rest  of  the 
campaign. 


CHAPTEE  XLIV. 

Retreat  to  Fisher's  Hill. 

On  the  9th,  Imboden  reported  that  a  large  force  had 
been  concentrated  at  Harper's  Ferry,  consisting  of  the 
6  th, !  19th,  and  Crook's  corps,  under  a  new  commander, 
and  that  it  was  moving  to  our  right.  The  new  commander 
proved  to  be  Major  General  Sheridan,  from  Grant's 
army.  On  the  10th,  we  moved  from  Bunker  Hill  to  the 
east  of  Winchester,  to  cover  the  roads  from  Charles- 
town  and  Berry ville  to  that  place;  and  Eamseur's  division 
was  moved  to  Winchester,  to  cover  that  place  against 
a  force  reported  to  be  advancing  from  the  west ;  but,  this 
report  proving  untrue,  it  was  subsequently  moved  to  the 
junction  of  the  Millwood  and  Front  Royal  roads. 

On  the  morning  of  the  11th,  it  was  discovered  that  the 
enemy  was  moving  to  our  right  on  the  east  of  the  Ope- 
quon,  and  my  troops,  which  had  been  formed  in  line  of 
battle  covering  Winchester,  were  moved  to  the  right, 
towards  Newtown,  keeping  between  the  enemy  and  the 
Valley  Pike.  Ramseur  had  a  brisk  skirmish  with  a  body 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the  Millwood  road,  and  drove 
it  back.  Imboden 's  and  Vaughan's  brigades  had  a  severe 
fight  with  another  body  of  cavalry  at  the  double  toll-gate, 
at  the  intersection  of  the  Front  Royal  road  with  the  road 
from  White  Post  to  Newtown ;  and  it  was  discovered  that 
there  had  been  a  considerable  accession  to  that  arm  from 
Grant's  army. 

Just  before  night,  Gordon  had  very  heavy  skirmish- 
ing near  Newtown,  with  a  large  force  of  cavalry,  which 
advanced  on  the  road  from  the  double  toll-gate,  and  drove 
it  off.  We  encamped  near  Newtown;  and  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  12th,  moved  to  Hupp 's  Hill,  between  Strasburg 
and  Cedar  Creek.  Finding  that  the  enemy  was  advancing 
in  much  heavier  force  than  I  had  yet  encountered,  I  de- 
termined to  take  position  at  Fisher's  Hill,  above  Stras- 

406 


RETREAT  TO  FISHER'S  HILL 

burg,  and  await  his  attack  there.  Imboden  with  his  bri- 
gade was  sent  to  the  Luray  Valley,  to  watch  that  route ; 
and,  in  the  afternoon,  we  moved  to  Fisher's  Hill.  I  had 
received  information,  a  few  days  before,  from  General 
Lee,  that  General  Anderson  had  moved  with  Kershaw's 
division  of  infantry  and  Fitz.  Lee's  division  of  cavalry 
to  Culpeper  Court-House;  and  I  sent  a  dispatch  to  An- 
derson informing  him  of  the  state  of  things,  and  request- 
ing him  to  move  to  Front  Royal,  so  as  to  guard  the 
Luray  Valley. 

Sheridan's  advance  appeared  on  the  banks  of  Cedar 
Creek,  on  the  12th,  and  there  was  some  skirmishing  with 
it.  My  troops  were  posted  at  Fisher's  Hill,  with  the  right 
resting  on  the  North  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  the 
left  extending  towards  Little  North  Mountain;  and  we 
awaited  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  General  Anderson 
moved  to  Front  Royal,  in  compliance  with  my  request, 
and  took  position  to  prevent  an  advance  of  the  enemy 
on  that  route.  Shortly  after  I  took  position  at  Fisher's 
Hill,  Major  General  Lomax  reported  to  me  to  relieve 
Ransom  in  command  of  the  cavalry,  and  McCausland  and 
Johnson  joined  us  with  the  remnants  of  their  brigades. 
Sheridan  demonstrated  at  Hupp's  Hill,  within  our  view, 
for  several  days,  and  some  severe  skirmishing  ensued. 

Upon  taking  position  at  Fisher's  Hill,  I  had  estab- 
lished a  signal  station  on  the  end  of  Three  Top  Mountain, 
a  branch  of  Massanutten  Mountain,  near  Strasburg, 
which  overlooked  both  camps  and  enabled  me  to  communi- 
cate readily  with  General  Anderson  in  the  Luray  Valley. 
A  small  force  from  Sheridan's  army  ascended  the  moun- 
tain and  drove  off  our  signal-men  and  possession  was 
taken  of  the  station  by  the  enemy,  who  was  in  turn  driven 
away;  when  several  small  but  severe  fights  ensued  over 
the  station,  possession  of  it  being  finally  gained  and  held 
by  a  force  of  100  men  under  Captain  Keller  of  Gordon's 
division. 

On  the  morning  of  the  17th,  it  was  discovered  that 
the  enemy  was  falling  back,  and  I  immediately  moved 

407 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

forward  in  pursuit,  requesting  General  Anderson,  by  sig- 
nal, to  cross  the  river  at  Front  Royal  and  move  towards 
Winchester.  Just  before  night,  the  enemy's  cavalry  and 
a  body  of  infantry,  reported  to  be  a  division,  was  encoun- 
tered between  Kernstown  and  Winchester,  and  driven 
through  the  latter  place,  after  a  sharp  engagement,  in 
which  Wharton 's  division  moved  to  the  left  and  attacked 
the  enemy 's  infantry,  and  drove  it  from  a  strong  position 
on  Bower's  Hill,  south  of  Winchester,  while  Ramseur 
engaged  it  in  the  front  and  Gordon  advanced  against  the 
cavalry  on  the  right. 

On  the  18th  we  took  possession  to  cover  Winchester, 
and  General  Anderson  came  up  with  Kershaw's  division 
of  infantry,  Cutshaw's  battalion  of  artillery  and  two 
brigades  of  cavalry  under  Fitz.  Lee.  General  Anderson 
ranked  me,  but  he  declined  to  take  command,  and  offered 
to  co-operate  in  any  movement  I  might  suggest.  We  had 
now  discovered  that  Torbert's  and  Wilson's  divisions  of 
cavalry  from  Grant's  army  had  joined  Sheridan's  force, 
and  that  the  latter  was  very  large. 

On  the  19th,  my  main  force  moved  to  Bunker  Hill  and 
Lomax's  cavalry  made  reconnaissances  to  Martinsburg 
and  Shepherdstown,  while  Anderson's  whole  force  re- 
mained near  Winchester. 

On  the  20th,  our  cavalry  had  some  skirmishing  with 
the  enemy's,  on  the  Opequon,  and  on  the  21st,  by  con- 
cert, there  was  a  general  movement  towards  Harper's 
Ferry — my  command  moving  through  Smithfield  towards 
Charlestown,  and  Anderson's  on  the  direct  road  by  Sum- 
mit Point.  A  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  driven 
from  the  Opequon,  and  was  pursued  by  part  of  our 
cavalry  towards  Summit  Point.  I  encountered  Sheri- 
dan's main  force  near  Cameron's  depot,  about  three  miles 
from  Charlestown,  in  a  position  which  he  commenced 
fortifying  at  once.  Rodes'  and  Ramseur 's  divisions  were 
advanced  to  the  front,  and  very  heavy  skirmishing  en- 
sued and  was  continued  until  night,  but  I  waited  for 
General  Anderson  to  arrive  before  making  a  general 

408 


RETREAT  TO  FISHER'S  HILL 

attack.  He  encountered  Wilson's  division  of  cavalry 
at  Summit  Point,  and,  after  driving  it  off,  went  into  camp 
at  that  place.  At  light  next  morning,  it  was  discovered 
that  the  enemy  had  retired  during  the  night,  and  his  rear 
guard  of  cavalry  was  driven  through  Charlestown  to- 
wards Halltown,  where  Sheridan  had  taken  a  strong 
position  under  the  protection  of  the  heavy  guns  on  Mary- 
land Heights. 

I  demonstrated  on  the  enemy's  front  on  the  22nd,  23rd 
and  24th,  and  there  was  some  skirmishing.  General 
Anderson  then  consented  to  take  my  position  in  front  of 
Charlestown  and  amuse  the  enemy  with  Kershaw's  divis- 
ion of  infantry,  supported  by  McCausland's  brigade  of 
cavalry  on  the  left  and  a  regiment  of  Fitz.  Lee's  cavalry 
on  the  right,  while  I  moved  with  my  infantry  and  artillery 
to  Shepherdstown  and  Fitz.  Lee  with  the  rest  of  the 
cavalry  to  Williamsport,  as  if  to  cross  into  Maryland,  in 
order  to  keep  up  the  fear  of  an  invasion  of  Maryland 
and  Pennsylvania. 

On  the  25th  Fitz.  Lee  started  by  way  of  Leetown  and 
Martinsburg  to  Williamsport,  and  I  moved  through  Lee- 
town and  crossed  the  railroad  at  Kearneysville  to  Shep- 
herdstown. After  Fitz.  Lee  had  passed  on,  I  encountered 
a  very  large  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  between  Lee- 
town and  Kearneysville,  which  was  moving  out  with 
several  days'  forage  and  rations  for  a  raid  in  our  rear. 
After  a  sharp  engagement  with  small  arms  and  artillery, 
this  force  was  driven  back  through  Shepherdstown,  where 
we  came  near  surrounding  and  capturing  a  considerable 
portion  of  it,  but  it  succeeded  in  making  its  escape  across 
the  Potomac.  Gordon's  division,  which  was  moved 
around  to  intercept  the  enemy,  became  heavily  engaged, 
and  cut  off  the  retreat  of  part  of  his  force  by  one  road, 
but  it  made  its  way  down  the  river  to  the  ford  by  another 
and  thus  escaped.  In  this  affair,  a  valuable  officer, 
Colonel  Monaghan,  of  the  6th  Louisiana  Regiment,  was 
killed.     Fitz.  Lee  reached  Williamsport,  and  had  some 

409 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

skirmishing  across  the  river  at  that  place,  and  then  moved 
to  Shepherdstown. 

On  the  26th  I  moved  to  Leetown,  on  the  27th  moved 
back  to  Bunker  Hill ;  while  Anderson,  who  had  confronted 
Sheridan,  during  the  two  days  of  my  absence,  with  but 
a  division  of  infantry,  and  a  brigade  and  a  regiment  of 
cavalry,  moved  to  Stephenson's  depot.  On  the  28th  our 
cavalry,  which  had  been  left  holding  a  line  from  Charles- 
town  to  Shepherdstown,  was  compelled  to  retire  across 
the  Opequon,  after  having  had  a  brisk  engagement  with 
the  enemy's  cavalry  at  Smithfield.  On  the  29th,  the 
enemy's  cavalry  crossed  the  Opequon  near  Smithfield, 
driving  in  our  cavalry  pickets,  when  I  advanced  to  the 
front  with  a  part  of  my  infantry,  and  drove  the  enemy 
across  the  stream  again,  and  after  a  very  sharp  artil- 
lery duel,  a  portion  of  my  command  was  crossed  over 
and  pursued  the  enemy  through  Smithfield  towards 
Charlestown. 

Quiet  prevailed  on  the  30th,  but  on  the  31st  there 
were  some  demonstrations  of  cavalry  by  the  enemy  on  the 
Opequon,  which  were  met  by  ours.  On  this  day  Anderson 
moved  to  Winchester,  and  Rodes,  with  his  division,  went 
to  Martinsburg  on  a  reconnaissance,  drove  a  force  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  from  that  place,  interrupted  the  prep- 
arations for  repairing  the  railroad,  and  then  returned. 

There  was  quiet  on  the  1st,  but  on  the  2nd,  I  broke 
up  my  camp  at  Bunker  Hill,  and  moved  with  three  divis- 
ions of  infantry  and  part  of  McCausland's  cavalry,  under 
Colonel  Ferguson,  across  the  country  towards  Summit 
Point,  on  a  reconnaissance,  while  the  trains  under  the 
protection  of  Rodes'  division  were  moved  to  Stephenson's 
depot.  After  I  had  crossed  the  Opequon  and  was  moving 
towards  Summit  Point,  Averill's  cavalry  attacked  and 
drove  back  in  some  confusion  first  Vaughan's  and  then 
Johnson's  cavalry,  which  were  on  the  Martinsburg  road 
and  the  Opequon,  but  Rodes  returned  towards  Bunker 
Hill  and  drove  the  enemy  back  in  turn.  This  affair 
arrested  my  march  and  I  recrossed  the  Opequon  and 

410 


RETREAT  TO  FISHER'S  HILL 

moved  to  Stephenson's  depot,  where  I  established  my 
camp. 

On  the  3rd,  Rodes  moved  to  Bunker  Hill  in  support  of 
Lomax's  cavalry,  and  drove  the  enemy's  cavalry  from 
and  beyond  the  place. 

A  letter  had  been  received  from  General  Lee  request- 
ing that  Kershaw's  division  should  be  returned  to  him, 
as  he  was  very  much  in  need  of  troops,  and,  after  consul- 
tation with  me,  General  Anderson  determined  to  recross 
the  Blue  Ridge  with  that  division  and  Fitz.  Lee's  cavalry. 
On  the  3rd,  he  moved  towards  Berryville  for  the  purpose 
of  crossing  the  mountain  at  Ashby's  Gap,  and  I  was  to 
have  moved  towards  Charlestown  next  day,  to  occupy  the 
enemy's  attention  during  Anderson's  movement.  Sheri- 
dan, however,  had  started  two  divisions  of  cavalry 
through  Berryville  and  White  Post,  on  a  raid  to  our  rear, 
and  his  main  force  had  moved  towards  Berryville. 
Anderson  encountered  Crook's  corps  at  the  latter  place, 
and  after  a  sharp  engagement  drove  it  back  on  the  main 
body.  Receiving  information  of  this  affair,  I  moved  at 
daylight  next  morning,  with  three  divisions,  to  Ander- 
son's assistance,  Gordon's  division  being  left  to  cover 
Winchester. 

I  found  Kershaw's  division  extended  out  in  a  strong 
skirmish  line  confronting  Sheridan's  main  force,  which 
had  taken  position  in  rear  of  Berryville,  across  the  road 
from  Charlestown  to  that  place,  and  was  busily  fortifying, 
while  the  cavalry  force  which  had  started  on  the  raid  was 
returning  and  passing  between  Berryville  and  the  river 
to  Sheridan's  rear.  As  may  be  supposed,  Anderson's 
position  was  one  of  great  peril,  if  the  enemy  had  pos* 
sessed  enterprise,  and  it  presented  the  appearance  of  the 
most  extreme  audacity  for  him  thus  to  confront  a  force  so 
vastly  superior  to  his  own,  while,  too,  his  trains  were  at 
the  mercy  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  had  the  latter  known 
it.  Placing  one  of  my  divisions  in  line  on  Kershaw 's  left, 
I  moved  with  the  other  two  along  the  enemy's  front 
towards  his  right,  for  the  purpose  of  reconnoitring  and 

411 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

attacking  that  flank,  if  a  suitable  opportunity  offered. 
After  moving  in  this  way  for  two  miles,  I  reached  an 
elevated  position  from  which  the  enemy's  line  was  visi- 
ble, and  within  artillery  range  of  it.  I  at  first  thought 
that  I  had  reached  his  right  flank  and  was  about  making 
arrangements  to  attack  it,  when,  casting  my  eye  to  my 
left,  I  discovered,  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach,  with  the 
aid' of  field  glasses,  a  line  extending  toward  Summit 
Point. 

The  position  the  enemy  occupied  was  a  strong  one, 
and  he  was  busily  engaged  fortifying  it,  having  already 
made  considerable  progress.  It  was  not  until  I  had  had 
this  view  that  I  realized  the  size  of  the  enemy's  force,  and 
as  I  discovered  that  his  line  was  too  long  for  me  to  get 
around  his  flank  and  the  position  was  too  strong  to  attack 
in  front,  I  returned  and  informed  General  Anderson  of 
the  condition  of  things.  After  consultation  with  him,  we 
thought  it  not  advisable  to  attack  the  enemy  in  his  en- 
trenched lines,  and  we  determined  to  move  our  forces 
back  to  the  west  side  of  the  Opequon,  and  see  if  he  would 
not  move  out  of  his  works. 

The  wagon  trains  were  sent  back  early  next  morning 
(the  5th)  towards  Winchester,  and  about  an  hour  by  sun, 
Kershaw's  division,  whose  place  had  been  taken  by  one 
of  my  divisions,  moved  toward  the  same  point.  About 
two  o  'clock  in  the  afternoon  my  troops  were  withdrawn, 
and  moved  back  to  Stephenson's  depot.  This  withdrawal 
was  made  while  the  skirmishers  were  in  close  proximity 
and  firing  at  each  other;  yet  there  was  no  effort  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  to  molest  us.  Just  as  my  front  divis- 
ion (Rodes')  reached  Stephenson's  depot,  it  met,  and 
drove  back,  and  pursued  for  some  distance,  Averill's 
cavalry,  which  was  forcing,  towards  Winchester,  that 
part  of  our  cavalry  which  had  been  watching  the  Martins- 
burg  road. 

It  was  quiet  on  the  6th,  but  on  the  7th  the  enemy's 
cavalry  made  demonstrations  on  the  Martinsburg  road 
and  the  Opequon  at  several  points  and  was  repulsed. 

412 


RETREAT  TO  FISHER'S  HILL 

On  the  8th  it  was  quiet  again,  but  on  the  9th  a  detach- 
ment of  the  enemy's  cavalry  came  to  the  Opequon  below 
Brucetown,  burned  some  mills  and  retreated  before  a 
division  of  infantry  sent  out  to  meet  it. 

On  the  10th,  my  infantry  moved  by  Bunker  Hill  to 
Darksville  and  encountered  a  considerable  force  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  which  was  driven  off,  and  then  pursued 
by  Lomax  through  Martinsburg  across  the  Opequon.  We 
then  returned  to  Bunker  Hill  and  the  next  day  to  Stephen- 
son's  depot,  and  there  was  quiet  on  the  12th. 

On  the  13th,  a  large  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
reported  to  be  supported  by  infantry,  advanced  on  the 
road  from  Summit  Point,  and  drove  in  our  pickets  from 
the  Opequon,  when  two  divisions  of  infantry  were  ad- 
vanced to  the  front,  driving  the  enemy  across  the  Opequon 
again.  A  very  sharp  artillery  duel  across  the  creek  then 
took  place  and  some  of  my  infantry  crossed  over,  when 
the  enemy  retired. 

On  the  14th,  General  Anderson  again  started,  with 
Kershaw's  division  and  Cutshaw's  battalion  of  artillery, 
to  cross  the  Blue  Ridge  by  the  way  of  Front  Royal,  and 
was  not  molested.  Fitz.  Lee's  cavalry  was  left  with  me, 
and  Ramseur's  division  was  moved  to  Winchester  to 
occupy  Kershaw's  position. 

There  was  an  affair  between  one  of  Kershaw's  bri- 
gades and  a  division  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  while  I  was 
at  Fisher's  Hill  and  Anderson  at  Front  Royal,  in  which 
some  prisoners  were  lost;  and  two  affairs  in  which  the 
outposts  from  Kershaw's  command  were  attacked  and 
captured  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  one  in  front  of  Win- 
chester and  the  other  in  front  of  Charlestown;  which  I 
have  not  undertaken  to  detail,  as  they  occurred  when 
General  Anderson  was  controlling  the  operations  of  that 
division,  but  it  is  proper  to  refer  to  them  here  as  part  of 
the  operations  in  the  Valley.  On  the  15th  and  16th  my 
troops  remained  in  camp  undisturbed. 

The  positions  of  the  opposing  forces  were  now  as 
follows:  Ramseur's  division  and  Nelson's  battalion  of 

413 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

artillery  were  on  the  road  from  Berryville  to  Winchester, 
one  mile  from  the  latter  place.  Rodes',  Gordon's  and 
Wharton's  divisions  (the  last  two  being  nnder  Brecken- 
ridge),  and  Braxton's  and  King's  battalions  of  artillery 
were  at  Stephenson's  depot  on  the  Winchester  &  Poto- 
mac Railroad,  which  is  six  miles  from  Winchester. 
Lomax's  cavalry  picketed  in  my  front  on  the  Opeqnon, 
and  on  my  left  from  that  stream  to  North  Mountain,  while 
Fitz.  Lee's  cavalry  watched  the  right,  having  small 
pickets  across  to  the  Shenandoah.  Four  principal  roads, 
from  positions,  centred  at  Stephenson's  depot,  to  wit: 
the  Martinsburg  road,  the  road  from  Charlestown  via 
Smithfield,  the  road  from  the  same  place  via  Summit 
Point,  and  the  road  from  Berryville  via  Jordan's  Springs. 
Sheridan's  main  force  was  near  Berryville,  at  the  en- 
trenched position  which  has  been  mentioned,  while  Averill 
was  at  Martinsburg  with  a  division  of  cavalry.  Berry- 
ville is  ten  miles  from  Winchester^  nearly  east,  and  Mar- 
tinsburg twenty-two  miles  nearly  north.  The  crossing  of 
the  Opequon  on  the  Berryville  road  is  four  or  five  miles 
from  Winchester.  From  Berryville  there  are  two  good 
roads  via  White  Post  to  the  Valley  Pike  at  Newtown  and 
Middletown,  the  last  two  roads  running  east  of  the  Ope- 
quon. The  whole  country  is  very  open,  being  a  lime- 
stone country  which  is  thickly  settled  and  well  cleared, 
and  affords  great  facilities  for  the  movement  of  troops 
and  the  operations  of  cavalry.  From  the  enemy's  fortifi- 
cations on  Maryland  Heights,  the  country  north  and  east 
of  Winchester,  and  the  main  roads  through  it  are  exposed 
to  view. 

The  relative  positions  which  we  occupied  rendered 
my  communications  to  the  rear  very  much  exposed,  but 
I  could  not  avoid  it  without  giving  up  the  lower  Valley. 
The  object  of  my  presence  there  was  to  keep  up  a  threat- 
ening attitude  towards  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  and 
prevent  the  use  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  and  the 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal,  as  well  as  to  keep  as  large 
a  force  as  possible  from  Grant's  army  to  defend  the 

414 


RETREAT  TO  FISHER'S  HILL 

Federal  Capital.  Had  Sheridan,  by  a  prompt  movement, 
thrown  his  whole  force  on  the  line  of  my  communications, 
I  would  have  been  compelled  to  attempt  to  cut  my  way 
through,  as  there  was  no  escape  for  me  to  the  right  or 
left,  and  my  force  was  too  weak  to  cross  the  Potomac 
while  he  was  in  my  rear.  I  knew  my  danger,  but  I  could 
occupy  no  other  position  that  would  have  enabled  me  to 
accomplish  the  desired  object. 

If  I  had  moved  up  the  Valley  at  all,  I  could  not  have 
stopped  short  of  New  Market,  for  between  that  place  and 
the  country,  in  which  I  was,  there  was  no  forage  for  my 
horses ;  and  this  would  have  enabled  the  enemy  to  resume 
the  use  of  the  railroad  and  canal,  and  return  all  the 
troops  from  Grant's  army  to  him.  Being  compelled  to 
occupy  the  position  where  I  was,  and  being  aware  of  its 
danger  as  well  as  apprised  of  the  fact  that  very  great 
odds  were  opposed  to  me,  my  only  resource  was  to  use  my 
forces  so  as  to  display  them  at  different  points  with  great 
rapidity,  and  thereby  keep  up  the  impression  that  they 
were  much  larger  than  they  really  were.  The  events  of 
the  last  month  had  satisfied  me  that  the  commander 
opposed  to  me  was  without  enterprise,  and  possessed  an 
excessive  caution  which  amounted  to  timidity.  If  it  was 
his  policy  to  produce  the  impression  that  his  force  was 
too  weak  to  fight  me,  he  did  not  succeed,  but  if  it  was  to 
convince  me  that  he  was  not  an  energetic  commander,  his 
strategy  was  a  complete  success,  and  subsequent  events 
have  not  changed  my  opinion. 

My  infantry  force  at  this  time  consisted  of  the  three 
divisions  of  the  2nd  Corps  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia, and  Wharton's  division  of  Breckenridge's  com- 
mand. The  2nd  corps  numbered  a  little  over  8,000 
muskets  when  it  was  detached  in  pursuit  of  Hunter,  and 
it  had  now  been  reduced  to  about  7,000  muskets,  by  long 
and  rapid  marches,  and  the  various  encampments  and 
skirmishes  in  which  it  had  participated.  Wharton's 
division  had  been  reduced  to  about  1,700  muskets  by  the 
same  causes.    Making  a  small  allowance  for  details  and 

415 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

those  unfit  for  duty,  I  had  about  8,500  muskets  for  duty. 

When  I  returned  from  Maryland,  my  cavalry  con- 
sisted of  the  remnants  of  five  small  brigades,  to  wit: 
Imboden's,  McCausland's,  Johnson's,  Jackson's  and 
Vaughan's.  Vaughan's  had  now  been  ordered  to  South- 
western Virginia,  most  of  the  men  having  left  without 
permission.  The  surprise  and  rout  of  McCausland's  and 
Johnson's  brigades  by  Averill  at  Moorefield  had  resulted 
in  the  loss  of  a  considerable  number  of  horses  and  men, 
and  such  had  been  the  loss  in  all  the  brigades,  in  the 
various  fights  and  skirmishes  in  which  they  had  been 
engaged,  that  the  whole  of  this  cavalry,  now  under 
Lomax,  numbered  only  about  1,700  mounted  men.  Fitz. 
Lee  had  brought  with  him  two  brigades,  to  wit:  Wick- 
ham's  and  Lomax 's  old  brigade  (now  under  Colonel 
Payne),  numbering  about  1,200  mounted  men.  I  had 
three  battalions  of  artillery  which  had  been  with  me  near 
Washington,  and  Fitz.  Lee  had  brought  a  few  pieces  of 
horse  artillery.  When  I  speak  of  divisions  and  brigades 
of  my  troops,  it  must  be  understood  that  they  were  mere 
skeletons  of  those  organizations. 

Since  my  return  from  Maryland,  my  supplies  had  been 
obtained  principally  from  the  lower  Valley  and  the  coun- 
ties west  of  it,  and  the  money  which  was  obtained  by 
contributions  in  Maryland  was  used  for  that  purpose. 
Nearly  the  whole  of  our  bread  was  obtained  by  threshing 
the  wheat  and  then  having  it  ground,  by  details  from  my 
command,  and  it  sometimes  happened  that  while  my 
troops  were  fighting,  the  very  flour  which  was  to  furnish 
them  with  bread  for  their  next  meal  was  being  ground 
under  the  protection  of  their  guns.  Latterly  our  flour  had 
been  obtained  from  the  upper  Valley,  but  also  by  details 
sent  for  that  purpose.  The  horses  and  mules,  including 
the  cavalry  horses,  were  sustained  almost  entirely  by 
grazing. 

I  have  no  means  of  stating  with  accuracy  Sheridan's 
force,  and  can  only  form  an  estimate  from  such  data  as 
I  have  been  able  to  procure.    Citizens  who  had  seen  his 

416 


RETREAT  TO  FISHER'S  HILL 

force  stated  that  it  was  the  largest  which  they  had  ever 
seen  in  the  Valley  on  either  side,  and  some  estimated  it  as 
high  as  60,000  or  70,000,  but  of  course  I  made  allowance 
for  the  usual  exaggeration  of  inexperienced  men.  My 
estimate  is  from  the  following  data:  in  Grant's  letter  to 
Hunter,  dated  at  Monocacy,  August  5th,  1864,  and  con- 
tained in  the  report  of  the  former,  is  the  following  state- 
ment: "In  detailing  such  a  force,  the  brigade  of  cavalry 
now  en  route  from  Washington  via  Rockville  may  be 
taken  into  account.  There  are  now  on  their  way  to  join 
you  three  other  brigades  of  the  best  cavalry,  numbering  at 
least  5,000  men  and  horses."  Sheridan  relieved  Hunter 
on  the  6th,  and  Grant  says  in  his  report,  "On  the  7th  of 
August,  the  Middle  Department  and  the  Departments  of 
West  Virginia,  Washington  and  the  Susquehanna  were 
constituted  into  the  Middle  Military  division,  and  Major 
General  Sheridan  was  assigned  to  the  temporary  com- 
mand of  the  same.  Two  divisions  of  cavalry,  commanded 
by  Generals  Torbert  and  Wilson,  were  sent  to  Sheridan 
from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  first  reached  him 
at  Harper 's  Ferry  on  the  11th  of  August. ' ' 

Before  this  cavalry  was  sent  to  the  Valley,  there  was 
already  a  division  there  commanded  by  Averill,  besides 
some  detachments  which  belonged  to  the  Department  of 
West  Virginia.  A  book  containing  the  official  reports  of 
the  chief  surgeon  of  the  cavalry  corps  of  Sheridan's 
army  which  was  subsequently  captured  at  Cedar  Creek 
od  the  19th  of  October,  showed  that  there  were  present 
for  duty  in  that  corps,  during  the  first  week  in  September, 
10,000  men.  The  extracts  from  Grant's  report  go  to  con- 
firm this  statement,  as,  if  three  brigades  numbered  at 
least  5,000  men  and  horses,  the  two  divisions,  when  the 
whole  of  them  arrived  with  Averill 's  cavalry,  must  have 
numbered  over  10,000. 

I  think,  therefore,  that  I  can  safely  estimate  Sheri- 
dan's cavalry  at  the  battle  of  Winchester,  on  the  19th  of 
September,  at  10,000.  His  infantry  consisted  of  the  6th, 
19th,  and  Crook's  corps,  the  latter  being  composed  of  the 

27  417 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

"Army  of  West  Virginia,"  and  one  division  of  the  8th 
corps.  The  report  of  Secretary  Stanton  shows  that  there 
was  in  the  department  of  which  the  "Middle  Military 
division"  was  composed  the  following  "available  force 
present  for  duty  May  1st,  1864,"  to  wit: 

Department  of  Washington    42,124 

.Department  of  West    Virginia    30,782 

Department  of  the  Susquehanna   2,970 

Middle   Department    5,627 

making  an  aggregate  of  81,503 ;  bnt,  as  the  Federal  Secre- 
tary of  War  in  the  same  report  says,  "In  order  to  repair 
the  losses  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  chief  part  of 
the  force  designed  to  guard  the  Middle  Department  and 
the  Department  of  Washington  was  called  forward  to 
the  front,"  we  may  assume  that  40,000  men  were  used 
for  that  purpose,  which  would  leave  41,503,  minus  the 
losses  in  battle  before  Sheridan  relieved  Hunter  in  the 
Middle  Military  division,  exclusive  of  the  6th  and  19th 
corps,  and  the  cavalry  from  Grant's  army.  The  infantry 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  composed  of  the  2nd, 
5th,  and  6th  corps,  on  the  1st  of  May,  1864,  and  Stanton 
says  the  "available  force  present  for  duty"  in  that  army, 
on  that  day,  was  120,386  men.  Allowing  30,000  for  the 
artillery  and  cavalry  of  that  army,  which  would  be  a  very 
liberal  allowance,  and  there  would  be  still  left  90,385 
infantry;  and  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  the  6th  corps 
numbered  one-third  of  the  infantry,  that  is  30,000  men  on 
the  1st  of  May,  1864. 

If  the  losses  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been 
such  as  to  reduce  the  6th  corps  to  less  than  10,000  men, 
notwithstanding  the  reinforcements  and  recruits  received, 
the  carnage  in  Grant's  army  must  have  been  frightful 
indeed.  The  19th  corps  was  just  from  the  Department  of 
the  Gulf  and  had  not  gone  through  a  bloody  campaign. 
A  communication  which  was  among  the  papers  captured 
at  Cedar  Creek,  in  noticing  some  statement  of  a  news- 
paper correspondent  in  regard  to  the  conduct  of  that 

418 


RETREAT  TO  FISHER'S  HILL 

corps  at  Winchester,  designated  it  as  "  a  vile  slander  on 
12,000  of  the  best  soldiers  in  the  Union  army." 

In  view  of  the  foregoing  data  without  counting  the 
troops  in  the  Middle  Department  and  the  Departments 
of  Washington  and  the  Susquehanna,  and  making  liberal 
allowances  for  losses  in  battle,  and  for  troops  detained 
on  post  and  garrison  duty  in  the  Department  of  West 
Virginia,  I  think  that  I  may  assume  that  Sheridan  had 
at  least  35,000  infantry  against  me.  The  troops  of  the 
6th  corps  and  of  the  Department  of  West  Virginia,  alone, 
without  counting  the  19th  corps,  numbered  on  the  1st  of 
May,  1864,  60,784.  If  with  the  19th  corps  Sheridan 
did  not  have  35,000  infantry  remaining  from  this  force, 
what  had  become  of  the  balance?  Sheridan's  artillery 
very  greatly  outnumbered  mine,  both  in  men  and  guns. 

Having  been  informed  that  a  force  was  at  work  on  the 
railroad  at  Martinsburg,  I  moved  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
17th  of  September,  with  Rodes'  and  Gordon's  divisions, 
and  Braxton 's  artillery,  to  Bunker  Hill,  and  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  18th  with  Gordon's  division  and  a  part  of  the 
artillery  to  Martinsburg,  preceded  by  a  part  of  Lomax's 
cavalry.  Averill's  division  of  cavalry  was  driven  from 
the  town  across  the  Opequon  in  the  direction  of  Charles- 
town,  and  we  then  returned  to  Bunker  Hill.  Gordon  was 
left  at  Bunker  Hill,  with  orders  to  move  to  Stephenson's 
depot  by  sunrise  next  morning,  and  Rodes'  division 
moved  to  the  latter  place  that  night,  to  which  I  also 
returned.  At  Martinsburg,  where  the  enemy  had  a  tele- 
graph office,  I  learned  that  Grant  was  with  Sheridan 
that  day,  and  I  expected  an  early  move. 


CHAPTER  XLV. 

Battle  of  Winchester. 

At  light  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  our  cavalry 
pickets,  at  the  crossing  of  the  Opequon  on  the  Berryville 
road,  were  driven  in,  and  information  having  been  sent  me 
of  that  fact,  I  immediately  ordered  all  the  troops  at 
Stephenson's  depot  to  be  in  readiness  to  move,  directions 
being  given  for  Gordon,  who  had  arrived  from  Bunker 
Hill,  to  move  at  once,  but  by  some  mistake  on  the  part  of 
my  staff  officer,  the  latter  order  was  not  delivered  to 
General  Breckenridge  or  Gordon.  I  rode  at  once  to 
Eamseur's  position,  and  found  his  troops  in  line  across 
the  Berryville  road  skirmishing  with  the  enemy.  Before 
reaching  this  point,  I  had  ascertained  that  Gordon  was 
not  moving  and  sent  back  for  him,  and  now  discovering 
that  the  enemy's  advance  was  a  real  one  and  in  heavy 
force,  I  sent  orders  for  Breckenridge  and  Rodes  to  move 
up  as  rapidly  as  possible.  The  position  occupied  by 
Ramseur  was  about  one  mile  and  a  half  out  from  Win- 
chester, on  an  elevated  plateau  between  Abraham's  Creek 
and  Red  Bud  Run.  Abraham's  Creek  crosses  the  Valley 
Pike  one  mile  south  of  Winchester,  and  then  crosses  the 
Front  Royal  road  about  the  same  distance  southeast  of 
the  town,  and  running  eastwardly,  on  the  southern  side 
of  the  Berryville  road,  crosses  that  road  a  short  distance 
before  it  empties  into  the  Opequon. 

Red  Bud  Run  crosses  the  Martinsburg  road  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  north  of  Winchester  and  runs  eastwardly, 
on  the  northern  side  of  the  Berryville  road,  to  the  Ope- 
quon. Ramseur  was  therefore  in  the  obtuse  angle  formed 
by  the  Martinsburg  and  Front  Royal  roads.  In  front  of 
and  to  the  right  of  him,  for  some  distance,  the  country 
was  open.  Abraham's  Creek  runs  through  a  deep  valley, 
and  beyond  it,  on  the  right,  is  high  open  ground,  at  the 
intersection  of  the  Front  Royal  and  Millwood  roads.    To 

420 


BATTLE  OF  WINCHESTER 

Ramseur's  left  the  country  sloped  off  to  the  Red  Bud, 
and  there  were  some  patches  of  woods  which  afforded 
cover  for  troops.  To  the  north  of  the  Red  Bud,  the  coun- 
try is  very  open,  affording  facilities  for  any  kind  of 
troops.  Towards  the  Opequon,  on  the  front,  the  Berry- 
ville  road  runs  through  a  ravine  with  hills  and  woods  on 
each  side,  which  enabled  the  enemy  to  move  his  troops 
under  cover,  and  mask  them  out  of  range  of  artillery. 

Nelson's  artillery  was  posted  on  Ramseur's  line, 
covering  the  approaches  as  far  as  practicable,  and  Lomax 
with  Jackson's  cavalry  and  part  of  Johnson's  was  on  the 
right,  watching  the  valley  of  Abraham's  Creek,  and  the 
Front  Royal  road  beyond,  while  Fitz.  Lee  was  on  the  left, 
across  the  Red  Bud,  with  his  cavalry  and  a  battery  of 
horse  artillery;  and  a  detachment  of  Johnson's  cavalry 
watched  the  interval  between  Ramseur's  left  and  the  Red 
Bud.  These  troops  held  the  enemy's  main  force  in  checlj 
until  Gordon's  and  Rodes'  divisions  arrived  from 
Stephenson's  depot. 

Gordon's  division  arrived  first,  a  little  after  ten 
o'clock  a.m.,  and  was  placed  under  cover  in  a  rear  of  a 
piece  of  woods  behind  the  interval  between  Ramseur's 
line  and  the  Red  Bud,  the  detachment  of  Johnson's  cav- 
alry having  been  removed  to  the  right.  Knowing  that  it 
would  not  do  for  us  to  await  the  shock  of  the  enemy's 
attack,  Gordon  was  directed  to  examine  the  ground  on  the 
left,  with  a  view  to  attacking  a  force  of  the  enemy  which 
had  taken  position  in  a  piece  of  wood  in  front  of  him,  and 
while  he  was  so  engaged,  Rodes  arrived  with  three  of  his 
brigades,  and  was  directed  to  form  on  Gordon's  right  in 
rear  of  another  piece  of  woods.  While  this  movement 
was  executed,  we  discovered  very  heavy  columns  of  the 
enemy,  which  had  been  massed  under  cover  between  the 
Red  Bud  and  the  Berryville  road,  moving  to  attack  Ram- 
seur  on  his  left  flank,  while  another  force  pressed  him 
in  front.  It  was  a  moment  of  imminent  and  thrilling 
danger,  as  it  was  impossible  for  Ramseur's  division, 

421 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

which  numbered  only  about  1,700  muskets,  to  withstand 
the  immense  force  advancing  against  it. 

The  only  chance  for  us  was  to  hurl  Rodes  and  Gordon 
upon  the  flank  of  the  advancing  columns,  and  they  were 
ordered  forward  at  once  to  the  attack.  They  advanced 
in  most  gallant  style  through  the  woods  into  the  open 
ground,  and  attacked  with  great  vigor,  while  Nelson's 
battery  on  the  right,  and  Braxton's  on  the  left,  opened  a 
destructive  fire.  But  Evans'  brigade  of  Gordon's  divis- 
ion, which  was  on  the  extreme  left  of  our  infantry,  re- 
ceived a  check  from  a  column  of  the  enemy,  and  was 
forced  back  through  the  woods  from  behind  which  it  had 
advanced,  the  enemy  following  to  the  very  rear  of  the 
woods,  and  to  within  musket  range  of  seven  pieces  of 
Braxton's  artillery  which  were  without  support. 

This  caused  a  pause  in  our  advance  and  the  position 
was  most  critical,  for  it  was  apparent  that  unless  this 
force  was  driven  back  the  day  was  lost.  Braxton's  guns, 
in  which  now  was  our  only  hope,  resolutely  stood  their 
ground,  and  under  the  personal  superintendence  of 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Braxton  and  Colonel  T.  H.  Carter,  my 
then  Chief  of  Artillery,  opened  with  canister  on  the 
enemy.  This  fire  was  so  rapid  and  well  directed  that  the 
enemy  staggered,  halted,  and  commenced  falling  back, 
leaving  a  battle  flag  on  the  ground,  whose  bearer  was 
cut  down  by  a  canister  shot.  Just  then,  Battle's  brigade 
of  Rodes'  division,  which  had  arrived  and  been  formed  in 
Hue  for  the  purpose  of  advancing  to  the  support  of  the 
rest  of  the  division,  moved  forward  and  swept  through 
the  woods,  driving  the  enemy  before  it,  while  Evans'  bri- 
gade was  rallied  and  brought  back  to  the  charge. 

Our  advance,  which  had  been  suspended  for  a  moment, 
was  resumed,  and.  the  enemy's  attacking  columns  were 
thrown  into  great  confusion  and  driven  from  the  field. 
This  attacking  force  of  the  enemy  proved  to  be  the  6th 
and  19th  corps,  and  it  was  a  grand  sight  to  see  this 
immense  body  hurled  back  in  utter  disorder  before  my 
two  divisions,  numbering  a  very  little  over  5,000  muskets. 

422 


BATTLE  OF  WINCHESTER 

Ramseur's  division  had  received  the  shock  of  the 
enemy's  attack,  and  been  forced  back  a  little,  but  soon 
'recovered  itself.  Lomax,  on  the  right,  had  held  the 
enemy's  cavalry  in  check,  and,  with  a  part  of  his  force, 
had  made  a  gallant  charge  against  a  body  of  infantry, 
when  Ramseur's  line  was  being  forced  back,  thus  aiding 
the  latter  in  recovering  from  the  momentary  disorder. 
Fitz.  Lee  on  the  left,  from  across  the  Red  Bud,  had  poured 
a  galling  fire  into  the  enemy's  columns  with  his  sharp- 
shooters and  horse  artillery,  while  Nelson's  and  Brax- 
ton's battalions  had  performed  wonders. 

This  affair  occurred  about  11  a.m.,  and  a  splendid 
victory  had  been  gained.  The  ground  in  front  was  strewn 
with  the  enemy's  dead  and  wounded,  and  some  prisoners 
had  been  taken.  But  on  our  side,  Major  General  Rodes 
had  been  killed,  in  the  very  moment  of  triumph,  while 
conducting  the  attack  of  his  division  with  great  gallantry 
and  skill,  and  this  was  a  heavy  blow  to  me.  Brigadier 
General  Godwin  of  Ramseur's  division  had  been  killed, 
and  Brigadier  General  York  of  Gordon's  division  had 
lost  an  arm.  Other  brave  men  and  officers  had  fallen, 
and  we  could  illy  bear  the  loss  of  any  of  them. 

Had  I  then  had  a  fresh  body  of  troops  to  push  our 
victory,  the  day  would  have  been  ours,  but  in  this  action, 
in  the  early  part  of  the  day,  I  had  present  only  about 
7,000  muskets,  about  2,000  cavalry  and  two  battalions  of 
artillery  with  about  30  guns;  and  they  had  all  been  en- 
gaged. Wharton's  division  and  King's  artillery  had  not 
arrived,  and  Imboden's  cavalry  under  Colonel  Smith,  and 
McCausland's  under  Colonel  Ferguson,  were  watching 
the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the  right,  on  the  Martinsburg  road 
and  the  Opequon.  The  enemy  had  a  fresh  corps  which 
had  not  been  engaged,  and  there  remained  his  heavy  force 
of  cavalry.  Our  lines  were  now  formed  across  from 
Abraham's  Creek  to  Red  Bud  and  were  very  attenuated. 
The  enemy  was  still  to  be  seen  in  front  in  formidable 
force,  and  away  to  our  right,  across  Abraham's  Creek, 
at  the  junction  of  the  Front  Royal  and  Millwood  roads, 

423 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

he  had  massed  a  division  of  cavalry  with  some  artillery, 
overlapping  ns  at  least  a  mile,  while  the  country  was  open 
between  this  force  and  the  Valley  Pike  and  Cedar  Creek 
Pike  back  of  the  latter ;  which  roads  furnished  my  only 
means  of  retreat  in  the  event  of  disaster.  My  line  did 
not  reach  the  Front  Royal  road  on  the  right  or  the 
Martinsburg  road  on  the  left. 

When  the  order  was  sent  for  the  troops  to  move  from 
Stephenson's  depot,  General  Breckenridge  had  moved  to 
the  front,  with  Wharton's  division  and  King's  artillery, 
to  meet  a  cavalry  force,  which  had  driven  our  pickets 
from  the  Opequon  on  the  Charlestown  road,  and  that 
division  had  become  heavily  engaged  with  the  enemy,  and 
sustained  and  repulsed  several  determined  charges  of 
his  cavalry,  while  his  own  flanks  were  in  great  danger 
from  the  enemy's  main  force  on  the  right,  and  a  column 
of  his  cavalry  moving  up  the  Martinsburg  road  on  the 
left.  After  much  difficulty,  and  some  hard  fighting, 
General  Breckenridge  succeeded  in  extricating  his  force, 
and  moving  up  the  Martinsburg  road  to  join  me,  but  he 
did  not  reach  the  field  until  about  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon. 

In  the  meantime  there  had  been  heavy  skirmishing 
along  the  line,  and  the  reports  from  the  front  were  that 
the  enemy  was  massing  for  another  attack,  but  it  was 
impossible  to  tell  where  it  would  fall.  As  the  danger 
from  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the  right  was  very  great  and 
Lomax's  force  very  weak,  Wickham's  brigade  of  Fitz. 
Lee's  cavalry  had  been  sent  from  the  left  to  Lomax's 
assistance.  When  Wharton's  division  arrived,  Patton's 
brigade  of  that  division  was  left  to  aid  Fitz.  Lee  in  guard- 
ing the  Martinsburg  road,  against  the  force  of  cavalry 
which  was  advancing  on  that  road  watched  by  Lomax's 
two  small  brigades;  and  the  rest  of  the  division  in  the 
centre,  in  order  to  be  moved  to  any  point  that  might  be 
attacked.  Late  in  the  afternoon  two  divisions  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  drove  in  the  small  force  which  had  been 
watching  it  on  the  Martinsburg  road,  and  Crook's  corps, 

424 


BATTLE  OF  WINCHESTER 

which  had  not  been  engaged,  advanced  at  the  same  time 
on  that  flank,  on  the  north  side  of  Red  Bud,  and,  before 
this  overwhelming  force,  Patton's  brigade  of  infantry 
and  Payne's  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Fitz.  Lee  were 
forced  back. 

A  considerable  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  then 
swept  along  the  Martinsbnrg  road  to  the  very  skirts  of 
Winchester,  thus  getting  in  the  rear  of  our  left  flank. 
Wharton's  two  other  brigades  were  moved  in  double 
quick  time  to  the  left  and  rear,  and  making  a  gallant 
charge  on  the  enemy's  cavalry,  with  the  aid  of  King's  ar- 
tillery, and  some  of  Braxton's  guns  which  were  turned  to 
the  rear,  succeeded  in  driving  it  back.  The  division  was 
then  thrown  into  line  by  General  Breckenridge,  in  rear  of 
our  left  and  at  right  angles  with  the  Martinsburg  road, 
and  another  charge  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  hand- 
somely repulsed.  But  many  of  the  men  on  our  front  line, 
hearing  the  fire  in  the  rear,  and  thinking  they  were 
flanked  and  about  to  be  cut  off,  commenced  falling  back, 
thus  producing  great  confusion.  At  the  same  time  Crook 
advanced  against  our  left,  and  Gordon  threw  Evans'  bri- 
gade into  line  to  meet  him,  but  the  disorder  in  the  front 
line  became  so  great  that,  after  an  obstinate  resistance, 
that  brigade  was  compelled  to  retire  also. 

The  whole  front  line  had  now  given  way,  but  a  large 
portion  of  the  men  were  rallied  and  formed  behind  an 
indifferent  line  of  breastworks,  which  had  been  made  just 
outside  of  Winchester  during  the  first  year  of  the  war, 
and,  with  the  aid  of  the  artillery  which  was  brought  back 
to  this  position,  the  progress  of  the  enemy's  infantry  was 
arrested.  Wharton's  division  maintained  its  organiza- 
tion on  the  left,  and  Ramseur  fell  back  in  good  order  on 
the  right.  Wickham's  brigade  of  cavalry  had  been 
brought  from  the  right,  and  was  in  position  on  Fort 
Hill  just  outside  of  Winchester  on  the  west.  Just  after 
the  advance  of  the  enemy's  infantry  was  checked  by  our 
artillery,  it  was  reported  to  me  that  the  enemy  had  got 
around  our  right  flank,  and  as  I  knew  this  was  practicable 

425 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

and  was  expecting  such  a  movement  from  the  cavalry  on 
the  Front  Royal  road,  I  gave  the  order  to  retire,  but  in- 
stantly discovering  that  the  supposed  force  of  the  enemy 
was  Ramseur's  division,  which  had  merely  moved  back 
to  keep  in  line  with  the  other  troops,  I  gave  the  order 
for  the  latter  to  return  to  the  works  before  they  had 
moved  twenty  paces. 

This  order  was  obeyed  by  Wharton's  division,  but  not 
so  well  by  the  others.  The  enemy's  cavalry  force,  how- 
ever, was  too  large  for  us,  and  having  the  advantage  of 
open  ground,  it  again  succeeded  in  getting  around  our 
left,  producing  great  confusion,  for  which  there  was  no 
remedy.  Nothing  now  was  left  for  us  but  to  retire 
through  Winchester,  and  Ramseur's  division,  which  main- 
tained its  organization,  was  moved  on  the  east  of  the  town 
to  the  south  side  of  it,  and  put  in  position,  forming  a  basis 
for  a  new  line,  while  the  other  troops  moved  back  through 
the  town.  Wickham's  brigade,  with  some  pieces  of  horse 
artillery  on  Fort  Hill,  covered  this  movement  and  checked 
the  pursuit  of  the  enemy's  cavalry.  When  the  new  line 
was  formed,  the  enemy 's  advance  was  checked  until  night- 
fall, and  we  then  retired  to  Newtown  without  serious 
molestation.  Lomax  had  held  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the 
Front  Royal  road  in  check,  and  a  feeble  attempt  at  pur- 
suit was  repulsed  by  Ramseur  near  Kernstown. 

As  soon  as  our  reverse  began,  orders  had  been  sent 
for  the  removal  of  the  trains,  stores  and  sick  and  wounded 
in  the  hospitals  to  Fisher's  Hill  over  the  Cedar  Creek 
Pike  and  the  Back  Road.  This  was  done  with  safety,  and 
all  the  wounded,  except  such  as  were  not  in  a  condition 
to  be  moved,  and  those  which  had  not  been  brought  from 
the  field,  were  carried  to  the  rear. 

This  battle,  beginning  with  the  skirmishing  in  Ram- 
seur's front,  had  lasted  from  daylight  till  dark,  and,  at 
the  close  of  it,  we  had  been  forced  back  two  miles,  after 
having  repulsed  the  enemy's  first  attack  with  great 
slaughter  to  him  and  subsequently  contested  every  inch 
of  ground  with  unsurpassed  obstinacy.     We  deserved 

426 


BATTLE  OF  WINCHESTER 

the  victory,  and  would  have  had  it,  but  for  the  enemy's 
immense  superiority  in  cavalry,  which  alone  gave  it  to 
him. 

Three  pieces  of  King's  artillery,  from  which  the 
horses  were  shot,  and  which,  therefore,  could  not  be 
brought  off,  were  lost,  but  the  enemy  claimed  five,  and  if 
he  captured  that  number,  two  were  lost  by  the  cavalry  and 
not  reported  to  me.  My  loss  in  killed,  wounded  and 
prisoners  was  severe  for  the  size  of  my  force,  but  it  was 
only  a  fraction  of  that  claimed  by  the  enemy.  Owing  to 
its  obedience  to  orders  in  returning  to  the  works,  the 
heaviest  loss  of  prisoners  was  in  Wharton's  division. 
Colonel  G.  W.  Patton,  commanding  a  brigade,  was  mor- 
tally wounded  and  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy; 
Major  General  Fitz.  Lee  was  also  severely  wounded.  In 
the  death  of  Major  General  Kodes,  I  had  to  regret  the 
loss,  not  only  of  a  most  accomplished,  skilful  and  gallant 
officer,  upon  whom  I  placed  great  reliance,  but  also  of  a 
personal  friend,  whose  counsels  had  been  of  great  service 
to  me  in  the  trying  circumstances  with  which  I  had  found 
myself  surrounded.  He  fell  at  his  post,  doing  a  soldier's 
and  patriot's  duty  to  his  country,  and  his  memory  will 
long  be  cherished  by  his  comrades.  General  Godwin  and 
Colonel  Patton  were  both  most  gallant  and  efficient  offi- 
cers, and  their  loss  was  deeply  felt,  as  was  that  of  all 
the  brave  officers  and  men  who  fell  in  this  battle.  The 
enemy's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  very  heavy,  and 
some  prisoners  fell  into  our  hands. 

A  skilful  and  energetic  commander  of  the  enemy's 
forces  would  have  crushed  Ramseur  before  any  assistance 
could  have  reached  him,  and  thus  ensured  the  destruction 
of  my  whole  force ;  and  later  in  the  day,  when  the  battle 
had  turned  against  us,  with  the  immense  superiority  in 
cavalry  which  Sheridan  had,  and  the  advantage  of  the 
open  country,  would  have  destroyed  my  whole  force  and 
captured  everything  I  had.  As  it  was,  considering  the 
immense  disparity  in  numbers  and  equipment,  the  enemy 
had  very  little  to  boast  of.    I  had  lost  a  few  pieces  of 

427 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JTJBAL  A.  EARLY 

artillery  and  some  very  valuable  officers  and  men,  but  the 
main  part  of  my  force  and  all  my  trains  bad  been  saved, 
and  the  enemy's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  far 
greater  than  mine.  When  I  look  back  to  this  battle,  I  can 
but  attribute  my  escape  from  utter  annihilation  to  the 
incapacity  of  my  opponent.* 

f  *  The  enemy  has  called  this  battle  "  The  Battle  of  the  Opequon," 
but  I  know  of  no  claim  it  has  to  that  title,  unless  it  be  in  the  fact 
that,  after  his  repulse  in  the  forepart  of  the  day,  some  of  his  troops 
ran  back  across  that  stream. 


CHAPTER  XL VI. 

Affair  at  Fisher's  Hill. 

At  light  on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  my  troops  moved 
to  Fisher's  Hill  without  molestation  from  the  enemy, 
and  again  took  position  at  that  point  on  the  old  line — 
Wharton's  division  being  on  the  right,  then  Gordon's, 
Ramseur's  and  Rodes',  in  the  order  in  which  they  are 
mentioned.  Fitz.  Lee's  cavalry,  now  under  Brigadier 
General  Wickham,  was  sent  up  the  Luray  Valley  to  a 
narrow  pass  at  Millwood,  to  try  to  hold  that  valley 
against  the  enemy's  cavalry.  General  Ramseur  was 
transferred  to  the  command  of  Rodes'  division,  and 
Brigadier  General  Pegram,  who  had  reported  for  duty 
about  the  1st  of  August,  and  been  in  command  of  his 
brigade  since  that  time,  was  left  in  command  of  the  divis- 
ion previously  commanded  by  Ramseur.  My  infantry 
was  not  able  to  occupy  the  whole  line  at  Fisher's  Hill, 
notwithstanding  it  was  extended  out  in  an  attenuated  line, 
with  considerable  intervals.  The  greater  part  of  Lomax's 
cavalry  was  therefore  dismounted,  and  placed  on  Ram- 
seur 's  left,  near  Little  North  Mountain,  but  the  line  could 
not  then  be  fully  occupied. 

This  was  the  only  position  in  the  whole  Valley  where 
a  defensive  line  could  be  taken  against  an  enemy  moving 
up  the  Valley,  and  it  had  several  weak  points.  To  have 
retired  beyond  this  point  would  have  rendered  it  neces- 
sary for  me  to  fall  back  to  some  of  the  gaps  of  the  Blue 
Ridge,  at  the  upper  part  of  the  Valley,  and  I  determined 
therefore  to  make  a  show  of  a  stand  here,  with  the  hopes 
that  the  enemy  would  be  deterred  from  attacking  me  in 
this  position,  as  had  been  the  case  in  August. 

On  the  second  day  after  our  arrival  at  this  place, 
General  Breckenridge  received  orders  from  Richmond, 
by  telegraph,  to  return  to  Southwestern  Virginia,  and 
I  lost  the  benefit  of  his  services.    He  had  ably  co-operated 

429 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

with  me,  and  our  personal  relations  had  been  of  the  most 
pleasant  character. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  20th,  Sheridan's  forces  ap- 
peared on  the  banks  of  Cedar  Creek,  about  four  miles 
from  Fisher's  Hill,  and  the  21st,  and  the  greater  part  of 
the  22nd,  were  consumed  by  him  in  reconnoitring  and 
gradually  moving  his  forces  to  my  front  under  cover  of 
breastworks.  After  some  sharp  skirmishing,  he  attained 
a  strong  position  immediately  in  my  front  and  fortified  it, 
and  I  began  to  think  he  was  satisfied  with  the  advantage 
he  had  gained  and  would  not  probably  press  it  further ; 
but  on  the  afternoon  of  the  22nd,  I  discovered  that  an- 
other attack  was  contemplated,  and  orders  were  given  for 
my  troops  to  retire,  after  dark,  as  I  knew  my  force  was 
not  strong  enough  to  resist  a  determined  assault.  Just 
before  sunset,  however,  Crook's  corps,  which  had  moved 
to  our  left  on  the  side  of  Little  North  Mountain,  and 
under  cover  of  the  woods,  forced  back  Lomax's  dis- 
mounted cavalry  and  advanced  against  Eamseur's  left. 

Ramseur  made  an  attempt  to  meet  this  movement  by 
throwing  his  brigades  successively  into  line  to  the  left, 
and  Wharton's  division  was  sent  for  from  the  right,  but 
it  did  not  arrive.  Pegram's  brigades  were  also  thrown 
into  line  in  the  same  manner  as  Eamseur's,  but  the  move- 
ment produced  some  disorder  in  both  divisions,  and  as 
soon  as  it  was  observed  by  the  enemy,  he  advanced  along 
his  whole  line  and  the  mischief  could  not  be  remedied. 
After  a  very  brief  contest,  my  whole  force  retired  in 
considerable  confusion,  but  the  men  and  officers  of  the 
artillery  behaved  with  great  coolness,  fighting  to  the  very 
last,  and  I  had  to  ride  to  some  of  the  officers  and  order 
them  to  withdraw  their  guns,  before  they  would  move. 
In  some  cases,  they  had  held  out  so  long,  and  the  roads 
leading  from  their  positions  into  the  Pike  were  so  rugged, 
that  eleven  guns  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Vigor- 
ous pursuit  was  not  made,  and  my  force  fell  back  through 
Woodstock  to  a  place  called  the  Narrow  Passage,  all  the 
trains  being  carried  off  safely. 

430 


AFFAIR  AT  FISHER'S  HILL 

Our  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  in  this  affair  was 
slight,  but  some  prisoners  were  taken  by  the  enemy,  the 
most  of  whom  were  captured  while  attempting  to  make 
their  way  across  the  North  Fork  to  Massanutten  Moun- 
tain, under  the  impression  that  the  enemy  had  possession 
of  the  Valley  Pike  in  our  rear.  I  had  the  misfortune  to 
lose  my  Adjutant  General,  Lieutenant  Colonel  A.  S.  Pen- 
dleton, a  gallant  and  efficient  young  officer,  who  had 
served  on  General  Jackson's  staff  during  his  Valley  cam- 
paign, and  subsequently  to  the  time  of  the  latter 's  death. 
Colonel  Pendleton  fell  mortally  wounded  about  dark, 
while  posting  a  force  across  the  Pike,  a  little  in  rear  of 
Fisher's  Hill,  to  check  the  enemy.  He  was  acting  with 
his  accustomed  gallantry,  and  his  loss  was  deeply  felt 
and  regretted. 


CHAPTER  XL VII. 

The  March  up  the  Valley. 

On  the  morning  of  the  23rd,  I  moved  back  to  Mount 
Jackson,  where  I  halted  to  enable  the  sick  and  wounded, 
and  the  hospital  stores  at  that  place  to  be  carried  off.  In 
the  afternoon  Averill's  division  of  cavalry  came  up  in 
pursuit,  and  after  some  heavy  skirmishing  was  driven 
back.  I  then  moved  to  Rude's  Hill  between  Mount  Jack- 
son and  New  Market. 

On  the  morning  of  the  24th,  a  body  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  crossed  the  North  Fork  below  Mount  Jackson, 
and  attempted  to  get  around  my  right  flank,  but  was  held 
in  check.  The  enemy's  infantry  soon  appeared  at  Mount 
Jackson,  and  commenced  moving  around  my  left  flank,  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  river  from  that  on  which  my  left 
rested.  As  the  country  was  entirely  open,  and  Rude's 
Hill  an  elevated  position,  I  could  see  the  whole  movement 
of  the  enemy,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  fully  developed,  I 
commenced  retiring  in  line  of  battle,  and  in  that  manner 
retired  through  New  Market  to  a  point  at  which  the  road 
to  Port  Republic  leaves  the  Valley  Pike,  nine  miles  from 
Rude's  Hill. 

This  movement  was  made  through  an  entirely  open 
country,  and  at  every  mile  or  two  a  halt  was  made,  and 
artillery  opened  on  the  enemy,  who  was  pursuing,  which 
compelled  him  to  commence  deploying  into  line,  when  the 
retreat  would  be  resumed.  In  this  retreat,  under  fire  in 
line,  which  is  so  trying  to  a  retiring  force,  and  tests  the 
best  qualities  of  the  soldier,  the  conduct  of  my  troops 
was  most  admirable,  and  they  preserved  perfect  order 
and  their  line  intact,  notwithstanding  their  diminished 
numbers,  and  the  fact  that  the  enemy  was  pursuing  in 
full  force,  and  every  now  and  then  dashing  up  with  horse 
artillery  under  the  support  of  cavalry,  and  opening  on  the 
retiring  lines.     At  the  last  halt,  which  was  at  a  place 

432 


THE  MARCH  UP  THE  VALLEY 

called  "Tenth  Legion,"  near  where  the  Port  Republic 
road  leaves  the  Pike,  and  was  a  little  before  sunset,  I 
determined  to  resist  any  further  advance  so  as  to  enable 
my  trains  to  get  on  the  Port  Republic  road;  and  skir- 
mishers were  sent  out  and  artillery  opened  on  the  ad- 
vancing enemy,  but  after  some  skirmishing,  he  went  into 
camp  in  our  view,  and  beyond  the  reach  of  our  guns.  At 
this  point  a  gallant  officer  of  artillery,  Captain  Massie, 
was  killed  by  a  shell.  As  soon  as  it  was  dark,  we  retired 
five  miles  on  the  Port  Republic  road  and  bivouacked. 

In  the  morning  Lomax's  cavalry  had  been  posted  to 
our  left,  on  the  Middle  and  Back  Roads  from  Mount  Jack- 
son to  Harrisonburg,  but  it  was  forced  back  by  a  superior 
force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  retired  to  the  latter 
place  in  considerable  disorder.  Wickham's  brigade  had 
been  sent  for  from  the  Luray  Valley  to  join  me  through 
the  New  Market  Gap,  but  it  arrived  at  that  gap  just  as 
we  were  retiring  through  New  Market,  and  orders  were 
sent  for  it  to  return  to  the  Luray  Valley,  and  join  me  at 
Port  Republic.  In  the  meantime,  Payne's  small  brigade 
had  been  driven  from  Millf ord  by  two  divisions  of  cavalry 
under  Torbert,  which  had  moved  up  the  Luray  Valley, 
and  subsequently  joined  Sheridan  through  the  New 
Market  Gap.  This  cavalry  had  been  detained  by  Wick- 
ham  with  his  and  Payne's  brigades,  at  Millf  ord,  a  suffi- 
cient time  to  enable  us  to  pass  New  Market  in  safety. 
If,  however,  it  had  moved  up  the  Luray  Valley  by  Con- 
rad's store,  we  would  have  been  in  a  critical  condition. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th,  we  moved  towards  Port 
Republic, — which  is  in  the  fork  of  the  South  Fork  and 
South  River,  and  where  the  road  through  Brown's  Gap 
in  the  Blue  Ridge  crosses  those  rivers, — in  order  to  unite 
with  Kershaw's  division  which  had  been  ordered  to  join 
me  from  Culpeper  Court-House.  We  crossed  the  river 
below  the  junction,  and  took  position  between  Port  Re- 
public and  Brown's  Gap.  Fitz.  Lee's  and  Lomax's  cav- 
alry joined  us  here,  and  on  the  26th,  Kershaw's  division 
with   Cutshaw's  battalion  of  artillery  came  up,   after 

28  433 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

having  crossed  through  Swift  Run  Gap,  and  encountered 
and  repulsed,  below  Port  Republic,  a  body  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry.  There  was  likewise  heavy  skirmishing  on  my 
front  on  the  26th  with  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  made 
two  efforts  to  advance  towards  Brown's  Gap,  both  of 
which  were  repulsed  after  brisk  fighting  in  which  artillery 
was  used. 

Having  ascertained  that  the  enemy 's  infantry  had 
halted  at  Harrisonburg,  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  I 
moved  out  and  drove  a  division  of  his  cavalry  from  Port 
Republic,  and  then  encamped  in  the  fork  of  the  rivers.  I 
here  learned  that  two  divisions  of  cavalry  under  Torbert 
had  been  sent  through  Staunton  to  Waynesboro,  and  were 
engaged  in  destroying  the  railroad  bridge  in  the  latter 
place,  and  the  tunnel  through  the  Blue  Ridge  at  Rock-fish 
Gap,  and  on  the  28th  I  moved  for  those  points.  In  mak- 
ing this  movement  I  had  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  infan- 
try on  my  right,  while  one  division  of  cavalry  was  in  my 
rear  and  two  in  my  front,  and  on  the  left  was  the  Blue 
Ridge.  I  had  therefore  to  move  with  great  circum- 
spection. 

Wickham's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  sent  up  South 
River,  near  the  mountain,  to  get  between  the  enemy  and 
Rock-fish  Gap,  while  the  infantry  moved  in  two  columns, 
one  up  South  River,  with  the  trains  guarded  in  front  by 
Pegram's  and  Wharton's  divisions,  and  in  rear  by  Ram- 
seur's  division,  and  the  other,  composed  of  Kershaw's 
and  Gordon's  divisions  with  the  artillery,  on  the  right 
through  Mount  Meridian,  Piedmont  and  New  Hope.  Mc- 
Causland's  cavalry,  under  Colonel  Ferguson,  was  left  to 
blockade  and  hold  Brown's  Gap,  while  Lomax,  with  the 
rest  of  his  cavalry  and  Payne's  brigade,  watched  the 
right  flank  and  rear.  Wickham's  brigade,  having  got 
between  Rock-fish  Gap  and  Waynesboro,  drove  the 
enemy's  working  parties  from  the  latter  place,  and  took 
position  on  a  ridge  in  front  of  it,  when  a  sharp  artillery 
fight  ensued.  Pegram's  division,  driving  a  small  body  of 
cavalry  before  it,  arrived  just  at  night  and  advanced  upon 

434 


THE  MARCH  UP  THE  VALLEY 

the  enemy,  when  he  retired  in  great  haste,  taking  the 
roads  through  Staunton  and  west  of  the  Valley  Pike, 
back  to  the  main  body.  A  company  of  reserves,  com- 
posed of  boys  under  18  years  of  age,  which  had  been 
employed  on  special  duty  at  Staunton,  had  gone  to  Rock- 
fish  Gap,  and  another  company  of  reserves  from  Char- 
lottesville, with  two  pieces  of  artillery,  had  moved  to 
the  same  point,  and  when  the  enemy  advanced  towards 
the  tunnel  and  before  he  got  in  range  of  the  guns,  they 
were  opened  and  he  retired  to  Waynesboro. 

On  the  29th  and  30th,  we  rested  at  Waynesboro,  and 
an  engineer  party  was  put  to  work  repairing  the  bridge, 
which  had  been  but  partially  destroyed. 

On  the  1st  of  October,  I  moved  my  whole  force  across 
the  country  to  Mount  Sidney  on  the  Valley  Pike,  and  took 
position  between  that  place  and  North  River,  the  enemy's 
forces  having  been  concentrated  around  Harrisonburg, 
and  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river.  In  this  position  we 
remained  until  the  6th,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Rosser's 
brigade  of  cavalry,  which  was  on  its  way  from  General 
Lee's  army.  In  the  meantime  there  was  some  skirmishing 
with  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the  North  River,  at  the 
bridge  near  Mount  Crawford  and  at  Bridgewater  above. 

On  the  5th,  Rosser's  brigade  arrived  and  was  tem- 
porarily attached  to  Fitz.  Lee's  division,  of  which  Rosser 
was  given  the  command,  as  Brigadier  General  Wickham 
had  resigned.  The  horses  of  Rosser's  brigade  had  been 
so  much  reduced  by  previous  hard  service  and  the  long 
march  from  Richmond,  that  the  brigade  did  not  exceed 
six  hundred  mounted  men  for  duty,  when  it  joined  me. 
Kershaw's  division  numbered  2,700  muskets  for  duty  and 
he  had  brought  with  him  Cutshaw's  battalion  of  artillery. 
These  reinforcements  about  made  up  my  losses  at  Win- 
chester and  Fisher's  Hill,  and  I  determined  to  attack 
the  enemy  in  his  position  at  Harrisonburg,  and  for  that 
purpose  made  a  reconnaissance  on  the  5th,  but  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th  it  was  discovered  that  he  had  retired 
during  the  night  down  the  Valley. 

435 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

When  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy  was  retiring, 
I  moved  forward  at  once  and  arrived  at  New  Market 
with  my  infantry  on  the  7th.  Rosser  pushed  forward 
on  the  Back  and  Middle  roads  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  which  was  engaged  in  burning  houses,  mills, 
barns,  and  stacks  of  wheat  and  hay,  and  had  several 
skirmishes  with  it,  while  Lomax  also  moved  down  the 
Valley  in  pursuit,  and  skirmished  successfully  with  the 
enemy's  cavalry  on  the  8th;  but  on  the  9th  they  encoun- 
tered his  whole  cavalry  force  at  Tom's  Brook,  in  rear  of 
Fisher's  Hill,  and  both  of  their  commands  were  driven 
back  in  considerable  confusion,  with  a  loss  of  some  pieces 
of  artillery, — nine  were  reported  to  me  as  the  number 
lost,  but  Grant  claims  eleven.  Rosser  rallied  his  com- 
mand on  the  Back  Road,  at  Columbia  furnace  opposite 
Edinburg,  but  a  part  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  swept  along 
the  Pike  to  Mount  Jackson,  and  then  retired  on  the 
approach  of  a  part  of  my  infantry.  On  the  10th,  Rosser 
established  his  line  of  pickets  across  the  Valley  from 
Columbia  Furnace  to  Edinburg,  and  on  the  11th  Lomax 
was  sent  to  the  Luray  Valley  to  take  position  at  Millf  ord. 


CHAPTER  XL VIII. 

Battle  of  Cedar  Creek,  or  Belle  Grove. 

Having  heard  that  Sheridan  was  preparing  to  send 
part  of  his  troops  to  Grant,  I  moved  down  the  Valley 
again  on  the  12th.  On  the  morning  of  the  13th  we  reached 
Fisher's  Hill,  and  I  moved  with  part  of  my  command  to 
Hupp 's  Hill,  between  Strasburg  and  Cedar  Creek,  for  the 
purpose  of  reconnoitring.  The  enemy  was  found  posted 
on  the  north  bank  of  Cedar  Creek  in  strong  force,  and 
while  we  were  observing  him,  without  displaying  any  of 
my  force  except  a  small  body  of  cavalry,  a  division  of  his 
infantry  was  moved  out  to  his  left  and  stacked  arms 
in  an  open  field,  when  a  battery  of  artillery  was  run  out 
suddenly  and  opened  on  this  division,  scattering  it  in 
great  confusion. 

The  enemy  then  displayed  a  large  force,  and  sent  a 
division  across  the  creek  to  capture  guns  which  had  been 
opened  on  him,  but  when  it  had  advanced  near  enough, 
Conner's  brigade  of  Kershaw's  division  was  sent  forward 
to  meet  this  division,  and  after  a  sharp  contest  drove  it 
back  in  considerable  confusion  and  with  severe  loss. 
Conner's  brigade  behaved  very  handsomely  indeed,  but 
unfortunately,  after  the  enemy  had  been  entirely  re- 
pulsed, Brigadier  General  Conner,  a  most  accomplished 
and  gallant  officer,  lost  his  leg  by  a  shell  from  the  opposite 
side  of  the  creek.  Some  prisoners  were  taken  from  the 
enemy  in  this  affair,  and  Colonel  Wells,  the  division  com- 
mander, fell  into  our  hands  mortally  wounded.  The 
object  of  the  reconnaissance  having  been  accomplished,  I 
moved  back  to  Fisher's  Hill,  and  I  subsequently  learned 
that  the  6th  corps  had  started  for  Grant's  army  but  was 
brought  back  after  this  affair. 

I  remained  at  Fisher's  Hill  until  the  16th  observing 
the  enemy,  with  the  hope  that  he  would  move  back  from 
his  very  strong  position  on  the  north  of  Cedar  Creek,  and 

437 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

that  we  would  be  able  to  get  at  him  in  a  different  position, 
but  he  did  not  give  any  indications  of  an  intention  to 
move,  nor  did  he  evince  any  purpose  of  attacking  us, 
though  the  two  positions  were  in  sight  of  each  other. 
In  the  meantime  there  was  some  skirmishing  at  Hupp's 
Hill,  and  some  with  the  cavalry  at  Cedar  Creek  on  the 
Back  Road.  On  the  16th  Rosser's  scouts  reported  a 
brigade  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  encamped  on  the  Back 
Road,  and  detached  from  the  rest  of  his  force,  and 
Rosser  was  permitted  to  go  that  night,  with  a  brigade  of 
infantry  mounted  behind  the  same  number  of  cavalry, 
to  attempt  the  surprise  and  capture  of  the  camp.  He 
succeeded  in  surrounding  and  surprising  the  camp,  but 
it  proved  to  be  that  of  only  a  strong  picket,  the  whole 
of  which  was  captured — the  brigade  having  moved  its 
location. 

At  light  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  the  whole  of  my 
troops  were  moved  out  in  front  of  our  lines,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  covering  Rosser's  return  in  case  of  difficulty, 
and,  after  he  had  returned,  General  Gordon  was  sent 
with  a  brigade  of  his  division  to  Hupp's  Hill,  for  the 
purpose  of  ascertaining,  by  close  inspection,  whether  the 
enemy's  position  was  fortified,  and  he  returned  with  the 
information  that  it  was.  I  was  now  compelled  to  move 
back  for  want  of  provisions  and  forage,  or  attack  the 
enemy  in  his  position  with  the  hope  of  driving  him  from 
it,  and  I  determined  to  attack.  As  I  was  not  strong 
enough  to  attack  the  fortified  position  in  front,  I  deter- 
mined to  get  around  one  of  the  enemy's  flanks  and  attack 
him  by  surprise  if  I  could. 

After  General  Gordon's  return  from  Hupp's  Hill,  he 
and  Captain  Hotchkiss,  my  topographical  engineer,  were 
sent  to  the  signal  station  on  the  end  of  Massanutten 
Mountain,  which  had  been  re-established,  for  the  purpose 
of  examining  the  enemy's  position  from  that  point,  and 
General  Pegram  was  ordered  to  go  as  near  as  he  could 
to  Cedar  Creek  on  the  enemy's  right  flank,  and  see 
whether  it  was  practicable  to  surprise  him  on  that  flank. 

438 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK,  OR  BELLE  GROVE 

Captain  Hotchkiss  returned  to  my  headquarters  after 
dark,  and  reported  the  result  of  his  and  General  Gordon's 
examination,  and  he  gave  me  a  sketch  of  the  enemy's 
position  and  camps.  He  informed  me  that  the  enemy's 
left  flank,  which  rested  near  Cedar  Creek,  a  short  distance 
above  its  mouth,  was  lightly  picketed,  and  that  there  was 
but  a  small  cavalry  picket  on  the  North  Fork  of  the 
Shenandoah,  below  the  mouth  of  the  creek,  and  he  stated 
that,  from  information  he  had  received,  he  thought  it 
was  practicable  to  move  a  column  of  infantry  between  the 
base  of  the  mountain  and  the  river,  to  a  ford  below  the 
mouth  of  the  creek.  He  also  informed  me  that  the  main 
body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  on  his  right  flank  on 
the  Back  Road  to  Winchester. 

The  sketch  made  by  Captain  Hotchkiss,  which  proved 
to  be  correct,  designated  the  roads  in  the  enemy's  rear, 
and  the  house  of  a  Mr.  Cooley  at  a  favorable  point  for 
forming  an  attacking  column,  after  it  crossed  the  river, 
in  order  to  move  against  the  enemy  and  strike  him  on  the 
Valley  Pike  in  rear  of  his  works.  Upon  this  information, 
I  determined  to  attack  the  enemy  by  moving  over  the 
ground  designated  by  Captain  Hotchkiss,  if  it  should 
prove  practicable  to  move  a  column  between  the  base  of 
the  mountain  and  the  river.  Next  morning,  General  Gor- 
don confirmed  the  report  of  Captain  Hotchkiss,  express- 
ing confidence  that  the  attack  could  be  sucessfully  made 
on  the  enemy's  left  and  rear,  and  General  Pegram  re- 
ported that  a  movement  on  the  enemy's  right  flank  would 
be  attended  with  great  difficulty,  as  the  banks  of  Cedar 
Creek  on  that  flank  were  high  and  precipitous  and  were 
well  guarded.  General  Gordon  and  Captain  Hotchkiss 
were  then  sent  to  examine  and  ascertain  the  practicability 
of  the  route  at  the  base  of  the  mountain,  and  General 
Pegram,  at  his  request,  was  permitted  to  go  to  the  signal 
station  on  the  mountain  to  examine  the  enemy's  position 
himself  from  that  point.  Directions  were  given,  in  the 
meantime,  for  everything  to  be  in  readiness  to  move  that 
night  (the  18th)  and  the  division  commanders  were  re- 

439 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

quested  to  be  at  my  quarters  at  two  o  'clock  in  the  after- 
noon, to  receive  their  final  instructions. 

The  river  makes  a  circuit  to  the  left  in  front  of  the 
right  of  the  position  at  Fisher's  Hill  and  around  by  Stras- 
burg,  leaving  a  considerable  body  of  land  between  it  and 
the  mountain,  on  which  are  several  farms.  Whenever 
Fisher's  Hill  had  been  occupied  by  us,  this  bend  of  the 
river  had  been  occupied  by  a  portion  of  our  cavalry,  to 
prevent  the  enemy  from  turning  the  right  of  the  position, 
and  it  was  now  occupied  by  Colonel  Payne  with  his 
cavalry,  numbering  about  300.  In  order  to  make  the 
contemplated  movement,  it  was  necessary  to  cross  the 
river  into  this  bend,  and  then  pass  between  the  foot  of 
the  mountain  and  the  river  below  Strasburg,  where  the 
passage  was  very  narrow,  and  across  the  river  again 
below  the  mouth  of  Cedar  Creek.  The  enemy's  camps 
and  position  were  visible  from  a  signal  station  on  Round 
Hill  in  rear  of  Fisher's  Hill,  and  had  been  examined 
by  me  from  that  point,  but  the  distance  was  too  great  to 
see  with  distinctness.  From  the  station  on  the  mountain, 
which  immediately  overlooked  the  enemy's  left,  the  view 
was  very  distinct,  but  I  could  not  go  to  that  point  myself, 
as  the  ascent  was  very  rugged,  and  it  required  several 
hours  to  go  and  come,  and  I  could  not  leave  my  command 
for  that  time.  I  had,  therefore,  necessarily,  to  rely  on 
the  reports  of  my  officers. 

General  Gordon  and  Captain  Hotchkiss,  on  their  re- 
turn, reported  the  route  between  the  mountain  and  river, 
which  was  a  blind  path,  to  be  impracticable  for  infantry, 
but  not  for  artillery,  and  a  temporary  bridge  was  con- 
structed under  Captain  Hotchkiss'  superintendence,  at 
the  first  crossing  of  the  river  on  our  right. 

The  plan  of  attack  on  which  I  determined  was  to  send 
the  three  divisions  of  the  2nd  corps,  to  wit:  Gordon's, 
Ramseur's  and  Pegram's, under  General  Gordon, over  the 
route  which  has  been  specified  to  the  enemy's  rear,  to 
make  the  attack  at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning,  which 
would  be  a  little  before  daybreak — to  move  myself,  with 

440 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK,  OR  BELLE  GROVE 

Kershaw's  and  Wharton's  divisions,  and  all  the  artillery, 
along  the  Pike  through  Strasburg,  and  attack  the  enemy 
on  the  front  and  left  flank  as  soon  as  Gordon  should 
become  engaged,  and  for  Rosser  to  move  with  his  own 
and  Wickham's  brigade,  on  the  Back  Road  across  Cedar 
Creek,  and  attack  the  enemy's  cavalry  simultaneously 
with  Gordon's  attack,  while  Lomax  should  move  by  Front 
Royal,  across  the  river,  and  come  to  the  Valley  Pike, 
so  as  to  strike  the  enemy  wherever  he  might  be,  of  which 
he  was  to  judge  by  the  sound  of  the  firing. 

At  two  o'clock  p.m.  all  the  division  commanders,  ex- 
cept Pegram,  who  had  not  returned  from  the  mountain, 
came  to  my  headquarters,  and  I  gave  them  their  instruc- 
tions. Gordon  was  directed  to  cross  over  the  bend  of  the 
river  immediately  after  dark;  and  move  to  the  foot  of  the 
mountain,  where  he  would  rest  his  troops,  and  move  from 
there  in  time  to  cross  the  river  again  and  get  in  position 
at  Cooley's  house  in  the  enemy's  rear,  so  as  to  make 
the  attack  at  the  designated  hour,  and  he  was  instructed, 
in  advancing  to  the  attack,  to  move  for  a  house  on  the 
west  side  of  the  Valley  Pike  called  the  "  Belle  Grove 
House,"  at  which  it  was  known  that  Sheridan's  head- 
quarters were  located. 

A  guide,  who  knew  the  country  and  the  roads,  was 
ordered  to  be  sent  to  General  Gordon,  and  Colonel  Payne 
was  ordered  to  accompany  him  with  his  force  of  cavalry, 
and  endeavor  to  capture  Sheridan  himself.  Rosser  was 
ordered  to  move  before  day,  in  time  to  attack  at  five 
o'clock  next  morning,  and  to  endeavor  to  surprise  the 
enemy's  cavalry  in  camp.  Kershaw  and  Wharton  were 
ordered  to  move,  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  towards 
Strasburg  under  my  personal  superintendence,  and  the 
artillery  was  ordered  to  concentrate  where  the  Pike 
passed  through  the  lines  at  Fisher's  Hill,  and,  at  the 
hour  appointed  for  the  attack,  to  move  at  a  gallop 
to  Hupp 's  Hill — the  movement  of  the  artillery  being  thus 
delayed  for  fear  of  attracting  the  attention  of  the  enemy 
by  the  rumbling  of  the  wheels  over  the  macadamized  road 

441 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Swords  and  canteens  were  directed  to  be  left  in  camp,  so 
as  to  make  as  little  noise  as  possible. 

The  division  commanders  were  particularly  admon- 
ished as  to  the  necessity  for  promptness  and  energy  in 
all  their  movements,  and  they  were  instructed  to  press 
the  enemy  with  vigor  after  he  was  encountered,  and  to 
allow  him  no  time  to  form,  but  to  continue  the  pursuit 
until  his  forces  should  be  completely  routed.  They  were 
also  admonished  of  the  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  a 
disposition  to  plunder  the  enemy's  camps  by  their  men, 
and  they  were  enjoined' to  take  every  possible  precaution 
against  it. 

Gordon  moved  at  the  appointed  time,  and,  after  he  had 
started,  General  Pegram  reported  to  me  that  he  had  dis- 
covered, from  the  signal  station  on  the  mountain,  what  he 
supposed  to  be  an  intrenchment  thrown  up  since  Gordon 
and  Hotchkiss  made  their  examination ;  and  he  suggested 
the  propriety  of  attacking  the  enemy's  left  flank  at  the 
same  time  Gordon  made  his  attack,  as  he  would  prob- 
ably have  more  difficulty  than  had  been  anticipated.  I 
adopted  this  suggestion  and  determined  to  cross  Ker- 
shaw's division  over  Gedar  Creek,  at  Bowman's  Mill,  a 
little  above  its  mouth,  and  strike  the  enemy's  left  flank 
simultaneously  with  the  other  attacks,  of  which  purpose 
notice  was  sent  to  General  Gordon  by  General  Pegram. 

At  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  Kershaw 
and  Wharton  moved,  and  I  accompanied  them.  At 
Strasburg  Kershaw  moved  to  the  right  on  the  road  to 
Bowman's  Mill,  and  Wharton  moved  along  the  Pike  to 
Hupp's  Hill,  with  instructions  not  to  display  his  forces 
but  avoid  the  enemy's  notice  until  the  attack  began,  when 
he  was  to  move  forward,  support  the  artillery  when  it 
came  up,  and  send  a  force  to  get  possession  of  the  bridge 
on  the  Pike  over  the  creek.  I  accompanied  Kershaw's 
division,  and  we  got  in  sight  of  the  enemy's  fires  at  half- 
past  three  o'clock.  The  moon  was  now  shining  and  we 
could  see  the  camps.  The  division  was  halted  under  cover 
to  await  the  arrival  of  the  proper  time,  and  I  pointed  out 

442 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK,  OR  BELLE  GROVE 

to  Kershaw,  and  the  commander  of  his  leading  brigade, 
the  enemy's  position  and  described  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  and  directed  them  how  the  attack  was  to  be  made 
and  followed  up.  Kershaw  was  directed  to  cross  his 
division  over  the  creek  as  quietly  as  possible,  and  to 
form  it  into  column  of  brigades,  as  he  did  so,  and  advance 
in  that  manner  against  the  enemy's  left  breastwork,  ex- 
tending to  the  right  or  left  as  might  be  necessary. 

At  half -past  four  he  was  ordered  forward,  and,  a  very 
short  time  after  he  started,  the  firing  from  Rosser,  on 
our  left,  and  the  picket  firing  at  the  ford  at  which  Gordon 
was  crossing  were  heard.  Kershaw  crossed  the  creek 
without  molestation  and  formed  his  division  as  directed, 
and  precisely  at  five  o'clock  his  leading  brigade,  with 
little  opposition,  swept  over  the  enemy's  left  work,  cap- 
turing seven  guns,  which  were  at  once  turned  on  the 
enemy.  As  soon  as  this  attack  was  made,  I  rode  as 
rapidly  as  possible  to  the  position  on  Hupp's  Hill  to  which 
Wharton  and  the  artillery  had  been  ordered.  I  found 
the  artillery  just  arriving,  and  a  very  heavy  fire  of  mus- 
ketry was  now  heard  in  the  enemy's  rear  from  Gordon's 
column.  Wharton  had  advanced  his  skirmishers  to  the 
creek,  capturing  some  prisoners,  but  the  enemy  still  held 
the  works  on  our  left  of  the  Pike,  commanding  that  road 
and  the  bridge,  and  opened  with  his  artillery  on  us.  Our 
artillery  was  immediately  brought  into  action  and  opened 
on  the  enemy,  but  he  soon  evacuated  his  works,  and  our 
men  from  the  other  columns  rushed  into  them. 

Just  then  the  sun  rose,  and  Wharton's  division,  and 
the  artillery  were  ordered  immediately  forward.  I  rode 
in  advance  of  them  across  the  creek,  and  met  General 
Gordon  on  the  opposite  hill.  Kershaw's  division  had 
swept  along  the  enemy's  works  on  the  right  of  the  Pike, 
which  were  occupied  by  Crook's  corps,  and  he  and  Gordon 
had  united  at  the  Pike,  and  their  divisions  had  pushed 
across  it  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  The  rear  division  of 
Gordon's  column  (Pegram's)  was  crossing  the  river  at 
the  time  Kershaw's  attack  was  made,  and  General  Gordon 

443 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

moved  rapidly  to  Cooley's  house,  formed  his  troops  and 
advanced  against  the  enemy  with  his  own  division  on  the 
left,  under  Brigadier  General  Evans,  and  Ramseur's  on 
the  right,  with  Pegram  in  the  right  supporting  them. 

There  had  been  a  delay  of  an  hour  at  the  river  before 
crossing  it,  either  from  a  miscalculation  of  time  in  the 
dark,  or  because  the  cavalry  which  was  to  precede  his 
column  had  not  gotten  up,  and  the  delay  thus  caused, 
for  which  no  blame  is  to  be  attached  to  General  Gordon, 
enabled  the  enemy  partially  to  form  his  lines  after  the 
alarm  produced  by  Kershaw's  attack,  and  Gordon's 
attack,  which  was  after  light,  was  therefore  met  with 
greater  obstinacy  by  the  enemy  than  it  would  otherwise 
have  encountered,  and  the  fighting  had  been  severe. 

Gordon,  however,  pushed  his  attack  with  great  energy, 
and  the  19th  and  Crook's  corps  were  in  complete  rout, 
and  their  camps,  with  a  number  of  pieces  of  artillery  and 
a  considerable  quantity  of  small  arms,  abandoned.  The 
6th  corps,  which  was  on  the  enemy's  right,  and  some  dis- 
tance from  the  point  attacked,  had  had  time  to  get  under 
arms  and  take  position  so  as  to  arrest  our  progress. 
General  Gordon  briefly  informed  me  of  the  condition  of 
things  and  stated  that  Pegram 's  division,  which  had  not 
been  previously  engaged,  had  been  ordered  in.  He  then 
rode  to  take  command  of  his  division,  and  I  rode  forward 
on  the  Pike  to  ascertain  the  position  of  the  enemy,  in 
order  to  continue  the  attack. 

There  was  now  a  heavy  fog,  and  that,  with  the  smoke 
from  the  artillery  and  small  arms,  so  obscured  objects 
that  the  enemy's  position  could  not  be  seen;  but  I  soon 
came  to  Generals  Ramseur  and  Pegram,  who  informed 
me  that  Pegram 's  division  had  encountered  a  division  of 
the  6th  corps  on  the  left  of  the  Valley  Pike,  and,  after 
a  sharp  engagement,  had  driven  it  back  on  the  main  body 
of  that  corps,  which  was  in  their  front  in  a  strong  posi- 
tion. They  further  informed  me  that  their  divisions  were 
in  line  confronting  the  6th  corps,  but  that  there  was  a 
vacancy  in  the  line  on  their  right  which  ought  to  be  filled. 

444 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK,  OR  BELLE  GROVE 

I  ordered  Wharton's  division  forward  at  once,  and 
directed  Generals  Ramseur  and  Pegram  to  put  it  where 
it  was  required.  In  a  very  short  time,  and  while  I  was 
endeavoring  to  discover  the  enemy's  line  through  the  ob- 
scurity, "Wharton's  division  came  back  in  some  confusion, 
and  General  Wharton  informed  me  that,  in  advancing  to 
the  position  pointed  out  to  him  by  Generals  Ramseur  and 
Pegram,  his  division  had  been  driven  back  by  the  6th 
corps,  which,  he  said,  was  advancing.  He  pointed  out 
the  direction  from  which  he  said  the  enemy  was  advanc- 
ing, and  some  pieces  of  artillery,  which  had  come  up, 
were  brought  into  action.  The  fog  soon  rose  sufficiently 
for  us  to  see  the  enemy's  position  on  a  ridge  to  the  west 
of  Middletown,  and  it  was  discovered  to  be  a  strong  one. 
After  driving  back  Wharton's  division  he  had  not  ad- 
vanced, but  opened  on  us  with  artillery,  and  orders  were 
given  for  concentrating  all  our  guns  on  him. 

In  the  meantime,  a  force  of  cavalry  was  advancing 
along  the  Pike,  and  through  the  fields  to  the  right  of 
Middletown,  thus  placing  our  right  and  rear  in  great 
danger,  and  Wharton  was  ordered  to  form  his  division  at 
once,  and  take  position  to  hold  the  enemy's  cavalry  in 
check.  Wofford's  brigade  of  Kershaw's  division,  which 
had  become  separated  from  the  other  brigades,  was 
ordered  up  for  the  same  purpose.  Discovering  that  the 
6th  corps  could  not  be  attacked  with  advantage  on  its 
left  flank,  because  the  approach  in  that  direction  was 
through  an  open  flat  and  across  a  boggy  stream  with  deep 
banks,  I  directed  Captain  Powell,  serving  on  General 
Gordon's  staff,  who  rode  up  to  me  while  the  artillery 
was  being  placed  in  position,  to  tell  the  General  to  advance 
against  the  enemy's  right  flank  and  attack  it  in  con- 
junction with  Kershaw,  while  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery 
was  opened  from  our  right;  but  as  Captain  Powell  said 
he  did  not  know  where  General  Gordon  was  and  expressed 
some  doubt  about  finding  him,  immediately  after  lie 
started,  I  sent  Lieutenant  Page  of  my  own  staff,  with 

445 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

orders  for  both  Generals  Gordon  and  Kershaw  to  make 
the  attack. 

In  a  short  time  Colonel  Carter  concentrated  18  or  20 
guns  on  the  enemy,  and  he  was  soon  in  retreat.  Ramseur 
and  Pegram  advanced  at  once  to  the  position  from  which 
the  enemy  was  driven,  and  just  then  his  cavalry  com- 
menced pressing  heavily  on  the  right,  and  Pegram 's  divi- 
sion was  ordered  to  move  to  the  north  of  Middletown, 
and  take  position  across  the  Pike  against  the  cavalry. 
Lieutenant  Page  had  returned  and  informed  me  that  he 
delivered  my  order  to  General  Kershaw,  but  the  latter 
informed  him  that  his  division  was  not  in  a  condition 
to  make  the  attack,  as  it  was  very  much  scattered,  and 
that  he  had  not  delivered  the  order  to  General  Gordon, 
because  he  saw  that  neither  his  division  nor  Kershaw's 
was  in  a  condition  to  execute  it.  As  soon  as  Pegram 
moved,  Kershaw  was  ordered  from  the  left  to  supply  his 
place. 

I  then  rode  to  Middletown  to  make  provision  against 
the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  discovered  a  large  body  of  it 
seriously  threatening  that  flank,  which  was  very  much 
exposed.  Wharton's  division  and  WofTord's  brigade 
were  put  in  position  on  Pegram 's  right,  and  several 
charges  of  the  enemy 's  cavalry  were  repulsed.  I  had  no 
cavalry  on  that  flank  except  Payne's  very  small  brigade, 
which  had  accompanied  Gordon,  and  made  some  captures 
of  prisoners  and  wagons.  Lomax  had  not  arrived,  but  I 
received  a  message  from  him,  informing  me  that  he  had 
crossed  the  river  after  some  delay  from  a  cavalry  force 
guarding  it,  and  I  sent  a  message  to  him  requiring  him  to 
move  to  Middletown  as  quickly  as  possible,  but,  as  I  subse- 
quently ascertained,  he  did  not  receive  that  message. 
Rosser  had  attacked  the  enemy  promptly  at  the  appointed 
time,  but  he  had  not  been  able  to  surprise  him,  as  he  was 
found  on  the  alert  on  that  flank,  doubtless  owing  to  the 
attempt  at  a  surprise  on  the  night  of  the  16th. 

There  was  now  one  division  of  cavalry  threatening  my 
right  flank  and  two  were  on  the  left,  near  the  Back  Road, 

446 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK,  OR  BELLE  GROVE 

held  in  check  by  Rosser.  The  force  of  the  latter  was  too 
weak  to  make  any  impression  on  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and 
all  he  could  do  was  to  watch  it.  As  I  passed  across  Cedar 
Creek  after  the  enemy  was  driven  from  it,  I  had  discov- 
ered a  number  of  men  in  the  enemy's  camps  plundering, 
and  one  of  Wharton's  battalions  was  ordered  to  clear  the 
camps,  and  drive  the  men  to  their  commands. 

It  was  reported  to  me,  subsequently,  that  a  great 
number  were  at  the  same  work,  and  I  sent  all  my  staff 
officers  who  could  be  spared,  to  stop  it  if  possible,  and 
orders  were  sent  to  the  division  commanders  to  send  for 
their  men. 

After  he  was  driven  from  his  second  position,  the 
enemy  had  taken  a  new  position  about  two  miles  north  of 
Middletown,  and,  as  soon  as  I  had  regulated  matters  on 
the  right  so  as  to  prevent  his  cavalry  from  getting  in  rear 
of  that  flank,  I  rode  to  the  left,  for  the  purpose  of  order- 
ing an  advance. 

I  found  Ramseur  and  Kershaw  in  line  with  Pegram, 
but  Gordon  had  not  come  up.  In  a  short  time,  however,  I 
found  him  coming  up  from  the  rear,  and  I  ordered  him  to 
take  position  on  Kershaw's  left,  and  advance  for  the  pur- 
pose of  driving  the  enemy  from  his  new  position — Ker- 
shaw and  Ramseur  being  ordered  to  advance  at  the  same 
time.  As  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  our  left  was  very  strong, 
and  had  the  benefit  of  an  open  country  to  the  rear  of  that 
flank,  a  repulse  at  this  time  would  have  been  disastrous, 
and  I  therefore  directed  General  Gordon,  if  he  found  the 
enemy's  line  too  strong  to  attack  with  success,  not  to  make 
the  assault.  The  advance  was  made  for  some  distance, 
when  Gordon's  skirmishers  came  back,  reporting  a  line 
of  battle  in  front  behind  breastworks,  and  Gordon  did  not 
make  the  attack. 

It  was  now  apparent  that  it  would  not  do  to  press  my 
troops  further.  They  had  been  up  all  night  and  were 
much  jaded.  In  passing  over  rough  ground  to  attack  the 
enemy  in  the  early  morning,  their  own  ranks  had  been 
much  disordered,  and  the  men  scattered,  and  it  had  re- 

447 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

quired  time  to  re-form  them.  Their  ranks,  moreover, 
were  much  thinned  by  the  advance  of  the  men  engaged  in 
plundering  the  enemy's  camps.  The  delay  which  had 
unavoidably  occurred  had  enabled  the  enemy  to  rally  a 
portion  of  his  routed  troops,  and  his  immense  force  of 
cavalry,  which  remained  intact,  was  threatening  both  of 
our  flanks  in  an  open  country,  which  of  itself  rendered  an 
advance  extremely  hazardous. 

I  determined,  therefore,  to  try  and  hold  what  had 
been  gained,  and  orders  were  given  for  carrying  off  the 
captured  and  abandoned  artillery,  small  arms  and 
wagons.  A  number  of  bold  attempts  were  made  during 
the  subsequent  part  of  the  day,  by  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
to  break  our  line  on  the  right,  but  they  were  invariably 
repulsed. 

Late  in  the  afternoon,  the  enemy's  infantry  advanced 
against  Ramseur's,  Kershaw's  and  Gordon's  lines,  and 
the  attack  on  Ramseur's  and  Kershaw's  fronts  was  hand- 
somely repulsed  in  my  view,  and  I  hoped  that  the  day 
was  finally  ours,  but  a  portion  of  the  enemy  had  pene- 
trated an  interval  which  was  between  Evans'  brigade,  on 
the  extreme  left,  and  the  rest  of  the  line,  when  that  bri- 
gade gave  way,  and  Gordon's  other  brigades  soon  fol- 
lowed. General  Gordon  made  every  possible  effort  to 
rally  his  men,  and  lead  them  back  against  the  enemy,  but 
without  avail.  The  information  of  this  affair,  with  exag- 
gerations, passed  rapidly  along  Kershaw's  and  Ram- 
seur's lines,  and  their  men,  under  the  apprehension  of 
being  flanked,  commenced  falling  back  in  disorder,  though 
no  enemy  was  pressing  them,  and  this  gave  me  the  first 
intimation  of  Gordon's  condition. 

At  the  same  time  the  enemy's  cavalry,  observing  the 
disorder  in  our  ranks,  made  another  charge  on  our  right, 
but  was  repulsed.  Every  effort  was  made  to  stop  and 
rally  Kershaw's  and  Ramseur's  men,  but  the  mass  of 
them  resisted  all  appeals,  and  continued  to  go  to  the 
rear  without  waiting  for  any  effort  to  retrieve  the  partial 
disorder.    Ramseur,  however,  succeeded  in  retaining  with 

448 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK,  OR  BELLE  GROVE 

him  two  or  three  hundred  men  of  his  division,  and  Major 
Gog^in  of  Kershaw's  staff,  who  was  in  command  of 
Conner's  brigade,  about  the  same  number  from  that 
brigade;  and  these  men,  with  six  pieces  of  artillery  of 
Cutshaw's  battalion,  held  the  enemy's  whole  force  on  our 
left  in  check  for  one  hour  and  a  half,  until  Ramseur  was 
shot  down  mortally  wounded,  and  the  ammunition  of 
those  pieces  of  artillery  was  exhausted.  "While  the  latter 
were  being  replaced  by  other  guns,  the  force  that  had 
remained  with  Ramseur  and  Goggin  gave  way  also. 
Pegram's  and  Wharton's  divisions,  and  Wofford's  bri- 
gade had  remained  steadfast  on  the  right  and  resisted  all 
efforts  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  but  no  portion  of  this 
force  could  be  moved  to  the  left  without  leaving  the  Pike 
open  to  the  cavalry,  which  would  have  destroyed  all  hope 
at  once. 

Every  effort  to  rally  the  men  in  the  rear  having  failed, 
I  now  had  nothing  left  for  me  but  to  order  these  troops 
to  retire  also.  When  they  commenced  to  move,  the  dis- 
order soon  extended  to  them,  but  General  Pegram  suc- 
ceeded in  bringing  back  a  portion  of  his  command  across 
Cedar  Creek  in  an  organized  condition,  holding  the  enemy 
in  check,  but  this  small  force  soon  dissolved.  A  part  of 
Evans'  brigade  had  been  rallied  in  the  rear,  and  held  a 
ford  above  the  bridge  for  a  short  time,  but  it  followed 
the  example  of  the  rest.  I  tried  to  rally  the  men  immedi- 
ately after  crossing  Cedar  Creek,  and  at  Hupp 's  Hill,  but 
without  success. 

Could  500  men  have  been  rallied,  at  either  of  these 
places,  who  would  have  stood  by  me,  I  am  satisfied  that 
all  my  artillery  and  wagons,  and  the  greater  part  of  the 
captured  artillery  could  have  been  saved,  as  the  enemy's 
pursuit  was  very  feeble.  As  it  was,  a  bridge  broke  down 
on  a  very  narrow  part  of  the  road  between  Strasburg  and 
Fisher's  Hill,  just  above  Strasburg,  where  there  was  no 
other  pas  sway,  thereby  blocking  up  all  the  artillery,  ord- 
nance and  medical  wagons  and  ambulances  which  had  not 
passed  that  point ;  and,  as  there  was  no  force  to  defend 

29  449 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

them,  they  were  lost,  a  very  small  body  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  capturing  them. 

The  greater  part  of  the  infantry  was  halted  at 
Fisher's  Hill,  and  Rosser,  whose  command  had  retired  in 
good  order  on  the  Back  Road,  was  ordered  to  that  point 
with  his  cavalry.  The  infantry  moved  back  towards  New 
Market  at  three  o'clock  next  morning,  and  Rosser  was 
left  at  Fisher's  Hill  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  troops, 
and  hold  that  position  nntil  they  were  beyond  pursuit. 
He  remained  at  Fisher's  Hill  until  after  ten  o'clock  on  the 
20th,  and  the  enemy  did  not  advance  to  that  place  while 
he  was  there.  He  then  fell  back  without  molestation  to  his 
former  position,  and  established  his  line  on  Stony  Creek, 
across  from  Columbia  Furnace  to  Edinburg,  seven  miles 
below  Mount  Jackson.  My  other  troops  were  halted  at 
New  Market,  about  seven  miles  from  Mount  Jackson,  and 
there  was  an  entirely  open  country  between  the  two 
places,  they  being  very  nearly  in  sight  of  each  other. 

Lomax  had  moved,  on  the  day  of  the  battle,  on  the 
Front  Royal  road  towards  Winchester,  under  the  im- 
pression that  the  enemy  was  being  forced  back  towards 
that  place,  and  he  did  not  reach  me.  When  he  ascer- 
tained the  reverse  which  had  taken  place  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  day,  he  retired  up  the  Luray  Valley  to  his  former 
place  at  Millford,  without  molestation. 

My  loss  in  the  battle  of  Cedar  Creek  was  twenty-three 
pieces  of  artillery,  some  ordnance  and  medical  wagons 
and  ambulances,  which  had  been  carried  to  the  front  for 
the  use  of  the  troops  on  the  field,  about  1860  in  killed 
and  wounded,  and  something  over  1,000  prisoners.  Major 
General  Ramseur  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  mor- 
tally wounded,  and  in  him  not  only  my  command,  but  the 
country  sustained  a  heavy  loss.  He  was  a  most  gallant 
and  energetic  officer,  whom  no  disaster  appalled,  but  his 
courage  and  energy  seemed  to  gain  new  strength  in  the 
midst  of  confusion  and  disorder.  He  fell  at  his  post  fight- 
ing like  a  lion  at  bay,  and  his  native  State  has  reason 
to  be  proud  of  his  memory.    Brigadier  General  Battle 

450 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK,  OR  BELLE  GROVE 

was  wounded  at  the  beginning  of  the  fight,  and  other 
valuable  officers  were  lost.  Fifteen  hundred  prisoners 
were  captured  from  the  enemy  and  brought  off,  and  his 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  in  this  action  was  very  heavy. 

This  was  a  case  of  a  glorious  victory  given  up  by  my 
own  troops  after  they  had  won  it,  and  it  is  to  be  accounted 
for  on  the  ground  of  the  partial  demoralization  caused  by 
the  plunder  of  the  enemy's  camps,  and  from  the  fact  that 
the  men  undertook  to  judge  for  themselves  when  it  was 
proper  to  retire.  Had  they  but  waited,  the  mischief  on 
the  left  would  have  been  remedied.  I  have  never  been 
able  to  satisfy  myself  that  the  enemy's  attack  in  the  after- 
noon was  not  a  demonstration  to  cover  his  retreat  during 
the  night.  It  certainly  was  not  a  vigorous  one,  as  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  the  very  small  force  with  Ramseur 
and  G-oggin  held  him  in  check  so  long;  and  the  loss  in 
killed  and  wounded  in  the  division  which  first  gave  way 
was  not  heavy,  and  was  the  least  in  numbers  of  all  but 
one,  though  it  was  the  third  in  strength,  and  its  relative 
loss  was  the  least  of  all  the  divisions. 

I  read  a  sharp  lecture  to  my  troops,  in  an  address  pub- 
lished to  them  a  few  days  after  the  battle,  but  I  have 
never  attributed  the  result  to  a  want  of  courage  on  their 
part,  for  I  had  seen  them  perform  too  many  prodigies  of 
valor  to  doubt  that.  There  was  an  individuality  about  the 
Confederate  soldier  which  caused  him  to  act  often  in 
battle  according  to  his  own  opinions,  and  thereby  impair 
his  own  efficiency;  and  the  tempting  bait  offered  by  the 
rich  plunder  of  the  camps  of  the  enemy's  well-fed  and 
well-clothed  troops  was  frequently  too  great  for  our 
destitute  soldiers,  and  caused  them  to  pause  in  the  career 
of  victory. 

Had  my  cavalry  been  sufficient  to  contend  with  that  of 
the  enemy,  the  rout  in  the  morning  would  have  been  com- 
plete; as  it  was,  I  had  only  about  1,200  cavalry  on  the 
field  under  Rosser,  and  Lomax's  force,  which  numbered 
less  than  1,700,  did  not  get  up.  My  infantry  and  artillery 
was  about  the  same  strength  as  at  Winchester.    The  re- 

451 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

ports  of  the  Ordnance  officers  showed  in  the  hands  of  my 
troops  about  8,800  muskets  in  round  numbers,  as  follows : 
in  Kershaw's  division  2,700,  Ramseur's  2,100,  Gordon's 
1,700,  Pegram's  1,200  and  Wharton's  1,100.  Making  a 
moderate  allowance  for  the  men  left  to  guard  the  camps 
and  the  signal  station  on  the  mountain,  as  well  as  for  a 
few  sick  and  wounded,  I  went  into  this  battle  with  about 
8,500  muskets  and  a  little  over  forty  pieces  of  artillery. 

The  book  containing  the  reports  of  the  chief  surgeon 
of  Sheridan's  cavalry  corps,  which  has  been  mentioned 
as  captured  at  this  battle,  showed  that  Sheridan's  cavalry 
numbered  about  8,700  men  for  duty  a  few  days  previous, 
and  from  information  which  I  had  received  of  reinforce- 
ments sent  him,  in  the  way  of  recruits  and  returned  con- 
valescents, I  am  satisfied  that  his  infantry  force  was  fully 
as  large  as  at  Winchester.  Sheridan  was  absent  in  the 
morning  at  the  beginning  of  the  fight,  and  had  returned  in 
the  afternoon  before  the  change  in  the  fortunes  of  the 
day.* 

It  may  be  asked  why  with  so  small  a  force  I  made  the 
attack.  I  can  only  say  we  had  been  fighting  large  odds 
during  the  whole  war,  and  I  knew  there  was  no  chance  of 
lessening  them.  It  was  of  the  utmost  consequence  that 
Sheridan  should  be  prevented  from  sending  troops  to 
Grant,  and  General  Lee,  in  a  letter  received  a  day  or  two 
before,  had  expressed  an  earnest  desire  that  a  victory 
should  be  gained  in  the  Valley  if  possible,  and  it  could 
not  be  gained  without  fighting  for  it.  I  did  hope  to  gain 
one  by  surprising  the  enemy  in  his  camp,  and  then 
thought  and  still  think  I  would  have  had  it,  if  my  direc- 
tions had  been  complied  with,  and  my  troops  had  awaited 
my  orders  to  retire. 

*  The  retreat  of  the  main  body  of  his  army  had  been  arrested, 
and  a  new  line  formed  behind  breastworks  of  rails,  before  Sheridan 
arrived  on  the  field;  and  he  still  had  immense  odds  against  me  when 
he  made  the  attack  in  the  afternoon. 


CHAPTER  XLIX. 

Close  op  the  Valley  Campaign. 

Aftek  the  return  from  Cedar  Creek,  the  main  body  of 
my  troops  remained  in  their  camp  for  the  rest  of  the 
month  without  disturbance,  but  on  the  26th  of  October 
the  enemy's  cavalry  attacked  Lomax  at  Millford  and 
after  sharp  fighting  was  repulsed.  Having  heard  that 
Sheridan  was  preparing  to  send  troops  to  Grant,  and  that 
the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad  was  being  repaired,  I  moved 
down  the  Valley  again  on  the  10th  of  November.  I  had 
received  no  reinforcements  except  about  250  cavalry 
under  General  Cosby  from  Breckenridge 's  department  in 
Southwestern  Virginia,  some  returned  convalescents  and 
several  hundred  conscripts  who  had  been  on  details  which 
had  been  revoked. 

On  the  11th,  on  our  approach  to  Cedar  Creek,  it  was 
found  that  the  enemy  had  fallen  back  towards  Winches- 
ter, after  having  fortified  and  occupied  a  position  on 
Hupp's  Hill  subsequently  to  the  battle  of  Cedar  Creek. 
Colonel  Payne  drove  a  small  body  of  cavalry  through 
Middletown  to  Newtown  and  I  followed  him  and  took 
position  south  of  the  latter  place  and  in  view  of  it.  Sheri- 
dan's main  force  was  found  posted  north  of  Newtown  in 
a  position  which  he  was  engaged  in  fortifying. 

I  remained  in  front  of  him  during  the  11th  and  12th, 
Rosser  being  on  my  left  flank  on  the  Back  Road,  and 
Lomax  on  my  right  between  the  Valley  Pike  and  the 
Front  Royal  road,  with  one  brigade  (McCausland's) 
at  Cedarville  on  the  latter  road.  Rosser  had  some  skir- 
mishing with  the  enemy 's  cavalry  on  the  11th,  and  on  the 
12th  two  divisions  advanced  against  him,  and  after  a 
heavy  fight  the  enemy  was  repulsed  and  some  prisoners 
captured.  Colonel  Payne,  who  was  operating  immedi- 
ately in  my  front,  likewise  had  a  sharp  engagement  with 
a  portion  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  defended  it.    When 

453 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Rosser  was  heavily  engaged,  Lomax  was  ordered  to  his 
assistance,  with  a  part  of  his  command,  and  during  his 
absence,  late  in  the  afternoon,  Powell's  division  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  attacked  McCausland  at  Cedarville,  and 
after  a  severe  fight  drove  him  back  across  the  river  with 
the  loss  of  two  pieces  of  artillery. 

At  the  time  of  this  affair,  a  blustering  wind  was  blow- 
ing and  the  firing  could  not  be  heard;  and  nothing  was 
known  of  McCausland's  misfortune  until  after  we  com- 
menced retiring  that  night.  In  these  cavalry  fights,  three 
valuable  officers  were  killed,  namely:  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Marshall  of  Rosser 's  brigade,  Colonel  Radford  of  Mc- 
Causland's brigade,  and  Captain  Harvie  of  McCausland's 
staff. 

Discovering  that  the  enemy  continued  to  fortify  his 
position,  and  showed  no  disposition  to  come  out  of  his 
lines  with  his  infantry,  and  not  being  willing  to  attack 
him  in  his  entrenchments,  after  the  reverses  I  had  met 
with,  I  determined  to  retire,  as  we  were  beyond  the  reach 
of  supplies.  After  dark  on  the  12th,  we  moved  to  Fisher's 
Hill,  and  next  day  returned  in  the  direction  of  New 
Market,  where  we  arrived  on  the  14th,  no  effort  at  pur- 
suit being  made.  I  discovered  by  this  movement  that  no 
troops  had  been  sent  to  Grant,  and  that  the  project  of 
repairing  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad  had  been  aban- 
doned. 

Shortly  after  our  return  to  New  Market,  Kershaw's 
division  was  returned  to  General  Lee,  and  Cosby 's  cav- 
alry to  Breckenridge.  On  the  22nd  of  November  two 
divisions  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  advanced  to  Mount 
Jackson,  after  having  driven  in  our  cavalry  pickets.  A 
part  of  it  crossed  over  the  river  into  Meem's  Bottom  at 
the  foot  of  Rude's  Hill,  but  was  driven  back  by  a  portion 
of  my  infantry,  and  the  whole  retreated,  being  pursued 
by  Wickham's  brigade,  under  Colonel  Munford,  to 
Woodstock. 

On  the  27th,  Rosser  crossed  Great  North  Mountain 
into  Hardy  County,  with  his  own  and  Payne's  brigade, 

454 


CLOSE  OF  THE  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN 

and,  about  the  29th,  surprised  and  captured  the  fortified 
post  at  New  Creek,  on  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Eailroad.  At 
this  place,  two  regiments  of  cavalry  with  their  arms  and 
colors  were  captured  and  eight  pieces  of  artillery  and  a 
very  large  amount  of  ordnance,  quartermaster  and  com- 
missary stores  fell  into  our  hands.  The  prisoners,  num- 
bering 800,  four  pieces  of  artillery,  and  some  wagons  and 
horses,  were  brought  off,  the  other  guns,  which  were 
heavy  siege  pieces,  being  spiked,  and  their  carriages  and 
a  greater  part  of  the  stores  destroyed.  Rosser  also 
brought  off  several  hundred  cattle  and  a  large  number 
of  sheep  from  Hampshire  and  Hardy  counties. 

This  expedition  closed  the  material  operations  of  the 
campaign  of  1864  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and,  at  that 
time,  the  enemy  held  precisely  the  same  portion  of  that 
valley  which  he  held  before  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign in  the  spring,  and  no  more,  and  the  headquarters 
of  his  troops  were  at  the  same  place,  to  wit :  Winchester. 
There  was  this  difference,  however:  at  the  beginning  of 
the  campaign,  he  held  it  with  comparatively  a  small 
force,  and,  at  the  close,  he  was  compelled  to  employ  three 
corps  of  infantry,  and  one  of  cavalry,  for  that  purpose, 
and  to  guard  the  approaches  to  Washington,  Maryland 
and  Pennsylvania.  When  I  was  detached  from  General 
Lee's  army,  Hunter  was  advancing  on  Lynchburg,  170 
miles  south  of  Winchester,  with  a  very  considerable  force, 
and  threatening  all  of  General  Lee 's  communications  with 
a  very  serious  danger. 

By  a  rapid  movement,  my  force  had  been  thrown  to 
Lynchburg,  just  in  time  to  arrest  Hunter's  march  into 
that  place,  and  he  had  been  driven  back  and  forced  to 
escape  into  the  mountains  of  Western  Virginia,  with  a 
loss  of  ten  pieces  of  artillery  and  subsequent  terrible 
suffering  to  his  troops.  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  had 
been  invaded,  Washington  threatened  and  thrown  into  a 
state  of  frantic  alarm,  and  Grant  had  been  compelled  to 
detach  two  corps  of  infantry  and  two  divisions  of  cavalry 
from  his  army.    Five  or  six  thousand  prisoners  had  been 

455 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

captured  from  the  enemy  and  sent  to  Richmond,  and 
according  to  a  published  statement  by  Sheridan,  his  army 
had  lost  13,831,  in  killed  and  wounded,  after  he  took 
command  of  it.  Heavy  losses  had  been  inflicted  on  that 
army  by  my  command,  before  Sheridan  went  to  the 
Valley,  and  the  whole  loss  could  not  have  been  far  from 
double  my  entire  force.  The  enemy  moreover  had  been 
deprived  of  the  use  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  and 
the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal,  for  three  months. 

It  is  true  that  I  had  lost  many  valuable  officers  and 
men,  and  about  60  pieces  of  artillery,  counting  those  lost 
by  Ramseur  and  McCausland,  and  not  deducting  the  19 
pieces  captured  from  the  enemy ;  but  I  think  I  may  safely 
state  that  the  fall  of  Lynchburg  with  its  foundries  and 
factories,  and  the  consequent  destruction  of  General  Lee's 
communications,  would  have  rendered  necessary  the 
evacuation  of  Richmond,  and  that,  therefore,  the  fall  of 
the  latter  place  had  been  prevented;  and  by  my  subse- 
quent operations,  Grant's  operations  against  General 
Lee's  army  had  been  materially  impeded,  and  for  some 
time  substantially  suspended. 

My  loss  in  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners,  at  Winches- 
ter and  Fisher's  Hill,  had  been  less  than  4,000,  and  at 
Cedar  Creek,  about  3,000,  but  the  enemy  has  claimed  as 
prisoners  several  thousand  more  than  my  entire  loss. 
I  know  that  a  number  of  prisoners  fell  into  the  enemy's 
hands  who  did  not  belong  to  my  command :  such  as  cav- 
alrymen on  details  to  get  fresh  horses,  soldiers  on  leave 
of  absence,  conscripts  on  special  details,  citizens  not  in 
the  service,  men  employed  in  getting  supplies  for  the  de- 
partments, and  stragglers  and  deserters  from  other  com- 
mands. My  army  during  the  entire  campaign  had  been 
self-sustaining  so  far  as  provisions  and  forage  were 
concerned,  and  a  considerable  number  of  beef  cattle  had 
been  sent  to  General  Lee's  army;  and  when  the  difficulties 
under  which  I  labored  are  considered,  I  think  I  may 
confidently  assert  that  I  had  done  as  well  as  it  was  pos- 
sible for  me  to  do. 

456 


CLOSE  OF  THE  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN 

Shortly  after  Rosser 's  return  from  the  New  Creek 
expedition,  Colonel  Munford  was  sent  with  Wickham's 
brigade  to  the  counties  of  Hardy  and  Pendleton,  to  pro- 
cure forage  for  his  horses,  and,  cold  weather  having  now 
set  in  so  as  to  prevent  material  operations  in  the  field, 
the  three  divisions  of  the  2nd  corps  were  sent,  in  suc- 
cession, to  General  Lee, — Wharton's  division,  the  cavalry, 
and  most  of  the  artillery  being  retained  with  me. 

On  the  16th  of  December,  I  broke  up  the  camp  at 
New  Market,  and  moved  back  towards  Staunton,  for  the 
purpose  of  establishing  my  troops  on  or  near  Central 
Railroad — Lomax's  cavalry,  except  one  brigade  left  to 
watch  the  Luray  Valley,  having  previously  moved  across 
the  Blue  Ridge  so  as  to  be  able  to  procure  forage.  Cav- 
alry pickets  were  left  in  front  of  New  Market,  and  tele- 
graphic communications  kept  up  with  that  place,  from 
which  there  was  communication  with  the  lower  Valley,  by 
means  of  signal  stations  on  the  northern  end  of  Massa- 
nutten  Mountain,  and  at  Ashby's  Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge, 
which  overlooked  the  enemy's  camps  and  the  surrounding 
country. 

The  troops  had  barely  arrived  at  their  new  camps 
when  information  was  received  that  the  enemy's  cavalry 
was  in  motion.  On  the  19th,  Custer's  division  moved 
from  Winchester  towards  Staunton,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  two  other  divisions  of  cavalry,  under  Torbert  or 
Merrit,  moved  across  by  Front  Royal  and  Chester  Gap 
towards  Gordonsville.  This  information  having  been 
sent  me  by  signal  and  telegraph,  Wharton's  division  was 
moved  on  the  20th,  through  a  hailstorm,  towards  Harri- 
sonburg, and  Rosser  ordered  to  the  front  with  all  the 
cavalry  he  could  collect.  Custer 's  division  reached  Lacy 's 
Spring,  nine  miles  north  of  Harrisonburg,  on  the  evening 
of  the  20th,  and  next  morning  before  day,  Rosser,  with 
about  600  men  of  his  own  and  Payne's  brigades,  attacked 
it  in  camp,  and  drove  it  back  down  the  Valley  in  some 
confusion. 

Lomax  had  been  advised  of  the  movement  towards 

457 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

Gordonsville,  and  as  soon  as  Custer  was  disposed  of, 
Wharton's  division  was  moved  back,  and  on  the  23rd  a 
portion  of  it  was  run  on  the  railroad  to  Charlottesville, 
Munford,  who  had  now  returned  from  across  the  great 
North  Mountain,  being  ordered  to  the  same  place. 

On  my  arrival  at  Charlottesville  on  the  23rd,  I  found 
that  the  enemy's  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  which  had 
crossed  the  Blue  Ridge,  had  been  held  in  check  near  Gor- 
donsville by  Lomax,  until  the  arrival  of  a  brigade  of 
infantry  from  Richmond,  when  they  retired  precipitately. 
I  returned  to  the  Valley  and  established  my  headquarters 
at  Staunton — Wharton's  division  and  the  artillery  being 
encamped  east  of  that  place,  and  Rosser's  cavalry  west 
of  it ;  and  thus  closed  the  operations  of  1864  with  me. 


CHAPTER  L. 
Operations  in  1865. 

On  the  2nd  of  January,  1865, 1  had  a  consultation  witn 
General  Lee  at  Richmond,  about  the  difficulties  of  my 
position  in  the  Valley,  and  he  told  me  that  he  had  left 
me  there  with  the  small  command  which  still  remained 
in  order  to  produce  the  impression  that  the  force  was 
much  larger  than  it  really  was,  and  he  instructed  me  to 
do  the  best  I  could.  Before  I  returned  from  Richmond, 
Rosser  started  with  between  300  and  400  picked  cavalry, 
for  the  post  of  Beverly  in  West  Virginia,  and,  on  the 
11th,  surprised  and  captured  the  place,  securing  over 
500  prisoners  and  some  stores.  This  expedition  was  made 
over  a  very  mountainous  country,  amid  the  snows  of  an 
unusually  severe  winter.  Rosser 's  loss  was  very  light, 
but  Lieutenant  Colonel  Cook,  of  the  8th  Virginia  Cavalry, 
a  most  gallant  and  efficient  officer,  lost  his  leg  in  the 
attack,  and  had  to  be  left  behind. 

The  great  drought  during  the  summer  of  1864  had 
made  the  corn  crop  in  the  Valley  a  very  short  one,  and,  as 
Sheridan  had  destroyed  a  considerable  quantity  of  small 
grain  and  hay,  I  found  it  impossible  to  sustain  the  horses 
of  my  cavalry  and  artillery  where  they  were,  and  forage 
could  not  be  obtained  from  elsewhere.  I  was  therefore 
compelled  to  send  Fitz.  Lee's  two  brigades  to  General 
Lee,  and  Lomax's  cavalry  was  brought  from  across  the 
Blue  Ridge,  where  the  country  was  exhausted  of  forage, 
and  sent  west  into  the  counties  of  Pendleton,  Highland, 
Bath,  Alleghany  and  Greenbrier,  where  hay  could  be 
obtained.  Rosser 's  brigade  had  to  be  temporarily  dis- 
banded, and  the  men  allowed  to  go  to  their  homes  with 
their  horses,  to  sustain  them,  with  orders  to  report  when 
called  on, — one  or  two  companies,  whose  homes  were 
down  the  Valley,  being  required  to  picket  and  scout  in 
front  of  New  Market. 

459 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

The  men  and  horses  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  King's 
artillery  were  sent  to  Southwestern  Virginia  to  be  win- 
tered, and  most  of  the  horses  of  the  other  battalions 
were  sent  off  under  care  of  some  of  the  men,  who  under- 
took to  forage  them  until  spring.  Nelson's  battalion,  with 
some  pieces  of  artillery  with  their  horses,  was  retained 
with  me  and  the  remaining  officers  and  men  of  the  other 
battalions  were  sent,  under  the  charge  of  Colonel  Carter, 
to  General  Lee,  to  man  stationary  batteries  on  his  lines. 
Brigadier  General  Long,  who  had  been  absent  on  sick 
leave  for  some  time  and  had  returned,  remained  with  me, 
and  most  of  the  guns  which  were  without  horses  were  sent 
to  Lynchburg  by  railroad.  This  was  a  deplorable  state 
of  things,  but  it  could  not  be  avoided,  as  the  horses  of  the 
cavalry  and  artillery  would  have  perished  had  they  been 
kept  in  the  Valley. 

Echols'  brigade  of  Wharton's  division  was  subse- 
quently sent  to  Southwestern  Virginia  to  report  to 
General  Echols  for  special  duty,  and  McNeil's  company 
of  partisan  rangers,  and  Woodson's  company  of  unat- 
tached Missouri  cavalry,  were  sent  to  the  county  of 
Hardy,  Major  Harry  Gilmor  being  likewise  ordered  to 
that  county,  with  the  remnant  of  his  battalion,  to  take 
charge  of  the  whole,  and  operate  against  the  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  Railroad ;  but  he  was  surprised  and  captured  there, 
at  a  private  house,  soon  after  his  arrival.  Two  very 
small  brigades  of  Wharton's  division,  and  Nelson's  bat- 
talion with  the  few  pieces  of  artillery  which  had  been 
retained,  were  left,  as  my  whole  available  force,  and  these 
were  in  winter  quarters  near  Pishersville,  on  the  Central 
railroad  between  Staunton  and  Waynesboro.  The  tele- 
graph to  New  Market  and  the  signal  stations  from  there 
to  the  lower  Valley  were  kept  up,  and  a  few  scouts  sent 
to  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  and  in  this  way  was  my  front 
principally  picketed,  and  I  kept  advised  of  the  enemy's 
movements.  Henceforth  my  efficient  and  energetic  signal 
officer,  Captain  Welbourn,  was  the  commander  of  my 
advance  picket  line. 

460 


OPERATIONS  IN  1865 

The  winter  was  a  severe  one,  and  all  material  opera- 
tions were  suspended  until  its  close.  Late  in  February, 
Lieutenant  Jesse  McNeil,  who  was  in  command  of  his 
father's  old  company,  with  forty  or  fifty  men  of  that 
company  and  Woodson's,  made  a  dash  into  Cumberland, 
Maryland,  at  night  and  captured  and  brought  off  Major 
Generals  Crook  and  Kelly,  with  a  staff  officer  of  the  lat- 
ter, though  there  were  at  the  time  several  thousand  troops 
in  and  around  Cumberland.  The  father  of  this  gallant 
3roung  officer  had  performed  many  daring  exploits  during 
the  war,  and  had  accompanied  me  into  Maryland,  doing 
good  service.  When  Sheridan  was  at  Harrisonburg  in 
October,  1864,  Captain  McNeil  had  burned  the  bridge  at 
Edinburg  in  his  rear,  and  had  attacked  and  captured  the 
guard  at  the  bridge  at  Mount  Jackson,  but  in  this  affair 
he  received  a  very  severe  wound  from  which  he  subse- 
quently died.  Lieutenant  Baylor  of  Eosser's  brigade, 
who  was  in  Jefferson  County  with  his  company,  made  one 
or  two  dashes  on  the  enemy's  outposts  during  the  winter, 
and,  on  one  occasion,  captured  a  train  loaded  with  sup- 
plies, on  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad. 

On  the  20th  of  February,  an  order  was  issued  by 
General  Lee,  extending  my  command  over  the  Depart- 
ment of  Southwestern  Virginia  and  East  Tennessee,  pre- 
viously commanded  by  General  Breckenridge,  the  latter 
having  been  made  Secretary  of  War. 

_____On  the  27th,  Sheridan  started  from  Winchester  up  the 
Valley  with  a  heavy  force,  consisting,  according  to  the 
statement  of  Grant,  in  his  report,  of  "two  divisions  of 
cavalry,  numbering  about  5,000  each."  I  had  been  in- 
formed of  the  preparations  for  a  movement  of  some  kind, 
some  days  previous,  and  the  information  had  been  tele- 
graphed to  General  Lee.  As  soon  as  Sheridan  started,  I 
was  informed  of  the  fact  by  signal  and  telegraph,  and 
orders  were  immediately  sent  by  telegraph  to  Lomax, 
whose  headquarters  were  at  Millboro,  on  the  Central 
Railroad,  forty  miles  west  of  Staunton,  to  get  together 
all  of  his  cavalry  as  soon  as  possible.    Rosser  was  also 

461 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

directed  to  collect  all  of  Ms  men  that  he  could,  and  an 
order  was  sent  by  telegraph  to  General  Echols,  in  South- 
western Virginia,  to  send  his  brigade  by  rail  to  Lynch- 
burg. My  own  headquarters  were  at  Staunton,  but  there 
were  no  troops  at  that  place  except  a  local  provost  guard, 
and  a  company  of  reserves,  composed  of  boys  under  18 
years  of  age,  which  was  acting  under  the  orders  of  the 
Conscript  Bureau.  Orders  were  therefore  given  for  the 
immediate  removal  of  all  stores  from  that  place. 

Rosser  succeeded  in  collecting  a  little  over  100  men, 
and  with  these  he  attempted  to  check  the  enemy  at  North 
River,  near  Mount  Crawford,  on  the  first  of  March,  but 
was  unable  to  do  so.  On  the  afternoon  of  that  day,  the 
enemy  approached  to  within  three  or  four  miles  of  Staun- 
ton, and  I  then  telegraphed  to  Lomax  to  concentrate  his 
cavalry  at  Pound  Gap  in  Rockbridge  County,  and  to  fol- 
low and  annoy  the  enemy  should  he  move  towards  Lynch- 
burg, and  rode  out  of  town  towards  Waynesboro,  after  all 
the  stores  had  been  removed. 

Wharton  and  Nelson  were  ordered  to  move  to 
Waynesboro  by  light  next  morning,  and  on  that  morning 
(the  2nd)  their  commands  were  put  in  position  on  a 
ridge  covering  Waynesboro  on  the  west  and  just  outside 
of  the  town.  My  object  in  taking  this  position  was  to 
secure  the  removal  of  five  pieces  of  artillery  for  which 
there  were  no  horses,  and  some  stores  still  in  Waynes- 
boro, as  well  as  to  present  a  bold  front  to  the  enemy, 
and  ascertain  the  object  of  his  movement,  which  I  could 
not  do  very  well  if  I  took  refuge  at  once  in  the  mountain. 
The  last  report  for  Wharton's  command  showed  1,200 
men  for  duty;  but  as  it  was  exceedingly  inclement,  and 
raining  and  freezing,  there  were  not  more  than  1,000 
muskets  on  the  line,  and  Nelson  had  six  pieces  of  artillery. 
I  did  not  intend  making  my  final  stand  on  this  ground, 
yet  I  was  satisfied  that  if  my  men  would  fight,  which  I 
had  no  reason  to  doubt,  I  could  hold  the  enemy  in  check 
until  night,  and  then  cross  the  river  and  take  position  in 
Rock-fish  Gap ;  for  I  had  done  more  difficult  things  than 
that  during  the  war. 

462 


OPERATIONS  IN  1865 

About  twelve  o  'clock  in  the  day,  it  was  reported  to  me 
that  the  enemy  was  advancing,  and  I  rode  ont  at  once 
on  the  line,  and  soon  discovered  about  a  brigade  of  cav- 
alry coming  up  on  the  road  from  Staunton,  on  which  the 
artillery  opened,  when  it  retired  out  of  range.  The 
enemy  manoeuvred  for  some  time  in  our  front,  keeping 
out  of  reach  of  our  guns  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  when 
I  discovered  a  force  moving  to  the  left.  I  immediately 
sent  a  messenger  with  notice  of  this  fact  to  General 
Wharton,  who  was  on  that  flank,  and  with  orders  for  him 
to  look  out  and  provide  for  the  enemy's  advance;  and 
another  messenger,  with  notice  to  the  guns  on  the  left, 
and  directions  for  them  to  fire  towards  the  advancing 
force,  which  could  not  be  seen  from  where  they  were. 

The  enemy  soon  made  an  attack  on  our  left  flank,  and 
I  discovered  the  men  on  that  flank  giving  back.  Just 
then,  General  Wharton,  who  had  not  received  my  mes- 
sage, rode  up  to  me  and  I  pointed  out  to  him  the  disorder 
in  his  line,  and  ordered  him  to  ride  immediately  to  that 
point  and  rectify  it.  Before  he  got  back,  the  troops  gave 
way  on  the  left,  after  making  very  slight  resistance,  and 
soon  everything  was  in  a  state  of  confusion  and  the  men 
commenced  crossing  the  river.  I  rode  across  it  myself 
to  try  and  stop  them  at  the  bridge  and  check  the  enemy; 
but  they  could  not  be  rallied,  and  the  enemy  forded  the 
river  above  and  got  in  our  rear.  I  now  saw  that  every- 
thing was  lost,  and  after  the  enemy  had  got  between 
the  mountain  and  the  position  where  I  was,  and  retreat 
was  thus  cut  off,  I  rode  aside  into  the  woods,  and  in  that 
way  escaped  capture.  I  went  to  the  top  of  a  hill  to 
reconnoitre,  and  had  the  mortification  of  seeing  the 
greater  part  of  my  command  being  carried  off  as  pris- 
oners, and  a  force  of  the  enemy  moving  rapidly  towards 
Rock-fish  Gap. 

I  then  rode  with  the  greater  part  of  my  staff  and 
15  or  20  others,  including  General  Long,  across  the  moun- 
tain, north  of  the  Gap,  with  the  hope  of  arriving  at 
Greenwood  depot,  to  which  the  stores  had  been  removed, 
before  the  enemy  reached  that  place ;  but  on  getting  near 

463 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

it,  about  dark,  we  discovered  the  enemy  in  possession. 
We  then  rode  to  Jarman's  Gap,  about  three  miles  from 
the  depot,  and  remained  there  all  night,  as  the  night  was 
exceedingly  dark,  and  the  ice  rendered  it  impossible  for 
us  to  travel  over  the  rugged  roads. 

The  only  solution  of  this  affair  which  I  can  give  is 
that  my  men  did  not  fight  as  I  had  expected  them  to  do. 
Had  they  done  so,  I  am  satisfied  that  the  enemy  could 
have  been  repulsed ;  and  I  was  and  am  still  of  opinion  that 
the  attack  at  Waynesboro  was  a  mere  demonstration,  to 
cover  a  movement  to  the  south  towards  Lynchburg.  Yet 
some  excuse  is  to  be  made  for  my  men,  as  they  knew  that 
they  were  weak  and  the  enemy  very  strong. 

The  greater  part  of  my  command  was  captured,  as 
was  also  the  artillery,  which,  with  five  guns  on  the  cars 
at  Greenwood,  made  eleven  pieces.  Very  few  were  killed 
or  wounded  on  either  side.  The  only  person  killed  on  our 
side,  as  far  as  I  have  ever  heard,  was  Colonel  Wm.  H. 
Harman,  who  had  formerly  been  in  the  army  but  then 
held  a  civil  appointment;  and  he  was  shot  in  the  streets 
of  Waynesboro,  either  after  he  had  been  made  prisoner, 
as  some  said,  or  while  he  was  attempting  to  make  his 
escape,  after  everything  was  over.  My  aide,  Lieutenant 
Wm.  G.  Callaway,  who  had  been  sent  to  the  left  with  one 
of  the  messages,  and  my  medical  director,  Surgeon  H.  Mc- 
Guire,  had  the  misfortune  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  All  the  wagons  of  Wharton's  command  were 
absent  getting  supplies;  but  those  we  had  with  us,  in- 
cluding the  ordnance  and  medical  wagons  and  my  own 
baggage  wagon,  fell  into  their  hands. 

On  the  3rd,  I  rode,  with  the  party  that  was  with  me, 
towards  Charlottesville ;  but  on  getting  near  to  that  place, 
we  found  the  enemy  entering  it.  We  had  then  to  turn 
back  and  go  by  a  circuitous  route  under  the  mountains  to 
Gordonsville,  as  the  Rivanna  River  and  other  streams 
were  very  much  swollen.  On  arriving  at  Gordonsville,  I 
found  General  Wharton,  who  had  made  his  escape  to 
Charlottesville  on  the  night  of  the  affair  at  Waynesboro, 

464 


OPERATIONS  IN  1865 

and  he  was  ordered  to  Lynchburg,  by  the  way  of  the 
Central  and  Southside  Railroads,  to  take  command  of 
Echols'  brigade,  and  aid  in  the  defence  of  the  city. 
General  Long  was  ordered  to  report  to  General  Lee  at 
Petersburg. 

The  affair  at  Waynesboro  diverted  Sheridan  from 
Lynchburg,  which  he  could  have  captured  without  diffi- 
culty, had  he  followed  Hunter 's  route  and  not  jumped  at 
the  bait  unwillingly  offered  him,  by  the  capture  of  my 
force  at  the  former  place.  His  deflection  from  the  direct 
route  to  the  one  by  Charlottesville  was  without  adequate 
object,  and  resulted  in  the  abandonment  to  capture 
Lynchburg,  or  to  cross  the  James  River  to  the  south  side. 
He  halted  at  Charlottesville  for  two  or  three  days,  and 
then  moved  towards  James  River  below  Lynchburg, 
when,  being  unable  to  cross  that  river,  he  crossed  over  the 
Rivanna,  at  its  mouth,  and  then  moved  by  the  way  of 
Frederick's  Hall  on  the  Central  Railroad,  and  Ashland 
on  the  R.,  F.  &  P.  Railroad,  across  the  South  and  North 
Anna,  and  down  the  Pamunkey  to  the  White  House. 

At  Gordonsville,  about  200  cavalry  were  collected 
under  Colonel  Morgan  of  the  1st  Virginia  Cavalry,  and, 
with  this  force,  I  watched  the  enemy  for  several  days 
while  he  was  at  Charlottesville,  and  when  he  was  endeav- 
oring to  cross  the  James  River.  When  Sheridan  had 
abandoned  this  effort,  and  on  the  day  he  reached  the 
vicinity  of  Ashland,  while  I  was  riding  on  the  Louisa 
Court-House  and  Richmond  Road,  towards  the  bridge 
over  the  South  Anna,  with  about  20  cavalry,  I  came 
very  near  being  captured,  by  a  body  of  300  cavalry  sent 
after  me,  but  I  succeeded  in  eluding  the  enemy  with  most 
of  those  who  were  with  me,  and  reached  Richmond  at 
two  o'clock  next  morning,  after  passing  twice  between  the 
enemy's  camps  and  his  pickets.  My  Adjutant  General, 
Captain  Moore,  however,  was  captured,  but  made  his 
escape. 

Lomax  had  succeeded  in  collecting  a  portion  of  his 
cavalry  and  reaching  Lynchburg,  where  he  took  position 

30  465 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

on  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  but  the  enemy  avoided  that 
place.  Rosser  had  collected  a  part  of  his  brigade  and 
made  an  attack,  near  New  Market,  on  the  guard  which 
was  carrying  back  the  prisoners  captured  at  Waynesboro, 
with  the  view  of  releasing  them,  but  he  did  not  succeed 
in  that  object,  though  the  guard  was  compelled  to  retire 
in  great  haste.  He  then  moved  towards  Richmond  on 
Sheridan's  track. 

After  consultation  with  General  Lee,  at  his  head- 
quarters near  Petersburg,  Rosser 's  and  McCausland's 
brigades  were  ordered  to  report  to  him  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Rosser,  and  I  started  for  the  Valley, 
by  the  way  of  Lynchburg,  to  reorganize  what  was  left  of 
my  command.  At  Lynchburg,  a  despatch  was  received 
from  General  Echols,  stating  that  Thomas  was  moving  in 
East  Tennessee,  and  threatening  Southwestern  Virginia 
with  a  heavy  force,  and  I  immediately  went,  by  train, 
to  Wytheville.  From  that  place  I  went  with  General 
Echols  to  Bristol,  on  the  state  line  between  Virginia  and 
Tennessee,  and  it  was  ascertained,  beyond  doubt,  that 
some  important  movement  by  the  enemy  was  on  foot.  We 
then  returned  to  Abingdon,  and  while  I  was  engaged  in 
endeavoring  to  organize  the  small  force  in  that  section, 
so  as  to  meet  the  enemy  in  the  best  way  we  could,  I  re- 
ceived, on  the  30th  of  March,  a  telegraphic  despatch  from 
General  Lee,  directing  me  to  turn  over  the  command  in 
Southwestern  Virginia  to  General  Echols,  and  in  the 
Valley  to  General  Lomax,  and  informing  me  that  he 
would  address  a  letter  to  me  at  my  home.  I  complied  at 
once  with  this  order  and  thus  terminated  my  military 
career. 


Conclusion. 


In  the  afternoon  of  the  30th  of  March,  after  having 
turned  over  the  command  to  General  Echols,  I  rode  to 
Marion  in  Smythe  County  and  was  taken  that  night  with 
a  cold  and  cough  so  violent  as  to  produce  hemorrhage 

466 


CONCLUSION 

from  the  lungs,  and  prostrate  me  for  several  days  in  a 
very  dangerous  condition.  While  I  was  in  this  situation, 
a  heavy  cavalry  force  under  Stoneman,  from  Thomas' 
army  in  Tennessee,  moved  through  North  Carolina  to  the 
east,  and  a  part  of  it  came  into  Virginia  from  the  main 
column,  and  struck  the  Virginia  &>  Tennessee  Railroad 
at  New  River  east  of  Wytheville ;  whence,  after  destroy- 
ing the  bridge,  it  moved  east,  cutting  off  all  communi- 
cation with  Richmond,  and  then  crossed  over  into  North 
Carolina.  As  soon  as  I  was  in  a  condition  to  be  moved, 
I  was  carried  on  the  railroad  to  Wytheville,  and  was 
proceeding  thence  to  my  home,  in  an  ambulance  under 
charge  of  a  surgeon,  when  I  received,  most  unexpectedly, 
the  news  of  the  surrender  of  General  Lee.  Under  the 
disheartening  influence  of  the  sad  tidings  I  had  received, 
I  proceeded  to  my  journey's  end,  and  I  subsequently 
received  a  letter  from  General  Lee,  dated  on  the  30th 
of  March,  explaining  the  reasons  for  relieving  me  from 
command.  This  letter,  written  on  the  very  day  of  the 
commencement  of  the  attack  on  General  Lee's  lines, 
which  resulted  in  the  evacuation  of  Richmond,  and  just 
ten  days  before  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  has  a  historical  interest;  for  it  shows  that 
Lee,  even  at  that  late  day,  was  anxiously  and  earnestly 
contemplating  the  continuation  of  the  struggle  with 
unabated  vigor,  and  a  full  determination  to  make  avail- 
able every  element  of  success. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Cedar  Creek,  I  had 
written  a  letter  to  General  Lee,  stating  my  willingness 
to  be  relieved  from  command,  if  he  deemed  it  necessary 
for  the  public  interests,  and  I  should  have  been  content 
with  the  course  pursued  towards  me,  had  his  letter  not 
contained  the  expressions  of  personal  confidence  in  me 
that  it  does ;  for  I  knew  that  in  everything  he  did  as  com- 
mander of  our  armies,  General  Lee  was  actuated  solely 
by  an  earnest  and  ardent  desire  for  the  success  of  the 
cause  of  his  country.  As  to  those  among  my  countrymen 
who  judged  me  harshly,  I  have  not  a  word  of  reproach. 

467 


LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY 

When  there  was  so  much  at  stake,  it  was  not  unnatural 
that  persons  entirely  ignorant  of  the  facts,  and  forming 
their  opinions  from  the  many  false  reports  set  afloat  in  a 
time  of  terrible  war  and  public  suffering,  should  pass 
erroneous  and  severe  judgments  on  those  commanders 
who  met  with  reverses. 

I  was  not  embraced  in  the  terms  of  General  Lee's  sur- 
render or  that  of  General  Johnston,  and,  as  the  order 
relieving  me  from  command  had  also  relieved  me  from 
all  embarrassment  as  to  the  troops  which  had  been  under 
me,  as  soon  as  I  was  in  a  condition  to  travel,  I  started 
on  horseback  for  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department  to 
join  the  army  of  General  Kirby  Smith,  should  it  hold  out ; 
with  the  hope  of  at  least  meeting  an  honorable  death 
while  fighting  under  the  flag  of  my  country.  Before  I 
reached  that  Department,  Smith's  army  had  also  been 
surrendered,  and,  without  giving  a  parole,  after  a  long, 
weary  and  dangerous  ride  from  Virginia,  through  the 
states  of  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Ala- 
bama, Mississippi,  Arkansas,  and  Texas,  I  finally  suc- 
ceeded in  leaving  the  country. 

LETTER  FROM  GENERAL  LEE. 

"  Hd.  Qes.,  C.  S.  Armies, 
30th  March,  1865. 

"Lt.-General  J.  A.  Early,  Franklin  Co.,  Va. 

"  General, — My  telegram  will  have  informed  you  that  I  deem  a 
change  of  commanders  in  your  Department  necessary;  but  it  is  due 
to  your  zealous  and  patriotic  services  that  I  should  explain  the  reasons 
that  prompted  my  action.  The  situation  of  affairs  is  such  that  we  can 
neglect  no  means  calculated  to  develop  the  resources  we  possess  to 
the  greatest  extent,  and  make  them  as  efficient  as  possible.  To  this 
end,  it  is  essential  that  we  should  have  the  cheerful  and  hearty  support 
of  the  people,  and  the  full  confidence  of  the  soldiers,  without  which 
our  efforts  would  be  embarrassed  and  our  means  of  resistance  weak- 
ened. I  have  reluctantly  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  you  cannot 
command  the  united  and  willing  co-operation  which  is  so  essential  to 
success.  Your  reverses  in  the  Valley,  of  which  the  public  and  the 
army  judge  chiefly  by  the  results,  have,  I  fear,  impaired  your  in- 
fluence both  with  the  people  and  the  soldiers,  and  would  add  greatly 

468 


CONCLUSION 

to  the  difficulties  which  will,  under  any  circumstances,  attend  our 
military  operations  in  S.  W.  Virginia.  While  my  own  confidence  in 
your  ability,  zeal,  and  devotion  to  the  cause  is  unimpaired,  I  have 
nevertheless  felt  that  I  could  not  oppose  what  seems  to  be  the  current 
of  opinion,  without  injustice  to  your  reputation  and  injury  to  the 
service.  I  therefore  felt  constrained  to  endeavor  to  find  a  commander 
who  would  be  more  likely  to  develop  the  strength  and  resources  of  the 
country,  and  inspire  the  soldiers  with  confidence;  and  to  accomplish 
this  purpose,  I  thought  it  proper  to  yield  my  own  opinion,  and  to 
defer  to  that  of  those  to  whom  alone  we  can  look  for  support. 

"  I  am  sure  that  you  will  understand  and  appreciate  my  motives, 
and  no  one  will  be  more  ready  than  yourself  to  acquiesce  in  any 
measures  which  the  interests  of  the  country  may  seem  to  require,  re- 
gardless of  all   personal  considerations. 

"  Thanking  you  for  the  fidelity  and  energy  with  which  you  have 
always  supported  my  efforts,  and  for  the  courage  and  devotion  you 
have  ever  manifested  in  the  service  of  the  country, 

"  I  am,  very  respectfully  and  truly 

"  Your  ob't  servant, 

"R.  E.  Lee, 

"  Gen'l." 


APPENDIX. 

The  Testimony  of  Letteks. 

I  feel  reluctant  to  add  a  word  to  what  General  Early 
has  written  of  himself  and  yet  his  letters,  bearing  (as 
many  of  them  do)  upon  his  manuscript,  show  that  there 
are  some  things  he  has  left  untold  which  would  interest 
the  reader  of  his  life. 

My  feeling  in  this  matter  proceeds  from  the  remem- 
brance of  his  sentiments  on  the  subject  of  biography, 
which  he  forcibly  expressed  in  a  letter  written  in  1866 
to  a  correspondent  who  proposed  writing  an  account  of 
his  life,  saying : 

I  trust  that  you  will  not  suspect  me  of  rudeness  or  a  desire  to 
offend  when  I  respectfully  request  that  you  omit  mine  from  the  list  of 
biographies  you  propose  writing.  If  I  were  to  furnish  you  the  ma- 
terials desired,  you  would  become  the  biographer  of  my  choice,  and  I 
would  be  bound  by  what  you  might  write.  I  hope  you  will  understand 
what  I  mean,  and  will  not  interpret  what  I  say  as  intended  in  an 
offensive  sense.  I  cannot,  of  course,  prevent  your  writing  on  any 
subject  you  may  choose. 

If  my  biography  was  of  sufficient  importance  to  require  its  being 
placed  before  the  world,  and  my  wishes  were  consulted,  I  would  not 
trust  its  compilation  to  any  but  one  who  had  known  me  personally  and 
well :  you  and  I  are,  personally,  entire  strangers.  During  my  life  I 
have  often  associated  with  men  who  thought  they  knew  me,  but  who 
in  fact  had  very  little  appreciation  of  my  true  character.  I  would 
not  therefore  expect  it  to  be  understood  by  one  who  is  a  stranger. 

Naturally  possessing  a  reserved  disposition,  and  in 
his  bachelor  life  cut  off  from  the  softening  influences  of 
familiar  intercourse  to  be  found  in  the  home,  it  was  not 
entirely  the  fault  of  others  that  he  was  often  misunder- 
stood: but  as  he  has  said,  those  who  knew  him  best  were 
the  ones  who  best  appreciated  him.  The  opportunity  of 
intimate  acquaintance  enabled  one  to  fathom  the  depths 
of  his  kindly  nature  and  to  discover  his  real  feelings. 

In  his  autobiographical  sketch  he  writes  of  the  mother 
whose  death  was  the  source  of  grief  to  her  family,  but 
he  does  not  tell  of  the  affection  which  caused  him  to 

470 


APPENDIX 

choose  lier  companionship  preferably  to  that  of  any  other, 
nor  of  the  sense  of  deprivation  he  felt  upon  the  loss  of 
her  tender  counsels  at  the  early  age  of  sixteen.  His 
father  was  a  most  thoughtful  and  affectionate  parent,  but 
from  him,  too,  he  was  parted  during  the  crucial  period  of 
his  youth,  though  that  parent's  watchful  care  followed 
closely  in  a  correspondence,  preserved  by  the  son,  during 
a  long  life  of  many  vicissitudes. 

As  the  son's  character  developed,  he  inspired  more 
and  more  confidence  and  respect,  until  the  relations  of 
father  and  son  seemed  to  become  reversed,  and,  as  years 
wore  on,  the  position  of  head  of  the  family  was  insensibly 
accorded  the  son.  Possessing  a  sense  of  right  never 
swayed  by  impulse,  his  opinion  and  advice  were  never 
questioned  by  members  of  his  family.  His  grandmother, 
observing  the  promise  of  his  youth,  had  said  of  him  that 
he  was  born  to  make  a  name  for  himself. 

In  his  nineteenth  year,  while  a  cadet  at  "West  Point 
Academy,  his  sympathies  were  very  much  aroused  for 
the  Texans  in  their  revolt  against  the  tyranny  of  Santa 
Anna,  and  he  wrote  urging  his  father's  consent  to  his 
joining  in  their  cause.  This  letter  portrays  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  future  patriot,  and  is  in  part  as  follows : 

The  Texans  are  bound  by  every  principle  of  self-preservation  and 
are  justified  by  the  natural  law  of  rights,  as  well  as  by  precedent,  to 
declare  their  independence  and  to  resist  the  attempt  which  is  being 
made  to  annihilate  them.  And  we  of  the  United  States  are  called  upon 
by  every  principle  of  humanity,  by  our  love  of  liberty  and  our  detesta- 
tion of  oppression,  to  go  to  the  succor  of  our  countrymen  and  aid  in 
overwhelming  the  tyrant.  Shall  we  shed  tears  over  the  fate  of  Greece 
and  Poland,  yet  see  our  countrymen  slaughtered  with  indifference1? 
The  respect  we  entertain  for  our  forefathers  of  the  Revolution  forbids 
it.  The  gratitude  we  owe  another  country  for  espousing  our  cause 
imperiously  commands  us  to  espouse  that  of  the  oppressed.  The  cause 
of  the  Texans  is  more  justifiable  than  was  ours.  We  resisted  the 
usurpation  of  our  lawful  government.  They  are  resisting  the  tyranny 
and  cruelty  of  an  usurped  government.  Liberty  has  been  driven  from 
the  old  world  and  its  only  asylum  is  in  the  new.  It  is  the  imperious 
duty  of  every  one,  who  in  this  fair  land  has  received  it  and  its  prin- 
ciples unsullied  from  his  ancestors,  to  extend  its  dominion  and  to 
perpetuate  its  glorious  light  to  posterity.     How  can  this  be  done  if 

471 


APPENDIX 

tyranny  more  despotic  than  that  which  exists  in  Europe  is  allowed  to 
exist  in  our  very  confines'?  In  succoring  the  Texans  we  should  consider 
that  we  extend  the  sway  of  the  goddess  we  worship,  that  we  secure  to 
their  progeny  the  benefits  of  which  we  are  so  tenacious,  and  secure 
to  oppressed  freemen  of  other  countries  an  asylum  which  our  own 
country  will,  ere  long,  not  be  able  to  afford  them.  .  .  . 

The  great  end  of  all  education  is  to  expand  the  mind  and  gain  a 
knowledge  of  human  nature.  What  is  more  calculated  to  expand  the 
mind,  than  the  espousing  and  working  in  the  cause  of  liberty?  What 
better  book  in  which  to  study  human  nature  than  such  a  variety  of 
characters  as  I  would  be  constantly  thrown  with?  All  things  cry  out 
to  me  to  go.  Oh,  my  dear  father,  will  you  not  give  me  permission? 
Do  not  think  that  my  resolution  has  been  taken  unadvisedly,  and  do 
not  smile  at  my  aspirations.  I  do  not  believe  that  I  shall  become  a 
Bonaparte  or  a  Bolivar,  but  he  who  never  aspires,  never  rises. 

I  have  confined  this  letter  to  one  subject  because  my  whole  soul  is 
taken  up  with  that  subject. 

General  Early  returned  from  Canada  to  the  States  in 
1869;  that  winter  was  devoted  to  visits  among  his  rela- 
tives and  friends  from  whom  he  had  been  so  long  parted. 
His  father  died  in  1870.  In  the  autobiography  he  writes 
of  his  father  as  still  living:  it  is  therefore  presumable 
that  his  manuscript  was,  at  least,  commenced  while  he 
was  in  Canada. 

Previously  he  had  published  at  Toronto  (in  1866), 
"A  Memoir  of  the  Last  Year  of  the  War  for  Independ- 
ence," which  was  written,  he  states,  "under  a  solemn 
sense  of  duty  to  my  unhappy  country,  and  to  the  brave 
soldiers  who  fought  under  me,  as  well  as  to  myself." 

His  correspondence  was  very  large  and  in  many  cases 
continued  during  years.  Through  this  runs  the  story  of 
his  unflagging  interest  and  industry  in  endeavoring  to 
confirm  every  minutest  detail  of  the  narrative  he  desired 
to  complete.  The  letters  all  show  the  esteem  in  which 
he  was  held.  Many  of  them  are  written  to  thank  him 
for  contributions,  already  written,  in  the  defence  of  the 
South.  Others  urge  that  he  prepare  a  complete  history 
of  the  war  giving  the  Southern  side. 

From  among  these  letters  the  following  are  selected; 
not  the  least  of  the  interest  in  which  proceeds  from  the 
fact  that  they  are  voluntary  offerings,  generally  from 

472 


JEFFERSON    DAVIS,    PRESIDENT    C.  S.  A.,  AND    MRS.    DAVIS 


APPENDIX 

warm  personal  friends  and  received  in  the  course  of 
private  correspondence. 

The  first  is  from  the  pen  of  the  beloved  leader  and 
is  followed  by  tributes  from  Jefferson  Davis,  Generals 
D.  H.  Hill  and  W.  H.  Payne,  Colonels  Marshall  and  John- 
ston, Senator  John  W.  Daniel,  Professors  Peters  and 
Venable,  Dr.  McGuire,  and  others, — if  less  known  to 
fame, — none  the  less  ardent  in  the  expression  of  their 
regard. 
General  J.  A.  Early:  Lexington,  Va.,  Nov,  1865. 

I  received  last  night  your  letter,  which  gave  me  the  first  authentic 
information  of  you  I  had  received  since  the  cessation  of  hostilities 
and  relieved  the  anxiety  I  had  felt  on  your  account.  I  am  very  glad 
to  hear  of  your  health  and  safety,  and  I  wish  you  every  happiness  and 
prosperity :  you  will  always  be  present  to  my  recollections. 

I  desire,  if  not  prevented,  to  writ©  a  history  of  the  campaigns  in 
Virginia;  all  of  my  records,  books,  orders,  etc.,  were  destroyed  in  the 
conflagration  and  retreat  from  Richmond,  only  such  reports  as  were 
printed  are  preserved.  Your  reports  of  your  operations  in  '64  were 
among  those  destroyed.  Can  you  not  repeat  them  and  send  me  copies 
of  such  letters,  orders,  etc.,  of  mine  and  particularly  give  me  your  recol- 
lection of  our  effective  strength  at  the  principal  battles?  My  only 
object  is  to  transmit,  if  possible,  the  truth  and  do  justice  to  our  brave 
soldiers.  Robert  E.  Lee. 

March,  1866. 
I  am  much  obliged  for  the  copies  of  my  letters.  Send  me  reports 
of  the  operations  of  your  commands  in  the  campaign  from  the  Wilder- 
ness to  Richmond,  at  Lynchburg,  in  the  Valley,  Maryland,  etc.  .  .  . 
All  statistics  as  regards  numbers,  destruction  of  private  property  by 
the  Federal  troops,  etc.,  I  should  like  to  have,  as  I  wish  my  memory 
strengthened  on  these  points.  It  will  be  difficult  to  get  the  world  to 
understand  the  odds  against  which  we  fought  and  the  destruction  or 
loss  of  all  returns  of  the  army  embarrasses  me.  We  shall  have  to  be 
patient  and  suffer  till  a  period  when  reason  and  charity  may  resume 
their  sway.  At  present  the  public  mind  is  not  prepared  to  receive 
the  truth.  I  hope  in  time  peace  will  be  restored  to  the  country  and 
that  the  South  may  enjoy  some  measure  of  prosperity.  I  fear,  how- 
ever, much  suffering  is  still  in  store  for  her  and  that  the  people  must 
be  prepared  to  exercise  fortitude  and  forbearance. 

Robert  E.  Lee. 

General  J.  A.  Early:  Montreal,  Canada. 

I  wish  to  thank  you  for  your  last  offering  to  the  cause  you 
served  so  zealously  and  efficiently  in  the  field.    To  vindicate  the  struggle 

473 


APPENDIX 

of  the  South  to  preserve  their  political  and  social  inheritance  by  truth- 
fully stating  events  was  alike  due  to  those  to  whom  its  regenera- 
tion must  be  confided,  as  well  as  to  those  who  suffered  for  that  cause. 
Your  career  as  a  commander  met  my  entire  approval  and  secured  my 
admiration.  It  was  such  estimate  concurrently  held  by  General  Lee 
and  myself  that  led  to  your  selection  to  command  the  vitally  important 
and  difficult  campaign  which  you  have  described  in  your  recent  pub- 
lication. The  means  were  known  to  be  disproportionate  to  the  task 
before  you  when  you  marched  against  General  Hunter.  That  they 
proved  adequate,  is  glory  enough  for  you  and  your  associates.  It 
would  be  easy  to  show,  if  it  were  desirable  now  to  enter  upon  that 
question,  at  whose  door  lies  the  responsibility  of  subsequent  disasters. 
You  have  rendered  the  more  grateful  and  useful  service  of  showing  at 
whose  door  it  does  not  belong.  Jefferson  Davis. 

General  J.  A.  Early:  University  of  Virginia. 

I  have  thought  much  of  this  matter  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  and  my  earnest,  honest  belief  is  that  you  should  write 
memoirs  of  its  campaigns.  I  don't  know  any  nobler  labor  of  love,  even 
if  you  do  not  publish  it. 

If  you  write  and  leave  it  unfinished  even,  I  will  pledge  myself  to 
edit  it  and  have  it  published  as  a  true  memorial  of  your  love  and 
affection  for  that  noble  army  of  martyrs.  General  Lee  ought  to  have 
done  this  thing.  Now  that  he  is  gone,  the  duty  devolves  on  you  to 
give  the  account  of  all  the  campaigns  in  detail  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end.  This  is  the  only  way  to  defeat  the  deplorable  effects  of 
thousands  of  books  of  misapprehension,  because  nobody  has  written 
authoritatively  on  the  subject.  I  do  hope  you  will  take  the  matter 
into  consideration  and  undertake  the  work.  I  will  do  everything  I 
can  to  collect  material  for  you.  .  .  .  Your  address  at  Washington  and 
Lee  is  the  best  piece  of  military  criticism  which  has  been  written  on 
our  war,  and  I  beg  you  earnestly  and  solemnly  as  a  duty  to  that  old 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  to  write  a  history  of  its  campaigns;  it 
would  be  most  appropriate  and  essential. 

Charles  S.  Venable. 

General  J.  A.  Early:  University  of  Virginia. 

I  write,  at  the  lapse  of  twenty-five  years  from  the  close  of  the 
war,  on  a  matter  in  which  you  are  interested  as  well  as  every  man 
who  served  under  you.  It  is  due  to  yourself  and  to  the  truth  of  his- 
tory that  you  should  write  a  minute,  calm  and  complete  history  of 
your  campaigns,  from  the  time  you  were  detached  from  the  army 
around  Petersburg,  in  1864,  until  the  affair  at  Waynesboro. 

My  honest  conviction  is  that  your  campaign  will  lose  nothing  by 

474 


APPENDIX 

comparison  with  that  of  our  great  Jackson  in  the  same  field,  and  for 
the  following  reasons: 

(1st)  With  about  12,000  (perhaps  fewer)  men  you  met  and 
defeated  Hunter  at  Lynchburg  with  an  army  of  20,000  men.  You 
pursued  him,  driving  him  out  of  Virginia  into  Kanawha  Valley,  thus 
diverting  him  from  the  valley  of  Virginia.  He  had  (I  think)  two 
brigades  of  cavalry, — you  did  not  have  over  1,500  cavalry. 

(2nd)  You  made  a  forced  march  down  the  valley,  whipping 
another  army  of  12,000  men  at  Monocacy,  after  driving  all  the  Federal 
forces  out  of  the  valley,  marched  to  the  very  walls  of  Washington 
City,  causing  the  withdrawal  of  a  large  force  from  the  front  of  Lee, 
for  the  protection  of  the  city. 

(3rd)  You  fell  back  into  Virginia,  when  your  force  reduced  by 
fighting  and  marching  could  not  have  exceeded  9,000  men.  Sheridan 
was  sent  to  meet  you  with  35,000  or  40,000  men.  Up  to  this  period 
your  campaign  was  brilliantly  successful.  The  disproportion  was  vastly 
greater  between  your  forces  and  Sheridan's  than  between  Jackson's 
and  Shields'  at  Kernstown.  If  it  had  been  possible  to  reinforce  you 
at  Winchester  to  the  extent  of  20,000,  you  would  have  driven  Sheridan 
into  the  Potomac. 

(4th)  Now  observe.  After  Kernstown,  Jackson  fell  back  up  the 
valley,  was  reinforced  by  Ewell;  the  latter  was  left  to  hold  Banks  in 
check.  Jackson  marched  with  his  own  force,  4,500  men,  took  command 
of  Johnston's  force  of  two  brigades,  3,500  men,  defeated  Milroy, 
7,000  men,  returned  centre  with  Ewell  and  with  a  force,  now  some- 
thing over  20,000,  expelled  Banks  (who  commanded  not  over  7,000) 
from  the  valley.  When  threatened  by  Fremont  from  the  west  and 
Shields  from  the  east — each  with  about  18,000  men — he  retired,  keeping 
them  in  check,  and  fought  with  equal  numbers,,  the  battle  of  Port 
Kepublic. 

Again.  At  Chancellorsville  Jackson,  by  order  of  Lee,  by  a  forced 
and  daring  march,  attacked  the  right  flank  of  the  Federal  Army, 
surprised  and  routed  it.  You,  by  a  similar  march,  surprised  and  routed 
the  advance  forces  of  Sheridan  at  Cedar  Creek.  His  remaining  force 
would  have  been  routed  had  not  the  troops  halted  to  plunder  the  cap- 
tured camp.  Who  was  responsible  for  this?  Those  who  commanded 
under  you,  whose  business  and  duty  it  was  to  keep  their  troops  well 
in  hand,  and  pursue  the  routed  army. 

I  have  thought  much  of  your  campaign  in  the  valley  when  our 
military  affairs  were  in  extremis  and  think  you  did  all  that  could  have 
been  done.  I  urge  that  you  will  write  a  full,  consecutive  history  of 
that  campaign,  not  leaving  out  of  view  the  service  rendered  by  your 
cavalry;  they  acted  a  most  important  part  in  saving  Lynchburg  until 
your  arrival; 

You  reached  Lynchburg  late   in  the   afternoon;    the   day  before 

475 


APPENDIX 

your  cavalry  met  the  Federal  force  at  New  London  at  2  o'clock  p.m. 
and  held  them  until  night;  fell  back  during  the  night  to  the  old 
Quaker  Church  and  there  held  them  till  the  following  night.  Had  the 
cavalry  not  so  detained  Hunter,  he  would  have  captured  Lynchburg 
during  the  forenoon  of  the  day  in  which  you  reached  the  city.  No 
campaign  of  the  war  was  superior  to  this.         William  E.  Peters. 

General  J.  A.  Early  :  Lexington,  Virginia. 

I  throw  out  a  suggestion  for  your  consideration,  which  would  be 
to  the  country  a  matter  of  inestimable  value,  for  the  merit  of  truth 
and  knowledge.  I  refer  to  a  history  of  Virginia.  You  have  given  the 
subject  more  accurate  study  than  anybody  else.  Write  it  out  and 
publish  it.  I  write  after  a  good  deal  of  reflection  about  it.  Though 
you  may  not  know  it,  your  explicit,  lucid  pen  reflects  your  mind  more 
accurately  always  than  your  tongue,  which  must  banter,  willy-nilly. 

Wm.  Preston  Johnston. 

General  J.  A.  Early  :  New  York- 

More  than  a  year  ago  in  some  correspondence  with  the  sons  of 
General  R.  E.  Lee,  I  was  referred  to  you  by  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee, 
for  information  respecting  the  intention  of  the  commanding  general 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  the  time  of  the  assault  on  Fort 
Steadman  and  Haskell  before  Petersburg,  March  25th,  1865.  Although 
you  may  not  have  been  actually  engaged  there,  General  Lee  says  you 
are  an  authority  on  all  the  operations  of  that  army. 

George  L.  Kilmer. 

Treasury  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 
General  J.  A.  Early  : 

Accept  my  special  thanks  for  a  copy  of  your  narrative  of  the 
military  operations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  east  of  the  Blue 
Ridge.  Knowing  your  strict  and  straightforward  fidelity  to  the  truth 
makes  the  perusal  all  the  more  interesting.  w.    S.   Rosecrans. 

For  the  benefit  of  history,  a  physician  would  prolong 
his  life  indefinitely. 

General  J.  A.  Early  :  Richmond,  Virginia. 

I  leave  the  city  to-night  on  my  way  to  England,  but  I  cannot  go 
without  telling  you  how  glad  I  am  that  you  have  been  chosen  to 
deliver  the  address  at  Lexington. 

I  know  General  Jackson  admired  you  and  believe,  if  he  could  be 
consulted  in  the  matter,  he  would  select  you  to  make  the  address. 
I  wish  you  could  live  forever,  if  only  to  keep  history  straight. 

Hunter  McGuire,  M.D. 
476 


APPENDIX 

There  are  so  many  pages  devoted  to  recalling  war 
incidents  and  exploits  that  it  becomes  difficult  to  make  the 
choice,  from  among  them,  of  such  as  might  serve  to  gain 
the  especial  interest  of  the  reader;  those  which  disclose 
critical  situations  and  unconscious  heroism,  such  as  these 
sent  from  Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  and  Farmdale,  Ken- 
tucky, will  best  appeal  to  veterans  of  the  war : 

Charlotte,  N.  C. 
General  J.  A.  Early  : 

You  remember  that  I  was  the  cause  of  your  being  sent  to  Ross 
Pole  just  before  the  first  Fredericksburg  battle.  Did  you  ever  notice 
that  Burnside  said  that  Halleck  had  selected  Ross  Pole  for  the  crossing 
of  the  Federal  Army,  but  that  he  had  taken  the  responsibility  of 
crossing  at  Fredericksburg,  because  Halleck  had  selected  Ross  Pole 
before  troops  had  been  sent  to  guard  it,  and  that  as  the  circumstances 
had  changed  he  felt  at  liberty  to  disobey  orders?  Your  presence  at 
the  first  place  made  Burnside  cross  at  Fredericksburg.  On  that  hor- 
rible Sunday  I  rode  up  with  young  Morrison  from  Port  Royal  to  Ross 
Pole,  and  found  that  we  did  not  have  even  a  cavalry  picket  there, 
while  the  Federals  were  in  force  on  the  other  side  and  were  working 
on  a  batteau  bridge.  I  wrote  to  General  Jackson  about  the  condition 
of  things,  and  you  were  sent  down.  Yon  never  rendered  more  im- 
portant service.  .  .  . 

You  and  I  were  long  side  by  side,  and,  like  you,  I  was  only  un- 
popular with  those  soldiers  who  did  not  do  their  duty.  .  .  . 

Your  letter  was  full  of  touching  interest  to  me,  who  am  alive  to 
any  incident  connected  with  the  rank  and  file. 

I  have  laid  it  away  for  the  benefit  of  my  children's  children.  You 
are  so  accurate  in  statistics,  I  would  be  afraid  of  a  blunder,  if  I 
differed  with  you. 

In  comparing  my  statistics  with  yours  in  my  address,  I  wished 
to  say,  "  General  Early  knows  more  of  Confederate  history  than  any 
man  now  living,  probably  for  the  reason  that  he  has  never  moved  out 
of  the  Confederacy  " — but  I  know  you  did  not.  like  some  haversack  anec- 
dotes which  were  entirely  to  your  credit,  and  which  endeared  you  to 
thousands  of  our  people.  You  were  so  fortunate,  or  unfortunate,  as 
to  be  considered  the  wittiest  man  in  the  army  and  doubtless  many 
clever  and  witty  things  were  put  upon  you  in  consequence. 

Heaven  bless  you  always !  D.  H.  Hill. 


477 


APPENDIX 

Kentucky  Military  Institute, 

Farm  dale,  Ky. 
General  J.  A.  Early: 

Captain  Sam  Gaines  went  to  the  reunion  at  Gettysburg  some 
years  ago  and  while  standing  at  the  point  taken  by  you  (Hays'  and 
Hoke's  brigades  on  Cemetery  Heights)  he  says  a  Federal  officer,  who 
was  also  in  the  battle,  told  him  that  your  charge  was  more  serious 
than  you  or  our  people  seemed  to  be  aware  of, — that  you  really  had 
passed  in  rear  of  Meade's  headquarters  and  that  Meade  and  his  staff 
would  certainly  have  been  your  prisoners  had  you  been  supported  on 
your  right,  so  that  you  could  have  held  the  ground  you  had  taken.  The 
officer  pointed  out  the  house  in  which  Meade  and  his  staff,  virtually  for 
the  time  (you  held  the  heights)  your  prisoners,  were  at  the  time  you 
made  the  assault,  and  that  it  was  in  the  rear  of  your  position;  that  it 
was  indeed  a  crisis  with  the  Federals.  j),  j\  Boyd    Supt. 

In  his  manuscript,  General  Early  refers  to  his  order 
for  the  burning  of  Chambersburg ;  this  I  do  not  find,  but 
in  an  article  in  the  Eichmond  State,  June  22nd,  1887, 
lie  makes  this  statement : 

The  act  was  done  in  retaliation  for  outrages  connnitted  by  General 
David  Hunter  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia. 

I  thought  it  was  time  to  try  and  stop  this  mode  of  warfare  by 
some  act  of  retaliation,  and  I  accordingly  sent  a  cavalry  force  to 
Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania,  to  demand  of  the  authorities  of  that 
town  compensation  for  the  houses  of  Messrs.  Hunter,  Lee  and  Boteler, 
upon  pain  of  having  their  town  reduced  to  ashes  on  failure  to  pay 
the  compensation  demanded.  The  three  houses  burned  were  worth 
fully  $100,000  in  gold  and  I  demanded  that,  or  what  I  regarded  as 
equivalent  in  greenbacks.  No  attempt  was  made  to  comply  with  my 
demand  and  my  order  to  burn  the  town  was  executed. 

This  was  in  strict  accordance  with  the  laws  of  war  and  was  a  just 
retaliation.  I  gave  the  order  on  my  own  responsibility,  but  General 
Lee  never  in  any  manner  indicated  disapproval  of  my  act,  and  his 
many  letters  to  me  expressive  of  confidence  and  friendship  forbade 
the  idea  that  he  disapproved  of  my  conduct  on  that  occasion.  It 
afforded  me  no  pleasure  to  subject  non-combatants  to  the  rigors  of 
war,  but  I  felt  that  I  had  a  duty  to  perform  to  the  people  for  whose 
homes  I  was  fighting  and  I  endeavored  to  perform  it,  however  dis- 
agreeable it  might  be. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  keeping  with  General  Early's 
object  in  writing  a  history  of  the  war  to  insert  a  letter 

478 


APPENDIX 

from  a  former  Federal  soldier  acknowledging  kindness 
received  while  lie  was  held  as  prisoner  within  Southern 
lines.  The  one  chosen  gives  the  address  at  the  National 
Military  Home  in  Montgomery  County,  Ohio : 

General  J.  A.  Early  : 

I  write  in  memory  of  old  times  and  a  special  act  of  kindness  on 
your  part,  when  in  the  midst  of  battle,  with  your  self -earned  brave 
army  around,  and  General  Sheridan's  army  contending  at  Cedar  Creek, 
Virginia,  October  19th,  1864.  I  was  wounded,  early  at  dawn  of  day, 
in  the  face  and  right  thigh,  and  was  unable  to  walk  on  account  of  my 
wounds.  Your  men  came  to  me  and  asked  how  long  since  I  was  paid 
off ;  and  then  searched  me,  but  I  had  no  money,  as  I  had  not  lately  been 
paid.  One  of  the  men  came  up  to  me  and  took  my  canteen;  just  then 
you  came  riding  along  and  spoke  to  me,  asking  if  I  was  badly  hurt. 
I  said  "  Yes,  sir,  I  am."  I  looked  earnestly  at  you  and  said  to  you, 
"  Do  you  allow  a  man  to  rob  another  of  the  last  drop  of  water  he 
possesses?"  You  replied,  "No."  "Well,"  I  said,  pointing  to  a  man 
who  had  just  robbed  me,  "  there  stands  the  man  who  took  my  can- 
teen." 

Straightway  you  rode  up  to  him,  made  him  give  up  my  canteen, 
and  filled  it,  yourself,  with  water  for  me. 

"  Now,"  said  you,  "  get  away  to  your  command." 

Thomas  Douglas, 
Late  of  Co.  G,  12th  Reg. 

Volumes  might  be  filled  from  the  collection,  which  in 
length  of  time  covers  the  period  of  his  manhood  to  old 
age,  all  attesting  respect  for  the  veracity  of  his  character. 
Perhaps  the  finest  tribute  to  him  comes  from  the  pen  of 
his  devoted  friend,  General  Wm.  H.  Payne,  of  Warrenton, 
who  writes : 

There  is  no  man  now  living  who  so  entirely  commands  my  respect, 
or  of  whose  good  opinion  I  am  so  covetous,  as  yours.  What  I  most 
admire  in  you  is  your  passionate  love  of  truth.  I  am  truly  pleased  to 
know  that  you  are  to  deliver  the  address  on  the  Jackson  statue.  So 
many  false  conceptions  of  men  and  events  are  cultivated,  that  one 
gives  ur  all  hope  of  truth  ever  having  an  audience.  It  is  a  consolation 
to  know  that  it  will  be  spoken  at  Lexington. 

The  friendship  between  General  Early  and  Senator 
Daniil  dated  from  the  time  the  latter  became  a  member 
of  Early's  staff. 

The  acquaintance  thus  begun  ripened  into  a  friendship 

479 


APPENDIX 

which  never  paled,  and  which  afforded  General  Early- 
great  satisfaction.  I  have  selected  from  a  bundle  of  his 
letters  a  hurried  note  written  in  1874  while  Senator 
Daniel  was  a  candidate  for  Congress, — in  order  to  show 
the  friendly  relations  existing  between  these  two. 

My  deak  General: 

,The  three  tickets  enclosed  were  elected  here  to-night  by  overwhelm- 
ing majorities.  I  shall  have  60  votes  on  first  ballot.  I  ask  that  you 
will  do  me  the  honor  to  nominate  me  in  convention.  It  will  be  glory 
enough  whether  I  succeed  or  not.  I  beg  that  you  will  come  and  help 
me  now.  You  said,  in  Richmond,  you  "  raised  me."  Come  then  and 
stand  by  your  boy.  Ymvs  ^  ^  ^  ^^ 

After  an  interval  of  eight  years,  there  is  a  letter  tell- 
ing of  Daniel 's  desire  to  write  the  life  of  his  friend.  To 
accomplish  this  purpose  he  seems  to  have  collected  a  vast 
deal  of  material.  The  answer  to  his  request  has  not 
been  found. 

My  dear  General:  December  3rd,  1882. 

I  have  wished  to  talk  with  you  about  a  contemplated  undertaking 
in  which  you  are  not  disinterested.  With  your  permission  and  good 
will  in  the  plan,  I  desire  to  render  such  contribution  to  the  history  of 
the  war  as  I  may  be  able  to  do,  in  the  shape  of  a  volume  to  bear  the 
title  "  The  Life  and  Campaigns  of  Lieutenant  General  Jubal  A.  Early." 

I  have  some  elements  of  qualification  in  familiarity  with  some  of 
your  campaigns  and  a  very  good  general  knowledge  of  the  conditions 
under,  and  means  with  which  you  conducted  others.  My  mind  con- 
tinually recurs  to  the  war  and  not  a  day  passes  that  its  various  scenes 
and  phases  are  not  revolved  over  and  over  again.  It  would  be  a  relief 
to  work  on  the  subject,  and  did  you  consent  to  my  doing  so  in  the 
manner  indicated,  in  a  year  or  two  I  could  prepare  the  work  as  well 
as  my  poor  abilities  permit:  and  while,  to  tell  the  truth  would  be  ever 
the  uppermost  thought,  it  would  be  a  labor  of  love  to  me  to  .recount  it 
in  the  themes  proposed.  If  for  any  reason  you  do  not  wi&ii  me  to 
write  such  a  book,  your  wishes  would  of  course  control  me,  br.t  unless 
you  object,  my  mind  is  made  up  to  the  undertaking.  If  you  ...pprove 
there  are  many  things  in  which  I  would  need  your  assistance.  Think 
over  this  matter  and  let  me  know  your  views.    Most  truly  your*, 

John  W.  Da>'iel. 


INDEX 


Aaronsburg,  263 

Abbottstown,  264 

Abingdon,  466 

Abraham's  Creek,  242,  420,  421,  423 

Adams,  Captain,  188 

Aquia  Creek,  15,  31,  104,  105,  168 

Aquia  District,  51 

Alabama  Troops,  3,  21,  27,  51,  60, 

61,  162,  185,  192,  468 
Alexandria,  2,  39,  44,  45,  48,  75,  118, 

131 
Alleghany  County,  459 
Alleghany  Mountains,  338,  366 
Altodale,  254 
Alum    Spring    Mill,    224,    225,    227, 

230 
Anderson,  General,  68,  105,  132,  135, 

147,  149,  151,  152,  155,  156,  158, 

159,  163,  196,  198,  211,  212,  216, 

227,  231,  234,  236,  322,  323,  324, 

352,  362,  363,  364,  404,  407,  408, 

409,410,411,  412,413 
Andersonville,  297,  298 
Andrews,  Colonel,  197,  199,  206,  211, 

220,  221,  222,  224,  323 
Antietam,   139,   140,   143,   150,   151, 

156,  161,  384,  385,  403 
Antietam  Creek,  140 
Appomattox  Court-House,  191 
Archer,  General,  170,  172,  173,  174, 

175 
Arendtsville,  264 
Arkansas,  468 
Arlington  Heights,  41 
Armistead,  General,  83,  84,  149,  153, 

156 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  74,  163, 

182,  236,  361,  371,  379,  415,  466 
Army  of  Potomac,  47,  50,  52,  74,  157, 

161,    341,    343,    344,    360,    392, 

417,  418 
Army  of  Virginia,  92 
Army  of  Western  Virginia,  399,  418 


Ashby's  Gap,  411,  457 

Ashland,  361,  465 

Atkinson,  Colonel  N.  N.,   171,   172, 

173,  174,  175,  180 
Atlee's  Station,  361 
Auburn,  304 

Augusta  County,  366,  368 
Augusta  Raid  Guards,  332 
Averill,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  326,  327, 

328,  329,  330,  331,  332,  338,  397, 

398,  399,  410.  412,  414,  416,  417, 

419.  432 
Avery,  Colonel,  230,  242,  243,  250, 

259,  268,  269,  271,  273 

Back  Creek,  284,  368,  383,  384 
Back  Road,  369,  426,  433,  436,  438, 

439,  440,  446,  450,  453 
Badham,  Colonel  J.  C,  72 
Baker,  Jas.  C,  244 
Ball's  Bluff,  52 
Baltimore,  51,  75,  135,  159,  255,  386, 

387,  388,  392,  394 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.,  135,  136,  163,  326, 

332,  333,  340,  368,  382,  383,  391, 

402,  414,  455,  456,  460,  461 
Banks'    Ford,    208,    212,    229,    231, 

233 
Banks,  General    (U.  S.  A.),  75,  92, 

101,  103,  112,  156,  157,  475 
Barksdale,  Colonel,  19,  20,  23,  25 
Barksdale,    General,    147,    149,    195, 

196,  198,  200,  202,  203,  204,  206, 

207,  208,  209,  210,  211,  212,  218, 

219,  221-25,  228,  232-34,  404 
Barlow,  General,  268 
Barnett's  Ford,  93 
Bartlett's  Mill,  318,  319,  320,  321, 

324 
Barton,  Lieutenant,  240 
Bartonsville,  241,  242,  368,  369 
Bartow,  General,  31,  32 
Bath  County.  459 

481 


482 


INDEX 


Battle,  General,  346,  422,  450 

Baylor,  Lieutenant,  461 

Bealton,  307 

Beauregard,  General,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7, 

10,  11,  13,  15,  17,  19,  20,  21,  26, 

27,  29,  31,  33,  34,  35,  38,  44,  46, 

47,  51,  52,  341 
Beaver  Dam  Creek,  361,  362 
Beckham,    Lieutenant,    22,    25,    26, 

38 
Bedford  City,  372,  374 
Bedford  County,  378 
Bee,  General,  31,  32,  37 
Belle  Grove,  437,  441 
Benning,  Colonel,  81,  82 
Berkeley  County,  366,  367,  368 
Bermuda  Hundreds,  360 
Bernard  House,  196 
Berry,  Major,  11,  240,  251 
Berry's  Ferry,  396 
Berryville,  164,  240,  369,  396,  397, 

406,  411,  414,  420,  421 
Bethesda  Church,  362,  363 
Beverly,  459 
Beverly's  Ford,  106 
Big  Calf  Pasture,  327 
Big  Lick,  377 
Big  Springs,  134 
Blackburn's  Ford,  5,  6,  7,  10,  11,  12, 

15,  16,  18,  19,  20,  31,  32,  39,  118, 

119 
Black  Horse  Cavalry,  157 
Black  Walnut  Run,  318 
Blacksburg,  327,  329 
Blair,    Postmaster    General,    U.   S., 

395 
Blue  Ridge,  10,  11,  63,  164,  165,  238, 

284,  285,  366,  367,  368,  369,  370, 

371,  377,  396,  411,  413,  429,  433, 

434,  457,  458,  459,  476 
Board,  Colonel,  397 
Bolivar,  384 

Bolivar  Heights,  136,  137,  164,  384 
Bonham,  General,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  9,  15, 

20,  27,  31,  33,  38,  51,  52 
Boonsboro,  Pa.,  135,  139,  140,  254, 

282,  385 
Boonsboro  Gap,  386 
Boteler,  Honorable  A.  R.,  401,  478 
Boteler's  Ford,  139,  153,  162,  254 
Botetourt  County,  369 


Bower's  Hill,  242,  243,  244,  248,  249, 

250,  407 
Bowling  Green,  168,  186,  203 
Bowman's  Mill,  442 
Boyd,  Superintendent,  J.  F.,  477 
Bragg,  General  Braxton,  157,  303 
Branch,  General,  128 
Branch  Mountain,  334,  336 
Brandy  Station,  106,  237,  307,  309, 

310,  316 
Braxton,  Colonel,  371,  414,  417,  419, 

422,  423,  425 
Breckenridge,  360,  370,  371,  372,  374, 

375,  376,  378,  381,  382.  384,  385, 

386,  387,  388,  392,  396,  399,  402, 

414,  415,  420,  424,  425,  429,  453, 

454,  461 
Brentsville,  305 
Bridgewater,  435 
Brinly's  Land,  246 
Bristol,  466 
Bristow,  54,  114,  115,  117,  133,  304, 

305,  307 
Broad  Run,  116,  117,  118,  306 
Brock  Road,  352 

Brockenborough,    Colonel,    170,    173 
Brock's  Gap,  334,  339,  382 
Brown,  Captain,  97,  98,  127,  131,  176, 

179,  199,  206,  241,  244 
Brown,  Captain  Wm.  F.,  97,  99,  108, 

110 
Brownsburg,  328 
Brown's  Gap,  371,  433,  434 
Brucetown,  413 
Buchanan,  327,  329,  330,  369,  375, 

377,  380 
Buckner's  Neck,  160 
Buffalo,  328 
Buffalo  Gap,  326,  327 
Buford,  Colonel,  278 
Buford,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  266 
Buford's  Depot,  377 
Buford's  Gap,  377 
Bull  Mountain,  114 
Bull  Pasture  River,  326 
Bull  Run,  3,  4,  5,  6,  10,  16,  17,  18,  19, 

25,  26,  27,  31,  32,  33,  37,  39,  44, 

45,  46,  47,  52,  53,  54,  55,  58, 

118,  119,  127,  128,  129,  306 
Bunker  Hill,  163,  284,  400,  402,  403, 

406,  40S,  410,  411,  413,  419,  420 


INDEX 


483 


Burke's  Station,  50 

Burnside,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  104, 
105,  106,  131,  132,  150,  151,  158, 
165,  166,  169,  180,  189,  192,  341, 

343,  348,  356,  358,  477 
Burton's  Mill,  242 

Butler,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  40,  341, 

344,  364 
Butterfield  (U.  S.  A.),  218 


Cabell,  General,  198,  210 

Calf  Pasture  River,  326 

Callahan's,  327,  330 

Callaway,  Lieutenant  Wm.  G.,  187, 

209,  250,  464 
Camden,  184 
Cameron's  Depot,  408 
Campbell  Court-House,  376 
Camp  Walker,  6,  12 
Canada,  472 
Capital,  90,  159.  160 
Carlisle,  255,  263 
Caroline,  184 
Carpenter,  206 
Carrington,  176,  179 
Carter,  Colonel,  445 
Carter  House,  26,  27 
Carter,  Lieutenant  T.  H.,  422,  460 
Cash,  Colonel,  27,  28 
Cashtown,  256,  257,  264,  266,  267, 

276,  278,  279 
Castleman's  Ferry,  164,  396 
Catharpin  Creek,  237 
Catlett's  Station,  110,  114 
Catoctan  Mountain,  386 
Cavetown,  254 
Cedar  Creek,  242,  368,  369,  398,  406, 

407,  417,  418,  430,  437,  438,  439, 

440,    441,    442,    447,    449,    450, 

453,  456,  466,  475,  479 
Cedar   Creek   Pike,    240,   242,   304, 

424,  426 
Cedar  Run,  92,  93,  94,  96,  106,  154, 

155 
Cedarville,  241,  284,  453,  454 
Cemetery  Hill,   169,   222,  223,  224, 

267,  268,  270,  271,  272,  273,  277, 

278,  478 
Central  R.  R.,  261,  378,  359,  361, 

369,  372,  457,  460,  461,  465 


Centreville,  4,  5,  6,  7,  27,  31,  33,  35, 

44,  50,  51,  52.  119,  122,  128,  129, 

133,  304 
Chaffin's  Bluff,  76,  89 
Chamberlain,  Lieutenant,  172 
Chambersburg,   254,   255,   263,   281, 

401,  402,  404,  405,  477 
Chambliss,  General,  357 
Chancellorsville,  167,  193,  197,  200, 

201,  202,  208,  211,  212,  213,  214, 

216,  217,  231,  233,  235,  237,  475 
Chantilly,  129 

Charles  City  Court-House,  73 
Charlestown,  136,  164,  240,  369,  406, 

408,  409,  411,  413,  414,  419,  424 
Charlottesville,  340,   341,  371,  372, 

378,  393,  401,  435,  458,  464,  465 
C.  &  O.  Canal,  42,  134,  383,  414,  456 
Chester  Gap,  238,  285,  457 
Chickahominy.  76,  77,  87, 89,  155,  361 
Chilton,  Colonel  R.  H.,  200,  201 
Chinn's  House,  23,  25,  28 
Chisholm,  Colonel,  17,  26 
Christie,  Captain  C.  W.,  187 
Clarke  County,  366,  369 
Clark's  Mountain,  303 
Clear  Spring,  402 
Clifton  Forge,  328,  331,  380 
Cobb's  Brigade,  149 
Cocke,  Colonel  Ph.  St.  G.,  3,  4,  5,  16, 

26,  31,  32,  35,  38,  41 
Codorus,  261 
Cold  Harbor,  76,  361,  362,  363,  371, 

372 
College  Hill,  374 
Colliertown,  328,  329 
Colquitt,  General,  158,  177 
Colston,  General,  63,  195,  212 
Columbia,  255 
Columbia  Bridge,  259 
Columbia  Furnace,  339,  436,  450 
Conduct  of  the  War,  161,  231-32 
Conewago,  259,  261 
Confederate  Government,   2,   3,    10, 

98,  160 
Congressional  Committee,   197,  207, 

232,  256,  277,  297,  300 
Conner's  Brigade,  437,  449 
Conrad's  Store,  367,  369,  433 
Conscript  Act,  64 
Conscript  Bureau,  462 


484 


INDEX 


Cook,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  459 

Cooke,  General,  353,  356,  363 

Cooley's  House,  439,  441,  444 

Corbet,  Boston,  296,  297 

Corse,  Colonel,  48,  49 

Cosby,  General,  453,  454 

Costin,  Major,  220 

Covington,  327,  328,  329,  330,  331 

Cow  Pasture  River,  328,  330 

Cox,>General  (U.  S.  A.),  158 

Cox's  House,  210,  220,  223 

Coxe,  Dr.  (U.  S.  A.),  49 

Craig's  Creek,  328,  329 

Crampton's  Gap,  385,  386 

Creigh,  380 

Crittenden's  House,  95,  96 

Crook,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  370,  375, 

379,  396,  398,  399,  406,  411,  417, 

424,  425,  430,  443,  444,  461 
Crooked  Creek,  93 
Cross  Keys,  75 
Crutchfield,  Colonel,  176 
Culpeper  County,  285,  316,  317 
Culpeper  Court-House,  93,  94,  95,  96, 

100,  101,  106,  165,  192,  237,  253, 

277,  284,  302,  303,  316,  343,  407, 

433 
Cumberland,  282,  284,  338,  368,  402, 

404,  461 
Curtin,  Governor,  257,  261 
Custer,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  457,  458 
Cutshaw's  Battalion,  408,  413,  433, 

435,  449 
Cutt's  Battalion,  198 

Dabney,  Major,  78 

Dams,  59,  60,  63,  72,  80,  81,  109 

Dance,  Captain,  241,  307,  308,  310, 

311,  313,  314,  315 
Daniel,  General,  346 
Daniel,  Major  J.  W.,  187,  310,  314, 

349,  359,  473,  474,  479,  480 
Danville,  104 

D'Aquin,  Captain,  176,  180 
Darien,  260 
Darkesville,  283,  413 
Davis,  Eugene,  4 
Davis,  General,  353 
Davis,  President  Jefferson,  27,  45,  56, 

473 
Death  of  Jackson,  235 


Delaware,  45,  157 

Dement,  Captain,  97,  98,   108,   111, 

176,  179 
Deep  Creek,  170,  201 
Deep  Run,  167,  168,  193,  194,  198, 

199,  202,  205,  206,  209,  211,  221 
Department  of  the  Gulf,  418 
Department  of  Northern  Virginia,  51 
Department  of  Southwestern  Vir- 
ginia and  Eastern  Tennessee,  461 
Department    of    Susquehanna,    417, 

418,  419 
Department  of  Washington,  344,  417, 

418,  419 
Department     of    Western    Virginia, 

417,  418,  419 
Dillstown,  255 
Dix,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  51 
Dogan  House,  26 

Doles,  General,  267,  268,  346,  363 
Douglas,  Colonel,  108,  109,  112,  143 
Downman's   House,    223,    224,    227, 

228,  231,  232 
Drainesville,  52,  134 
Drayton's  Brigade,  132,  154 
Drewry's  Bluff,  76,  S9 
Duffield's  Depot,  384 
Dunkard  Church,  140,  142,  144,  145, 

146,  149,  151,  158 

Early,  General  J.  A.,  1-7,  13,  15-29, 
31,  33,  38,  41,  47-49,  52.  56,  58, 
60-73,  75-85,  88,  92-103,  106- 
111,  114,  116-130,  133,  136,  140- 
166,  170-179,  184,  185-187,  194, 
195,  200-213,  219-228,  230-238, 
240,  243-248,  250-257,  260,  263, 
264,  267,  269,  271-276,  279,  280- 
480 

Early,  Jno.  C,  186 

Early,  Captain  R.  D.,  187 

Early,  Lieutenant  S.  H.,  68,  81,  97, 
130,  186 

East  Berlin,  258,  263,  264 

East  Tennessee,  466 

Echols.  General,  331,  385,  388,  396, 
399,  460,  462,  465,  466 

Edinburg,  368,  436,  450,  461 

Elzey,  General,  23,  24,  25,  33,  36,  38, 
77,  78,  375,  376,  381 

Emory,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  393 


INDEX 


485 


Evacuation,  53,  54,  55,  56,  65,  66,  67, 
89,  105,  363,  384,  467 

Evans,  Colonel,  4,  5, 16,  26,  31,  32,  35, 
37,  47,  52, 132, 140, 154, 155, 158, 
173,  188,  190,  349,  359,  388,  422, 

425,  444,  448 

Ewell,  General,  3-6,  13, 15,  31,  33,  50, 
51,  54,  56,  63,  74-82,  84,  86,  88, 
92-94,  97,  101-03,  106,  107,  108, 
111,  112,  114-122,  126,  129,  131, 
133,  135,  136,  137,  144,  151,  153- 
155,  158,  163,  164,  185,  187,  188, 
236,  237,  238,  240,  243,  249,  251, 
253-56,  261,  264,  266,  269-273, 
275, 276. 279-281, 283-85, 303-05, 
309,  310,  313,  316,  317,  321,  326, 
340,  343-48,  351,  354-59,  361, 
371,  475 

Fairfax  Court-House,  4,  39,  40,  45, 

47,  48,  50,  52,  129 
Fairfax  Station,  4,  6,  15,  45,  47,  48,  50 
Fairfield,  279,  280,  281 
Fair  Oaks,  74 
Falling  Waters,  282,  283 
Falmouth,  167, 169, 198,  201,  202,  218 
Farmdale,  477,  478 
Fauquier  Springs,  303 
Feagans,  Captain,  152 
Ferguson,  Colonel,  410,  423,  434 
Field,   General,   170,  342,  353,   354, 

355,  357,  360 
Fincastle,  327,  328,  330,  377,  379 
First  Division,  C.  S.  A.,  50 
Fisher,  Colonel,  32 
Fisher's  Hill,  333,  334,  406,  407,  413, 

426,  429,  430,  431,  435,  436,  437, 
440,  441,  449,  450,  454,  456 

Fishersville,  460 

Florida  Regiment,  60,  63,  67,  69,  73 

Folk's  Old  House,  246,  247 

Forest  Road,  374,  376 

Forno,  General,  107,  114,  115,   116, 

126 
Fort  Haskell,  476 
Fort  Hill,  425,  426 
Fort  Magruder,  59,  68,  69,  70,  73 
Fort  Steadman,  476 
Fort  Stevens,  389 
Fortress  Monroe,  58,  61,  65 
Fox's  Gap,  386 


Franklin  County,  468 

Franklin,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  151, 159, 
176,  181,  394 

Frazier,  Captain,  162 

Frazier's  Farm,  77,  87 

Frederick  City,  135,  139,  385,  386, 
387,  388,  395 

Frederick  County,  366,  367,  368 

Frederick's  Hall,  74,  465 

Fredericksburg,  63,  104,  135,  162, 
166-170,  176,  179,  182,  183, 190- 
192,  194-97,  200-207,  209,  212, 
214,  218,  220,  221,  223-25,  228, 
231,  233-35,  237,  253,  285,  318, 
344,  353,  354,  357,  477 

Freeman's  Ford,  106 

Freestone  Point,  4 

Fremont  (U.  S.  A.),  75,  92,  158,  475 

French,  Colonel,  254,  255,  257,  258, 
259,  261,  321 

French,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  149,  151 

Front  Royal,  165,  239,  240,  241,  243, 
284,  366,  367,  368,  369,  399,  406, 
407,  408,  413,  420,  421,  423,  424, 
426,  444,  450,  453,  459 

Fry,  A.  A.  G.  (U.  S.  A.),  40 

Fry,  Colonel,  363 

Gaines,  Captain  S.,  478 

Gaines'  House,  75,  89 

Gaines'  Mill,  76,  364,  371,  379 

Gainesville,  114,  123,  133 

Garber,  176 

Gardner,  Captain  F.,  19,  20,  29,  186 

Gardner,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  27 

Garland,  General  S.,  12,  158 

Garnett,  Lieutenant,  8 

Garnett's  Expedition,  336 

Gayle's  House,  357 

General  Conscription,  64 

Georgetown,  42,  134,  387 

Georgetown  Pike,  387,  389,  390,  391 

Georgia  Troops,  27,  49,  50,  67.  78,  81, 
95,  97,  98,  99,  107,  109,  111,  115, 
116,  118,  124,  125,  127,  131,  153, 
173-77,  180,  185,  190,  193,  259, 
280,  333,  336,  349,  362,  388,  390, 
393,  468 

Germana  Ford,  317,  319,  324,  325, 
344,  346 

Germantown,  40 


486 


INDEX 


Gettysburg,  254-58, 264,  266, 267, 271, 
272,  275,  276,  278,  279,  282,  286- 
288,  290,  478 

Gibbon,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  198,  206, 
209,  225 

Gibson,  Captain,  28 

Gibson,  Colonel,  153 

Gilmor,  Major  H.,  333-34,  338,  340, 
383,  394,  460 

Gilmbre,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  393 

Gloucester  Point,  59,  61 

Godwin,  Colonel,  249,  274-75,  311- 
314 

Godwin,  General,  423,  427 

Goggin,  Major,  449,  451 

Goldsborough,  Major,  243 

Goodwin,  Colonel,  385 

Gordon,  General  J.  B.,  192,  209-11, 
221-25, 227, 229, 230, 232-33, 239, 
240, 242-44, 246, 248-250, 252-53, 
256-263,  267-275,  280,  305,  311, 
245-351,  359,  363,  372,  374,  381, 
384-85,  388,  392,  396,  403,  406, 
408-09, 414, 419-23, 425, 429, 434, 
438-444,  446,  448,  452 

Gordonsville,  74-75,  92,  104-05,  237, 
340,  343-44,  359,  451,  458,  464, 
465 

Gosport  Navy  Yard,  1 

Government  at  Richmond,  44,  45,  46, 
89,  157,  160,  290,  297 

Government  at  Washington,  89,  157 

Graham's  Battery,  197-99,  206,  221, 
224,  307,  308,  310-11,  314-15 

Grant,  General  (U.S.A.),  341,  343-44, 
348,  351,  358,  360-64,  371,  376, 
379,  388,  390-393,  406,  408,  414, 
415,  417-19,  436-37,  452-56, 
461 

Great  North  Mountain,  332,  356,  382, 
454,  458 

Great  Run,  109 

Green,  Captain,  50,  307,  310,  311, 
312,  315 

Green,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  145,  148, 
404 

Green,  Major  B.  H.,  1S7 

Greenbrier  County,  459 

Greenwich,  116,  304 

Greenwood  Depot,  254,  263,  283,  463 

Greenwood  Gap,  270 


Gregg,  General,  124,  127,  170,  173 

Griffin,  Colonel,  207 

Grigsby,  Colonel,  142-44, 146-47, 149, 

403,  404, 
Groveton,  119,  120,  122,  133 
Guardstown,  284 
Guest's  House,  223-25,  228-29,  230, 

232 
Guiney's  Depot,  166,  185,  197 
Gunpowder  River,  386,  394 

Hagerstown,139, 142, 144, 145, 281-82, 

285,  395,  402 
Hagerstown  Pike,  140,  145,  149,  254 
Hairston,  Colonel  P.,  3,  5,  7,  16,  72 
Hale,  Major  S.,  99,  110,  145,  187,  203, 

313,  359 
Halleck,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  104,  105, 

132,  477 
Halltown,  136,  408 
Hambrick,  Major,  6 
Hamilton's   Crossing,    166,    16S-170, 

191-92,  194,  199   203 
Hampshire  County,  332,  404,  455 
Hampton,  General,  32,  341,  352-53, 

355,  379 
Hampton,  Pa.,  258 
Hampton's  Legion,  15,  28,  47 
Hancock,    General    (U.   S.   A.),    72, 

352 
Hanging  Rock,  378 
Hanover  County,  167,  361 
Hanover  Junction,  258,  261,  264,  345, 

348,  354,  357,  359,  360,  370 
Hanover  Town,  361 
Hardwick,  Captain  W.  W.,  184 
Hardy  County,  332-34,  404,  454-55, 

457,  460 
Harman,  Colonel  Wm.  H.,  464 
Harper's  Ferry,  1,  2,  43,  135-37,  139, 

150,  155,  160,  163-64,  240,  251, 

254,  284,   367-69,   371,  384-86, 

391,   396-97,  400,  402-03,  406, 

408,  417 
Harris,  General,  355 
Harrisburg,  Pa.,  255,  259,  261,  263, 

267,  386,  394 
Harrisonburg,  75, 331-32, 340, 367-69, 

433-35,  457,  461 
Harrison's  Landing,  84,  88,  104,  105 
Harvie,  Captain,  454 


INDEX 


487 


Haymarket,  114 

Haynesville,  283,  383,  384 

Hays,  General,  5,  7,  8,  17-20,  23-25, 
28,  107,  114-124,  126,  129-131, 
136,  139,  141,  143,  150,  152,  158, 
171, 175-77, 179, 180, 188, 202-04, 
206,  208,  210,  211,  219,  221,  222, 
226-27,  229,  230,  232-34,  239, 
241-43,  247,  248-49,  251-53,  257, 
259,267-69, 271-76, 307, 310, 311- 
315,  319,  320,  322,  345-46,  351, 
374,  478 

Hazel  River,  106 

Hazel  Run,  167-69, 191,  194,  205,  207, 
211,  220-24,  227-30,  233 

Hazelwood,  184 

Hedgeman's  River,  108 

Hedgesville,  284 

Heidlersburg,  263-64,  266-68 

Heintzelman,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  32, 
131 

Herbert,  Colonel,  241,  243,  251 

Heth,  General,  236,  352-54,  356,  358, 
363 

Higginbotham,  Major  J.  C.,  125 

Highland  County,  459 

Hill,  Colonel,  24 

Hill,  General  A.  P.,  76-77,  86,  93,  98, 
99,  100,  102-03,  119,123-29,  133, 
135-39, 150, 155, 158, 162-64, 166, 
170-72, 176, 179, 188, 195,  211-17, 
236-37, 253, 263, 266, 269, 270-71, 
273, 275, 278, 281-83, 285, 302-04, 
307,  316,  322,  324,  326,  343-44, 
351-52,  358-59,  363-64,  371,  403 

Hill,  General  D.  H.,  62-65,  67,  69,  71, 
76.  78,  79,  81,  82,  86,  87, 132, 139, 
140,149, 151, 154-56, 158-59, 163- 
66, 171, 175, 177-79, 185,  187-88, 
192,  194,  236,  374-75,  473,  477 

Hillsboro,  396 

Hilltown,  256 

Hinson's  Mill,  114 

Hobson,  Lieutenant,  388 

Hodges,  Colonel,  149,  153 

Hoffman,  Colonel,  347 

Hoke,  General,  47,  71,  171,  174-79, 
185-86, 188,  190,  205-06,  221-22, 
226-234,  239,  242,  244,  247-48, 
250, 253, 259, 267-68, 273-74, 276, 
302,  311,  341,  345,  359,  360,  478 


Holman,  Captain,  47 

Holmes,  General,  15,  31,  33,  36,  51, 

76,  86,  133 
Hood,  General  J.  B.,  105,  123,  132, 

140,  141,  143-46,   149-151,  155, 

158, 163, 170, 176, 185-86, 191-92, 

236,  342,  403 
Hooker,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  117,  151, 

158, 181, 189, 196-97, 200-01,211, 

213,    21S,  231-34,  236-37,  253, 

266,  277,  285 
Hop  Yard,  166 
Hotchkiss,  Major  J.,  340,438-39,440, 

442 
Howard,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  148,  266 
Howe,  General  A.  P.  (U.  S.  A.),  198, 

231-32 
Howison  House,  207 
Huger,  General,  76,  83,  84,  86,  87,  105 
Hughes'  Cross- Roads,  361 
Hundley's  Corner,  361,  362,  363 
Hunter,  Andrew,  401,  478 
Hunter,  Colonel,  32 
Hunter,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  32,  37,  40, 

364, 370-72, 375-76, 378-382, 391, 

393,  396,  399,  401-02,  415,  417, 

455,  465,  475-76 
Hunterstown,  258,  264,  266 
Hupp's  Battalion,  244 

Imboden,  General,  191,  326-29,  333- 
34,  339,  369,  370,  374,  376,  378, 
381-82,  386,  389,  391,  398,  402, 
406,  416,  423 

Jackson,  Colonel  Wm.  L.,  328-331, 
381,  389,  397,  399,  402-03,  416, 
421 

Jackson,  General  T.  J.,  10,  11,  31,  32, 
37, 43,51,74-79,  84,  86-90,92-94, 
97-109,  111,  112,  114-16,  119, 
120, 122-27, 129, 131-32, 134-145, 
149, 151, 153, 155-56, 158, 162-66, 
170-72,  174,  177-78,  180-81,  183, 
187-88,  190,  194-97,  212-217, 
234-236,  241,  285,  297,  301,  361, 
368,  403,  431 

Jackson's  River,  327-28,  340,  369 

Jackson's  River  Depot,  328 

Jackson's  River  Valley,  330 

Jacob's  Ford,  317 


488 


INDEX 


James  River,  57,  58,  63,  65,  73,  77,  86, 

92,  104,  105, 132, 160, 191,236-37, 

342-43,  364,  369,  376,  465 
Jarman's  Gap,  464 
Jefferson,  113,  386 

Jefferson  County,  366,  369,  401,  461 
Jenkins,  General,  156,  251,  254,  263 
Jerrett,  Colonel  George,  3 
Johnson,  Captain  Elliot,  263 
Johnson,  General  B.  T.,  78,  381,  384, 

386,  392,  394,  401,  405,  407,  410, 

416,  421 
Johnson,  General  Edw.,  236-240,  243, 

249,   250,  252-55,   263,    270-73, 

275-76,  278,  281,  284,  304,  306, 

307, 318-23, 325, 345-47, 349, 351, 

355,  359 
Johnson's  Battery,  122,  123 
Johnson's  Cavalry,  385 
Johnston,  Colonel  Wm.  P.,  473,  476 
Johnston,  General  Jos.  E.,  2,  10,  11, 

13,  15,  16,  21,  22,  27,  29,  31,  33, 

34-36,  38,  41,  43-44,  51-52,  54- 

55,  58,  62-63,  65,  74,  468,  475 
Johnston,  General  R.  D.,  345,  348-49, 

350-51,  359 
Jones'  Battalion,  267,  304,  374-75 
Jones'  Brigade,  346,  381 
Jones,  Colonel,  26 
Jones,  Colonel  Hilary  P.,  238-39,  241, 

247-48,  253-54 
Jones,  General  D.  R.,  3-7,  15-19,  31, 

33,  58,  76,  105,  132,  140,  147,  151, 

163 
Jones,  General  J.  R.,  140-41, 143, 155, 

163,  186,  191,  236,  382 
Jones,  General  Saml.,  331 
Jones,  General  W.  E.,  370 
Jones,  Lieutenant  Colonel  J.  M.,  236, 

322 
Jordan  Springs,  414 
Junction,   12,  36,  49,  53-54,  114-15, 

117-18,  133,  135,  167,  258,  359, 

387 

Kanawha  River,  378 
Kanawha  Valley,  114,  158,  475 
Kearney,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  49,  131 
Kearneysville,  163,  383,  409 
Keller,  Captain,  407 
Kelley's  Ford,  192,  307,  316 


, 


Kelly,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  75,  338 

404,  461 
Kemper,  General  J.  L.,  5,  16,  17,  19, 

21-25,  28 
Kentucky,  52,  157 
Kentucky  Military  Institute,  477 
Kernstown,  240-42,  368,  398-99,  408, 

426,  475 
Kershaw,  General,  27-28,  33,  41,  52, 

54, 57, 59, 81, 82, 139, 407-09, 411- 

413,  433-35,  437, 441-49, 452, 454 
Kettle  Run,  115,  304-06 

Kettle  Run  Bridge,  305 
Keyes,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  132 
Kilmer,  G.  L.,  476 
Kilpatrick  (U.  S.  A.),  340 
King,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  74,  122 
King,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  381,  388, 

414,  423-25,  427,  460 
Kirkland,  General,  353 
Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle,  353 


Lacy's  Springs,  326,  457 

Lamar,  Colonel,  153,  180,  388 

Lancaster,  261 

Lane's  Brigade,  171,  173,  199,  274, 
355-56 

Langhorne,  Colonel  D.  A.,  2,  3 

Langster's  Cross-Roads,  47,  50 

Latimer,  Captain  J.  W.,  176, 179, 186, 
199,  200,  205-06 

Lawton,  Captain  E.  P.,  175,  180 

Lawton,  General,  75,103,106-08,111, 
112, 115-17, 119-124, 126-27, 129, 
136-37, 139, 140-44,  152-53, 155, 
158,  162,  171,  174-75,  177,  179, 
180,  187-88,  190,  192 

Lee,  Captain,  216 

Lee,  Edmund  I.,  401,  478 

Lee,  General  Fitz.,  153,  192,  303,  318, 
320-21,  325-26,  328-30,  332-34, 
337, 407-09, 411, 413-14, 416, 421, 
423,  424-25,  427,  429,  433,  435, 
459 

Lee,  General  R.  E.,  1.  5-7,  74,  76-77, 
85,  88-90,  92,  104,  105,  114,  119, 
125,  131-33, 139, 154-57, 160-61, 
164,169, 180, 181-83, 196-97, 200- 
01,  203,  211,  217-18,  220,  227-28, 
282,  284,  288,  290,  297,  301,  303, 
305,  307,   309-11,   313-14,  315, 


INDEX 


489 


317, 319-20, 322. 324, 326-27, 329, 
332,  339-40,  343-44,347^8,351- 
56, 358,  360-64, 370-71, 380,  382- 
383,  385,  394,  403,  407,  411,  435, 
453,  454-57,  459-61,  465-69,  473, 
475 

Lee,  General  Wm.  H.  F.,  184,  476 

Lee's  Hill,  169,  197-200,  204,  208-11, 
219-21,  223-24,  231-33 

Leesburg,  3,  43,  47,  134,  371,  394,  396 

Leetown,  383,  384,  409,  410 

Leitersburg,  281 

Leroy,  Lieutenant,  126 

Letqher,  Governor,  1,  380 

Lewis,  General,  397 

Lewis  House,  20,  29 

Lewis,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  359 

Lewis,  Major,  124,  130 

Lewis'  Brigade,  384,  386 

Lewisburg,  370,  377-79 

Lexington,  327-29,  360  374-75,  379- 
380,  473-74,  476 

Liberty,  374-76,  378 

Liberty  Mills,  92,  93,  102,  285 

Lilly,  General  R.  D.,  100,  126,  397 

Lincoln,  President  A.,  58,  218,  287, 
290 

Little  Calf  Pasture,  327,  328 

Little  North  Mountain,  368,  407,  429, 
430 

Little  River  Pike,  129 

Little  Washington,  238 

Locust  Grove,  318-22,  324,  325,  345 

Lomax,  General  L.,  407-08,  411,  413- 
14,  416,  419,  421-24,  426,  427-30, 
433-34,  436,  441,  446,  450,  451, 
453-54,  457-58,  461-62,  465-66 

Long  Bridge,  42,  88 

Long,  General  A.  L.,  371,  460, 463, 465 

Longstreet,  General  J.,  3-10,  12,  15- 
19, 31, 33, 47-48, 51, 56,  63,  66-71, 
76-77,  86-90,  105-06,  119,  123, 
125-27,  132, 134, 135, 140, 151-53, 
155-56, 158, 163-66, 169,  170, 176, 
180,  191,  196,  211,  236-37,  253, 
263,  272-73,  275,  281,  283,  285, 
302-03,  342,  343,  353,  360,  362, 
363 

Lost  River,  334,  339 

Loudoun  County,  3,  5,  45,  134,  284, 
371,  383,  394,  396 


Loudoun  Heights,  135-136,  137 
Loudoun  &  Hampshire  R.  R.,  134 
Louisa  Court-House,  353, 355, 371, 465 
Louisiana  Troops,  3,  5-8,  15,  16,  78, 
79,  96,  103,  107,  116-18,  124-25, 
130,  139,  142,  188,  193,  203,  207, 
210,  307,  313,  351,  385,  409 
Lowe,  Major,  152 
Lowe,  Professor,  49,  89,  202 
Lupton's,  244,  245 
Luray  Valley,  75,  284,  367,  369,  407, 

429,  433,  436,  450,  457 
Lynchburg,  1-3,  54,  73,  75,  104,  328- 
329, 369, 371, 372, 375-76, 378-82, 
393,  400,  455-56,  460-61,  464, 
465-66,  475 


Madison  County,  93 

Madison  Court-House,  92,  94,  165, 
284-85,  303,  343 

Magruder,  General,  5,  7,  58-9,  61,  63, 
65-66,  76-77,  79,  81,  86,  87,  133 

Mahone,  General  Wm.,  83,  352-58 

Main  Valley,  367 

Malvern  Hill,  77-79,  81,  83,  85 

Manassas,  2-5,  15,  20,  22,  29,  30-32, 
35,  45,  47,  56,  75,  90,  114-19, 
122-23,  132-34,  154,  163,  190, 
293,  300,  304,  306,  308,  403 

Manassas  Gap,  284,  285,  286 

Manassas  Gap  R.  R.,  10,  20,  31,  36, 
54,  165,  368,  453,  454 

Manassas  Junction,  368 

Mansfield,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  44,  145, 
148,  151,  158,  404 

Marion,  466 

Marshall,  454,  473 

Martinsburg,  135-36, 153, 162-63, 240, 
250-51,  283-84,  326,  332,  338, 
368-69,  382-84,  391, 397,  400-03, 
408-10,  412-14,  419,  420,  423-25 

Marye's  Heights.  169,  197,  199,  204, 
205,  207,  208,  209,  217,  219,  220, 
222-23-24,  231,  234 

Marye's  House,  204 

Maryland,  45-46,  51,  54,  78,  98,  132, 
134,  157,  159,  160,  161,  164,  185- 
186,  241,  243-44,  367,  369,  371, 
380-81, 384, 402-03, 409,  414, 416, 
455,  461 


490 


INDEX 


Maryland  Heights,  135-36-37-38, 154, 
164,  176,  254,  284,  333,  365,  368, 
385-86-87,  389,  391,  394,  400, 
403,  408,  414 

Mason's  Hill,  48,  49,  50 

Massanutten  Mountain,  165,  366-67, 
407,  431,  438,  457 

Massaponix,  167-68-69,  171,  183, 
188,  191,  194,  195,  197,  199 

Massie,  Captain,  433 

Matadaquean,  363,  364 

Matapony,  357 

Matthews'  House,  26,  27,  334,  339 

Mayo,  Colonel,  356 

McCausland,  General,  374-75-76, 
378,  381,  383,  385-86-87,  389, 
391,  396,  401-02,  404,  407,  409- 
10, 416, 423, 434, 453, 454, 456, 466 

McClanahan's  Battery,  333-34-35 

McClellan,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  44,  48, 
50,  51,  54,  58,  64,  66,  72,  74,  75, 
85,  87-92,  104,  105,  114, 131-32- 
33,  140,  148,  150,  154-159,  161, 
163-64-65,  361,  404 

McDonald,  Lieutenant  (A.  A.G.),  24, 
25 

McDowell,  326 

McDowell,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  2,  10, 
13,  28,  31,  33,  36,  38-42,  44,  46, 
48,  74,  75,  92,  103,  119,  122 

McGowan's  Brigade,  355 

McGuire,  Surgeon  H,  215,  217,  464, 
473,  476 

McLaws,  General,  60, 76, 132-33, 135- 
36-37,  147,  149,  152,  154-55, 
158,  163,  194-95,  197,  211-12, 
216,  218,  220,  225-26-27,  230-31, 
233,  236,  342 

McLean's  Farm,  6,  12,  16 

McLean's  Ford,  5,  15,  17,  18,  20,  31, 
52,  53 

McLean's  House,  6,  7,  10,  16 

McNeil,  Captain,  333-34-35,  337-38, 
460 

McNeil,  Lieutenant  Jesse,  461 

MeRae,  General,  47,  60,  62,  70-71-72 

Meade,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  267,  271, 
275-76-77,  282,  284,  285,  297, 
302-03-04-05,  307,  317, 318,324- 
325,  341,  343,  47S 

Mechanicsville,  76,  361,  362 


Meem's  Bottom,  454 

Merritt's  Division  (U.  S.  A.),  457 

Merry  Oaks,  361 

Middle  Department,  418,  419 

Middle  Military  Division,  344,  417, 

418 
Middle  Mountain,  331 
Middle  River,  366,  368 
Middle  Road,  369,  433,  436 
Middletown,  75, 135,  264,  266,  368-69, 

386,  397-98,  414,  444,  446,  447, 

453 
Miles'  Division  (U.  S.  A.),  31,  44,  137 
Milford,  117,  433,  436,  450,  453 
Military  Institute,  374,  3S0 
Millboro,  330,  461 
Mills'  Gap,  284 
Millwood,   164,   240,   397,   406,  420, 

423,  429 
Milroy,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  40,  101, 

240,  244-46,  250-51,  475 
Mine  Run,  317-19,  321-23,  325-26, 

343,  345 
Mississippi  Troops,  3,  15,  19,  60-61, 

63,  67,  69,  204,  208,  234,  236,  466 
Missouri,  158,  460 
Mitchell's  Ford,  5,  7,  9,  15,  19,  20, 

27-28,  31,  35,  60,  61 
Monaghan,  Colonel,  193,  207,  409 
Monocacy,  135,  186,  387-88,  391-92- 

93,  395,  417,  475 
Monocacy  Junction,  386,  402 
Monterey  Springs,  281 
Montgomery  County,  327,  479 
Montreal,  Canada,  473 
Moore,  Captain,  465 
Moore,  Lieutenant,  311 
Moorefield,  334-339,  404,  416 
Moorefield  Valley,  334 
Morrison,  Lieutenant,  177,  216,  477 
Morton's  Ford,  302,  317,  320-21,  325 
Mosby,  Colonel  Jno.  S.,  382-83,  391 
Moss  Neck,  192 
Mott,  Colonel,  60 
Mount  Crawford,  331,  368-69,  435, 

462 
Mount    Jackson,    333-34,   339,   366, 

368-69,   398,  404,   432-33,  450, 

454,  461 
Mount  Meridian,  366,  434 
Mount  Sydney,  36S,  435 


INDEX 


491 


Mountain  Run,  317,  318 
Mulligan,  Colonel  (U.  S.  A.),  384,  400 
Mummasburg,  256-57-58, 264, 266-67 
Munford,  General  T.  T.,  454,  457-58 
Munson's  Hill,  48 

Narrow  Passage,  430 

National  Military  Home,  479 

Navy  Yard,  1 

Nelson's  Battalion,  371,  388,  413, 
421-22-23,  460,  462 

New  Chester,  258 

New  Creek,  75,  326,  333,  335,  405, 
455,  456 

New  Hope,  434 

New  Jersey  Regiment,  48,  49 

New  London,  374,  476 

New  Market,  165,  284,  331-32,  366- 
367-68,  370,  383,  397,  415,  433, 
436,  450,  454,  457,  459,  460,  466 

New  Market  Gap,  433 

New  Orleans,  393 

New  River,  467 

New  York,  476 

Newton's  Division,  207 

Newtown,  240-41,  368,  382-83,  397- 
98,  406,  414,  426,  453 

Nichols,  General,  328,  329 

Ninevah,  241 

North  Anna,  359,  361,  465 

North  Branch,  368 

North  Carolina  Regiments,  15,  32,  38, 
47-48,  60,  62,  69,  70-71,  104,  132, 
158,  185-86,  188,  193,  230,  236, 
242,  244,  247,  249,  253,  274,  282, 
302,  312,  341,  345,  467-68 

North  Fork,  335-36,  366-67-68-69, 
407,  431-32,  439 

North  Mountain,  136,  163,  368,  383- 
384,  414 

North  River,  331,  366,  368,  435,  462 

Northern  Central  R.  R.,  255,  258 

Northwestern  Virginia,  191,  368 

Ny  River,  354,  357-58 

Occoquon  River,  3,  4,  5,  10,  47 

Ohio  River,  368,  391,  479 

Old  Church,  361-62-63 

Old  Court-House,  353 

Old  Stone  Pike,  344,  346 

Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  344,  346 


Opequon  River,  136,  162,  367-68-69, 

384,  406,  408,  410,  412-14,  419- 

21,  423-24,  428 
Orange  County,  327,  343 
Orange  Court-House,  56,  59,  92-93, 

106,  165,  168,  285,  318,  326,  340, 

344,  351 
Orange  &  Alexandria  R.  R.,  106,  114, 

368 
Orkney  Springs,  333,  334 
Orleans,  114 
Ox  Hill,  129,  131-32-33 

Page  County,  366,  367 

Page,  Lieutenant,  444,  445 

Pamunkey  River,  357, 359, 361-62, 465 

Parkersburg,  368 

Parker's  Ford,  396 

Patterson,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  35 

Patterson's  Creek,  332-33-34,  337 

Patterson's  Mountain,  334 

Patton,  Colonel  G.  W.,  427 

Patton's  Brigade,  424,  425 

Paxton,  General,  175,  179 

Payne,  General  Wm.  H.,  416,  425, 

433-34,  440-41,  446, 453-54,  457, 

473 
Peaks  of  Otter,  375,  376,  377 
Pegram,  General,  306,  311,  314-15, 

345-46-47,  349/350,   359,   362, 

429,   430,   434,   438-39,   440-47, 

449,  452 
Pelham,  Major,  176 
Pender,  General,  217,  236,  270,  274 
Pendleton,  Captain,  94 
Pendleton,  Colonel  A.  S.,  217,  431 
Pendleton  County,  457,  459 
Pendleton,    General,    153,    162,    196, 

198-204,  207,  209-10 
Peninsular,  54,  57-58-59,  65 
Penn,  Colonel,  307,  309,  310 
Penn,  Major,  16,  203,  204 
Pennsylvania,  46,  131,  159,  164,  236, 

257,   259,   263,   264,   285-86-87, 

306,  367,  401-02,  409,  414,  455 
Perrin,  General,  355 
Perrin's  Brigade,  355 
Peters,  Professor  Wm.  E.,  473,  474 
Petersburg,  Pa.,  264 
Petersburg,   Va.,   341,    359,  465-66, 

474,  476 


492 


INDEX 


Petersburg,  Western  Virginia,  332-33, 

335-338 
Philadelphia,  255,  262,  386,  394 
Pickett,  General,  163,  236,  275,  342, 

360 
Piedmont,  165,  370,  374-75-76,  382, 

434 
Piedmont  Station,  11 
Pisgah  Church,  105,  285 
Pittsylvania  House,  26 
Pitser,  Major  A.  L.,   107,   187,  211, 

220,  226-27,  377 
Plank  Road,  167,  169,  182,  203-212, 

214,  216,  218,  220,  222-23,  225- 

233,  317-18,  320,  322,  324,  344. 

351-52 
Pleasant  Valley,  154 
Plymouth,  340 
Po  River,  353-54-55,  357 
Point  Lookout,  385-86,  390 
Pole  Green  Church,  361,  362 
Poolsville,  394 
Pope,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  40,  92,  102- 

106,  110,  112,  114-15,  117,  119, 

122,  131-32-33,  139 
Port  Conway,  185 
Port  Republic,  75,  139,  366,  369-70, 

432-33-34,  475 
Port  Royal,  166, 168, 179, 184-85, 189, 

477 
Port  Tobacco,  184 
Porter,    General     (U.    S.    A.),     131, 

152 
Posey,  General  C,  231,  233 
Potomac  District,  51 
Potomac  River,  4,  33,  40-41-42-43, 

45-46-47-48,    51,    91,    134-141, 

146,  152,  154-55,  157,  160,  237, 

253-55,   277,  281-82,  284,  297, 

326,  332,  366-69,  371,  380,  382- 

384,  386,  391-94,  398,  400-404, 

409,  415,  475 
Potts'  Mountain,  331 
Pound  Gap,  462 
Powell,  Captain,  444 
Powell  Fort  Valley,  367 
Powell's  Division  (U.  S.  A.),  454 
Pratt,  184,  193,  196,  200,  201 
Preston,  Colonel  R.  T.,  2 
Preston,  General  J.  S.,  21 
Prince,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  103 


Pritchard's  Hill,  241,  242 
Pughtown,  240,  244,  246 

Quaker  Church,  140,  374,  476 
Quincy,  254 

Raccoon  Ford,  106,  302 

Radford,  Colonel  R.  C.  W.,  24 

Radford,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  454 

Raines,  General,  61,  62,  64 

Ramseur,  General,  345-46,  361,  372, 
374,  376,  383-389  392,  396-97, 
399,  402,  406,  408,  413,  420-430, 
434,  440,  444-452,  456 

Randolph,  Captain,  W.  F.,  188,  322 

Randolph,  Secretary  General,  77 

Ransom,  General,  82,  149,  152,  156. 
375-77,  380,  384,  386,  399,  400 

Rapidan  River,  56,  92-93,  102,  105- 
106,  113,  196,  237,  285-86,  302, 
303,  343-45,  351,  364 

Rapidan  Station,  303,  306,  317,  326 

Rappahannock,  56.  63,  92,  102,  104, 
106,  131,  133,  154,  165,  166-67, 
196,  215,  217,  236,  285-86,  303, 
307,  343 

Rappahannock  Academy,  184 

Red  Bud  Run,  420,  423,  425 

Redoubts,  59-64,  66,  68 

Reno,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  106, 112, 131 

Reynolds,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  132, 
201,  266 

Richardson,  Capt.  H.,  187 

Richardson,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  149, 
151 

Richardson,  Lieutenant,  7 

Richmond,  Va.,  1,  3, 10,  44,  46,  51,  56, 
57,  73-77,  85,  88-92,  103-04-05, 
132-33.  154,  160,  164,  168,  190, 
235,  237,  251,  286,  327,  340-41, 
344,  358-59,  361,  369,  371,  375, 
380,  382,  429,  435,  456,  458-59, 
465-66,  476 

R.,  Fred.  &  Po.  R.  R.,  166,  168,  359, 
361,  465 

Rich  Patch  Mountain,  331 

Ricketts  Division  (U.  S.  A.),  388,  391 

Ridge  Road,  65 

Ridgeville,  254 

Ringgold,  254 

Ripley,  General,  15S 


INDEX 


Rivanna  River,  464 

River  Road,  168,  180,  194,  202-03- 
204-05 

Robertson,  General  B.  H.,  93,  94,  103, 
110 

Robertson's  Tavern,  318,  319 

Robinson's  River,  93,  295,  303,  343 

Rockbridge  County,  328,  340,  366, 
369,  381,  462 

Rock  Creek,  267,  268,  270,  271,  380 

Rock-fish  Gap,  369,  371-72,  382, 
434-35,  462-63 

Rockingham  County,  366 

Rockville,  389,  394,  417 

Rodes,  General  R.  E.,  51,  52,  54,  57, 
60-65,  192-195,  212-217,  236- 
240,  251,  254-55,  263-64,  266- 
276,  281,  284,  302-307,  316-322, 
344-48,  351,  360-63,  372,  377, 
383-87,  390,  392,  394,  396,  398- 
399,  402,  408,  410-13,  419-23, 
427,  429 

Rogers,  Captain  J.  G.,  81 

Rohrersville,  385 

Romney,  240,  244,  247,  249 

Rosecrans,  General  (U.S.A.),  303,476 

Ross  Pole,  477 

Rosser,  General  T.  L.,  334-339,  435- 
436,  438,  441,  443,  446,  447,  450- 
462,  466 

Round  Hill,  440 

Round  Top  Mountain,  272 

Rude's  Hill,  432,  454 

Salem,  114,  327-29,  331,  377,  379,  382, 

393 
Salem  Church,  218,  233 
Santa  Anna,  471 
Savage  Station,  77,  87 
Savannah,  190 
Scales,  General,  355 
School  House  Hill,  136,  137 
Scott,  Captain  John,  4,  6 
Scott,  Colonel,  93,  180 
Scott,  General,  1,  38,  39,  42 
Secret  Service  Corps,  88,  89 
Sedgwick,  General  (U.  S.  A.),   148, 

151,  197,  201,  203-04,  207,  214, 

217-220,  228,  231,  233-34,  281, 

309,  321,  360 
Seminary  Hill,  270,  276 


Semmes,  General,  147 
Seven  Pines,  74 
Seventh  Street  Pike,  389 
Seymour,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  350 
Shady  Grove,  351-355 
Shaler,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  350 
Sharpsburg,  139,  140,  153,  157,  162, 

186,  190,  192,  254,  391,  403 
Shenandoah,  10,  74,  136-37,  160,  164- 

165,  237,  239,  240,  284,  295,  332, 

343,  366-369,  371,  396,  407,  414, 

439,  455,  476 
Shepherdstown,    139,     162,    253-54, 

284,  408-09-10 
Sheridan,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  40,  371, 

379,  406-411,  414,  419,  427,  430, 

433,  437,  441,  452-53,  456,  459, 

461,  465-66,  475 
Sherman,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  40,  393 
Shields,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  241,  399, 

475 
Shippensburg,  263,  270 
Sigel,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  102-03,  112, 

158,  369,   370,   383-84,  393-94, 

396,  399 
Silver  Spring,  389,  395 
Skinner,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  80 
Slaughter's  Mountain,  93,  94,  96,  97, 

101 
Sloan's  Regiment,  31 
Smith,  Captain,  20 
Smith,  Colonel  Geo.  H.,  49,  386,  389 
Smith,  Colonel  W.  D.,  50,  193, 333,  423 
Smith,  Colonel  Wm,  32,   106,   120, 

125-26-27,  142,  147,  153 
Smith,  General  E.  K.,  33,  36,  38,  51, 

52,  157,  468 
Smith,  General  G.  W.,  51,  56,  58,  63 
Smith,  General  Wm.,  186,  188,  191, 

206,  221-22,  224-228,  230,  232- 

234,  239,  242-43,  247-48-49,  253, 

259,  267-272,  273,  275 
Smith,  Governor  of  Virginia,  306 
Smithfield,  383,  408,  410,  414 
Smithtown,  254 
Smyth  e  County,  466 
Snicker's  Ferry,  396 
Snicker's  Gap,  164,  396 
Snodgrass,  Major  C.  E.,  187 
Soldiers'  Home,  391 
Somerville  Ford,  106,  237,  302 


494 


INDEX 


South  Anna,  351,  361,  465 

South  Branch,  239,  327,  322-24,  337, 

368,  386,  398,  404 
South  Carolina,  3,  5,  15,  28,  132,  468 
South  Fork,  334,  338,  366-67,  433 
South  Mountain,  135,  139,  152,  161, 

254-55-56,  263,  280-81,  367,  385, 

392-93-94 
South  River,  366,  433,  434 
Southside  R.  R.,  465 
Southwestern  Virginia,  331,  378,  381, 

397,  416,  429,  453,  466,  469 
Sperryville,  238,  285 
Spottsylvania,  200,  237,  344,  351-354, 

358-360,  374 
Springfield,  50 
Squires,  Lieutenant,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9,  204, 

208 
Stafford,    Colonel,    142-43,    146-47, 

149,  403-04 
Stafford  Heights,  167,  169,  178,  181, 

191,  198,  200,  224 
Stansbury  Hill,  169,  222-23 
Stanton,   Secretary  of  War,   74,   75, 

343-44,  392-93,  417 
Starke,    General,    103,   120-21,   129- 

131,  140-42-43 
Staunton,  251,  253,  285,  326,  328-29, 

331,  340,  359,  368,  369-372,  375, 

379,    381-82,    434-35,    457-58, 

461,  462-63 
St.  James  Church,  106 
St.  James  College,  402 
Stephenson's    Depot,     250-51,    397, 

399,  410-414,  419,  420-21,  424 
Stevens,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  131 
Stevens,  Thaddeus,  255,  256 
Stevensburg,  106 
Stewart,  General  G.  H.,  372 
Stone  Bridge,  5,  16,  26-28,  31-32,  35, 

50,  119,  164,  165 
Stone  Tavern,  26,  29 
Stonewall  Brigade,  163,  237,  322 
Stony  Creek,  450 
Stop-Cock,  184 
Strasburg,   165,  326,  331,  333,  366, 

368-69,  397-98-99,  406-07,  437, 

440-41-42,  449 
Strong,  Colonel,  126,  130 
Stuart,   General  J.  E.  B.,  13,  22-23, 

25-26,  33,  36,  38,  52,  66  68,  76, 


101,  105-06,  110,  114-15,  118, 
132,  141,  144  148,  156,  164,  171, 
176,  180,  192,  196,  213-16,  273, 
285,  302-03-04 

Sturgis,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  131 

Sudley,  22,  29,  32,  119,  129 

Summit  Point,  408-09-10,  412-414 

Sumner,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  132,  148- 
149,  151,  158-59,  180,  182,  403 

Sumter,  Fort,  1 

Susquehanna,  255,  259,  261,  264 

Sweet  Springs,  327,  331 

Swift  Run  Gap,  328,  367,  371,  434 

Tabernacle  Church,  211 

Taliaferro,    General,    106,    119,    120, 

171,  175,  179 
Tanner,  186,  258 
Taverner,  Colonel,  388 
Taylor,  Colonel,  60 
Taylor,  General,  78,  107 
Taylor,  John,  184 
Taylor's  Hill,  169,  222-23,  225,  228 
Taylor's  House,  208,  226,  228-230, 

232 
Telegraph  Road,  167-68-69, 182,  202- 

203,  208.  210,  221,  223,  229,  230, 

233 
Tennessee,  52,  342,  466 
Tenth  Legion,  433 
Terrill,  Colonel,  349,  362 
Terrill,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  194,  250 
Terry,  Colonel,  62,  72 
Terry,  Lieutenant,  94 
Texas,  468 
The  Fort,  367 

Thoburn,  Colonel  (U.  S.  A.),  327 
Thomas,  Colonel,  99,  124 
Thomas,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  98,  100, 

155,    174,    326,    329-334,    336, 

337-38-39,   355-56-57-58,    466, 

467 
Thornton,  Captain  Wm.,  187 
Thornton,  W.  W.,  4,  47,  50 
Thornton's  Gap,  284,  285 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  114,  125 
Three  Springs,  134 
Three  Top  Mountain,  407 
Todd's  Tavern,  352 
Tom's  Brook,  436 
Toombs,  General,  81 


INDEX 


495 


Torbert,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  408,  417, 
433,  434 

Tottopotomoy,  362 

Trans-Mississippi  Department,  52, 468 

Treasury  Department,  476 

Trimble,  General,  78,  79,  82,  106,  115, 
119,  120-21,  123,  125,  129,  131, 
136,  139,  141,  143,  152,  158,  162, 
171,  176,  185,  188,  191,  212,  236 

Tunis,  Lieutenant,  197,  198 

Tunker  Church,  403 

Trevillian's,  379 

Tyler,  Colonel,  49 

Tyler's  Division  (U.  S.  A.),  10,  31,  32, 
35,  39,  49 

Union  Mills,  5,  6,  12,  13,  15,  31,  50 
University  of  Virginia,  474 
Upper  Valley,  369 

Valley  District,  51 

Valley  of  Virginia,  285,  326-27,  333, 
366, 370-71,  380-83,  391,  393-94, 

396,  398,  401,  413-17,  424,  429, 
435-37,  452-53,  456-58-59-60- 
461,  466,  468 

Valley  Pike,  240-243,  284-85,  334, 
367-68-69,  390,  397,  406,  414, 
420,  430-433,  435,  436,  439,  441- 
446,  453 

Van  Dorn,  General,  50,  51,  52 

Vaughan,  General,  370,  381,  396-97, 
402,  406,  410,  416 

Verdierville,  237,  317-319,  320,  322 

Veteran  Reserves,  393 

Vicksburg,  287 

Vienna,  134 

Virginia  Troops,  1-9,  12,  15,  16,  24, 
26,  28, 32,  38,  41,  47, 48, 62-63, 67, 
69,  70-72,  78,  80,  81,  93,  95,  99, 
100,  106, 109,  116,  117,  118,  120, 
122,  125-26-27,  130-31, 142, 147- 
148,  153,  174,  186,  194,  195,  226, 
236-37,  240,  250,  253-54,  282, 
284,  311,  346-47,  349,  362,  388, 

397.  459,  465 

Virginia  &  Tennessee  R.  R.,  327,  369, 
467 

Wade,  M.  C,  U.  S.,  30 
Waite's  Shop,  353 


Walker,  Colonel  J.  A.,  78,  84,  95,  99, 
100,  109,  111,  122  123,  131, 
133 

Walker,  General  H.  H.,  326,  354 

Walker,  General  J.  A.,  135,  136,  143, 
149,  155,  158-59,  170-177,  179, 
236,  240,  331-334,  352-53 

Walker's  Brigade,  356,  363 

Walker's  Division,  152 

Wallace,  General  Lew  (U.  S.  A.), 
387-88,  392-93 

Ward,  Colonel,  60,  61,  62,  69,  73 

Warren  County,  366-367 

Warren,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  304,  305, 
347 

Warrenton,  31,  109-10,  165,  285,  304, 
307,  479 

Warrenton  Junction,  114,  115,  116, 
307 

Warrenton  Pike,  5,  25,  26,  31-32-33, 
37,  114-15,  119,  120-22-23 

Warrenton  Springs,  106-110 

Warwick  Court-House,  61 

Warwick  River,  58,  59,  60,  61,  65 

Washington  Artillery,  5,  6,  7,  8,  204 

Washington  College,  380 

Washington,  D.  C,  2,  34,  40-46,  48, 
51,  54,  75,  89,  104,  105,  131,  135, 
157,  160-61,  253,  263,  344,  358, 
360,  371,  383,  385,  386,  389,  390- 
394,  398,  401,  416-17,  455,  475 

Waterloo  Bridge,  108,  109,  110,  114 

Watkins,  Colonel,  114 

Watson,  198 

Waynesboro,  Pa.,  254,  281,  370-71- 
372,  381,  434-35,  460,  468 

Waynesboro,  Va.,  366,  369,  464-66, 
474 

Weiglestown,  259,  263 

Weisiger,  General  D.  A.,  356 

Welbourn,  Captain,  212,  460 

Wellford's  Mill,  106 

Wells,  Colonel,  (U.  S.  A.),  326,  437 

Westover,  88 

Western  Virginia,  75 

Wharton,  General  G.  C,  188,  253, 
375,  399,  414-15,  423-27,  429-30, 
434,  441-443,  445-47,  449,  452, 
457-58,  460,  462-64 

Wheat's  Battalion,  3,  31 

Wheeling,  368 


496 


INDEX 


White,  Captain  Elijah,  134,  255-58, 

261,  263-64,  280 
White,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  136,  137 
White  House,  361,  465 
White  Oak  Swamp,  77 
White  Plains,  54,  114 
White  Post,  167,  397,  406,  411,  414 
White's  Ford,  43,  134,  137 
Whiting,  General  W.  H.,  74-76,  78-79, 

86,  88,  105 
Whittle,  Colonel,  67,  72 
Whitworth,  198 
Wickham,  General  W.  C,  416,  424- 

425-26,  429, 433-34-35,  441,  454, 

457 
Wilcox,  General,  58,  60-61,  208-09, 

212,  218,  352,  354,  355,  358 
Wilderness,  346,  350-51,  359,  363 
Wilderness  Tavern,  318 
Williams,  Colonel,  5,  8 
Williams,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  148 
Williamsburg,  65-68,  70,  71,  73 
Williamsport,  135,  162,  281-83,  369, 

383,  400,  402-03.  409 
Willis'  Church,  79 
Willis,  Colonel  Ed.,  362 
Willis,  Lieutenant  Murat,  28 
Wilson's  Division  (U.  S.  A.),  408-09, 

417 
Wilson,  Major  J.  P.,  144,  150,  187 
Winchester,  163,  240-41,  243-44,  249- 

253,  284, 333-34, 367-70, 382,  385, 


391,  397-400,  406,  408,  410,  412- 
414,  417,  419-20,  425-26,  435, 
439,  450-453,  455,  457,  475 

Winchester  &  Potomac  R.  R.,  163, 
368,  414 

Winder,  General,  94,  95,  96,  97 

Winston,  Captain,  148 

Winston,  Colonel,  60 

Wirz,  Captain,  296,  297,  298 

Wise,  General,  76,  132 

Woffard's  Brigade,  444,  446,  449 

Wolf  Run  Shoals,  10,  47,  48,  50 

Woodson's  Company,  460,  461 

Woodstock,  368,  430,  454 

Wounding  of  Jackson,  212 

Wright,  General,  83,  231,  233,  255,257 

Wright,  General  (U.  S.  A.),  392,  393 

Wrightsville  235,  255,  259,  260-61- 
262-63-64 

Wynn,  Captain,  215 

Wynn's  Mill,  60,  61,  62,  63 

Wytheville,  466,  467 

Yates'  Ford,  12,  13 

York,  253,  255,  258-64,  267 

York,  General,  423 

York  River,  57-58-59,  65 

York  River  R.  R.,  77 

York  Road,  269-71,  273,  357 

Young's  Branch,  26 

Zoar  Church,  31S-20,  322-23-24 


<o 


